CHAPTER I

WELLESLEY AT ABRANTES: VICTOR EVACUATES ESTREMADURA

When Wellesley’s columns, faint but pursuing, received the orders which bade them halt at Ruivaens and Montalegre, their commander was already planning out the details of their return-march to the Tagus. From the first moment of his setting forth from Lisbon, he had looked upon the expedition against Soult as no more than a necessary preliminary to the more important expedition against Victor. He would have preferred, as we have already seen[538], to have directed his first blow against the French army in Estremadura, and had only been induced to begin his campaign by the attack upon Soult because he saw the political necessity for delivering Oporto. His original intention had been no more than to manœuvre the 2nd Corps out of Portugal. But, owing to the faulty dispositions of the Duke of Dalmatia, he had been able to accomplish much more than this--he had beaten the Marshal, stripped him of his artillery and equipment, destroyed a sixth of his army, and flung him back into Galicia by a rugged and impracticable road, which took him far from his natural base of operations. He had done much more than he had hoped or promised to do when he set out from Lisbon. Yet these ‘uncovenanted mercies’ did not distract him from his original plan: his main object was not the destruction of Soult, but the clearing of the whole frontier of Portugal from the danger of invasion, and this could not be accomplished till Victor had been dealt with. The necessity for a prompt movement against the 1st Corps was emphasized by the news, received on May 19 at Montalegre, that its commander was already astir, and apparently about to assume the offensive. Mackenzie reported from Abrantes, with some signs of dismay, that a strong French column had just fallen upon Alcantara, and driven from it the small Portuguese detachment which was covering his front.

[538] See p. 292.

Accordingly Wellesley turned the march of his whole army southward, the very moment that he discovered that the 2nd Corps had not fallen into the trap set for it at Chaves and Ruivaens. He had resolved to leave nothing but the local levies of Silveira and Botilho to watch Galicia, and to protect the provinces north of the Douro. ‘Soult,’ he wrote, ‘will be very little formidable to any body of troops for some time to come.’ He imagined--and quite correctly--that the Galician guerrillas and the army of La Romana would suffice to find him occupation. He did not, however, realize that it was possible that not only Soult but Ney also would be so much harassed by the insurgents, and would fall into such bitter strife with each other, that they might ere long evacuate Galicia altogether. This, indeed, could not have been foreseen at the moment when the British turned southwards from Montalegre. If Wellesley could have guessed that by July 1 the three French Corps in Northern Spain--the 2nd, 5th, and 6th--would all be clear of the mountains and concentrated in the triangle Astorga-Zamora-Valladolid, he would have had to recast his plan of operations. But on May 19 such a conjunction appeared most improbable, and the British general could not have deemed it likely that a French army of 55,000 men, available for field-operations, would be collected on the central Douro, at the moment when he had committed himself to operations on the Tagus. Indeed, for some weeks after he had departed from Oporto the information from the north made any such concentration appear improbable. While he was on his march to the south he began to hear of the details of Ney’s and Kellermann’s expedition against the Asturias, news which he received with complacency[539], as it showed that the French were entangling themselves in new and hazardous enterprises which would make it more difficult than ever for them to collect a force opposite the frontier of Northern Portugal. Down to the very end of June Wellesley had no reason to dread any concentration of French troops upon his flank in the valley of the Douro. It was only in the following month that Soult was heard of at Puebla de Senabria and Ney at Astorga. By that time the British army had already crossed the frontier of Spain and commenced its operations against Victor.

[539] See the letter to Colonel Bourke, _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 390-400.

At the moment when Wellesley turned back from Montalegre and set his face southward, he had not yet settled the details of his plan of campaign. There appeared to be two courses open to him. The first was to base himself upon Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and advance upon Salamanca. This movement, which he could have begun in the second week of June, would undoubtedly have thrown into disorder all the French arrangements in Northern Spain. There would have been no force ready to oppose him save a single division of Mortier’s corps--the rest of that marshal’s troops were absent with Kellermann in the Asturias. This could not have held the British army back, and a bold march in advance would have placed Wellesley in a position where he could have intercepted all communications between the French troops in Galicia and those in and about Madrid. The movement might appear tempting, but it would have been too hazardous. The only force that could have been used for it was the 20,000 troops of Wellesley’s own army, backed by the 12,000 or 15,000 Portuguese regulars whom Beresford could collect between the Douro and the Tagus. The Spaniards had no troops in this direction save the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a battalion or two which Carlos d’España had raised on the borders of Leon and Portugal. On the other hand, the news that the British were at Salamanca or Toro would certainly have forced Ney, Soult, and Kellermann to evacuate Galicia and the Asturias and hasten to the aid of Mortier. They would have been far too strong, when united, for the 30,000 or 35,000 men of Wellesley and Beresford. La Romana and the Asturians could have brought no corresponding reinforcements to assist the British army, and must necessarily have arrived too late--long after the French corps would have reached the Douro[540]. The idea of a movement on Salamanca, therefore, did not even for a moment enter into Wellesley’s mind.

[540] Napier (ii. 149) calls this alternative plan of campaign ‘a movement in conjunction with Beresford, del Parque, and Romana by Salamanca.’ This is a most inappropriate description of it: about June 10, when operations might have commenced, Del Parque’s army did not yet exist. There were only three or four of Carlos d’España’s battalions at or near Rodrigo. La Romana, on the other hand, was at Orense facing Soult, and could not have reached Almeida or Rodrigo for weeks after the campaign would have begun.

The other alternative open to the British general, and that which he had from the first determined to take in hand, was (as we have already seen) a march against Victor. Such a movement might be carried out in one of two ways. (1) It would be possible to advance against his flank and rear by keeping north of the Tagus, and striking, by Coria and Plasencia, at Almaraz and its great bridge of boats, across which ran the communication between the 1st Corps and Madrid. This operation would have to be carried out by the British army alone, while the Spanish army of Estremadura, acting from a separate base, kept in touch with Victor but avoided compromising itself by any rash attack upon him. The Marshal, placed in a central position between Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s forces, would certainly try to beat one of them before they got the chance of drawing together. (2) It was equally possible to operate against Victor not on separate lines, but by crossing the Tagus, joining the Spaniards somewhere in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and falling upon the Marshal with the united strength of both armies. This movement would be less hazardous than the other, since it would secure the concentration of an army of a strength sufficient to crush the 25,000 men at which the 1st Corps might reasonably be rated. But it would only drive Victor back upon Madrid and King Joseph’s reserves by a frontal attack, while the other plan--that of the march on Almaraz--would imperil his flank and rear, and threaten to cut him off from the King and the capital.

Before making any decision between the two plans, Wellesley wrote to Cuesta, from Oporto on May 22, a letter requesting him to state his views as to the way in which the operations of the British and Spanish armies could best be combined. He informed him that the troops which had defeated Soult were already on their way to the south, that the head of the column would reach the Mondego on the twenty-sixth, and that the whole would be concentrated near Abrantes early in June. It was at that place that the choice would have to be made between the two possible lines of attack on Victor--that which led to Almaraz, and that which went on to Southern Estremadura. A few days later Wellesley dispatched a confidential officer of his staff--Colonel Bourke--to bear to the Spanish general a definite request for his decision on the point whether the allied armies should prepare for an actual junction, or should manœuvre from separate bases, or should ‘co-operate with communication,’ i.e. combine their movements without adopting a single base or a joint line of advance. Bourke was also directed to obtain all the information that he could concerning the strength, morale, and discipline of Cuesta’s army, and to discover what chance there was of securing the active assistance of the second Spanish army in the south--that which, under General Venegas, was defending the defiles in front of La Carolina[541].

[541] See the ‘Memorandum for Lieut.-Col. Bourke’ in _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 372-3.

It was clear that some days must elapse before an answer could arrive from the camp of the Estremaduran army, and meanwhile Wellesley continued to urge the counter-march of his troops from the various points at which they had halted between Oporto and Montalegre. All the scattered British brigades were directed on Abrantes by different routes: those which had the least distance to march began to arrive there on the eleventh and the twelve of June.

The Commander-in-chief had resolved not to take on with him the Portuguese regulars whom he had employed in the campaign against Soult. Both the brigades which had marched on Amarante under Beresford, and the four battalions which had fought along with Wellesley in the main column, were now dropped behind. They were destined to form an army of observation, lest Mortier and his 5th Corps, or any other French force, might chance to assail the front between the Douro and the Tagus during the absence of the British in the south. Beresford, who was left in command, was directed to arrange his troops so as to be able to support Almeida, and resist any raid from the direction of Salamanca or Zamora. The main body of the army lay at Guarda, its reserves at Coimbra. The Portuguese division which had been lying on the Zezere in company with Mackenzie’s troops, was also placed at Beresford’s disposition, so that he had about eighteen battalions, four regiments of cavalry, and five or six batteries--a force of between 12,000 and 15,000 men. It was his duty to connect Wellesley’s left wing with Silveira’s right, and to reinforce either of them if necessary. The Commander-in-chief was inclined to believe, from his knowledge of the disposition of the French corps at the moment, that no very serious attack was likely to be directed against Northern Portugal during his absence--at the most Soult might threaten Braganza or Mortier Almeida. But it was necessary to make some provision against even unlikely contingencies.

The only Portuguese force which Wellesley had resolved to utilize for the campaign in Estremadura was the battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, under Colonel Mayne, which had been stationed at Alcantara watching the movements of Victor. Sir Robert Wilson, now recalled from Beresford’s column and placed once more with his own men, was to take up the command of his old force, and to add to it the 5th Cazadores, a regiment which had hitherto been lying with Mackenzie’s division at Abrantes. With these 1,500 men he was to serve as the northern flank-guard of the British army when it should enter Spain.

When Wellesley first started upon his march, he was under the impression that his plan of campaign might be settled for him by the movements of Victor rather than by the devices of Cuesta. The rapidity of his progress was partly caused by the news of the Marshal’s attack on Alcantara, an operation which might, as it seemed, turn out to be the prelude of a raid in force upon Central Portugal. That it portended an actual invasion with serious designs Wellesley could not believe, being convinced that Victor would have to leave so large a proportion of his army to observe Cuesta, that he would not be able to set aside more than 10,000 or 12,000 men for operations in the valley of the Tagus[542]. But such a force would be enough to sweep the country about Castello Branco and Villa Velha, and to beat up Mackenzie’s line of defence on the Zezere.

[542] Wellesley to Mackenzie, from San Tyrso, May 21.

The actual course of events on the Tagus had been as follows. Victor, even after having received the division of Lapisse, considered himself too weak either to march on Cuesta and drive him over the mountains into Andalusia, or to fall upon Central Portugal by an advance along the Tagus[543]. He had received vague information of the formation of Mackenzie’s corps of observation on the Zezere, though apparently he had not discovered that there was a strong British contingent in its ranks. But he was under the impression that if he crossed the Guadiana in force, to attack Cuesta, the Portuguese would advance into Estremadura and cut his communications; while if he marched against the Portuguese, Cuesta would move northward to attack his rear. Accordingly he maintained for some time a purely defensive attitude, keeping his three French infantry divisions concentrated in a central position, at Torremocha, Montanches, and Salvatierra (near Caceres), while he remained himself with Leval’s Germans and Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons in the neighbourhood of Merida, observing Cuesta and sending flying columns up and down the Guadiana to watch the garrison of Badajoz and the guerrillas of the Sierra de Guadalupe. He had not forgotten the Emperor’s orders that he was to be prepared to execute a diversion in favour of Marshal Soult, when he should hear that the 2nd Corps was on its way to Lisbon. But, like all the other French generals, he was profoundly ignorant of the position and the fortunes of the Duke of Dalmatia. On April 22 the head-quarters staff at Madrid had received no more than a vague rumour that the 2nd Corps had entered Oporto a month before! They got no trustworthy information concerning its doings till May was far advanced[544]. Victor, therefore, depending on King Joseph for his news from Northern Portugal, was completely in the dark as to the moment when he might be called upon to execute his diversion on the Tagus. The Portuguese and Galician insurgents had succeeded in maintaining a complete blockade of Soult, and thus had foiled all Napoleon’s plans for combining the operations of the 1st and the 2nd Corps.

[543] Compare the two dispatches of Victor to Jourdan of April 25 (acknowledging the receipt of Lapisse’s division) and of May 21.

[544] See King Joseph to Napoleon, of the dates April 22 and May 24, 1809.

Victor was only stirred up into a spasmodic activity in the second week in May, by the news that a Portuguese force had crossed the frontier and occupied Alcantara, where the great Roman bridge across the Tagus provided a line of communication between North-Western and Central Estremadura. This detachment--as we have already seen--consisted of no more than Colonel Mayne’s 1st battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, brought down from the passes of the Sierra de Gata, and of a single regiment of newly-raised militia--that of the frontier district of Idanha. They had with them the six guns of the battery of the Legion and a solitary squadron of cavalry, Wellesley had thrown forward this little force of 2,000 men to serve as an outpost for Mackenzie’s corps on the Zezere. But rumour magnified its strength, and Victor jumped to the conclusion that it formed the vanguard of a Portuguese army which was intending to concert a combined operation with Cuesta, by threatening the communication of the 1st Corps while the Spaniards attacked its front.

Labouring under this delusion, Victor took the division of Lapisse and a brigade of dragoons, and marched against Alcantara upon the eleventh of May. As he approached the river he was met at Brozas by Mayne’s vedettes, whom he soon drove in to the gates of the little town. Alcantara being situated on the south side of the Tagus, it was impossible to defend it: but Mayne had barricaded and mined the bridge, planted his guns so as to command the passage, and constructed trenches for his infantry along the northern bank. After seizing the town, Victor opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry against the Portuguese detachment. It was met by a vigorous return from the further bank, which lasted for more than three hours before the defence began to flag. The Marshal very properly refused to send forward his infantry to attempt the storm of the bridge till his artillery should have silenced that of the defenders. At about midday the Idanha militia, who had already suffered not inconsiderable losses, deserted their trenches and fled. Thereupon Mayne fired his mine in the bridge, but unhappily for him the tough Roman cement defied even the power of gunpowder; only one side of the arch was shattered; the crown of the vault held firm, and the passage was still possible. The Legion still kept its ground, though it had lost many men, and had seen one of his guns dismounted, and the rest silenced by the French artillery. But when Victor hurled the leading brigade of Lapisse’s division at the bridge he succeeded in forcing it[545]. Mayne drew off his legionaries in good order and retreated to the pass of Salvatierra, leaving behind him a gun and more than 250 killed and wounded[546] [May 14]--a heavy loss from the 1,000 men of the single battalion which bore the whole brunt of the fighting.

[545] Compare Victor to Jourdan of May 21, with the account of the combat in Appendix I of Mayne and Lillie’s _Lusitanian Legion_.

[546] The exact losses of the L. L. L. were--killed, three officers and 103 rank and file; wounded, five officers and 143 rank and file; missing, fifteen rank and file. Of the Idanha militia, Mayne returned the whole as missing next morning.

Victor went no further than Alcantara, having satisfied himself that the Portuguese force which had made such a creditable resistance consisted of a single weak brigade, and did not form the vanguard of an army bent on invading Estremadura. After remaining for no more than three days at Alcantara, and trying in vain to obtain news of the whereabouts of Soult--who was at that moment being hunted past Guimaraens and Braga in the far north--the Marshal drew back his troops to Torremocha near Caceres.

His advance, though it had only lasted for six days, and had not been pushed more than a few miles beyond Alcantara, had much disturbed General Mackenzie, who dreaded to find himself the next object of attack and to see the whole of the 1st Corps debouching against him by the road through Castello Branco. Wellesley wrote to him that he need not be alarmed, that Victor could not spare more than 10,000 or 12,000 men for his demonstration, and that the 8,000 British and Portuguese troops behind the Zezere were amply sufficient to maintain defensive operations till the main army from the north should come up. He expressed his opinion that the French force at Alcantara was ‘a mere reconnoitring party, sent out for the purpose of ascertaining what has become of Soult,’ a conclusion in which he was perfectly right. Mackenzie[547], who betrayed an exaggerated want of confidence in his Portuguese troops, was profoundly relieved to see the enemy retire upon the seventeenth. He had advanced from Abrantes and taken up a defensive position along the Sobreira Formosa to resist the Marshal, but he had done so with many searchings of heart, and was glad to see the danger pass away. When Victor had retired into Central Estremadura, Mayne came back with all due caution, and reoccupied the bridge of Alcantara.

[547] See Wellesley to Mackenzie, May 21, and also Wellesley to Frere on the same day. _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 350-1.

Wellesley, therefore, had been perfectly well justified in his confidence that nothing was to be feared in this direction. The French could not possibly have dared to undertake more than a demonstration in the direction of Castello Branco. King Joseph’s orders to Victor had prescribed no more[548], and the Marshal had accomplished even less. In his letter of excuse to Jourdan he explained that he would gladly have left Lapisse’s division at Alcantara, or even have moved it forward for some distance into Portugal[549], if he had not found it absolutely impossible to feed it in the bare and stony district north of the Tagus, where Junot’s army had been wellnigh starved in November 1807. The peasantry of the villages for fifteen leagues round Alcantara had, as he declared, gone off into the mountains with their cattle, after burying their corn, and he had found it impossible to discover food for even three days’ consumption of a single division.

[548] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 190.

[549] A move by which he flattered himself that he would not only ‘inquiéter les Anglais,’ but also ‘dégager le duc de Dalmatie,’ an end which no raid with 8,000 or 10,000 men to Castello Branco could possibly have accomplished. Victor to Jourdan, May 29.

During Victor’s absence at Alcantara, Cuesta had sent down a part of his troops to make a raid on Merida, the Marshal’s advanced post on the Guadiana. It failed entirely; the garrison, two battalions of Leval’s German division, maintained themselves with ease in a large convent outside that town, which Victor had patched up and turned into a place of some little strength. On hearing that the Spaniards were descending from the mountains, King Joseph ordered the Duke of Belluno to attack them at once. But on the mere news of the Marshal’s approach Cuesta called back his detachment into the passes, sweeping off at the same time the inhabitants of all the villages along the Guadiana, together with their cattle and their stores of provisions.

At the beginning of June Victor began to press the King and Jourdan for leave to abandon his hold on Southern Estremadura, and to fall back towards the Tagus. He urged that his position was very dangerous, now that Cuesta’s army had been recruited up to a force of 22,000 infantry and 6,000 horse, especially since the Portuguese had once more got possession of Alcantara. His main contention was that he must either be reinforced up to a strength which would permit him to attack Andalusia, or else be permitted to withdraw from the exhausted district between the Guadiana and the Tagus, in order to seek a region where his men would be able to live. The only district in this neighbourhood where the country-side was still intact was that north of the Tagus, around the towns of Plasencia and Coria--the valleys of the Alagon and Tietar. To move the army in this direction would involve the evacuation of Central Estremadura--it would be necessary to abandon Merida, Truxillo, and Caceres, with the sacrifice of a certain amount of prestige. But unless the 1st Corps could be reinforced--and this, as Victor must have known, was impossible[550]--there was no other alternative. The internal condition of the army was growing worse day by day. ‘The troops are on half rations of bread: they can get little meat--often none at all. The results of starvation are making themselves felt in the most deplorable way. The men are going into hospital at the rate of several hundreds a day[551].’ A few days later Victor adds, ‘If I could even get together enough biscuit to feed the army for merely seven or eight days I should not feel so uncomfortable. But we have no flour to issue for a bread ration, so cannot bake biscuit[552].’ And again he adds, ‘The whole population of this region has retired within Cuesta’s lines, after destroying the ovens and the mills, and removing every scrap of food. It seems that the enemy is resolved to starve us out, and to leave a desert in front of us if we advance.... Carefully estimating all my stores I find that I have barely enough to last for five days in hand. We are menaced with absolute famine, which we can only avoid by moving off, and there is no suitable cantonment to be found in the whole space between Tagus and Guadiana: the entire country is ruined.’

[550] He suggests in a letter of June 8, that Mortier’s corps should be brought up to Plasencia to help him. But this was wholly impracticable.

[551] Victor to Jourdan, from Torremocha, May 24.

[552] Victor to Jourdan, May 29.

Joseph and Jourdan replied to the first of these dismal letters by promising to send the 1st Corps 300,000 rations of biscuit, and by urging its commander to renew his attack on Alcantara, in order to threaten Portugal and ‘disengage the Duke of Dalmatia’--who, on the day when their dispatch was written, was at Lugo, in the north of Galicia, some 300 miles as the crow flies from Victor’s head quarters[553]. They received the answer that such a move was impossible, as Mayne had just blown up the bridge of Alcantara, and it was now impossible to cross the Tagus[554].

[553] Jourdan to Victor, June 1.

[554] Victor to Jourdan, June 8. Oddly enough he was wrong in his statement by two days, for Mayne blew up the bridge on the tenth only.

A few days later the news arrived at Madrid that Soult had been defeated and flung out of Portugal[555]. It had taken three weeks for information of this transcendent importance to reach the king! Seriously alarmed, Joseph and Jourdan sent Victor his long-denied permission to retire from Estremadura and place himself behind the Tagus. They do not seem to have guessed that the victorious Wellesley would make his next move against the 1st Corps, but imagined that he would debouch into Old Castile by way of Rodrigo and Salamanca, wherefore their main idea was to strengthen Mortier and the army in the valley of the Douro[556]. Thus it fell in with their views that Victor should draw back to the line of the Tagus, a general concentration of all the French troops in the Peninsula seeming advisable, in face of the necessity for resisting the supposed attack on Old Castile. Another reason for assuming a defensive attitude was the gloomy news from Aragon, where Suchet, after his defeat at Alcañiz, had retired on Saragossa and was sending despairing appeals for reinforcements to Madrid.

[555] June 10, Joseph to Napoleon.

[556] Cf. Joseph’s letters of June 10 and June 16 to Napoleon: but there seems to be much vacillation in his decisions.

Accordingly, the 1st Corps evacuated Estremadura between the fourteenth and the nineteenth of June, and, crossing the Tagus, disposed itself in a position on the northern bank, with its right wing at Almaraz and its left at Talavera. Here Victor intended to make his stand, being confident that with the broad river in front of him he could easily beat off any attack on the part of the Spanish army.

But when Wellesley and Cuesta first began to correspond concerning their joint movement against the French in Estremadura, Victor was still in his old cantonments, and their scheme of operations had been sketched out on the hypothesis that he lay at Merida, Torremocha, and Caceres. It was with the design of assailing him while he still held this advanced position, that Cuesta drew up his paper of answers to Wellesley’s queries and dispatched it to Abrantes to meet the British general on his arrival[557].

[557] Cuesta’s replies, sent on by Bourke, are dated June 4 and June 6, i.e. ten and eight days respectively before Victor began his retreat beyond the Tagus on June 14.

If the old Captain-General’s suggestions were by no means marked with the stamp of genius, they had at least the merit of variety. He offered Wellesley the choice between no less than three plans of campaign. (1) His first proposal was that the British army should descend into Southern Estremadura, and join him in the neighbourhood of Badajoz. From thence the united host was to advance against Victor and assail him in front. But meanwhile Cuesta proposed to send out two subsidiary columns, to turn the Marshal’s flanks and surround him. One was to base itself on Alcantara and march along the northern bank of the Tagus to seize Almaraz: the other was to push by La Serena through the Guadalupe mountains to threaten Talavera. By these operations, if Victor would be good enough to remain quiet in his present cantonments, he would be completely surrounded, his retreat would be cut off, and he would finally be compelled to surrender. The scheme was of course preposterous. What rational man could have supposed it likely that the Marshal would remain quiescent while his flanks were being turned? He would certainly have hastened to retire and to throw himself upon the detached columns, one or both of which he could have annihilated before the main armies of the allies could get within touch of him[558]. Wellesley refused to listen for a moment to this plan of campaign. (2) The second proposal of Cuesta was that the British army should pass the Tagus at Alcantara and operate against Victor’s flank, while the Spanish army attacked him in front. To this the same objection could be urged: it presupposed that the Frenchman would remain fixed in his present cantonments: but he certainly would not do so when he heard that he was to be assailed on both flanks; he would retire behind the Tagus at once, and the British army would have wasted its march, and be obliged to return to the north bank of that river: moreover, it would involve a very long movement to the south to get in touch with Victor’s flank. Probably it would be necessary to descend as far into Estremadura as Caceres, and, when that point was reached, the Marshal could make the whole manœuvre futile by retiring at once behind the Tagus at Almaraz. To follow him to the north bank the British would have to retrace their steps to Alcantara.

[558] Wellesley writes in commenting on this plan [_Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 402]: ‘At all events these two detachments on the two flanks appear to me to be too weak to produce any great effect upon the movements of Victor.... I think it would be nearly certain that the Marshal would be able to defend the passage [of the Tagus] with a part only of his force, while with the other part he would beat one or both of the detachments sent round his flank. Indeed the detachment which should have been sent from La Serena toward Talavera, being between the corps of Victor and Sebastiani, could hardly escape.’ Wellesley also points out that it is useless to expect that Victor would wait in his present cantonments: at the first news of the approach of the British army he will retire to Almaraz and Arzobispo.

The third proposal of Cuesta--the only one in which Wellesley could find any prospect of success, was that the British army, keeping north of the Tagus, should march by Castello Branco on Plasencia. There it would be in the rear of Victor’s best line of retreat by the bridge of Almaraz. If the manœuvre could be kept very secret, and executed with great speed, Almaraz, perhaps also the subsidiary passage at Arzobispo, might be seized. Should the Marshal get early news of the movement, and hurry back across the Tagus to fend off this stab in the rear, Wellesley was prepared to fight him in the open with equal forces, conceiving that he was ‘sufficiently strong to defend himself against any attack which Victor might make.’ He hoped that Cuesta was able to guarantee that he also was competent to hold his own, supposing that the Marshal, neglecting the British diversion, should concentrate his corps and strike at the Spanish army.

On the whole, therefore, Wellesley was not disinclined to fall in with this plan, which had the extra merit of remaining feasible even if Victor withdrew north of the Tagus before either of the allied armies had completed its march. He made one countersuggestion, viz. that Cuesta might move eastward, with the whole or part of his army, join the army of Venegas in La Mancha, and attack Sebastiani, leaving the British alone to deal with Victor. But he did not wish to press this plan, thinking that an attack on the enemy’s left was on first principles less advisable than one on his right, because it did not offer any chance of cutting him off from Madrid[559].

[559] I print as an Appendix this all-important letter to Bourke, regarding Cuesta’s three plans of campaign.

The answer to Cuesta’s proposals was sent off from Abrantes, which Wellesley, preceding his army by three or four days’ march, reached upon June 8. He had now under his hand Mackenzie’s Anglo-Portuguese force, but the leading brigades of the troops who had fought at Oporto could not arrive before the eleventh or twelfth. There was thus ample time to concert the joint plan of campaign before the whole army would be concentrated and ready to move. But when Cuesta’s reply to the dispatch of June 8 came to hand upon June 13, Wellesley was much vexed to find that the old Captain-General had expressed a great dislike for the idea that the British army should march upon Plasencia and Almaraz--though it had been one of his own three suggestions. He now pleaded urgently in favour of the first of his original alternatives--that Wellesley should come down to Badajoz and join him in a frontal attack upon Victor. With much reluctance the British general resolved to comply, apparently moved by his ally’s openly expressed dislike to being left to face Victor alone. ‘I must acknowledge,’ he wrote to Colonel Bourke, ‘that _I_ entertain no apprehension that the French will attack General Cuesta: I am much more afraid that they are going away, and strengthening themselves upon the Tagus[560].’ To the Spanish General he sent a dispatch to the same effect, in which he pledged himself to march to join the army of Estremadura, though he frankly stated that all his information led him to believe that Victor had no intention of taking the offensive, and that the junction was therefore unnecessary. He expressed his hope that Cuesta would avoid all fighting till they had met, the only possible danger to the allied cause being that one of the two armies should suffer a defeat before the other had started on the combined movement to which they were committed[561].

[560] Wellesley to Bourke, from Abrantes, June 14.

[561] Wellesley to Cuesta, from Abrantes, June 14.

Fortunately for all parties concerned, the march on Badajoz which Wellesley so much disliked never had to be begun, for on the day after he had sent off his dispatch to Cuesta he received reliable information from several sources, to the effect that Victor had evacuated and blown up the fortified convent of Merida, and had sent off all his baggage and heavy artillery towards Almaraz. During the next four days the whole of the 1st Corps marched for that all-important bridge, and crossed it. On the nineteenth Victor had established his entire army north of the Tagus, at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and Talavera. Thus the whole face of affairs was changed, and the advance of the British army into Southern Estremadura was rendered unnecessary. It was fortunate that the news of the retreat of the 1st Corps was received at Abrantes just in time to allow of the countermanding of the march of Wellesley’s army on Badajoz, for that fruitless movement would have begun if the Duke of Belluno had been able to retain his starving army in its positions for a few days longer.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER II

WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN

The retreat of Victor beyond the Tagus forced Wellesley to concert yet another plan of operation with Cuesta, since the position of the French army, on which the whole of the recently adopted scheme depended, had just suffered a radical change. It was clear that every consideration now pointed to the necessity for adopting the combination which Wellesley had urged upon his colleague in his letter of June 8, viz. that the British army should move on Plasencia and Almaraz. It would now be striking at the flank instead of the rear of Victor’s corps, but it was clear that under the new conditions it would still be in a position to roll up his whole army, if he should endeavour to defend the passages of the Tagus against the Spaniards, who were now approaching them from the front. For Cuesta had descended from the mountains when he heard of Victor’s retreat, and was now approaching Almaraz.

It took some time, however, to induce the Captain-General to consent to this move. To the extreme vexation of his colleague he produced other plans, so gratuitously impracticable that Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh to say that he could conceive no explanation for the old man’s conduct save a desire to refuse any scheme urged on him by others, and a resolve to invent and advocate alternative plans of his own out of mere pride and wrongheadedness. ‘The best of the whole story,’ he added[562], was that Cuesta was now refusing to accept a plan which he himself had suggested in one of his earlier letters, merely because that plan had been taken up and advocated by his ally. ‘The obstinacy of this old gentleman,’ he concluded, ‘is throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies ever had[563].’

[562] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Abrantes, June 17. The real cause of Cuesta’s angry and impracticable attitude will be shown in the next chapter.

[563] Wellesley to Frere from the same place, June 14.

The necessity for working out a new scheme for the combined operations of the British and Spanish armies, in view of Victor’s retreat to Almaraz, entailed the loss of a few days. It would have been impossible to start on the advance to Plasencia till Cuesta had promised to accept that movement as part of the joint campaign. There was also some time to be allowed for concluding an agreement with Venegas, the General of the La Carolina army, whose connexion with the campaign must become much more intimate, now that the fighting was to take place not in Estremadura, but further north, in the valley of the Tagus. For while Victor lay at Merida and Sebastiani at Manzanares and Ciudad Real, the Spanish forces which faced them were very far apart. But when Victor retired to Talavera, and Sebastiani to Madridejos, in the end of June, Cuesta and Venegas--each following the corps opposed to him--could draw closer together. It was evident that the Andalusian army ought to be made to play an important part in the combined operations of July.

It would be unfair to the Spanish generals to let it be supposed that the necessity for settling on a common scheme of operations with them was the sole cause which detained Wellesley at Abrantes from the eighth to the twenty-seventh of June. The leading brigades of the British troops from Oporto had begun to reach Abrantes on the eleventh, and the more belated columns came up on the fourteenth and fifteenth. But it would have been impossible to have moved forward without some further delay, even if Wellesley had been in possession of a complete and satisfactory plan of operations on the day upon which his whole force was concentrated on the line of the Zezere. At the least he would have required another week for preparations.

His hindrances at this moment were manifold. The first was the distressed condition of those of his brigades which had seen most service during the Oporto campaign. Many regiments had been constantly on the march from May 9 to June 14, without obtaining more than two days’ rest in the whole time. Their shoes were worn out, their jaded baggage-animals had dropped to the rear, and they were leaving so many stragglers on the way that it was absolutely necessary to give them a moderate rest at Abrantes, in order to allow the ranks to grow full and the belated baggage to come up. The regiments which had followed Beresford in the forced march from Amarante to Chaves were worst off--they had never completely recovered from the fatigues of those three days of constant rain and storm spent on the stony roads of the Tras-os-Montes[564]. In any case some delay must have occurred before all the troops were ready to march. But many circumstances conspired to detain the army at Abrantes for several days after the moment at which Wellesley had determined to start for Plasencia. The first was the non-arrival of convoys of shoes and clothing which he had ordered up from Lisbon. The transport of the army was not yet fully organized, its officers were lacking in experience, if not in zeal, and orders were slowly executed. Many corps had, in the end, to start for Spain without receiving the much-needed stores, which were still trailing up from Santarem to Abrantes when Wellesley gave the signal to advance. Another hindrance was the lack of money: the army was obliged to pay for its wants in coin, but hard cash was so difficult to procure both in London and in Lisbon that arrears were already beginning to grow up. At first they vexed the soul of Wellesley almost beyond endurance, but as the war dragged on they only grew worse, and the Commander-in-chief had to endure with resignation the fact that both the pay of the men and the wages of the Portuguese muleteers and followers were overdue for many months. In June 1809 he had not yet reached this state of comparative callousness, and was endeavouring to scrape together money by every possible device. He had borrowed £3,000 in Portuguese silver from the merchants of the impoverished city of Oporto: he was trying to exchange bills on England for dollars at Cadiz, where the arrival of the American contribution had produced a comparative plenty of the circulating medium. Yet after all he had to start from Abrantes with only a comparatively moderate sum in his military chest[565], the rest had not reached him on June 28, the treasure convoy having taken the unconscionable time of eleven days to crawl forward from Lisbon to Abrantes--a distance of no more than ninety miles[566].

[564] With regard to these regiments [5/60th, 2/87th, 1/88th], Wellesley writes in very bitter terms to Donkin on June 16, saying that the number of their stragglers was scandalous, and that the laggards were committing all manner of disorders in the rear of the army. It is fair to remember that the battalions had suffered exceptional hardships, as may be seen from the narratives of Gough of the 87th, and Grattan of the 88th.

[565] The main convoy only reached Abrantes when Wellesley had advanced to Plasencia, in Spain. See letter to the officer commanding Artillery at Castello Branco, dated July 8, from Plasencia.

[566] Cf. Wellesley to Frere, June 14, to Commissary-General Murray, June 16, both from Abrantes, and to Castlereagh, June 27.

A third cause of delay was the time spent in waiting for reinforcements from Lisbon. Eight or nine regiments had landed, or were expected to arrive within the next few days. It was in every way desirable to unite them to the army before the campaign should begin. This was all the more necessary because several corps had to be deducted from the force which had been used in the Oporto campaign. Under stringent orders from home, Wellesley had sent back two infantry battalions and part of two cavalry regiments to Lisbon, to be embarked for Gibraltar and Sicily[567]. In return he was to receive a much larger body of troops. But while the deduction was immediate, the addition took time. Of all the troops which were expected to reinforce the army, only one battalion caught him up at Abrantes, while a second and one regiment of Light Dragoons[568] joined later, but yet in time for Talavera. Thus at the commencement of the actual campaign the force in the field was, if anything, slightly less in numbers than that which had been available in May. It was particularly vexatious that the brigade of veteran light infantry, for which Wellesley had made a special demand on Castlereagh as early as April, did not reach Abrantes till long after the army had moved forward. These three battalions, the nucleus of the famous Light Division[569], had all gone through the experiences of Moore’s campaign, and were once more under their old leader Robert Craufurd. Detained by baffling winds in the Downs, the transports that bore them only reached Lisbon at various dates between June 28 and July 2, though they had sailed on May 25. Their indefatigable brigadier hurried them forward with all speed to the front, but in spite of his exertions, they only came up with the main army after the day of battle was over. The same was the fate of two batteries of horse artillery[570]--an arm in which Wellesley was wholly deficient when he marched into Spain. They arrived late, and were still far to the rear when the march from Abrantes began.

[567] The 2/9th and 2/30th were sent to Gibraltar in May. The two squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons and the one squadron of the 3rd Hussars of the K. G. L. were sent to Sicily at the same time.

[568] The 1/48th, 1/61st, and 23rd Light Dragoons.

[569] 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 1/95th. Of these three units only 1/43rd had been in Robert Craufurd’s old brigade, during the march to Sahagun. The other two had been in Anstruther’s brigade of Paget’s reserve; they had therefore fought at Corunna, while Craufurd and the ‘flank brigade’ which includes the 1/43rd, had been detached from the main army and had embarked at Vigo.

[570] A and I troops. The first joined in company with Craufurd. The second only appeared much later.

It thus resulted that although there were over 33,000 British troops in the Peninsula at the commencement of July 1809, less than 21,000 could be collected for the advance on Plasencia which was now about to begin. More than 8,000 men lay at Lisbon, or were just starting from that city, while 4,500 were in hospital[571]. The sick seemed more numerous than might have been expected at the season of the year: though the fatigues of the Oporto campaign accounted for the majority of the invalids, yet Wellesley was of opinion that a contributory cause might be found in the slack discipline of certain regiments, where inefficient commanding officers had neglected sanitary precautions, and allowed their men to neglect personal cleanliness, or to indulge to excess in wine and unripe fruit and vegetables. It was his opinion that the number of men in hospital should never exceed ten per cent. of the total force. But all through the war he found that this proportion was exceeded.

[571] Writing to Castlereagh on June 30, Wellesley remarks that ‘according to your account I have 35,000 men--according to my own I have only 18,000,’ but this was before he had been joined by the 1/61st, the 23rd Dragoons, and certain details. It is certain, from the careful table of troops engaged at Talavera which is to be found in the Record Office, that somewhat over 22,000 men entered Spain, and that after deducting sick left at Plasencia and elsewhere, just 20,600 fought at Talavera.

With the internal condition of many of his regiments Wellesley was far from satisfied. His tendency to use the plainest, indeed the harshest, terms concerning the rank and file, is so well known that we are not surprised to find him writing that ‘the army behave terribly ill: they are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore’s army could bear failure[572].’ He complained most of all of the recruits sent him from the Irish militia, who were, he said, capable of every sin, moral or military. Though he was ‘endeavouring to tame the troops,’ yet there were several regiments in such bad order that he would gladly have sent them home in disgrace if he could have spared a man. The main offence, of course, was robbery of food from the Portuguese peasantry, often accompanied by violence, and now and then by murder. The number of assistant-provost-marshals was multiplied, some offenders were caught and hanged, but marauding could not be suppressed, even while the troops were receiving full rations in their cantonments at Abrantes. When they were enduring real privation, in the wilds of Estremadura, matters grew much worse. Though many regiments were distinguished for their good behaviour, yet there were always some whose excesses were a disgrace to the British army. Their Commander never shrank from telling them so in the most incisive language; he was always complaining that he could not get a sufficient number of the criminals flogged or hanged, and that regimental court-martials were far too lenient in their dealings with offenders[573].

[572] These topics occur in many dispatches to Castlereagh. Perhaps the most notable is that of May 31, 1809, written at Coimbra.

[573] Wellesley’s anxiety to make examples may be traced in the series of letters concerning a private of the 29th which occur in his July dispatches. The man had been acquitted by a court-martial on the ground of insanity, but this did not satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who sends repeated orders that the award must be revised, and the man, if possible, executed.

It was at Abrantes that Wellesley first arranged his army in divisions, and gave it the organization which, with certain modifications, it was to maintain during the rest of the war. His six regiments of cavalry were to form a single division consisting of one heavy and two light brigades, commanded respectively by Fane, Cotton, and Anson. The twenty-five battalions of infantry were distributed into four divisions of unequal strength under Generals Sherbrooke, Hill, Mackenzie, and A. Campbell. Of these the first was by far the largest, counting four brigades of two battalions each: the first (Henry Campbell’s) was formed of the two battalions of Guards, the second (Cameron’s) of two line regiments, the third and fourth, under Low and Langwerth, comprised the infantry of the King’s German Legion. The second and third divisions each consisted of two brigades of three battalions each[574]. The fourth, and weakest, showed only five battalions in line. Of artillery there were only thirty guns, eighteen English and twelve German: all were field-batteries, as none of the much-desired horse artillery had yet reached the front[575]. They were all of very light calibre, the heaviest being a brigade of heavy six-pounders belonging to the German Legion.

[574] Viz. 2nd, Tilson and Richard Stewart; 3rd, Mackenzie and Donkin; 4th, A. Campbell and Kemmis.

[575] A and I batteries R. H. A. were both late for Talavera.

On June 28 the army at last moved forward: that day the head quarters were at Cortiçada, on the Sobreira Formosa. On the thirtieth Castello Branco, the last Portuguese town, was reached. On July 3 the leading brigades passed the Elga, the frontier river, and bivouacked on the same night around Zarza la Mayor, the first place in Spanish Estremadura. At the same time Sir Robert Wilson’s small column of 1,500 Portuguese crossed the border a little further north, and advanced in a direction parallel to that of the main army, so as to serve as a flank guard for it in the direction of the mountains.

King Joseph meanwhile was in a state of the most profound ignorance concerning the impending storm. As late as July 9 he wrote to his brother that the British had not as yet made any pronounced movement, and that it was quite uncertain whether they would invade Galicia, or strike at Castile, or remain in the neighbourhood of Lisbon[576]! On that day the head of the British army had entered Plasencia, and was only 125 miles from Madrid. It is impossible to give any better testimonial than this simple fact to the way in which the insurgents and the guerrillas served the cause of the allies. Wellesley had been able to march from Oporto to Abrantes, and from Abrantes to Plasencia, without even a rumour of his advance reaching Madrid. All that Joseph had learnt was that there was now an allied force of some sort behind Alcantara, in the direction of Castello Branco. He took it for granted that they were Portuguese, but in one dispatch he broaches the theory that there might be a few English with them--perhaps from having heard a vague report of the composition of Mackenzie’s division on the Zezere in May. He therefore wrote in a cheerful tone to the Emperor that ‘if we have only got to deal with Cuesta and the Portuguese they will be beaten by the 1st Corps. If they have some English with them, they can be beaten equally well by the 1st Corps, aided by troops which I can send across the Tagus via Toledo’ (i.e. the 5,000 or 6,000 men of the Central Reserve which could be spared from Madrid). ‘I am not in the least disquieted,’ he continued, ‘concerning the present condition of military affairs in this part of Spain[577].’ In another epistle to his brother he added that ‘if the English should be at the back of Cuesta, it would be the happiest chance in the world for the concluding of the whole war[578].’

[576] Joseph to Napoleon, from Talavera, July 9, 1809.

[577] Joseph to Napoleon, from Almagro, July 2, 1809.

[578] Joseph to Napoleon, from Madridejos, July 3, 1809. It is fair to the King to say that in this letter he concludes that he had better call Mortier down into New Castile if the English are really on the move.

It was lucky for the King that he was not induced to try the experiment of falling upon Wellesley and Cuesta with the 28,000 men of Victor and the Central Reserve. If he had done so, he would have suffered a frightful disaster and have lost Madrid.

In the end of June and the first days of July Joseph’s main attention had been drawn off to that part of his front where there was least danger, so that he was paying comparatively little heed to the movements of the allies on the lower Tagus. He had been distracted by a rash and inexplicable movement of the Spanish army of La Mancha. When General Venegas had heard of the retreat of Victor from Estremadura, and had been informed that Cuesta was about to move forward in pursuit of the 1st Corps, he had concluded that his own troops might also advance. He argued that Sebastiani and the 4th Corps must beat a retreat, when their right flank was uncovered by Victor’s evacuation of the valley of the Guadiana. He was partly justified in his idea, for Joseph had drawn back Sebastiani’s main body to Madridejos when Victor abandoned Merida. It was safe therefore to advance from the Despeña Perros into the southern skirts of La Mancha, as far as Manzanares and the line of the Guadiana. But to go further forward was dangerous, unless Venegas was prepared to risk a collision with Sebastiani. This he was certainly not in a condition to do: his troops had not yet recovered from the moral effects of the rout of Ciudad Real, and his brigades were full of new battalions of untried Andalusian reserves. He should have been cautious, and have refused to move without concerting his operations with Cuesta: to have had his corps put _hors de combat_ at the very beginning of the joint campaign of the allied armies would have been most disastrous.

Nevertheless Venegas came down from the passes of the Sierra Morena with 18,000 infantry, 3,000 horse, and twenty-six guns, and proceeded to thrust back Sebastiani’s cavalry screen and to push in his outposts in front of Madridejos. The French general had in hand at this moment only two infantry divisions and Milhaud’s dragoons; his third division and his light cavalry were still absent with Victor, to whom they had been lent in March for the campaign of Medellin. But with 13,000 foot and 2,000 horse[579] he ought not to have feared Venegas, and could have given a good account of him had he chosen to attack. But having received exaggerated reports of the strength of the Spanish army, he wrote to the King that he was beset by nearly 40,000 men and must be reinforced at once, or he would have to fall back on Madrid[580]. Joseph, fully believing the news, sent orders to Victor to restore to the 4th Corps the divisions of Leval and Merlin, and then, doubting whether these troops could arrive in time, sallied out of Madrid on June 22 with his Guards and half the division of Dessolles--about 5,500 men.

[579] The July strength of Sebastiani’s corps, _présents sous les armes_, was 1st division (French) 8,118, 2nd division (Valence’s Poles) 4,784, Milhaud’s dragoons 2,249--total 15,151.

[580] Joseph to Napoleon, from Illescas, June 23: ‘Le général Sebastiani a devant lui des forces triples des siennes.’ Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral, July 1: ‘L’armée de 36,000 à 40,000 hommes qui menaçait le 4me Corps s’est enfuie et a repassé la Sierre Morena.’

It was lucky for Venegas that Sebastiani had refused to fight him, but still more lucky that the news of the King’s approach reached him promptly. On hearing that Joseph had joined the 4th Corps on June 25 he was wise enough to turn on his heel and retreat in all haste towards his lair in the passes of the Sierra Morena. If he had lingered any longer in the plains he would have been destroyed, for the King, on the arrival of Leval’s and Merlin’s divisions, would have fallen upon him at the head of 27,000 men. As it was, Venegas retired with such promptitude to Santa Cruz de Mudela, at the foot of the passes, that the French could never catch him. Joseph pursued him as far as Almagro and El Moral, on the southern edge of La Mancha, and there stopped short. He had received, on July 2, a dispatch from Victor to the effect that Cuesta had repaired the bridge of Almaraz and begun to cross the Tagus, while a body of 10,000 allied troops, presumably Portuguese, had been heard of in the direction of Plasencia[581]. (This was in reality the whole army of Wellesley!) Rightly concluding that he had pushed the pursuit of Venegas too far, the King turned back in haste, left Sebastiani and the 4th Corps behind the Guadiana, and returned with his reserve to Toledo, in order to be in a position to support Victor. His excursion to Almagro had been almost as reckless and wrongheaded as Venegas’s advance to Madridejos, for he had separated himself from Victor by a gap of 200 miles, at the moment when the British army was just appearing on the Marshal’s flank, while Cuesta was in his front. If the allied generals had concentrated their forces ten days earlier--a thing that might well have happened but for the vexatious delays at Abrantes caused by Cuesta’s impracticability--the 1st Corps might have been attacked at the moment when Joseph lay at the foot of the Sierra Morena, in a position too remote from Talavera to allow him to come up in time to succour Victor.

[581] For all this see Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral [July 1], and from Almagro [July 2].

While the King was absent on his expedition in pursuit of Venegas the most important change in the situation of affairs on the Tagus was that the Duke of Belluno had drawn back his troops from the line of the Tagus, where they had been lying since June 19, and had retired behind the Alberche. His retreat was not caused by any apprehension as to the appearance of Wellesley on his flank--a fact which was completely concealed from him--but by sheer want of provisions. On June 25 he sent to the King to say that his army was again starved out of its cantonments, and that he had eaten up in a week the small remnant of food that could be squeezed out of the country-side between the Tagus and the Tietar, and was forced to transfer himself to another region. ‘The position,’ he wrote, ‘is desperate. The 1st Corps is on the eve of dissolution: the men are dropping down from mere starvation. I have nothing, absolutely nothing, to give them. They are in a state of despair.... I am forced to fall back on Talavera, where there are no more resources than here. We must have prompt succour, but where can it be found? If your Majesty abandons me in my present wretched situation, I lose my honour, my military record--everything. I shall not be to blame for the disaster which menaces my troops, but I shall have to bear the blame. Tomorrow I shall be at Talavera, waiting your Majesty’s orders. The enemy [Cuesta] has a pontoon-train: if he wishes to cross the Tagus he can do so, for the 1st Corps can no longer remain opposite him. Never was there a more distressing situation than ours[582].’

[582] Victor to King Joseph, from the head quarters of the 1st Corps, Calzada, near Oropesa, June 25. Intercepted dispatch in the Record Office.

On June 26, therefore, Victor transferred himself to Talavera, and adopted a position behind the Alberche, after burning the materials of the late pontoon bridge at Almaraz, which he had taken up and stored in case they might again be needed. His movement was a lucky one for himself, as it took him further away from Wellesley’s army, which was just about to start from Abrantes with the object of turning his flank. It puzzled Cuesta, who sought for some other explanation of his departure than mere starvation, and was very cautious in taking advantage of it. However, on the day after the French had withdrawn, he pushed troops across the Tagus, and prepared to construct another bridge at Almaraz to replace that which the French had destroyed. His cavalry pushed out to Navalmoral and Oropesa, and further to the east he passed some detachments of infantry across the bridge of Arzobispo, which Victor--most unaccountably--had left intact. Fortunately he did no more, and refrained from advancing against Talavera, a step which from his earlier record we should judge that he might well have taken into consideration.

On the part of the allies things were now in a state of suspense from which they were not to stir for a fortnight. Cuesta was waiting for Wellesley, Wellesley was pushing forward from Zarza la Mayor to join Cuesta. Venegas was recovering at Santa Cruz de Mudela from the fatigues of his fruitless expedition into La Mancha.

But on the French side matters suffered a sudden change in the last days of July--the hand of the Emperor was stretched out from the banks of the Danube to alter the general dispositions of the army of Spain. On June 12 he had dictated at Schönbrunn a new plan of campaign, based on information which was already many weeks old when it reached him. At this date the Emperor was barely aware that Soult was being pressed by Wellesley in Northern Portugal. He had no detailed knowledge of what was taking place in Galicia or the Asturias, and was profoundly ignorant of the intrigues at Oporto which afterwards roused his indignation. But he was convinced that the English army was the one hostile force in Spain which ought to engage the attention of his lieutenants. Acting on this belief he issued an order that the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps--those of Soult, Mortier, and Ney--were to be united into a single army, and to be told off to the task of evicting Wellesley from Portugal. They were to put aside for the present all such subsidiary enterprises as the subjection of Galicia and the Asturias, and to devote themselves solely to ‘beating, hunting down, and casting into the sea the British army. If the three Corps join in good time the enemy ought to be crushed, and then the Spanish war will come to an end. But the troops must be moved in masses and not march in small detachments.... Putting aside all personal considerations, I give the command of the united army to the Duke of Dalmatia, as the senior marshal. His three Corps ought to amount to something between 50,000 and 60,000 men[583].’

[583] Napoleon to Clarke [Minister of War], from Schönbrunn, June 12, 1809.

This dispatch reached King Joseph at El Moral in La Mancha on July 1, and Soult at Zamora on July 2. It had been drawn up in view of events that were taking place about May 15. It presupposed that the British army was still in Northern Portugal, in close touch with Soult, and that Victor was in Estremadura[584]. As a matter of fact Soult was on this day leading his dilapidated corps down the Esla, at the end of his retreat from Galicia. Ney, furious at the way in which his colleague had deserted him, had descended to Astorga three days before. Mortier was at Valladolid, just about to march for Villacastin and Madrid, for the King had determined to draw him down to aid in the defence of the capital. Finally, Cuesta, instead of lying in the Sierra Morena, as he was when Napoleon drew up his orders, was now on the Tagus, while Wellesley was no longer in touch with Soult on the Douro, but preparing to fall upon Victor in New Castile. The whole situation was so changed that the commentary which the Emperor appended to his orders was hopelessly out of date--as was always bound to be the case so long as he persisted in endeavouring to direct the course of affairs in Spain from the suburbs of Vienna.

[584] The Emperor’s dispatch contained many rebukes to Victor for not pushing towards the North, to join hands with Soult. Jourdan very truly remarks that if the 1st Corps had been sent in that direction, King Joseph must infallibly have lost Madrid.

Soult was overjoyed at receiving the splendid charge which the Emperor’s decree put into his hands, though he must have felt secret qualms at the idea that ere long some account of his doings at Oporto must reach the imperial head quarters and provoke his master’s wrath. There was a bad quarter of an hour to come[585]. But meanwhile he was given a formidable army, and might hope to retrieve the laurels that he had lost in Portugal, being now in a position to attack the British with an overwhelming superiority of numbers. It must have been specially delightful to him to find that Ney had been put under his orders, so that he would be able to meet his angry colleague in the character of a superior officer dealing with an insubordinate lieutenant.

[585] The Emperor’s stormy dispatch came in due course, but only in September, see pp. 276-7.

Soult’s first action, on finding himself placed in command of the whole of the French forces in North-western Spain, was to issue orders to Mortier to march on Salamanca, and to Ney to bring the 6th Corps down to Benavente. These dispositions clearly indicate an intention of falling upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and assailing Northern Portugal--the plan which the Duke of Dalmatia had broached to the King in his letter from Puebla de Senabria on June 25, before he had received the news that the 5th and 6th Corps had been added to his command.

It is clear that on July 2 Soult had no knowledge of Wellesley’s movements, and thought that the British army was quite as likely to be aiming at Salamanca as at Madrid. It is also evident that he was aware that he would be unable to move for some weeks. Till the 2nd Corps should have received the clothing, munitions, and artillery which had been promised it, it could not possibly take the field for the invasion of Portugal.

Soult, therefore, was obliged to wait till his stores should be replenished, and till the two corps from Astorga and Valladolid should concentrate on his flanks. It was while he was remaining perforce in this posture of expectation that the news of the real condition of affairs in New Castile was at last brought to him.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER III

WELLESLEY AND CUESTA: THE INTERVIEW AT MIRABETE

It was not till the third day of July that Wellesley had been able to cross the Spanish border. Since Victor had assumed his new position to the north of the Tagus as early as the nineteenth of the preceding month, there was a perilous fortnight during which Cuesta and his army were left alone to face the French. All through this time of waiting, the British Commander-in-chief was haunted by the dread that the old Captain-General might repeat his earlier errors, and once more--as at Rio Seco and Medellin--court a pitched battle. Wellesley had done his best to urge caution, by letters written not only to Cuesta himself, but to his Chief-of-the-staff O’Donoju and to Colonel Roche, who had now replaced Bourke as British representative at the head quarters of the Army of Estremadura. Fortunately they were not needed: the Spanish General was for once cautious: he followed Victor at a respectful distance, and when he had reached the Tagus and repaired the bridge of Almaraz, held back his army to the southern bank and only pushed a few small detachments beyond the stream to search for the enemy. Since the French had withdrawn to Talavera on June 26 there was no collision. The cavalry of the 1st Corps were discovered upon the upper Tietar and the Alberche, but they preserved a defensive attitude, and the Spaniards did not provoke them by any rash attempt to drive them back upon their main body. All remained quiet, as Wellesley had rather desired than expected.

Cuesta’s strategical position, therefore, was perfectly secure, since he kept his main body to the south of the river, and showed no desire to meddle with Victor before the arrival of the British. At this moment military affairs were not the only things that were engaging the attention of the old Captain-General. He was watching with considerable anxiety the course of events at Seville, where he was aware that he had many enemies. Ever since his high-handed action against the deputies of Leon in the preceding autumn, he knew that the Central Junta, and especially its Liberal wing, viewed him with suspicion and dislike. It was with great reluctance that they had placed him in command of the Estremaduran army, and if he had not been popular with the Conservative and clerical party and with some of the military cliques, he would not have retained his post for long. At this moment there were many intrigues stirring in Andalusia, and if some of them were directed against the Junta, others had no other end than the changing of the commanders of the various armies. While the Junta were debating about forms of government, and especially about the summoning of a national Cortes in the autumn, there were a number of officers of damaged reputation whose main object was to recover the military rank of which they had been deprived after misfortunes in the field. Infantado, who thought that it was absurd that he should have been disgraced after Ucles, while Cuesta had been rewarded after Medellin, was at the head of one party of intriguers, which included Francisco Palafox and the Conde de Montijo, and had secured the aid of Colonel Doyle, late British agent in Aragon and Catalonia, an officer who showed a lamentable readiness to throw himself into the intestine quarrels of the Spanish factions[586]. Their actions went to the very edge of high treason, for Montijo stirred up a riot at Granada on April 16, attacked the provincial authorities, and almost succeeded in carrying out a _pronunciamiento_ which must have led to civil war. The Junta did no more than banish him to San Lucar, from which place he continued his plots with Infantado, in spite of the warning that he had received.

[586] Doyle, as his numerous letters in the Record Office show, was such a furious partisan of the family of Palafox, that he believed that all the Spanish authorities were in a conspiracy to keep them down. He especially hated Blake.

In Seville, faction if not so openly displayed was equally violent. There was, as we have already said, a large section of the Junta whose dearest wish would have been to displace Cuesta: it was they who had obtained the nomination of Venegas to take charge of the troops in La Mancha, merely because he was known to be an enemy of the elder general. Yet since the two armies would have to co-operate in any attempt to recover Madrid, it was clearly inexpedient that their commanders should be at enmity. Some of the politicians at Seville were set on giving high command to the Duke of Albuquerque, an energetic and ambitious officer, but one gifted with the talent of quarrelling with every superior under whom he served: he was now bickering with Cuesta just as in March he had bickered with Cartaojal. The Duke was a great admirer of all things English, and a personal friend of Frere, the British minister. The latter did his best to support his pretensions, often expressing in official correspondence with the Junta a desire that Albuquerque might be given an independent corps, and entrusted with the charge of the movement that was to be concerted in conjunction with Wellesley’s army.

But it was not so much Albuquerque as Wellesley himself that Cuesta dreaded as a possible successor. For Frere was possessed with the notion that the time had now arrived at which it would be possible to press for the appointment of a single Commander-in-chief of all the Spanish armies. The obvious person to fill this post was the victor of Vimiero and Oporto, if only Spanish pride would consent to the appointment of a foreigner. Frere had sufficient sense to refrain from openly publishing his idea. But he was continually ventilating it to his private friends in the Junta, in season and out of season. There can be no doubt that both from the military and the political point of view the results of Wellesley’s exaltation to the position of Generalissimo would have been excellent. If he had controlled the whole of the Spanish armies in the summer of 1809, the course of affairs in the Peninsula would have taken a very different turn, and the campaign of Talavera would not have been wrecked by the hopeless want of co-operation between the allied armies. But it was not yet the time to press for the appointment: great as Wellesley’s reputation already was, when compared with that of any Spanish general, it was still not so splendid or so commanding as to compel assent to his promotion[587]. Legitimate national pride stood in the way, and even after Espinosa, and Tudela, and Medellin the Spaniards could not believe that it was necessary for them to entrust the whole responsibility for the defence of their country to the foreigner. Only a few of the politicians of Seville showed any liking for the project. Wellesley himself would have desired nothing so much as this appointment, but being wiser and less hopeful than Frere, he thought it useless to press the point. When the sanguine diplomat wrote to him, early in June, to detail his attempts to bring home the advisability of the project to his Spanish friends, the general’s reply was cautious in the extreme. ‘I am much flattered,’ he said, ‘by the notion entertained by some of the persons in authority at Seville, of appointing me to the command of the Spanish armies. I have received no instruction from Government upon that subject: but I believe that it was considered an object of great importance in England that the Commander-in-chief of the British troops should have that situation. But it is one more likely to be attained by refraining from pressing it, and leaving it to the Spanish themselves to discover the expediency of the arrangement, than by any suggestion on our parts.’ He concluded by informing Frere that he could not conceive that his insinuation was likely to have any effect, and that the opinion of the British Ministry was probably correct--viz. that at present national jealousy made the project hopeless[588].

[587] On June 9, Frere writes to tell Wellesley that if he could only have destroyed Soult at Oporto, instead of merely chasing him across the frontier, it would have been possible to secure him the post of Generalissimo at once. This chance had gone by, but ‘your friends here (among whom you may count Mr. de Garay) are doing their best for you.’ [Record Office, from Seville, June 9, 1809.]

[588] Wellington to Frere, from Abrantes, June 16, 1809.

Now it was impossible that Frere’s well-meaning but mistaken endeavours should escape the notice of Cuesta’s friends in Seville. The British Minister had spoken to so many politicians on the subject, that we cannot doubt that his colloquies were promptly reported to the Captain-General of Estremadura. This fact goes far to explain Cuesta’s surly and impracticable behaviour towards Wellesley during the Talavera campaign. He disliked his destined colleague not only because he was a foreigner, and because he showed himself strong-willed and outspoken during their intercourse, but because he believed that the Englishman was intriguing behind his back to obtain the post of Generalissimo. This belief made him determined to assert his independence on the most trifling matters, loth to fall in with even the most reasonable plans, and suspicious that every proposal made to him concealed some trap. He attributed to Wellesley the design of getting rid of him, and was naturally determined to do nothing to forward it.

The English officers who studied Cuesta’s conduct from the outside, during the Talavera campaign, attributed his irrational movements and his hopeless impracticability to a mere mixture of pride, stupidity, and obstinacy. They were wrong; the dominant impulse was resentment, jealousy, and suspicion--a combination far more deadly in its results than the other. He awaited the approach of Wellesley with a predisposition to quarrel and a well-developed personal enmity, whose existence the British general had not yet realized.

We have dealt in the last chapter with the strength and organization of the British army at the moment when Wellesley crossed the frontier on July 3. It remains to speak of the two Spanish armies which were to take part in the campaign. We have already seen that Cuesta’s host had been reinforced after Medellin with a new brigade of Granadan levies, and a whole division taken from the army of La Mancha[589]. Since that date he had received large drafts both of infantry and cavalry from Andalusia. Six more regiments of horse had reached him, besides reinforcements for his old corps. All were now strong in numbers, and averaged between 400 and 500 sabres, so that by the middle of June he had fully 7,000 mounted men under his orders. Eight or nine additional regiments of infantry had also come to hand since April--some of them new Andalusian levies, others old corps whose _cadres_ had been filled up since the disaster of Ucles. His infantry counted about 35,000 bayonets, divided into five divisions and a ‘vanguard’: the latter under Zayas was about 4,000 strong, each of the others exceeded 5,000. The cavalry formed two divisions, under Henestrosa and Albuquerque, one composed of seven, one of six regiments. There were thirty guns--some of heavy calibre, nine-and twelve-pounders--with about 800 artillerymen. The whole army, inclusive of sick and detached, amounted to 42,000 men, of whom perhaps 36,000 were efficients present with the colours[590].

[589] I can nowhere find the date of the transference, but it took place before July: the old regiments of Calatrava, Sagunto, Alcantara, and Pavia, which were with Venegas’s army in March, had been transferred to Cuesta’s by June, as also the new regiments of Sevilla, and Cazadores de Madrid. My most valuable source of information is an unpublished dispatch of Cuesta’s in the Madrid War Office, which gives all the names of regiments, but not their numbers.

[590] These totals may be regarded as certain, being drawn from the dispatch of Cuesta’s alluded to above, which I was fortunate enough to find at Madrid. Unfortunately no regimental figures are given, only the gross total.

The second Spanish army, that of La Mancha under Venegas, was much weaker, having furnished heavy detachments to reinforce Cuesta before it took the field in June. Its base was the old ‘Army of the Centre,’ which had been commanded by Castaños and Infantado. Some twenty battalions that had seen service in the campaign of Tudela were still in its ranks: they had been recruited up to an average of 500 or 600 bayonets. The rest of the force was composed of new Andalusian regiments, raised in the winter and spring, some of which had taken part in the rout of Ciudad Real under Cartaojal, while others had never before entered the field. The gross total of the army on June 16 was 26,298 men, of whom 3,383 were cavalry. Deducting the sick in hospital, Venegas could dispose of some 23,000 sabres and bayonets, distributed into five divisions. The horsemen in this army were not formed into separate brigades, but allotted as divisional cavalry to the infantry units. There was little to choose, in point of efficiency, between the Estremaduran army and that of La Mancha; both contained too many raw troops, and in both, as was soon to be proved, the bulk of the cavalry was still as untrustworthy as it had shown itself in previous engagements.

The Spaniards therefore could put into the field for the campaign of July on the Tagus some 60,000 men. But the fatal want of unity in command was to prevent them from co-ordinating their movements and acting as integral parts of a single army guided by a single will. Venegas was to a certain degree supposed to be under Cuesta’s authority, but as he was continually receiving orders directly from the Junta, and was treated by them as an independent commander, he practically was enabled to do much as he pleased. Being a personal enemy of Cuesta, he had every inducement to play his own game, and did not scruple to do so at the most important crisis of the campaign,--covering his disregard of the directions of his senior by the easy pretext of a desire to execute those of the central government.

On July 15, the day when his share in the campaign commenced, the head quarters of Venegas were at Santa Cruz de Mudela, just outside the northern exit of the Despeña Perros. His outposts lay in front, at El Moral, Valdepeñas, and Villanueva de los Infantes. He was divided by a considerable distance--some twenty-five miles--from the advanced cavalry of Sebastiani’s corps, whose nearest detachment was placed at Villaharta, where the high-road to Madrid crosses the river Giguela.

Meanwhile we must return to Wellesley, who having crossed the frontier on July 3, was now moving forward by short marches to Plasencia. On the fourth the head quarters were at Zarza la Mayor, on the sixth at Coria, on the seventh at Galisteo; on the eighth Plasencia was reached, and the general halted the army, while he should ride over to Almaraz and confer in person with Cuesta on the details of their plan of campaign. In the valley of the Alagon, where the country was almost untouched by the hand of war, provisions were obtainable in some quantity, but every Spanish informant agreed that when the troops dropped down to the Tagus they would find the land completely devastated. Wellesley was therefore most anxious to organize a great dépôt of food before moving on: the local authorities professed great readiness to supply him, and he contracted with the Alcaldes of the fertile Vera de Plasencia for 250,000 rations of flour to be delivered during the next ten days[591]. Lozano de Torres, the Spanish commissary-general sent by the Junta to the British head quarters, promised his aid in collecting the food, but even before Wellesley departed to visit Cuesta, he had begun to conceive doubts whether supplies would be easily procurable. The difficulty was want of transport--the army had marched from Portugal with a light equipment, and had no carts to spare for scouring the country-side in search of flour. The General had relied on the assurances sent him from Seville to the effect that he would easily be able to find local transport in the intact regions about Coria and Plasencia: but he was disappointed: very few carts could be secured, and the store of food in the possession of the army seemed to shrink rather than to increase during every day that the army remained in the valley of the Alagon, though the region was fruitful and undevastated. It is certain that the British commissaries had not yet mastered the art of gathering in provisions from the country-side, and that the Spanish local authorities could not be made to understand the necessity for punctuality and dispatch in the delivery of the promised supplies.

[591] Wellesley to Frere, _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 524.

On July 10 Wellesley started off with the head-quarters staff to visit Cuesta, at his camp beyond the bridge of Almaraz, there to concert the details of their joint advance. Owing to an error made by his guides he arrived after dusk at the hamlet below the Puerto de Mirabete, around which the main body of the Army of Estremadura was encamped. The Captain-General had drawn out his troops in the afternoon for the inspection of the British commander. When at last he appeared they had been four hours under arms in momentary expectation of the arrival of their distinguished visitor, and Cuesta himself, though still lame from the effect of his bruises at Medellin, had sat on horseback at their head during the greater part of that time.

Two admirable accounts of the review of the Estremaduran host in the darkness were written by members of Wellesley’s staff. It is well worth while to quote one of them[592], for the narrative expresses with perfect clearness the effect which the sight of the Spanish troops made upon their allies:--

[592] That of Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry) on pp. 382-3 of the first volume of his _History of the Peninsular War_.

‘Our arrival at the camp was announced by a general discharge of artillery, upon which an immense number of torches were made to blaze up, and we passed the entire Spanish line in review by their light. The effect produced by these arrangements was one of no ordinary character. The torches, held aloft at moderate intervals, threw a red and wavering light over the whole scene, permitting at the same time its minuter parts to be here and there cast into the shade, while the grim and swarthy visages of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uniforms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as the flashes fell upon them. Nor was Cuesta himself an object to be passed by without notice: the old man preceded us, not so much sitting upon his horse as held upon it by two pages, at the imminent risk of being overthrown whenever a cannon was discharged, or a torch flamed out with peculiar brightness. His physical debility was so observable as clearly to mark his unfitness for the situation which he held. As to his mental powers, he gave us little opportunity of judging, inasmuch as he scarcely uttered five words during the continuance of our visit: but his corporal infirmities were ever at absolute variance with all a general’s duties.

‘In this way we passed by about 6,000 cavalry drawn up in rank entire, and not less than twenty battalions of infantry, each of 700 to 800 bayonets. They were all, without exception, remarkably fine men. Some indeed were very young--too young for service--particularly among the recruits who had lately joined. But to take them all in all, it would not have been easy to find a stouter or more hardy looking body of soldiers in any European service. Of their appointments it was not possible to speak in the same terms of commendation. There were battalions whose arms, accoutrements, and even clothing might be pronounced respectable[593]: but in general they were deficient, particularly in shoes. It was easy to perceive, from the attitude in which they stood, and the manner in which they handled their arms, that little or no discipline prevailed among them: they could not but be regarded as raw levies. Speaking of them in the aggregate they were little better than bold peasantry, armed partially like soldiers, but completely unacquainted with a soldier’s duty. This remark applied to the cavalry as much as to the infantry. Many of the horses were good, but the riders manifestly knew nothing of movement or of discipline: and they were on this account, as also on that of miserable equipment, quite unfit for service. The generals appeared to have been selected by one rule alone--that of seniority. They were almost all old men, and, except O’Donoju and Zayas, evidently incapable of bearing the fatigues or surmounting the difficulties of a campaign. It was not so with the colonels and battalion commanders, who appeared to be young and active, and some of whom were, we had reason to believe, learning to become skilful officers.... Cuesta seemed particularly unwilling that any of his generals should hold any serious conversation with us. It is true that he presented them one by one to Sir Arthur, but no words were exchanged on the occasion, and each retired after he had made his bow.’ Albuquerque, of whom the Captain-General was particularly jealous, had been relegated with his division to Arzobispo, and did not appear on the scene.

[593] As to the equipment of the Spaniards, the following quotation from Leslie (p. 135) may be worth giving: ‘Their uniforms were of every variety of colour, the equipment and appointments of the most inferior description. One could not but lament these defects, for the men were remarkably fine, possessing all the essential qualities to make good soldiers--courage, patience, and soberness. Their officers, in general, were the very reverse! The line infantry were in blue uniforms with red facings. The Provincial Corps, called “Volunteers,” were mostly dressed in the brown Spanish cloth of the country, with green or yellow facings. Some had chakoes, others broad-brimmed hats with the rim turned up at one side: all had cap-plates of tin announcing their designation. Some had belts, others none. They had no pouches, but a broad belt of soft leather, in which were placed a row of tin tubes, each holding a cartridge, with a fold of leather to cover them, fastened round the waist. The cavalry were heavy and light dragoons, with some regiments of Hussars. Some were tolerably well dressed, in blue or yellow uniforms with red facings. Some had boots, but more long leather leggings, coming up above the knee. The horses were small, active, and hardy, of the Spanish Barbary breed.’

The all-important plan of campaign was settled at a long conference--it lasted for four hours--on the morning of the following day. According to all accounts the scene at the interview must have been curious. Cuesta could not, or would not, speak French: Wellesley was not yet able to express himself fluently in Spanish. Accordingly, O’Donoju, the chief of the staff of the Army of Estremadura, acted as interpreter between them, rendering Wellesley’s views into Spanish and Cuesta’s into English. The greater part of the discussion consisted in the bringing forward of plans by the British commander and their rejection by the Captain-General. Cuesta was full of suspicion, and saw a trap in every proposal that was made to him: he imagined that Wellesley’s main object was to edge him out of the supreme command. He was almost silent throughout the interview, only opening his lips to give emphatic negatives, for which O’Donoju proceeded to find ingenious and elaborate explanations.

It was not the principles on which the campaign was to be conducted, but the details of the distribution of the troops on which the trouble arose. The enemy’s position and force was fairly well known to both generals, except in one all-important particular. They were aware that Victor lay behind the Alberche with not much more than 22,000 men, that Sebastiani was at Madridejos with a somewhat smaller force[594], and that King Joseph with his central reserve, which they over-estimated at 12,000 men, was able at any moment to join the 1st Corps. Hence they expected to find some 34,000 French troops at Talavera, and rightly considered that with the 55,000 men of their two armies they ought to give a good account of them. Sebastiani, as they supposed, might be left out of the game, for occupation for him would be found by the army of La Mancha, which was to be told off for this purpose and directed to cling to the skirts of the 4th Corps and never to lose sight of it. As Venegas would have, according to their calculations, nearly double the numbers of Sebastiani, he would have no difficulty in keeping him in check.

[594] They estimated him at only 10,000 men, but he had really 20,000, Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 15, from Plasencia.

But it was not only on the French troops in New Castile that watch had to be kept. It was necessary to take into account the enemy beyond the mountains, in the valley of the Douro. The allied generals were aware that Mortier and Soult must both be considered. The former they knew to be at Valladolid, and they had learnt that King Joseph was proposing to bring him down towards Madrid--as was indeed the fact. Accordingly they expected that he might turn up in a few days somewhere in the direction of Avila. Soult they knew to be at Zamora, and from the dispatches captured with General Franceschi ten days before, they had a good knowledge of his force and intentions. A study of these documents led them to conclude that he could not move for many weeks, owing to the dilapidated state of his corps--which he had painted in the most moving terms in his letters to King Joseph[595]. They also gathered that if he moved at all, he would be inclined to threaten Northern Portugal or Ciudad Rodrigo: in the dispatches captured with Franceschi he had named Braganza as a point at which he might strike. Accordingly they opined that he need not be taken very seriously into consideration, especially as he was wholly destitute of artillery[596]. Yet he might be drawn into the field by the news that Madrid was in danger. If he were induced to bring help to the King, he would almost certainly work by making a diversion against the communications of the British army, and not by directly joining himself to Joseph’s army by the long and circuitous march from Zamora to Madrid. To carry out such a diversion he would be obliged to cross the lofty Sierra de Francia by one of the passes which lead from the Salamanca region into the valley of the Alagon--perhaps by the defile of Perales, but much more probably by the better known and more practicable pass of Baños. Wellesley took the possibility of this movement into serious consideration, but did not think that it would be likely to cause him much danger if it should occur, for he believed that Soult would bring with him no more than the 15,000 or 18,000 men of his own 2nd Corps. That he would appear not with such a small force, but with Ney and Mortier in his wake, leading an army of 50,000 bayonets, did not enter into the mind of the British commander. Mortier was thought to be moving in the direction of Avila: Ney was believed to be contending with the Galician insurgents in the remote regions about Lugo and Corunna. The news of his arrival at Astorga had not yet reached the allied camps, and he was neglected as a factor in the situation. Wellesley and Cuesta had no conception that any force save that of Soult was likely to menace their northern flank and their line of communications when they committed themselves to their advance on Madrid. To provide against a possible movement of the 2nd Corps into the valley of the Tagus, therefore, all that was necessary was to hold the defiles of Perales and Baños. The former had already been seen to, for even before the meeting of Wellesley and Cuesta, Carlos d’España had blocked it with two or three battalions drawn from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. For the latter Wellesley hoped that Cuesta would provide a sufficient garrison[597]. The old Captain-General promised to do so, but only sent 600 men under the Marquis Del Reino, a wholly inadequate detachment[598].

[595] Soult had written [from Puebla de Senabria, June 25]: ‘Je me propose de reposer les troupes trois ou quatre jours: pendant ce temps elles se prépareront des subsistances, on raccommodera la chaussure, les chevaux seront ferrés, et je menacerai de nouveau le Portugal: peut-être même je ferai faire une incursion vers Bragance, afin d’opérer une diversion qui ne peut pas manquer de produire quelque effet.... Je me fais précéder à Zamora (où je compte être rendu le 2 juillet) par l’ordonnateur Le Noble, qui doit réclamer près l’intendant-général de l’armée des moyens en tout genre qui me manquent--tel que l’habillement, chaussure, ambulance, officiers de santé, administration, transport militaire, payeurs, argent pour solde et dépenses extraordinaires, postes etc. J’ai l’honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner donner des ordres pour qu’il soit fait droit a ses demandes: mes besoins sont très grands.... Il y a plus de cinq mois que je n’ai reçu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni secours, par conséquent je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses.’

[596] Wellesley’s views at this moment appear in his correspondence, e.g. to Mr. Villiers, July 8: ‘I defy Soult to do Beresford or Portugal any injury as long as his army is in its present situation--or any amelioration of that situation which can be produced in a short period of time.’ To Beresford, July 9: ‘I have no apprehension that Soult will be able to do anything with his corps for some time, but I think that column ought to be watched.’ To Beresford, July 14: ‘I do not believe that Ney has quitted Galicia, at least we have not heard that he has. Soult can do nothing against Portugal, for he is in a most miserable state, without arms, artillery or ammunition, stores, &c.’

[597] Wellesley to Beresford, July 9: ‘I have not forgotten either the Puerto de Baños or the Puerto de Perales, and have called upon Cuesta to occupy both. The former is already held, and the latter will be so in a day or two.’ [This was unfortunately not to be the case.]

[598] I cannot discover the names of the two very weak battalions, the smallest in Cuesta’s army, which were detached for this purpose under Del Reino. They are _not_ the same as the two battalions which joined Wilson (Merida and 3rd of Seville).

Wellesley’s first proposal to his Spanish colleague was that the main bodies of both armies should advance against Victor, while a detachment of 10,000 men should move out to the left, in the direction of Avila, to look for Mortier, if he were to be found in that direction, and if not to turn the enemy’s right and threaten Madrid. He hoped that Venegas and the army of La Mancha might at the same time move forward against Sebastiani, and keep him so fully employed that he would not be able to spare a man to aid Victor and King Joseph.

Cuesta at once refused to make any detachment in the direction of Avila from his own army, and suggested that Wellesley should find the 10,000 men required for this diversion. The English general objected that it would take exactly half his force, and that he could not split up such a small unit, while the Spaniards could easily spare such a number of troops from their total of 36,000 men. This argument failed to move Cuesta, and the project was dropped, Wellesley thinking that it was not strictly necessary, though very advisable[599].

[599] Wellesley to Frere, July 13: ‘You will see, in the accompanying letter, an account of my endeavour to prevail on General Cuesta to make a detachment upon Avila. I agree with you that it would be a great advantage from a military point of view ... but I must at the same time inform you that I do not consider the movement to be _necessary_ as a military measure.’ Frere and Wellesley had hoped that Albuquerque might be placed in command of this large detachment, and might distinguish himself at its head.

The only flanking force which was finally set aside for operations on the left wing, for the observation of the French about Avila and the feint at Madrid, consisted of Sir Robert Wilson’s 1,500 Portuguese, and a corresponding body of two battalions and one squadron from the Spanish army[600]--about 3,500 men in all. It played a part of some little importance in the campaign, but it is hard to see that it would have exercised any dominant influence even if it had been raised to the full strength that Wellesley had desired. Mortier, as a matter of fact, was not near Avila, and so the 10,000 men sent in this direction would not have served the end that the British general expected. The 5th Corps had been called off by Soult, contrary to the wishes of the King, and no body of troops was needed to contain it, on this part of the theatre of war. It was ultimately to appear at a very different point, where no provision had been made for its reception.

[600] Battalions of Merida (1,170 bayonets) and 3rd of Seville (810 bayonets).

Far more important were the arrangements which Wellesley and Cuesta made for the diversion on their other flank. It was from the miscarriage of this operation, owing to the wilful disobedience of the officer charged with it, that the failure of the whole campaign was to come about. They agreed that Venegas with the 23,000 men of the army of La Mancha, was to move up the high-road from his position at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and drive Sebastiani before him. Having pushed back the 4th Corps to the Tagus, Venegas was then to endeavour to force the passage of that river either at Aranjuez or at Fuentedueñas, and to threaten Madrid. It was calculated that Sebastiani would be forced to keep between him and the capital, and would be unable to spare a man to reinforce Victor and King Joseph. Thus Wellesley and Cuesta with 56,000 men would close on the King and the Marshal, who could not have more than 35,000, and (as it was hoped) defeat them or at least manœuvre them out of Madrid. A glance at the map will show one peculiarity of this plan: it would have been more natural to bid Venegas march by the bridge of Toledo rather than by those of Aranjuez and Fuentedueñas; to use the latter he would have to move towards his right, and to separate himself by a long gap from the main army of the allies. At Toledo he would be within thirty-five miles of them--at Aranjuez seventy, at Fuentedueñas 100 miles would lie between him and the troops of Wellesley and Cuesta. It would appear that the two generals at their colloquy came to the conclusion that by ordering Venegas to use the eastern passages of the Tagus they would compel Sebastiani to remove eastward also, so that he would be out of supporting distance of Victor. They recognized the bare possibility that Sebastiani might refuse to devote himself to the task of holding back the army of La Mancha, might leave Madrid to its fate, and then hurry off to join the King and the 1st Corps in an assault on the main Anglo-Spanish army. In this case they settled that Venegas should march on the capital and seize it, a move which (as they supposed) would force Joseph to turn back or to re-divide his army[601]. But it is clear that they did not expect to have to fight Victor, the King, and Sebastiani combined, as they were ultimately forced to do at Talavera on July 28. They supposed that Venegas would find occupation for the 4th Corps, and that they might count on finding only the 1st Corps and Joseph’s Madrid reserves in front of them.

[601] All these details as to the joint plan are better expressed in Cuesta’s Apologetic _Manifesto_, published after his resignation, than in Wellesley’s _Dispatches_ to Castlereagh and Frere.

When armies are working in a joint operation from separate bases it is all-important that they should time their movements with the nicest exactitude. This Wellesley and Cuesta attempted to secure, by sending to Venegas an elaborate time-table. He was ordered to be at Madridejos on July 19, at Tembleque on the twentieth, at Santa Cruz de la Zarza on the twenty-first, and at the bridge of Fuentedueñas on the twenty-second or twenty-third. All this was on the supposition that Sebastiani would have about 12,000 men and would give ground whenever pressed. If he turned out by some unlikely chance--presumably by having rallied the King’s reserves--to be much stronger, Venegas was to manœuvre in the direction of Tarancon, to avoid a general action, and if necessary to retreat towards the Passes from which he had started. It would be rather an advantage than otherwise if (contrary to all probability) the French had concentrated their main force against the army of La Mancha, for this would leave Victor helpless in front of the united hosts of Wellesley and Cuesta, which would outnumber him by two to one.

What the allied generals never expected was that Venegas would let Sebastiani slip away from his front, without any attempt to hold him, and would then (instead of marching on Madrid) waste the critical days of the campaign (July 24-29) in miserable delays between Toledo and Aranjuez, when there was absolutely no French field-force between him and Madrid, nor any hostile troops whatever in his neighbourhood save a weak division of 3,000 men in garrison at Toledo. The failure of the Talavera campaign is due even more to this wretched indecision and disobedience to orders on the part of Venegas than to the eccentricities and errors of Cuesta. If the army of La Mancha had kept Sebastiani in check, and refused to allow him to abscond, there would have been no battles on the Alberche on July 27-28, for the French would never have dared to face the Anglo-Spaniards of the main host without the assistance of the 4th Corps.

But to return to the joint plan of Wellesley and Cuesta: on July 23, the day on which Venegas was to reach Fuentedueñas (or Aranjuez) the 56,000 men of the grand army were to be assailing Victor behind the Alberche. The British were to cross the Tietar at Bazagona on the eighteenth and follow the high-road Navalmoral-Oropesa. The Estremadurans, passing the Tagus at Almaraz and Arzobispo, were to move by the parallel route along the river bank by La Calzada and Calera, which is only five or six miles distant from the great _chaussée_. Thus the two armies would be in close touch with each other, and would not be caught apart by the enemy. On reaching Talavera they were to force the fords of the Alberche and fall upon Victor in his cantonments behind that stream. Sir Robert Wilson and the 3,500 men of his mixed Spanish and Portuguese detachment were to move up as the flank-guard of the allied host, and to push by the head waters of the Tietar for Escalona on the side-road to Madrid[602].

[602] Cuesta’s and Wellesley’s accounts of their joint plan on the whole agree wonderfully well.

Criticisms of the most acrimonious kind have been brought to bear on this plan by English, French, and Spanish writers. Many of them are undeserved; in particular the tritest objection of all, made _ex post facto_ by those who only look at the actual course of the campaign, that Wellesley was exposing his communications to the united forces of Soult, Ney, and Mortier. There was on July 10, when Cuesta and Wellesley met, no reason whatever for apprehending the contingency of the march of the three marshals upon Plasencia. Soult, as his own letters of June 25 bore witness, was not in a condition to move--he had not a single piece of artillery, and his troops were in dire need of rest and re-equipment. Ney was believed to be at Corunna or Lugo--Soult’s intercepted dispatches spoke of the 6th Corps as being destined to remain behind in Galicia, and he (as the allied generals supposed) ought best to have known what his colleague was about to do. How could they have guessed that, in wrath at his desertion by the Duke of Dalmatia, Ney would evacuate the whole kingdom, abandon fortresses like Ferrol and Corunna, and march for Astorga? Without Ney’s corps to aid him, Soult could not possibly have marched on Plasencia--to have done so with the 2nd Corps alone would have exposed him to being beset by Wellesley on one side and by Beresford on the other. As to Mortier and the 5th Corps, Cuesta and Wellesley undervalued their strength, being unaware that Kellermann had sent back from the Asturias the division that had been lent him for his expedition to Oviedo. They thought that the Duke of Treviso’s force was more like 7,000 than 17,000 bayonets, and--such as it was--they had the best of reasons for believing that it was more likely to march on Madrid by Avila than to join Soult, for they had before them an intercepted dispatch from the King, bidding Mortier to move down to Villacastin in order to be in supporting distance of the capital and the 1st Corps.

On the whole, therefore, the two generals must be excused for not foreseeing the descent of 50,000 men upon their communications, which took place three weeks after their meeting at the bridge of Almaraz: the data in their possession on July 10 made it appear most improbable.

A much more valid criticism is that which blames the method of co-operation with Venegas which was employed. ‘Double external lines of operations’ against an enemy placed in a central position are notoriously perilous, and the particular movement on Fuentedueñas, which the army of La Mancha was ordered to execute, was one which took it as far as possible from Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s main body. Yet it may be urged in their defence that, if they had drawn in Venegas to join them, they would have got little profit out of having 23,000 more Spaniards on the Alberche. Sebastiani on the other hand, who could join Victor at the same moment that the corps from La Mancha joined the allies, would bring some 17,000 excellent troops to Talavera. The benefit of drawing in Venegas would be much less than the disadvantage of drawing in Sebastiani to the main theatre of war. Hence came the idea that the army from the Passes must be devoted to the sole purpose of keeping the 4th Corps as far as possible from the Alberche. Even knowing that Venegas was hostile to Cuesta, and that he was a man of no mark or capacity, Wellesley could not have expected that he would disobey orders, waste time, and fail utterly in keeping touch with Sebastiani or threatening Madrid.

The one irreparable fault in the drawing up of the whole plan of campaign was the fundamental one that Wellesley had undertaken to co-operate with Spanish armies before he had gauged the weak points of the generals and their men. If he had held the post of commander-in-chief of the allied forces, and could have issued orders that were obeyed without discussion, the case would have been different. But he had to act in conjunction with two colleagues, one of whom was suspicious of his intentions and jealous of his preponderant capacity, while the other deliberately neglected to carry out clear and cogent orders from his superior officer. Cuesta’s impracticability and Venegas’s disobedience could not have been foreseen by one who had no previous experience of Spanish armies. Still less had Wellesley realized all the defects of the Spanish rank and file when placed in line of battle. That he did not hold an exaggerated opinion of their merits when he started on the campaign is shown by letters which he wrote nine months before[603]. But he was still under the impression that, if cautiously handled, and not exposed to unnecessary dangers, they would do good service. He had yet to witness the gratuitous panic of Portago’s division on the eve of Talavera, and the helplessness of the Spanish cavalry at the combats of Gamonal and Arzobispo. After a month’s experience of Cuesta and his men, Wellesley vowed never again to take part in grand operations with a Spanish general as his equal and colleague. This was the teaching of experience--and on July 10 the experience was yet to come.

[603] See Wellington to Castlereagh, from Ramalhal, Sept. 1808.

The interview at the bridge of Almaraz had not been very satisfactory to Wellesley, but it was far from having undeceived him as to the full extent of the difficulties that lay before him. He wrote to Frere at Seville that he had been on the whole well received, and that Cuesta had not displayed any jealousy of him. As that sentiment was at this moment the predominant feeling in the old man’s breast, it is clear that he had succeeded in hiding it. But the obstinate silence of Wellesley’s colleague had worried him. O’Donoju had done all the talking, and ‘it was impossible to say what plans the general entertains.’ He was moreover somewhat perturbed by the rumours which his staff had picked up from the Estremaduran officers, to the effect that Cuesta was so much the enemy of the Central Junta that he was plotting a _pronunciamiento_ for its deposition[604]. As to the fighting powers of the Spanish army, Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh that ‘the troops were ill clothed but well armed, and the officers appeared to take pains with their discipline. Some of the corps of infantry were certainly good, and the horses of the cavalry were in good condition.’ Only ten days later he was to utter the very different opinion that ‘owing to their miserable state of discipline and their want of officers properly qualified, these troops are entirely incapable of performing any manœuvre however simple[605],’ and that ‘whole corps, officers and men, run off on the first appearance of danger[606].’

[604] ‘The general sentiment of the army appears to be contempt for the Junta and the present form of government, great confidence in Cuesta, and a belief that he is too powerful for the Junta, and will overturn that government. This sentiment appears to be so general that I conceive that the Duke of Albuquerque must entertain it equally with others: but I have not seen him.’ Wellesley to Frere from Plasencia, July 13.

[605] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Talavera, Aug. 1.

[606] Wellesley to his brother the Marquis Wellesley, Deleytosa, Aug. 8.

The British Commander-in-chief had indeed many moral and mental experiences to go through between the interview at Mirabete on July 10, and the retreat from Talavera on August 2!

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IV

THE MARCH TO TALAVERA: QUARREL OF WELLESLEY AND CUESTA

Having returned to his army on July 12, Wellesley gave orders for the whole force to get ready for a general advance on the morning of the eighteenth, the day which had been chosen for the commencement of operations at the conference of Almaraz. It would have been in every way desirable to have moved out at once, and not to have waited for these six days. If the march against Victor had been fixed for the thirteenth or fourteenth, the French would have been caught unprepared, for as late as the seventeenth King Joseph and his adviser Jourdan were under the impression that the force at Plasencia consisted of nothing more than a Portuguese division of 10,000 men, and it was only on the twenty-second that they received the definite information that the whole British army was upon the Tietar[607]. It is clear that, by advancing five days earlier than he actually did, Wellesley might have caught the enemy in a state of complete dispersion--the 4th Corps being on July 20 still at Madridejos in La Mancha, and the King with his reserves at Madrid. If attacked on the seventeenth or the eighteenth, as he might well have been, Victor would have found it impossible to call up Sebastiani in time, and must have fallen back in haste to the capital. The allies could then have cut him off from the 4th Corps, which must have retreated by a circuitous route, and could not have rejoined the main body of the French army in time for a battle in front of Madrid.

[607] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, and his letter to Soult of July 17, in which no sign whatever appears of the knowledge of the advance of the British from Portugal.

It would appear that Wellesley had fixed the date of his advance so late as the eighteenth mainly because of the difficulty as to the collection of provisions, which was now looming before him in larger proportions than ever. But it is possible that the necessity for allowing some days for the transmission of the plan of campaign to Venegas also counted for something in the drawing up of the time-table. It would have been rash to start before the army of La Mancha was prepared to take its part in the joint plan of operations. So much depended upon the diversion which Venegas was to execute, that it would have been a mistake to move before he could break up from his distant cantonments at Santa Cruz de Mudela. No word, however, concerning this appears in Wellesley’s correspondence. From July 13 to July 18 his dispatches show anxiety about nothing save his food and his transport. Every day that he stayed at Plasencia made him feel more uncomfortable concerning the all-important question of supplies. The corn which the Alcaldes of the Vera had promised to secure for him had begun to come in, though in driblets and small consignments, but there was no means of getting it forward: transport was absolutely unprocurable[608]. Wellesley sent officers to scour the country-side as far as Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo, but they could procure him neither mules nor carts. He also pressed the Spanish commissary-general, Lozano de Torres, to hunt up every animal that could be procured, but to small effect. The fact was that Estremadura was not at any time rich in beasts or vehicles, and that the peasantry had sent away most of those they owned while the French lay at Almaraz, lest they should be carried off by the enemy. Wellesley, who did not understand the limited resources of this part of Spain, was inclined to believe that the authorities were hostile or even treacherous. The Central Junta had promised him transport in order to make sure of his starting on the campaign along the Tagus, and when transport failed to appear, he attributed it to ill-will rather than to poverty. No doubt he was fully justified in his view that an army operating in a friendly country may rationally expect to draw both food and the means to carry it from the regions through which it is passing. But sometimes the provisions or the transport are not forthcoming merely because the one or the other is not to be found. It is certain that both Estremadura and the valley of the central Tagus were at this moment harried absolutely bare: Victor’s despairing letters from Caceres in May and from La Calzada in June are sufficient proof of the fact. In a district where the Marshal said that ‘he could not collect five days’ provisions by any manner of exertion,’ and that ‘his men were dropping down dead from actual starvation, so that he must retire or see his whole corps crumble away[609],’ it is clear that the Central Junta could not have created food for the British army. Cuesta’s troops were living from hand to mouth on supplies sent forward from Andalusia, or they could not have continued to exist in the land. The only district which was intact was that between Coria and Plasencia, and this was actually at the moment feeding the British army, and had done so now for ten days or more. But unfortunately the Vera could give corn but no draught animals. If Wellesley had known this, he must either have exerted himself to procure more transport before leaving Abrantes--a difficult task, for he had already drained Portugal of carts and mules--or have refused to march till the Spaniards sent him wagon trains from Andalusia. It would have taken months for the Junta to collect and send forward such trains: they had dispatched all that they could procure to Cuesta. The campaign on the Tagus, in short, would never have been fought if Wellesley had understood the state of affairs that he was to encounter.

[608] That food was coming in, but no transport, is clearly proved by Wellesley’s letter to the Junta of Plasencia on July 18: ‘Upon entering Spain I expected to derive that assistance in provisions and other means [i.e. transport] which an army invariably receives from the country in which it is stationed, more particularly when it has been sent to aid the people of that country. _I have not been disappointed in the expectation that I had formed of receiving supplies of provisions, and I am much obliged to the Junta for the pains they have taken._ I am convinced that they did everything in their power to procure us the other means we required [transport], although I am sorry to say that we have not received them.’

[609] See pp. 443 and 459.

The causes, therefore, of the deadlock that was about to occur were partly the light-hearted incompetence of the Central Junta in promising the British army the use of resources which did not exist, partly Wellesley’s natural ignorance of the miserable state of Central Spain. He had never entered the country before, and could not know of its poverty. He had trusted to the usual military theory that the country-side ought to provide for a friendly army on the march: but in Spain all military theories failed to act. Napoleon committed precisely similar errors, when he directed his army corps to move about in Castile as if they were in Germany or Lombardy, and found exactly the same hindrances as did the British general. In later years Wellesley never moved without a heavy train, and a vast provision of sumpter-beasts and camp-followers. In July 1809 he had still to learn the art of conducting a Spanish campaign.

Meanwhile he was beginning to feel most uncomfortable about the question of provisions. His anxiety is shown by his letters to Frere and Beresford; ‘it is impossible,’ he wrote, ‘to express the inconvenience and risk that we incur from the want of means of conveyance, which I cannot believe the country could not furnish, _if there existed any inclination to furnish them_. The officers complain, and I believe not without reason, that the country gives unwillingly the supplies of provisions that we have required ... and we have not procured a cart or a mule for the service of the army[610].’ But to O’Donoju, the chief of the staff of the Estremaduran army, he wrote in even more drastic terms, employing phrases that were certain to provoke resentment. He had, he said, scoured the whole region as far as Ciudad Rodrigo for transport, and to no effect. ‘If the people of Spain are unable or unwilling to supply what the army requires, I am afraid that they must do without its services.’ He had been forced to come to a painful decision, and ‘in order to be fair and candid to General Cuesta’ he must proceed to inform him that he would execute the plan for falling upon Victor behind the Alberche, but that when this had been done he would stir no step further, and ‘begin no new operation till he had been supplied with the means of transport which the army requires[611].’

[610] Wellesley to Frere, Plasencia, July 16.

[611] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Plasencia, July 16.

After dispatching this ultimatum, whose terms and tone leave something to be desired--for surely Cuesta was the last person to be saddled with the responsibility for the pledges made by his enemies of the Central Junta--Wellesley issued orders for the army to march. He had been joined at Plasencia by the last of the regiments from Lisbon, which reached him in time for Talavera[612], but had been forced to leave 400 sick behind him, for the army was still in a bad condition as regards health. It was therefore with little over 21,000 men that he began his advance to the Alberche. It was executed with punctual observance of the dates that had been settled at the interview at Almaraz. On July 18 the army crossed the Tietar on a flying bridge built at Bazagona, and lay at Miajadas. On the next night the head quarters were at Centinello; on the twentieth the British entered Oropesa. Here Cuesta joined them with his whole army, save the two battalions lent to Wilson, and the two others under the Marquis Del Reino which had been sent to the Puerto de Baños. Deducting these 2,600 bayonets and his sick, he brought over 6,000 horse and 27,000 foot to the rendezvous. The junction having taken place on the twenty-first, the advance to Talavera was to begin next morning. Oropesa lies only nineteen miles from that town, and as Victor’s cavalry vedettes were in sight, it was clear that contact with the enemy would be established during the course of the day. Accordingly the allied armies marched with caution, the Spaniards along the high-road, the British following a parallel path on the left, across the slopes of the hills which divide the valley of the Tietar from that of the Tagus.

[612] The 1/61st Foot and 23rd Light Dragoons.

About midday the Spaniards fell in with the whole of the cavalry division of Latour-Maubourg, which Victor had thrown out as a screen in front of Talavera. He had ascertained on the evening of the preceding day that Cuesta was about to move forward, and was anxious to compel him to display his entire force. Above all he desired to ascertain whether the rumours concerning the presence of British troops in his front were correct. Accordingly he had left two battalions of infantry in the town of Talavera, and thrown out the six regiments of dragoons in front of it, near the village of Gamonal. The Spaniards were advancing with Albuquerque’s cavalry division as an advanced guard. But seeing Latour-Maubourg in his front the Duke refused to attack, and sent back for infantry and guns. Cuesta pushed forward the division of Zayas to support him, but even when it arrived the Spaniards made no headway. They continued skirmishing for four hours[613] till the British light cavalry began to appear on their left. ‘Though much more numerous than the enemy,’ wrote an eye-witness, ‘they made no attempt to drive him in, but contented themselves with deploying into several long lines, making a very formidable appearance. We had expected to see them closely and successfully engaged, having heard that they were peculiarly adapted for petty warfare, but we found them utterly incapable of coping with the enemy’s _tirailleurs_, who were driving them almost into a circle.’

[613] ‘And,’ adds Lord Munster, from whom this quotation is taken (p. 199), ‘it is my belief that they would have continued _till now_ if we had not aided them.’

On the appearance, however, of Anson’s cavalry upon their flank the French went hastily to the rear, skirted the suburbs of Talavera, and rode off along the great Madrid _chaussée_ to the east, followed by the British light dragoons. As they passed the town two small columns of infantry came out of it and followed in their rear. Albuquerque sent one of his regiments against them, but could not get his men to charge home. On three separate occasions they came on, but, after receiving the fire of the French, pulled up and fell into confusion. The impression made by the Spanish cavalry on the numerous British observers was very bad. ‘No men could have more carefully avoided coming to close quarters than did the Spaniards this day[614],’ wrote one eye-witness. ‘They showed a total lack not only of discipline but of resolution[615],’ observes another.

[614] Londonderry, i. 392.

[615] Lord Munster, p. 200.

After crossing the plain to the north of Talavera the French, both cavalry and infantry, forded the Alberche and halted on the further bank. On arriving at the line of underwood which masks the river the pursuers found the whole of Victor’s corps in position. The thickets on the further side were swarming with _tirailleurs_, and two batteries opened on Anson’s brigade as it drew near to the water, and sent balls whizzing among Wellesley’s staff when he pushed forward to reconnoitre the position.

It was soon seen that Victor had selected very favourable fighting-ground: indeed he had been staying at Talavera long enough to enable him to get a perfect knowledge of the military features of the neighbourhood. The 1st Corps was drawn up on a range of heights, about 800 yards behind the Alberche, with its left resting on the impassable Tagus, and its right on a wooded hill, behind which the smaller river makes a sharp turn to the east, so as to cover that flank. The position was formidable, but rather too long for the 22,000 men who formed the French army. Having learnt from the people of Talavera that the enemy had received no reinforcements up to that morning, from Madrid or any other quarter, Wellesley was anxious to close with them at once. The afternoon was too far spent for any attempt to force the passage on the twenty-second, but on the next day (July 23) the British general hoped to fight. The Alberche was crossed by a wooden bridge which the enemy had not destroyed, and was fordable in many places: there seemed to be no reason why the lines behind it might not be forced by a resolute attack delivered with numbers which were as two to one to those of the French.

Accordingly Wellesley left the 3rd division and Anson’s light horse in front of the right wing of Victor’s position, and encamped the rest of his army some miles to the rear, in the plain between Talavera and the Alberche. In the same way Albuquerque and Zayas halted for the night opposite the bridge on the French left, while the main body of the Spaniards occupied the town in their rear. In the evening hours Wellesley endeavoured to urge upon Cuesta the necessity for delivering an attack at dawn: he undertook to force the northern fords and to turn the enemy’s right, if his colleague would attack the southern fords and the bridge. The Captain-General ‘received the suggestion with dry civility,’ and asked for time to think it over. After a conference with his subordinates, he at last sent word at midnight that he would accept the proposed plan of operations.

At 3 o’clock therefore on the morning of the twenty-third, Wellesley brought down Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s divisions to the ground opposite the fords, and waited for the arrival of the Spanish columns on his right. They did not appear, and after long waiting the British general rode to seek his colleague. He found him opposite the bridge of the Alberche, ‘seated on the cushions taken out of his carriage, for he had driven to the outposts in a coach drawn by nine mules, the picture of mental and physical inability.’ The old man murmured that the enemy’s position had not been sufficiently reconnoitred, that it would take time to get his army drawn out opposite the points which it was to attack, that he was not sure of the fords, that the bridge over which his right-hand column would have to advance looked too weak to bear artillery, and many other things to the same effect--finally urging that the forcing of the Alberche must be put off to the next day. As he had not got his troops into battle order, it was clear that the morning would be wasted, but Wellesley tried to bargain for an attack in the afternoon. The Captain-General asked for more time, and would listen to no arguments in favour of fighting on that day. After a heated discussion Wellesley had to yield: he could not venture to assail the French with his own army alone, and without any assistance from the Spaniards. Accordingly it was agreed that the advance should not be made till the dawn of the twenty-fourth.

In the afternoon the pickets sent back information that Victor seemed to be on the move, and that his line was growing thin. Cuesta was then persuaded to go forward to the outposts; he was hoisted on to his horse by two grenadiers, while an aide-de-camp stood on the other side to conduct his right leg over the croup and place it in the stirrup. Then, hunched up on his saddle, he rode down to the river, observed that the greater part of the enemy were still in position, and refused to attack till next morning.

At dawn, therefore, on the twenty-fourth the allied army moved forward to the Alberche in three columns, and found, as might have been expected, that the French had disappeared. On seeing the masses of redcoats opposite his right upon the previous day, Victor had realized at last that he had before him the whole British army. He had sent his train to the rear in the afternoon, and drawn off his entire force after dusk. By dawn he was more than ten miles away, on the road to Santa Ollala and Madrid. It was useless to pursue him with any hope of forcing him to a battle. The chance of crushing him before he should receive any further reinforcements had disappeared. It is not at all to his credit as a general that he had held his ground so long; if he had been attacked on the twenty-third, as Wellesley had desired, he must certainly have suffered a disaster. He had but 22,000 men; and it is clear that, while the Spaniards were attacking his left and centre, he could not have set aside men enough to hold back the assault of the solid mass of 20,000 British troops upon his right. He should have vanished on the twenty-second, the moment that Latour-Maubourg reported that Wellesley’s army was in the field. By staying for another day on the Alberche he risked the direst disaster.

The British general would have been more than human if he had not manifested his anger and disgust at the way in which his colleague had flinched from the agreement to attack, and sacrificed the certainty of victory. He showed his resentment by acting up to the terms of his letter written from Plasencia five days before, i.e. by announcing to Cuesta that, having carried out his pledge to drive the French from behind the Alberche, he should now refuse to move forward, unless he were furnished with transport sufficient to make it certain that the army could reach Madrid without any privations. He was able to state with perfect truth that he had already been forced to place his troops on half-rations that very morning: to the 10,000 men of Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s divisions and of Anson’s light cavalry, he had only been able to issue 5,000 rations of bread[616]. Nothing, of course, could be found at Talavera, where the French had been quartered for many days. Victor had only been maintaining his troops by the aid of biscuit sent down from Madrid, and by seizing and threshing for himself the small amount of corn which had been sown in the neighbourhood that spring. Wellesley was wrong in supposing that the 1st Corps had been supporting itself with ease from the country-side[617]. He was equally at fault when he asserted that the ‘Spanish army has plenty to eat.’ Cuesta was at this moment complaining to the Junta that he was short of provisions, and that the food which he had brought forward from the Guadiana was almost exhausted. Meanwhile every exertion was being made to collect flour and transport from the rear: Wellesley wrote to O’Donoju that he had at last hopes of securing some wagons from the Plasencia district within three days, and that ‘in the meantime he might get something to eat.’ He had some days before sent orders back even so far as Abrantes, to order up 200 Portuguese carts which had been collected there, and the Central Junta had informed him that a train for his use had already started from Andalusia. But ‘there was no very early prospect of relieving the present distress[618].’

[616] Wellesley to Sherbrooke, Talavera, July 24.

[617] Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 24.

[618] Wellesley to Beresford, from Plasencia, July 14.

Cuesta was, as might have been expected, as angry with Wellesley for refusing to move forward from Talavera, as Wellesley was with Cuesta for missing the great opportunity of July 23. When informed that the British army was not about to advance any further, he announced that he for his part should go on, that Victor was in full flight, and that he would pursue him to Madrid. ‘In that case’ dryly observed Wellesley, ‘Cuesta will get himself into a scrape; but any movement by me to his assistance is quite out of the question. If the enemy discover that we are not with him, he will be beaten, or must return. The enemy will make this discovery to-day, if he should risk any attempt upon their rearguard at Santa Ollala[619].’ In reply to the Captain-General’s declaration that he should press Victor hard, his colleague only warned him that he would be wiser ‘to secure the course of the Tagus and open communication with Venegas, while the measures should be taken to supply the British army with means of transport[620].’ The Spaniard would not listen to any such advice, and hurried forward; though he had been for many weeks refusing to fight the 1st Corps when it lay in Estremadura, he was now determined to risk a second Medellin. Apparently he was obsessed by the idea that Victor was in full retreat for Madrid, and would not make a serious stand. Underlying his sudden energy there was also some idea that he would disconcert his masters of the Central Junta by recovering the capital: he had discovered, it would seem, that the Junta had sent secret orders to Venegas, directing him to take charge of the city on its reconquest, and giving him authority to nominate the civil and military officers for its administration. If the Army of Estremadura seized Madrid, while the Army of La Mancha was still lingering on the way thither, all these plans would be frustrated[621].

[619] Wellesley to Frere, Talavera, July 25.

[620] Ibid.; and also Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 25.

[621] Cf. Arteche, vi. 358, with Wellesley’s remarks on the inexplicable eagerness of Cuesta to be in Madrid on an early day.

Accordingly Cuesta pushed on very boldly on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, dividing his army into two columns, of which one marched on Santa Ollala by the high-road to the capital, while the other moved by Cevolla and Torrijos on the side-road to Toledo. He was uncertain whether Victor had retired by one or by both of these routes: if all his corps had taken the former path, the natural deduction was that he was thinking only of Madrid: if the Toledo road had also been used, there was reason for concluding that the Marshal must be intending to join Sebastiani and the 4th Corps, who might be looked for in that direction. Late in the day the Spanish general ascertained that the main body of Victor’s army had taken the latter route: he proceeded to follow it, placing his head quarters that night at Torrijos, only fifteen miles from Toledo. Next morning he learnt to his surprise and dismay that he had in front of him not only the 1st Corps, but also Sebastiani and the King’s reserves from Madrid: for just at this moment the whole French force in New Castile had been successfully concentrated, and nearly 50,000 men were gathered in front of the 33,000 troops of the Army of Estremadura. Venegas’s diversion had utterly failed to draw off the 4th Corps to the East; the King had come down in haste from Madrid, and thus the whole plan of campaign which the allied generals had drawn up had been foiled--partly by the sloth of Venegas, partly by Cuesta’s inexplicable and perverse refusal to fight on July 23 upon the line of the Alberche.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER V

CONCENTRATION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES: THE KING TAKES THE OFFENSIVE: COMBATS OF TORRIJOS AND CASA DE SALINAS

It is now necessary to turn to the French camp, in order to realize the course of events which had led to the concentration of such a formidable force in the environs of Toledo. Down to the twenty-second of July Joseph and his adviser Jourdan had remained in complete ignorance of the advance of Wellesley upon Plasencia, and seem to have been perfectly free from any apprehension that Madrid was in danger. Since their return from their fruitless pursuit of the army of La Mancha, they had been spending most of their energy in a controversy with Soult. The Duke of Dalmatia, not content with the command of the three army corps which Napoleon had put at his disposal, had been penning elaborate dispatches to the King to demand that the greater part of the remaining French troops in Spain should be used to co-operate in his projected campaign against the English in Portugal. He wrote on July 13 to urge on Joseph the necessity (1) of drawing large detachments from the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, in order to form a corps of observation in the kingdom of Leon to support his own rear; (2) of placing another strong detachment at Plasencia to cover his flank; (3) of transferring every regiment that could be spared from Madrid and New Castile to Salvatierra on the Tormes, just south of Salamanca, in order to form a reserve close in his rear, which he might call up, if necessary, to strengthen the 60,000 men whom he already had in hand. He also demanded that Joseph should send him at once 200,000 francs to spend on the fortification of Zamora, Toro, and other places on the Douro, as also 500,000 francs more for the present expenses of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps. If this were granted him, together with 2,000,000 rations of flour, and a battering-train of at least forty-eight heavy guns for the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, he thought that he should be in a position to deliver a serious attack on Northern Portugal, and ultimately to drive the British army into the sea[622].

[622] Soult to Joseph, July 13. Compare with this Jourdan to Soult of July 17, the reply to these modest demands.

On the day upon which the Duke of Dalmatia made these comprehensive demands upon King Joseph, the British army had been for ten days in Spain, and was preparing to advance from Plasencia on Madrid. It was therefore an exquisitely inappropriate moment at which to demand that the greater part of the King’s central reserve should be sent off from the capital to the neighbourhood of Salamanca. There were other parts of Soult’s lists of requisitions which were equally impracticable. It is clear that Suchet could not have spared a man from Aragon, and that St. Cyr, with the siege of Gerona on his hands, would have found it absolutely impossible to make large detachments from Catalonia. Even if he and Suchet had been able to send off troops to Leon, they would have taken months to reach the Galician frontier. The demand for 700,000 francs in hard cash was also most unpalatable: King Joseph was at this moment in the direst straits for money: his brother could send him nothing while the Austrian war was in progress, and as he was not in proper military possession of any large district of Spain, he was at this moment in a condition of hopeless bankruptcy. He confessed to Soult that he was living from hand to mouth, by the pitiful expedient of melting down and coining the silver plate in the royal palace at Madrid.

Jourdan therefore replied, in the King’s behalf, to Soult that he must do his best with the 60,000 men already at his disposition, that no troops from Catalonia, Aragon, or Madrid could be spared, and that money could not be found. All that could be given was the battering-train that had been demanded, 600,000 rations of biscuit, and an authorization to raise forced contributions in Old Castile. For the protection of his flanks and his communications the Marshal must utilize Kellermann’s dragoons and the other unattached troops in the valley of the Douro, a force which if raised to 12,000 men by detachments from the 5th or 6th Corps could keep La Romana and the Galicians in check[623].

[623] Jourdan to Soult, July 17, 1809, from Madrid.

It is curious to note how entirely ignorant both Soult and the King were as to the real dangers of the moment. Soult had drawn up, and Joseph acceded to[624], a plan for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and an invasion of Northern Portugal--operations which would take long weeks of preparation--at the time when Madrid was in imminent danger from the combined armies of Wellesley, Cuesta, and Venegas. The Marshal’s plan was perfectly correct from the point of view of the higher strategy--the main objective of the French was certainly the British army, and it would have been highly advisable to invade Northern Portugal with 60,000 men in the front line, and 40,000 in support, if the circumstances of the moment had permitted it. But these circumstances were hidden alike from Soult and the King, owing to the impossibility of obtaining accurate information of the movements of the allies. The fundamental difficulty of all French operations in the Peninsula was that the commanders could never discover the whereabouts of the enemy till he actually came in contact with their outposts. Hence it chanced that Soult was planning, and Joseph approving, a campaign on the borders of Northern Portugal, at the precise moment when the British were on the march for Talavera.

[624] ‘Le roi pense, comme vous, qu’il est important de s’emparer de Ciudad Rodrigo; cette place servira de place d’armes aux troupes qui seront dans le cas d’entrer en Portugal.’--Ibid.

It was actually not until July 22 that the King’s eyes were at last unsealed. Victor having come into collision with the cavalry of Wellesley’s advanced guard, sent news to Madrid that the British army had joined Cuesta, and had reached the Alberche. On the same day, by a fortunate chance, there also arrived in the capital another emissary of Soult, with a message much less impracticable than that which had last been sent. This was General Foy, whom the Duke of Dalmatia had dispatched on July 19, after receiving very definite rumours that the British were moving in the valley of the Tagus, and not approaching Old Castile[625]. The Marshal sent word that in this case he must of course concert a common plan of operations with the King, and abandon any immediate action against Portugal. He suggested that his best plan would be to concentrate his three corps at Salamanca, and to march against the flank and rear of the English by way of Bejar and the Puerto de Baños. If the King could cover Madrid for a time with the 1st and 4th Corps, he would undertake to present himself in force upon Wellesley’s line of communications, a move which must infallibly stop the advance of the allies towards the capital. If they hesitated a moment after his arrival at Plasencia, they would be caught between two fires, and might be not merely checked but surrounded and destroyed. Soult added, however, that he could not move till the 2nd Corps had received the long-promised provision of artillery which was on its way from Madrid, and till he had rallied Ney’s troops, who were still at Astorga, close to the foot of the Galician mountains.

[625] Compare Le Noble’s account of Soult’s proposals (pp. 312-3) with Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, and with the _Vie Militaire du Général Foy_, p. 83.

Napoleon, at a later date, criticized this plan severely, declaring that Soult ought to have marched on Madrid to join the King, and not on Plasencia. He grounded his objections to the scheme on the strategical principle that combined operations on external lines should be avoided. ‘The march of Marshal Soult,’ he wrote, ‘was both dangerous and useless--dangerous, because the other army might be beaten (as happened at Talavera) before he could succour it, so that the safety of all my armies in Spain was compromised: useless, because the English had nothing to fear; they could get behind the Tagus in three hours; and whether they crossed at Talavera or at Almaraz, or anywhere else, they could secure a safe line of retreat on Badajoz.’ Against this criticism the defence made by both Soult and King Joseph was that it would have required a much longer time to bring the three corps from the Douro to Madrid than to Plasencia; that it would have taken them at least ten days to reach Madrid, and that during those days the King and his army might have been beaten and driven out of the capital by the united forces of Wellesley, Cuesta, and Venegas. It was, of course, impossible to foresee on July 22 that Wellesley would refuse to pursue Victor beyond Talavera, or that Venegas would let Sebastiani slip away from him. Accordingly King Joseph and Jourdan fell in with Soult’s suggestion, because they thought that he would come sooner into the field if he marched on Plasencia, and would remove the pressure of the British army from them at a comparatively early date. As a matter of fact, he took a much longer time to reach Plasencia than they had expected: they had hoped that he might be there on July 27, while his vanguard only reached the place on August 1, and his main body on the second and third[626]. But it seems clear that the expectation that he would intervene on the earlier date was far too sanguine. Soult dared not move till his three corps were well closed up, and since Ney had to come all the way from Astorga, it would have been impossible in any case to mass the army at Plasencia much earlier than was actually done. Napoleon’s remark that Soult could not hope to catch or surround the British army seems more convincing than his criticism of the march on Plasencia. If the passes of the Sierra de Gata had been properly held, and prompt news had been transmitted to Talavera that the French were on the move from the valley of the Douro, Wellesley would have had ample time to cover himself, by crossing the Tagus and transferring his army to the line of operations, Truxillo-Badajoz. The British general always defended himself by this plea: and complained that those who spoke of him as being ‘cut off from Portugal,’ by the arrival of Soult at Plasencia, forgot that he had as good a base at Elvas and Badajoz as at Abrantes.

[626] For the controversy about the expected date of Soult’s arrival at Plasencia, see Joseph’s and Jourdan’s letter to Napoleon, in Ducasse’s _Mémoires du Roi Joseph_, and on the other side Le Noble’s _Campagne de 1809_.

But we must not look too far forward into the later stages of the campaign. It is enough to say that Jourdan and Joseph sent back Foy to rejoin Soult, on the same day that he had reached Madrid, bearing the orders that the Marshal was to collect his three corps with the greatest possible haste, and to march by Salamanca on Plasencia, where they trusted that he might present himself on the twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth of the current month. Meanwhile it was necessary to hold back Cuesta and Wellesley till the Duke of Dalmatia’s operations in their rear began to produce their effect. The only possible way of doing this was to concentrate in all haste every available man in New Castile, and to cover Madrid as long as possible. This massing of the French forces turned out to be perfectly feasible, since Venegas had neglected to press in upon Sebastiani, so that it was possible to withdraw the whole 4th Corps from in front of him, and to send it to reinforce Victor, without any immediate danger. Accordingly, the 1st Corps was directed to fall back from its perilous advanced position on the Alberche, and to draw near to Toledo: Sebastiani was told to abandon Madridejos and La Mancha, and to hasten by forced marches toward the same point: while the King himself resolved to leave Madrid with the slenderest of garrisons, and to carry the rest of the central reserve to the general rendezvous. Accordingly, he left only one brigade of Dessolles’ division, with a few of his untrustworthy Spanish levies, to hold the capital: the total did not amount to much over 4,000 men, and General Belliard, the governor of the city, was warned that he must be prepared to retreat into the Retiro forts, with his troops and the whole body of the _Afrancesados_ and their families, if anything untoward should occur. For it was possible that an insurrection might break out, or that Venegas might succeed in slipping into Madrid by the roads from the east, or again, that Wilson (whose column had been heard of at Escalona and was believed to be much larger than was actually the case), might attempt a _coup de main_ from the west. Leaving Belliard in this dangerous and responsible position, the King marched out upon the twenty-third with the remaining brigade of Dessolles’s division, the infantry and cavalry of his French Guard, two squadrons of chasseurs and fourteen guns, a force of some 5,800 men[627]. He had reached Navalcarnero, with the intention of joining Victor on the Alberche, when he received the news that the Marshal had retired towards Toledo, and was lying at Bargas behind the Guadarrama river. Here Joseph joined him on the morning of July 25.

[627] The whole consisted of:

Infantry of the Guard 1,800 _Chevaux-Légers_ of the Guard 250 Godinot’s Brigade of Dessolles’s Division 3,350 27th Chasseurs (two squadrons) 250 Artillery (two batteries) 200 ----- Total 5,850

On their concentration a force of 46,000 men was collected, Victor having brought up 23,000, the King 5,800, and Sebastiani 17,500. The latter had placed four of the six Polish battalions of Valence’s division in Toledo, and was therefore short by 3,000 bayonets of the total force of his corps. With such a mass of good troops at their disposition, Joseph, Jourdan, and Victor were all agreed that it was right to fall upon the Spaniards without delay. They were astonished to find that the British army was not in their front, but only Cuesta’s troops. They had expected to see the whole allied host before them, and were overjoyed to discover that the Estremadurans alone had pushed forward to Torrijos and Santa Ollala. Instead, therefore, of being obliged to fight a defensive battle behind the river Guadarrama, it was in their power to take the offensive.

This was done without delay: on the morning of July 26 the French army advanced on Torrijos, with the 1st Corps at the head of the column. But Cuesta, when once he had discovered the strength of the force in his front, had resolved to retreat. Victor found opposed to him only the division of Zayas and two cavalry regiments, which had been told off to cover the withdrawal of the Estremaduran army. The Marshal sent out against this rearguard the chasseurs of Merlin and the dragoons of Latour-Maubourg, who drove in the Spanish horse, almost exterminating the unfortunate regiment of Villaviciosa, which, in retiring, chanced to blunder against the high stone walls of some enclosures from which exit was difficult[628]. Zayas then went to the rear, and retired towards the cavalry division of Albuquerque, which Cuesta hastily sent to his assistance. The French cavalry took some time to re-form for a second attack, and their infantry was still far off. The Spanish rearguard therefore, covered by Albuquerque’s horse, had time enough to fall back on the main body, which was already in full retreat. Their cavalry then followed, and being not very strenuously pursued by Merlin and Latour-Maubourg, got off in safety. The whole army, marching at the best of its speed, and in considerable disorder, finally reached the Alberche without being caught up by the enemy. Cuesta found the British divisions of Sherbrooke and Mackenzie guarding the river: Wellesley had sent them forward when he heard of the approach of the French, and had placed the former on the hills above the further side of the bridge, to cover the passage, and the latter in reserve. He rode out himself to meet the Spanish general, and begged him to carry his army beyond the Alberche, as it would be extremely dangerous to be caught with such an obstacle behind him, and no means of retreat save a long bridge and three fords. But Cuesta tempted providence by declaring that he should encamp on the further bank, as his troops were too exhausted to risk the long defile across the bridge after dark. His sullen anger against Wellesley for refusing to follow him on the twenty-fourth was still smouldering in his breast, and the English were convinced that he remained on the wrong side of the river out of pure perversity, merely because his colleague pressed him to put himself in safety. He consented, however, to retreat next morning to the position which Wellesley had selected in front of Talavera.

[628] ‘The cavalry regiment of Villaviciosa, drawn up in an enclosure with but one exit, was penned in by the enemy and cut to pieces without a possibility of escape. A British officer of engineers, present with them, saved himself by his English horse taking at a leap the barrier which the Spanish horses were incapable of clearing.’ Lord Munster, p. 208.

The French made no appearance that night, though they might well have done so, and the Spanish army, bivouacing confusedly in the narrow slip of flat ground between the heights and the Alberche, enjoyed undisturbed rest during the hours of darkness. It is impossible not to marvel at the slackness with which Victor conducted the pursuit: he had twelve regiments of splendid cavalry to the front[629], and could undoubtedly have pressed the Estremadurans hard if he had chosen to do so. Cuesta’s retreating columns were in such a state of confusion and disorder that a vigorous assault on their rear might have caused a general _débandade_. But after driving in Zayas in the early morning, Victor moved very slowly, and did not even attempt to roll up Albuquerque’s cavalry rearguard, though he could have assailed it with very superior numbers. When taxed with sloth by Marshal Jourdan, he merely defended himself by saying that the horses were tired, and that the infantry was still too far to the rear to make it right for him to begin a combat which might develop into a general engagement. But it is hard to see that he would have risked anything by pressing in upon Albuquerque, for if Cuesta had halted his whole army in order to support his rearguard, there was nothing to prevent the French cavalry from drawing off, and refusing to close till the main body of the 1st Corps should come up.

[629] He had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, 3,200 sabres, four regiments of Merlin’s Division, 1,007 sabres, two regiments of Beaumont’s (corps-cavalry of 1st Corps) 980--a total of over 5,000 men.

Thanks to Victor’s slackness the Spaniards secured an unmolested retreat across the Alberche on the following morning. It is said that Cuesta, in sheer perversity and reluctance to listen to any advice proffered him by Wellesley, delayed for some hours before he would retreat, and that when at last he yielded to the pressing solicitations of his colleague he remarked to his staff ‘that he had made the Englishman go down on his knees’ before consenting.

All through the morning hours of the twenty-seventh the Army of Estremadura was pouring across the bridge and the fords, not in the best order. They had almost all passed, when about noon the French cavalry began to appear in their front. When the enemy at last began to press forward in strength, Wellesley directed Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s divisions to prepare to evacuate their positions on the eastern bank, which they did as soon as the last of the Spaniards had got into safety. The first division passed at the bridge, the third at the fords near the village of Cazalegas: then Sherbrooke marched by the high-road towards Talavera, while Mackenzie, who had been told off as the rearguard, remained with Anson’s light horse near the ruined Casa de Salinas, a mile to the west of the Alberche.

It may seem strange that Wellesley made no attempt to dispute the passage of the river, but the ground was hopelessly indefensible. The left bank (Victor’s old position of July 22) completely commands the right, the one being high, the other both low and entirely destitute of artillery positions. Moreover, a great part of the _terrain_ was thickly strewn with woods and olive plantations, which made it impossible to obtain any general view of the country-side. They would have given splendid cover for an army advancing to storm the heights on the French bank, but were anything but an advantage to an army on the defensive. For, unable to hold the actual river bank because of the commanding hills on the further side, such an army would have been forced to form its line some way from the water, and the tangled cover down by the brink of the stream would have given the enemy every facility for pushing troops across, and for pressing them into the midst of the defender’s position without exposing them to his fire. Wellington had examined the line of the Alberche upon the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, and had pronounced it absolutely untenable; ‘no position could be worse,’ he wrote to O’Donoju[630], but he had discovered one of a very different kind a little to the rear, and had already settled the way in which it was to be occupied. It presented so many advantages that even Cuesta had consented to accept it as a good fighting-ground, and the Estremaduran army was at this very moment occupied in arraying itself along that part of the line which had been allotted to it. Sherbrooke’s division was retiring across the plain to fall into the section which Wellesley had chosen for it, and Hill’s and Campbell’s troops were moving to their designated ground. Only Mackenzie and the light cavalry had yet to be established in their post.

[630] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Cazalegas, July 25.

In the act of withdrawing, this division became involved in an unfortunate combat, which bid fair for a moment to develop into a disaster. Its two brigades had been halted close to the ruined house called the Casa de Salinas, in ground covered partly with underwood and partly with olive groves. The cavalry had been withdrawn to the rear, as it was impossible to use it for vedettes in such a locality. The infantry was supposed to have a chain of pickets thrown out in its front, but it would appear that they must have been badly placed: as one eye-witness confesses, ‘we were by no means such good soldiers in those days as succeeding campaigns made us, and sufficient precautions had not been taken to ascertain what was passing in the wood[631],’ and between it and the ford below Cazalegas. French cavalry alone had hitherto been seen, and from cavalry Mackenzie’s troops were certainly safe in the tangled ground where they were now lying.

[631] Lord Munster, p. 210.

But already Victor’s infantry had reached the front, and its leading division, that of Lapisse, had forded the Alberche far to the north, and had entered the woods without being observed by the outlying pickets of Mackenzie’s left brigade[632]. It had even escaped the notice of Wellesley himself, who had just mounted the roof of the ruined Casa de Salinas, the only point in the neighbourhood from which anything like a general view of the country-side could be secured. While he was intent on watching the heights above the Alberche in his front, and the cavalry vedettes descending from them, the enemy’s infantry was stealing in upon his left.

[632] Several eye-witnesses declare that Lapisse’s division escaped notice owing to a curious chance. Before abandoning the further bank of the Alberche, Mackenzie’s troops had set fire to the huts which Victor’s corps had constructed on the Cazalegas heights, during their long stay in that position. The smoke from the burning was driven along the slopes and the river bottom by the wind, and screened one of the fords from the British observers in the woods; over this ford came Lapisse’s unsuspected advance.

Lapisse had promptly discovered the line of British outposts, and had succeeded in drawing out his division in battle order before it was observed. He had deployed one regiment, the 16th Léger, as a front line, while the rest of his twelve battalions were coming on in support.

While, therefore, Wellesley was still unconscious that the enemy was close upon him, a brisk fire of musketry broke out upon his left front. It was the French advance driving in the pickets of Donkin’s brigade. The division had barely time to stand to its arms--some men are said to have been killed before they had risen from the ground--and the Commander-in-chief had hardly descended from the roof and mounted his charger, when the enemy was upon them. The assault fell upon the whole front of Donkin’s brigade, and on the left regiment (the 2/31st) of that of Mackenzie himself. So furious and unexpected was it, that the 87th, 88th, and 31st were all broken, and driven some way to the rear, losing about eighty prisoners. It was fortunate that the French advance did not strike the whole line, but only its left and centre. The 1/45th, which was just outside the limit of Lapisse’s attack, stood firm, and on it Wellesley re-formed the 31st, while, a little further to the north, the half-battalion of the 5/60th also held its ground and served as a rallying-point for the 87th and 88th. The steadiness of the 1/45th and 5/60th saved the situation; covered by them the division retired from the woods and formed up in the plain, where Anson’s light horsemen came to their aid and guarded their flanks. The French still pressed furiously forward, sending out two batteries of horse artillery to gall the retreating columns, but they had done their worst, and during the hours of the late afternoon Mackenzie’s infantry fell back slowly and in order to the points of the position which had been assigned to them. Donkin’s brigade took post in the second line behind the German Legion, while Mackenzie’s own three regiments passed through the Guards and formed up in their rear. Their total loss in the combat of Casa de Salinas had been 440 men--the French casualties must have been comparatively insignificant--probably not 100 in all[633].

[633] Unfortunately the French returns do not separate the losses of the twenty-seventh from those of the twenty-eighth of July. Only the 16th Léger can have suffered any appreciable damage.

From the moment when the fray had begun in the woods till dusk, the noise of battle never stopped, for on arriving in front of the allied position, the French artillery drew up and commenced a hot, but not very effective, fire against those of the troops who held the most advanced stations. As the cannonade continued, the different regiments were seen hurrying to their battle-posts, for, although the arrangements had all been made, some brigades, not expecting a fight till the morrow, had still to take up their allotted ground.

‘The men, as they formed and faced the enemy, looked pale, but the officers riding along their line, only two deep, on which all our hopes depended, observed that they appeared not less tranquil than determined. In the meanwhile the departing sun showed by his rays the immense masses moving towards us, and the last glimmering of the light proved their direction to be across our front, toward the left. The darkness, only broken in upon by the bursting shells and the flashes of the French guns, closed quickly upon us, and it was the opinion of many that the enemy would rest till the morning[634].’

[634] Lord Munster, p. 212.

Such, however, was not to be the case: there was to be hard fighting in front of Talavera before the hour of midnight had arrived.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA: THE PRELIMINARY COMBATS

(JULY 27-28)

The position which Wellesley had selected as offering far better ground for a defensive battle than any which could be found on the banks of the Alberche, extends for nearly three miles to the north of the town of Talavera. It was not a very obvious line to take up, since only at its northern end does it present any well marked features. Two-thirds of the position lie in the plain, and are only marked out by the stony bed of the Portiña, a brook almost dried up in the summer, which runs from north to south and falls into the Tagus at Talavera. In the northern part of its course this stream flows at the bottom of a well-marked ravine, but as it descends towards the town its bed grows broad and shallow, and ceases to be of any tactical or topographical importance. Indeed, in this part of the field the fighting-line of the allies lay across it, and their extreme right wing was posted upon its further bank.

The town of Talavera, a place of 10,000 souls, which had been a flourishing industrial centre in the sixteenth century, but had long sunk into decay, lies in a compact situation on the north bank of the Tagus. It possesses a dilapidated bridge of forty-five arches, the only passage across the river between Arzobispo and Toledo. Its site is perfectly flat, save for a low knoll crowned by the chapel of Nuestra Señora del Prado, just outside the eastern, or Madrid, gate, and overlooking the _Alameda_ (public promenade) and the neighbouring gardens. The place had no suburbs, but was surrounded by a broad belt of olive groves and enclosures, which extend for a full mile to the north and east, and hide the houses and walls from the traveller approaching from either of those directions. When the allies entered Talavera they found it deserted by most of its inhabitants, who had fled up into the villages of the Sierra de Toledo during the French occupation. Many, however, descended to reoccupy their homes when the enemy departed. Victor’s men had plundered most of the houses, and turned many of the churches into barracks or stables: hence the town presented a picture of abject desolation[635].

[635] ‘The French troops during their stay had been guilty of great excesses: a number of houses were completely destroyed, and the furniture burnt for fuel. In every quarter were to be seen marks of the devastation they had committed. The Cathedral, a handsome modern building, was uninjured, the enemy having contented himself with carrying off all the splendid ornaments used in the ceremonies of religion. But in the church of San Antonio the French had destroyed everything, and converted it into a barrack,’ &c. Stothert’s _Narrative of the Campaigns of 1809-11_, pp. 81-2.

For a mile and a half beyond the northern wall of Talavera the ground covered by gardens and olive groves is perfectly flat; it then commences to rise, and swells up into a long hill, the Cerro de Medellin. This height runs from east to west, so that its front, and not the full length of its side, overhangs the Portiña ravine. Its loftiest point and its steepest face are presented to that declivity, while to the west and south it has gentle and easily accessible slopes, sinking gradually down into the plain. This hill, the most commanding ground in the neighbourhood of Talavera, had been chosen by Wellesley as the position of his left wing. It formed, including its lower slopes, about one-third of the line which he had determined to occupy, the rest of the front lying in the low ground among the olives and gardens. North of the Cerro de Medellin is a narrow lateral valley, only half a mile broad, separating this hill from the main chain of the Sierra de Segurilla, the mountains which form the watershed between the basin of the Tagus and that of the Tietar. The British general had intended at first that his position should extend no further north than the hill, but in the course of the action he was compelled to lengthen his front, and to post troops both in the valley and on the mountain spurs beyond it.

By the agreement made with Cuesta, at the conference near the bridge of the Alberche on the evening of the twenty-sixth, it was settled that the Spanish army should hold the town of Talavera and the wooded and enclosed ground for a mile beyond it. The British had their right among the olive groves, but their centre and left on the open slopes of the Cerro de Medellin. This order of battle was the only one which it was possible to adopt. Wellesley had already discovered that the army of Estremadura could not manœuvre, and would be much safer behind walls and enclosures than in the open, and Cuesta had gladly accepted the proposal that he should occupy this part of the position. Having only a little more than a mile of front to defend, he was able to provide a double and triple line with his 32,000 men[636]. His Vanguard and 1st division, under Zayas, occupied the eastern outskirts of the town, with a battery placed upon the knoll crowned by the chapel of Nuestra Señora del Prado. A brigade of cavalry (four regiments) was deployed in the open ground of the Prado, close to the bank of the Tagus. The 2nd division, that of Iglesias, held Talavera, whose ancient walls, though imperfect in many places, were still quite defensible. The 3rd and 4th divisions (Manglano and Portago) were ranged in a double line among the gardens and enclosures to the north of the town, as far as a low hillock called the Pajar de Vergara, where they touched Wellesley’s left. Behind them were the rest of Cuesta’s cavalry (ten regiments) and the 5th division (Bassecourt) forming the reserves.

[636] The Spaniards had lost 1,000 men, mainly by dispersion, in the retreat from Torrijos on the twenty-sixth.

The Spanish position was immensely strong. The front was completely screened by groves and enclosures occupied by skirmishers: the first line was drawn up along the slightly sunken road leading from Talavera to the north, which provided the men with an excellent parapet and good cover[637]. The second line was equally well placed behind the Portiña rivulet, which was bordered by trees along its whole front. The only good artillery position was that outside the Madrid gate, in front of Zayas’ division, but three other batteries were planted in the least defective emplacements that could be found in the front line. The rest of the Spanish guns were in reserve, in line with Bassecourt and the cavalry.

[637] Cf. Londonderry, i. 403; and Arteche, vi. 293.

The northern half of the position had its strong points, but also its defects. For the first half mile beyond the Spanish left it was still covered by groves and gardens, and had on its right front the little eminence of the Pajar de Vergara. On this knoll a redoubt had been commenced, but no more had been done than to level a space, eighty yards long and twenty feet broad, on its summit, and to throw up the excavated earth in front, thus forming a bank three or four feet high. In this work, indifferently well protected, lay Lawson’s battery of 3-pounders, the lightest guns of Wellesley’s artillery. Beside and behind them were the five battalions of the 4th division, Campbell’s brigade in the front line, Kemmis’s in the second, to the rear of the Portiña.

On the left of the 4th division the enclosed ground ended, and cover ceased. Here, forming the British centre, were drawn up the eight battalions of Sherbrooke’s division, in a single line. The Guards’ brigade, under Henry Campbell, was in perfectly flat level ground, without shade or cover. Next to them, where there is a gentle ascent towards the foot of the Cerro de Medellin, were Cameron’s two battalions; while the two weak brigades of the King’s German Legion, under Langwerth and Low, continued the front on to the actual hill, with the Portiña, now flowing in a well-marked ravine, at their feet[638]. The whole of this part of the British line was bare rolling ground covered with long dry grass and scattered shrubs of thyme. There was no cover, and before the Guards’ and Cameron’s brigades the front was not defined by any strong natural feature. On the other hand, the _terrain_ on the opposite side of the Portiña was equally bare, and gave no advantage to an enemy about to attack.

[638] Thus, counting from right to left, the front of Sherbrooke’s brigade was composed as follows: 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Scots Fusilier Guards, 61st, 83rd, 1st Line K. G. L., 2nd ditto, 5th ditto, 7th ditto.

It was otherwise in the portion of the front where the four German battalions of Langwerth and Low were placed. They had a steep ravine in front of them, but on the opposite side, as a compensating disadvantage, the rolling upland swells into a hill called the Cerro de Cascajal, which, though much less lofty than the Cerro de Medellin, yet afforded good artillery positions from which the English slopes could be battered.

Behind Sherbrooke’s troops, as the second line of his centre, Wellesley had drawn up his 3rd division and all his cavalry. Cotton’s light dragoons were in the rear of Kemmis’s brigade of the 4th division. Mackenzie’s three battalions supported the Guards: then came Anson’s light and Fane’s heavy cavalry, massed on the rising slope in the rear of Cameron. Lastly Donkin’s brigade, which had suffered so severely in the combat of Casa de Salinas, lay high up the hill, directly in the rear of Low’s brigade of the King’s German Legion.

It only remains to speak of the British left, on the highest part of the Cerro de Medellin. This section of the front was entrusted to Hill’s division, which was already encamped upon its reverse slope. Here lay the strongest point of the position, for the hill is steep, and well covered in its front by the Portiña, which now flows in a deep stony ravine. But it was also the part of the British fighting-ground which was most likely to be assailed, since a quick-eyed enemy could not help noting that it was the key of the whole--that if the upper levels of the Cerro de Medellin were lost, the rest of the allied line could not possibly be maintained. It was therefore the part of the position which would require the most careful watching, and Wellesley had told off to it his most capable and experienced divisional general. But by some miscalculation, on the evening of the twenty-seventh Hill’s two brigades were not lying on their destined battle-line, but had halted half a mile behind it--Richard Stewart’s battalions on the left, Tilson’s on the right flank of the reverse slope. It is difficult to see with whom the responsibility lay, for Wellesley was far to the right, engaged in planting Mackenzie’s troops in their new position behind the centre, while Hill had ridden over towards Talavera to search for his Commander-in-chief and question him about details, and returned rather late to give his brigadiers the exact instruction as to the line they were to take up at nightfall[639]. There were piquets on the crest, and the greater part of the front slopes were covered by Low’s two battalions of the King’s German Legion, but the actual summit of the Cerro was not occupied by any solid force, though the brigades that were intended to hold it lay only 800 yards to the rear. It was supposed that they would have ample time to take up their ground in the morning, and no one dreamt of the possibility of a night attack.

[639] It would seem, on the whole, that the responsibility for the absence of the division from its destined fighting-ground lay with Hill, generally the most cautious and reliable of subordinates. He says, in a memorandum drawn up in 1827, in answer to an inquiry about Talavera, that he had gone to dine in Talavera, and then saw Mackenzie’s division come back into the line. Returning to his own troops, he found them moving out of their bivouac, but not on their fighting-ground. He was getting them into line, when the firing suddenly began in his front.

These details I give from the valuable (unpublished) map by Lieut. Unger of the K. G. L. artillery, which Colonel Whinyates has been good enough to place at my disposition. It carefully marks the emplacement of every British battery. Elliott was at this moment in command of the battery which had been under Baynes during the Oporto campaign, while Sillery had that which had been under Lane.

Of the very small force of artillery which accompanied the British army, we have already seen that Lawson’s light 3-pounder battery had been placed in the Pajar de Vergara entrenchment. Elliott’s and Heyse’s were in the centre of the line; the former placed in front of the Guards, the latter before Langwerth’s brigade of the German Legion. Rettberg’s heavy 6-pounders were on the Cerro de Medellin, with Hill’s division: at dusk they had been brought back to its rear slope and were parked near Richard Stewart’s brigade. Finally Sillery’s battery was in reserve, between the two lines, somewhere behind Cameron’s brigade of Sherbrooke’s division. This single unit was the only artillery reserve of which Wellesley could dispose.

The precise number of British troops in line was 20,194, after deducting the losses at Casa de Salinas; that of the Spaniards was within a few hundreds of 32,000. The French, as we have already seen, had brought a little more than 46,000 men to the field, so that the allies had a superiority of some 6,000 in mere numbers. If Wellesley could have exchanged the Army of Estremadura for half their strength of British bayonets, he might have felt quite comfortable in his strong position. But his confidence in the value of his allies, even when firmly planted among walls and groves, was just about to receive a rude shock.

It was about seven o’clock when the heads of Victor’s columns, following in the wake of the horse artillery which had been galling Mackenzie’s retreat, emerged from the woods on to the rolling plateau facing the allied position. Ruffin appeared on the right, and occupied the Cascajal hill, opposite the Cerro de Medellin. Villatte followed, and halted in its rear. More to the left Lapisse, adopting the same line that had been taken by Mackenzie, halted in front of the British centre: the corps-cavalry, under Beaumont, was drawn up in support of him. Latour-Maubourg’s six regiments of dragoons, further to the south, took ground in front of the Spaniards. The King and Sebastiani were still far to the rear: their infantry was only just passing the Alberche, though their advanced cavalry under Merlin was already pushing forward in the direction of Talavera down the high-road from Madrid[640].

[640] All these details are from the report drawn up by Sémélé, the chief of the staff of the 1st Corps, at Talavera on Aug. 10.

If Napoleon, or any other general who knew how to make himself obeyed, had been present with the French army, there would have been no fighting on the evening of July 27. But King Joseph counted for little in the eyes of his nominal subordinates, and hence it came to pass that the impetuous Victor took upon himself the responsibility of attacking the allies when only half the King’s army had come upon the field. With no more object, as it would seem, than that of harassing the enemy, he sent to the front the batteries belonging to Ruffin, Lapisse, and Latour-Maubourg, to join in the cannonade which his horse artillery had already begun. At the same time Merlin’s light horse pressed forward in the direction of Talavera, to feel for the front of the Spaniards, whose exact position was hidden by the olive groves. The British artillery replied, but no great harm was done to either side. Yet in the Spanish part of the line a dreadful disaster was on the point of occurring. When the artillery fire began, and the French light horse were seen advancing, the Estremaduran troops between Talavera and the Pajar de Vergara delivered a tremendous salvo of infantry fire along the whole line, though the enemy was too far off to take any damage. But, immediately after, four battalions of Portago’s division, which formed part of the left of Cuesta’s line and touched Campbell’s right, suddenly shouted ‘treason!’ broke, and went off to the rear in complete disorder. Wellesley, who, as it chanced, was behind Campbell’s troops, and witnessed the whole rout, declared that he could conceive no reason for their behaviour except that they must have been frightened by the crash of their own tremendous volley[641]. Two of these four battalions were troops who had never been in action before: the other two had been badly cut up at Medellin, and brought up to strength by the incorporation of a great mass of recruits[642]. This might have excused a momentary misconduct, but not a prolonged rush to the rear when the enemy was still half a mile off, still less the casting away of their arms and the plundering of the British camp, through which the multitude fled. Cuesta sent cavalry to hunt them up, and succeeded in hounding back the majority to their ranks, but many hundreds were still missing on the following morning. They fled in small bands all down the valley of the Tagus, dispersing dismal information on all sides. It is sad to have to acknowledge that in their rush through the British camp they carried away with them some commissaries and a few of the baggage guard, who did not halt till they got to Oropesa, twenty miles from the field[643]. Strange to say, this panic had no appreciable ill effects: the French were not in a position to take advantage of it, having no troops, save a few light horse, in front of the spot where it occurred. The Spaniards to the right and rear of the absconding regiments did not flinch, and as the second line held firm, there was no actual gap produced in the allied position. But Wellesley noted the scene, and never forgot it: of all that he had witnessed during the campaign, this was the sight that struck him most, and most influenced his future conduct. Cuesta also took account of it in his own fashion, and at the end of the battle of the next day proposed to decimate in the old Roman fashion, the battalions that had fled! He actually chose by lot some 200 men from the fugitives, and after trying them by court-martial prepared to shoot them. His British colleague begged off the majority, but the old Captain-General insisted on executing some twenty-five or thirty who were duly put to death on the morning of the twenty-ninth[644].

[641] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 25: ‘Two thousand of them ran off on the evening of the twenty-seventh, not 100 yards from where I was standing, who were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, and who were only frightened by the noise of their own fire. They left their arms and accoutrements on the ground, their officers went with them, and they plundered the baggage of the British army, which had been sent to the rear. Many others went, whom I did not see.’

[642] The panic-stricken regiments were Leales de Fernando VII, which had been garrisoning Badajoz when Medellin was fought, Badajoz (two batts.) which had been in the battle, and Toledo.

[643] ‘I wish I could assert with truth that this retrogression was confined to our Spanish allies. But the truth must be told, and I regret to say that stragglers from the British army were among them, taking a similar direction to the rear. As they passed, they circulated reports of a most disheartening nature.’ Col. Leach’s _Rough Sketches_, p. 81. He was with Craufurd’s brigade, then coming up by forced marches from Plasencia, which met the fugitives near Oropesa on the morning of the twenty-eighth. ‘The road was crowded with fugitives, Spaniards innumerable, and lots of English commissary clerks, paymasters and sutlers, to say nothing of a few soldiers who said they were _sick_.’ _Autobiography_ of Sir George Napier, p. 108.

[644] ‘Early in the morning some twenty-five Spanish soldiers, dressed in white, attended by several Popish priests, were marched up to the front of our regiment and shot. One, a young lad of nineteen or twenty years, dropped before the party fired, but to no use. For after the volley at ten paces, the firing party ran forward and shooting them in the head or breast completed their horrid work. These unfortunates belonged to regiments that had given way in the late battle.’ _Diary_ of Cooper (of the 7th Fusiliers), pp. 25-6.

After the panic had died down, Victor gradually withdrew his batteries[645], but it was with no intention of bringing the combat to a real termination. He had resolved to deliver a night attack on the key of the British position, when the whole of his corps should have reached the front. Having reconnoitred the allied lines, and noted the distribution of their defenders, he had determined to storm the Cerro de Medellin in the dark. During his long stay at Talavera he had acquired a very thorough knowledge of its environs, and understood the dominating importance of that height. If he could seize and hold it during the night, he saw that the battle of the next day would be already half won. Accordingly, still without obtaining King Joseph’s leave, he determined to assail the Cerro. He told off for the storm his choicest division, that of Ruffin, whose nine battalions were already ranged on the front of the Cascajal heights. At the same time Lapisse’s division was to distract the attention of the British centre by a noisy demonstration against its front.

[645] That the panic took place at dusk, and not during the night attack, is completely proved by the _Journal_ of General Sémélé, where it is noted as occurring in consequence of Victor’s earliest demonstration; as also by Wellesley’s note.

Night attacks are proverbially hazardous and hard to conduct, and it cannot be disputed that Victor showed an excessive temerity in endeavouring to deliver such a blow at the steady British troops, at an hour when it was impossible to guarantee proper co-operation among the attacking columns. But for an initial stroke of luck he ought not to have secured even the small measure of success that fell to his lot.

At about nine o’clock, however, Ruffin moved down to the attack. Each of his three regiments was formed in battalion columns, the 9th Léger in the centre, the 96th on its left, the 24th on its right. The first-named regiment was to deliver a frontal attack, the other two to turn the flanks of the hill and attack over its side-slopes. At the appointed moment the three regiments descended simultaneously into the ravine of the Portiña, and endeavoured to carry out their respective sections of the programme. The 9th, chancing on the place where the ravine was most easily negotiable, crossed it without much difficulty, and began to climb the opposite slope. On mounting half way to the crest, it suddenly came on Low’s brigade of the German Legion, lying down in line, with its pickets only a very small distance in advance of the main body. It is said that the brigadier was labouring under the delusion that some of Hill’s outposts were in his front, and that he was screened by them. It is at any rate clear that he was taken wholly unprepared by the midnight attack of the French. His sentries were trampled down in a moment, and the 9th Léger ran in upon the Germans, firing into them point blank and seizing many of them as prisoners almost ere they were awake. The 7th K. G. L. was completely broken, and lost 150 men--half of them prisoners--in five minutes. The 5th, the right-hand battalion of Low’s brigade, came off better, as it was not in the direct path of the French; but it was flung sideways along the southern slope of the hill, and could not be re-formed for some time. Meanwhile the three French columns, somewhat separated from each other in this first clash of arms, went straight on up the Cerro, and in a few minutes were nearing its crest. The two leading battalions actually reached and crowned it, without meeting with any opposition save from the outlying picket of Richard Stewart’s brigade. The third was not far behind, and it seemed almost certain that the position might be won. At this moment General Hill, who was occupied in drawing out his division on the rear slope, but had not yet conducted it to its fighting-ground, interfered in the fight. He had seen and heard the sudden outbreak of musketry on the frontal slopes, as the French broke through Low’s brigade. But when it died down, he was far from imagining that the cause was the complete success of the enemy. Nevertheless, he directed his nearest brigade, that of Richard Stewart, to prepare to support the Germans if necessary. He was issuing his orders to the colonel of the 48th, when he observed some men on the hill top fire a few shots in his direction. ‘Not having an idea,’ he writes, ‘that the enemy were so near, I said to myself that I was sure it was the old Buffs, as usual, making some blunder.’ Accordingly he galloped up the hill, with his brigade-major Fordyce, shouting to the men to cease firing. He rode right in among the French before he realized his mistake, and a voltigeur seized him by the arm and bade him surrender. Hill spurred his horse, which sprang forward and got clear of the Frenchman, who lost his hold but immediately raised his musket and fired at three paces’ distance, missing the General but hitting his charger. Hill escaped in the midst of a scattering volley, which killed his companion Fordyce, and got back as fast as he could to Richard Stewart’s brigade. Without delaying for a moment, even to change his wounded horse, he led on the nearest regiments to recover the hill top. So great was the confusion, owing to the sudden attack in the dark, that Stewart’s men moved forward, not in their proper order, but with the 1st Battalion of Detachments on the right, the 29th in the centre, and the 1/48 on the left. This arrangement brought the first-named unit first into touch with the enemy. The Detachments came into immediate collision with the leading battalions of the French, who were now somewhat in disorder, and trying to re-form on the ground they had won. The two forces opened a furious fire upon each other, and both came to a standstill[646]. But Hill, coming up a moment later at the head of his centre regiment, cleared the hill top by a desperate charge: passing through the Detachments, the 29th delivered a volley at point-blank range and closed. The enemy broke and fled down the slope that they had ascended. The 29th wheeled into line and followed them, pouring in regular volleys at short intervals. But before they had gone far, they became dimly conscious of another column to their left, pushing up the hill in the darkness. This was the rear battalion of the 9th Léger, which had fallen somewhat behind its fellows. It was moving up diagonally across the front of the British regiment, with drums beating and loud shouts of _vive l’Empereur_. Taken in flank by the fire of the right companies of the 29th, it could make no effective resistance, and ere long broke and rolled back in disorder into the bed of the Portiña, where it met with the wrecks of the rest of the regiment, and retired in company with them up the slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal.

[646] The Battalion of Detachments was decidedly checked. They got somewhat into confusion, and halted. ‘The soldiers seemed much vexed,’ writes Leslie of the 29th, ‘we could hear them bravely calling out “There is nobody to command us! Only tell us what to do, and we are ready to dare anything.” There was a fault somewhere.’ Leslie, p. 144.

The remainder of Ruffin’s division took little or no part in the fighting. The three battalions of the 24th, which ought to have mounted the hill on the right, lost their way in the darkness and wandered up the valley between the Cerro de Medellin and the northern mountains: they never came into action. The 96th, on the left of the attack, chanced upon a part of the Portiña ravine which was very precipitous: they found it difficult to descend, were very late in reaching the other side, and then fell into a futile bickering fight with the 5th and 2nd battalions of the King’s German Legion, which terminated--with small damage to either party--when the main attack in the centre was seen to have failed.

The loss of the French in this night battle was about 300 men, almost all in the 9th Léger. It included sixty-five prisoners, among whom was the colonel of the regiment, who was left on the ground desperately wounded. The British casualties were somewhat heavier, entirely owing to the disaster to the 5th and 7th battalions of the K. G. L., which suffered when surprised, a loss of 188 men, eighty-seven of whom were made captives. Richard Stewart’s brigade, which bore the brunt of the fighting and decided the affair, had only 125 killed and wounded[647].

[647] Though the French official reports of casualties do not give any officers of the 9th Léger as prisoners, it is certain that Colonel Meunier was taken. See Leslie, p. 143. Being recovered, along with the other wounded prisoners, when Talavera was evacuated, his name did not get down among the list of missing, which was only drawn up on Aug. 10.

Thus ended, in well-deserved failure, Victor’s night attack, of which it may suffice to say that even its initial success was only due to the gross carelessness of Low’s brigade in failing to cover their front with a proper screen of outlying pickets. To attack in the dark across rugged and difficult ground was to court disaster. The wonder is not that two-thirds of the division went astray, but that the other third almost succeeded in the hazardous enterprise to which it was committed. Great credit is due to the 9th Léger for all that it did, and no blame whatever rests upon the regiment for its ultimate failure. The Marshal must take all the responsibility.

The wrecks of the French attacking columns having rolled back beyond the ravine, and the flanking regiments having abandoned their futile demonstrations, the Cerro de Medellin was once more safe. The troops occupying it were rearranged, as far as was possible, in the dark. The front line on its left and highest part was now formed by Richard Stewart’s brigade, ranged, not in its proper order of seniority, but with the 29th on the left, the 1st Battalion of Detachments in the centre, and the 1/48 on the right. Tilson’s brigade, the other half of Hill’s division, was to the south of Stewart, continuing his line along the crest. Low’s battalions of the King’s German Legion were drawn off somewhat to the right, closing in towards Langwerth’s brigade, so as to leave the central slopes of the Cerro de Medellin entirely to Hill’s men. Donkin’s brigade of Mackenzie’s division lay close behind them. After the warning that had been given by Victor’s first assault, the greatest care was taken to make a second surprise impossible. Stewart’s and Low’s brigades threw forward their pickets to the brink of the Portiña ravine, so close to the enemy that all night they could hear the _Qui vive_ of the sentries challenging the visiting rounds, only two or three hundred yards above them. On several occasions the outposts opened fire on each other, and the word ‘stand to your arms,’ ran along the whole line. In front of Sherbrooke’s division, about midnight, there was a false alarm, which led to a whole brigade delivering a volley at an imaginary column of assault, while their own pickets were still out in front, with the result that two officers and several men were killed or wounded[648]. A similar outbreak of fire, lasting for several minutes, ran along the front of the Spanish lines an hour later. It seems to have been caused by French foragers, in search of fuel, blundering against the Estremaduran pickets on the edge of the olive groves.

[648] See the Diary of Boothby of the R. E., one of the victims of this unhappy fusilade, p. 5.

Altogether the night was not a peaceful one, and the troops were much harassed by the perpetual and unnecessary calls to stand to their arms. Many of them got little sleep, and several British diarists have left interesting impressions on record of their long vigil. There was much to keep them awake: not only the repeated blaze of fire running along parts of the allied line, but the constant signs of movement on the French side of the Portiña. Some time after midnight long lines of torches were seen advancing across and to the right of the Cerro de Cascajal; these were markers with flambeaux, sent out to fix the points on which Victor’s artillery were to take up their positions, as was soon shown by the rattling of gun-carriages, the noise of wheels, and the cracking of whips, which were plainly heard in the intervals of stillness, when the hostile pickets ceased their bickering musketry fire. The French were pushing up their guns into the very front of their line, and when the dawn began to break they were visible only 600 or 800 yards away from the British lines. A few deserters came over during the night, mainly from Leval’s German division; all agreed that the enemy was about to deliver a second attack in the early morning.

The dawn was an anxious moment: with the growing light it was possible to make out broad black patches dotting the whole of the rolling ground in front of the British army. Every instant rendered them more visible, and soon they took shape as French regiments in battalion columns, ranged on a front of nearly two miles, from the right end of the Cerro de Cascajal to the edge of the woods facing the Pajar de Vergara. The object which drew most attention was an immense solid column at the extreme right of the hostile line, on the lower slopes above the Portiña, with a thick screen of _tirailleurs_ already thrown out in its front, and evidently ready to advance at the word of command. The other divisions lay further back: in front of them artillery was everywhere visible: there were four batteries on the midslope of the Cascajal hill, and six more on the rolling ground to the south. In the far distance, behind the infantry, were long lines of cavalry dressed in all the colours of the rainbow--fifteen or sixteen regiments could be counted--and far to the rear of them more black masses were slowly rolling into view. It was easily to be seen that little or nothing lay in front of the Spaniards, and that at least five-sixths of the French army was disposed for an attack on the British front. There were 40,000 men visible, ready for the advance against the 20,000 sabres and bayonets of Wellesley’s long red line[649].

[649] There are admirable narratives of the night-vigil and the dawn of Talavera, in the narratives of Leslie, Leith-Hay, and Lord Munster.

An attack was imminent, yet there were many things which might have induced the French generals to hold back. Was it worth while to assail the allies in the admirable position which they now held, when it was possible to drive them out of it without risking a battle? Orders had been sent to Soult, six days before, to bid him fall on Wellesley’s communications by way of Plasencia. It was believed that he must have started ere now, and that the news of his approach would reach the enemy within the next forty-eight hours. This intelligence would compel them to go behind the Tagus, and to abandon the Talavera position. Both Jourdan and King Joseph were doubtful of the policy of risking a general action. But the initiative was taken out of their hands by Victor. He had already placed his corps so close to the British lines that it would have been hard to withdraw it without an engagement. He had also, during the night, sent a dispatch to the King, stating that he should storm the Cerro de Medellin at dawn unless he received counter-orders. He appeared so confident of success that Joseph and his adviser Jourdan did not venture to bid him desist. They were, as the latter confessed, largely influenced by the knowledge that if they refused, Victor would delate them to the Emperor for culpable timidity in letting the British army escape[650].

[650] ‘Le duc de Bellune rendit compte au roi du résultat de sa première attaque, et le prévint qu’il la renouvellerait au point du jour. Peut-être aurait on dû lui donner l’ordre d’attendre.... Mais ce maréchal, étant resté longtemps aux environs de Talavera, devait connaître parfaitement son terrain, et il paraissait si sûr du succès, que le roi le laissait libre d’agir comme il le désirait.... Il sentait que s’il adopterait l’avis du Maréchal Jourdan le duc de Bellune ne manquerait pas d’écrire à l’empereur “qu’on lui avait fait perdre l’occasion d’une brillante victoire sur les Anglais”.’ Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. 256 and 259.

The Duke of Belluno was still persisting in his idea that it might be possible to seize the key of Wellesley’s position by a partial attack, without engaging the rest of his corps till it had already been won. Accordingly he gave orders to his subordinates Lapisse and Villatte that they were not to move till Ruffin, with the first division, should have gained the Cerro de Medellin. In a similar way the King made the advance of the 4th Corps conditional on the preliminary success of Victor’s right. This seems to have been bad policy, as it left Wellesley free to devote the whole of his attention to the point where the first attack was to be delivered. It was clear that the threatening column on the lower slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal would start the game. Victor had drawn up his troops in the following order. Ruffin on the extreme left, and considerably in advance, was to attack the Cerro on its north-eastern and eastern fronts. Behind him on the summit of the Cascajal hill, were Villatte’s twelve battalions, and in rear of all the two regiments of Beaumont, the Marshal’s corps-cavalry. To Villatte’s left, but on lower ground opposite Sherbrooke’s line, lay Lapisse’s division, with Latour-Maubourg’s six regiments of dragoons in support. This completed the array of the 1st Corps: on their left stood Sebastiani and his 4th Corps, facing the Guards, Campbell, and the northernmost battalions of the Spanish army, opposite the Pajar de Vergara. Sebastiani’s French division was on his right, his German division on his left, while the stray Polish brigade (the only part of Valence’s division that was on the field) supported the Germans. In second line was Merlin’s light horse, while Milhaud’s six regiments of dragoons lay out on the extreme left, observing the town of Talavera. King Joseph and his reserve--the Guards and the brigade of Dessolles--were far to the rear, just outside the woods round the Casa de Salinas.

At about five in the morning the watchers on the Cerro de Medellin saw the smoke of a gun curl up into the air from the central battery in front of Villatte’s division. The ensuing report was the signal for the whole of Victor’s artillery to open, and twenty-four guns spoke at once from the Cascajal heights, and thirty more from the lower ground to their right. The cannonade was tremendous, and the reply wholly inadequate, as Wellesley could only put four batteries in line, Rettberg’s on the summit of the Cerro, Sillery’s from the lower slope near Donkin’s position, and those of Heyse and Elliott from the front of Sherbrooke’s division. The French fire was both accurate and effective, ‘they served their guns in an infinitely better style than at Vimiero: their shells were thrown with precision, and did considerable execution[651].’ Wellesley, who stood in rear of Hill’s line on the commanding height, at once ordered Richard Stewart’s and Tilson’s brigades to go back from the sky-line, and to lie down. But no such device was practicable in Sherbrooke’s division, where the formation of the ground presented no possibility of cover, and here much damage was done. After a few minutes the English position was obscured, for the damp of the morning air prevented the smoke from rising, and a strong east wind blew it across the Portiña, and drove it along the slopes of the Cerro[652]. So thick was the atmosphere that the defenders heard rather than saw the start of Ruffin’s division on its advance, and only realized its near approach when they saw their own skirmishers retiring up the slope towards the main line. The light companies of Hill’s division came in so slowly and unwillingly, turning back often to fire, and keeping their order with the regularity of a field-day. The general, wishing to get his front clear, bade the bugles sound to bring them in more quickly, and as they filed to the rear in a leisurely way was heard to shout (it was one of the only two occasions on which he was known to swear), ‘D--n their filing, let them come in anyhow[653].’

[651] Eliott’s Narrative, in his _Defence of Portugal_, p. 238.

[652] Lord Munster, p. 226.

[653] Leslie, p. 147. The other occasion on which Hill used strong language was at the battle of St. Pierre in 1814, when Wellington remarked: ‘If Hill is beginning to swear we had better get out of the way.’

When the light companies had fallen back, the French were at last visible through the smoke. They had mounted the lower slopes of the Cerro without any loss, covered by their artillery, which only ceased firing at this moment. They showed nine battalions, in three solid columns: Victor had arranged the divisions with the 24th in the centre, the 96th on the left, and the 9th Léger, which had suffered so severely in the night-battle, upon the right. This arrangement brought the last-named regiment opposite their old enemies of the 29th, and the Battalion of Detachments, while the 1/48th and 2/48th had to deal with the French centre, and the Buffs and 66th with their left. When Ruffin’s columns had got within a hundred yards of the sky-line, Hill bade his six battalions stand to their feet and advance. As they lined the crest they delivered a splendid volley, whose report was as sharp and precise as that of a field-day. The effect was of course murderous, as was always the case when line met column. The French had a marked superiority in numbers; they were nearly 5,000 strong, Hill’s two brigades had less than 4,000[654]. But there was the usual advantage that every British soldier could use his weapon, while the French, in column of divisions, had the normal mass of useless muskets in the rear ranks. The first volley brought them to a standstill--their whole front had gone down at the discharge--they lost the impetus of advance, halted, and kept up a furious fire for some minutes. But when it came to a standing fight of musketry, there was never a doubt in any Peninsular battle how the game would end. The French fire began ere long to slacken, the front of the columns shook and wavered. Just at this moment Sherbrooke, who had noted that the divisions in his own front showed no signs of closing, took the 5th battalion of the King’s German Legion out of his left brigade[655], and sent it against the flank and rear of Ruffin’s nearest regiment--the 96th of the line. When the noise of battle broke out in this new quarter, the French lost heart and began to give ground. Richard Stewart, at the northern end of the British line, gave the signal to his brigade to charge, and--as a participator in this fray writes, ‘on we went, a wall of stout hearts and bristling steel. The enemy did not fancy such close quarters, and the moment our rush began they went to the right-about. The principal portion broke and fled, though some brave fellows occasionally faced about and gave us an irregular fire.’ Nothing, however, could stop Hill’s division, and the whole six battalions rushed like a torrent down the slope, bayonetting and sweeping back the enemy to the line of black and muddy pools that marked the course of the Portiña. Many of the pursuers even crossed the ravine and chased the flying French divisions right into the arms of Villatte’s troops, on the Cascajal hill. When these reserves opened fire, Hill’s men re-formed on the lower slope of the Cerro, and retired to their old position without being seriously molested, for Victor made no counter-attack.

[654] Ruffin had 5,200 men, minus about 300 lost on the previous night, while Hill had 3,853, minus 138 lost in that same battle in the dark.

[655] This operation is described in the narrative of the K. G. L. officer, printed by Beamish (p. 212). The narrator, however, mistakes the French regiment’s number, and says twenty-six for ninety-six.

Ruffin’s three regiments had been terribly punished: they had lost, in forty minutes’ fighting, 1,300 killed and wounded, much more than a fourth of their strength. Hill’s brigades had about 750 casualties[656], including their gallant leader, who received a wound in the head, and had to go to the rear, leaving the command of his division to Tilson. The loss of the German battalion which had struck in upon the French rear was insignificant, as the enemy never stood to meet it.

[656] These losses can be accurately ascertained. Ruffin’s whole loss in the two days of fighting was 1,632, of whom 300 of the 9th Léger had fallen on the night of July 27. He was not seriously engaged during the rest of the day, so must have lost 1,300 in this fight. Hill’s total loss on July 28 was 835, but much of it was suffered in the afternoon, when (though not attacked by infantry) his division was under a heavy shell fire.

Thus was Victor’s second attempt to storm the Cerro de Medellin rebuked. It was a rash and unscientific operation, and received a merited chastisement. The Marshal should have sent in all his corps, and attacked the whole British line, if he wished to give his men a fair chance. He obviously underrated the troops with which he had to deal--he had never seen them before the combat of Casa de Salinas on the previous day--and had no conception of the power of the line against the column. Even now baffled rage seems to have been his main feeling, and his only desire was to make the attempt again with larger forces.

The whole engagement had taken about an hour and a half, and the morning was still young when the Marshal re-formed his line, and reported his ill-success to the King. After the cannonade died down he bade his men take their morning meal, and the British on the Cerro could see the whole 1st Corps turn to cooking, behind their strong line of pickets. A sort of informal armistice was established in a short time; both parties wished to use the stagnant water of the Portiña, and after a little signalling hundreds of men came down with their canteens from either side, and filled them with the muddy fluid. In spite of the heavy fighting which had just ended, all parties agree that a very friendly spirit was shown. The men conversed as best they could, and were even seen to shake hands across the pools. Many of the officers came down a little later, and after a short colloquy agreed that either party might take off its wounded without molestation. As there were hundreds of French lying on the west bank of the Portiña, and a good many English on its further side, there was a complete confusion of uniforms as the bearers passed and repassed each other at the bottom of the ravine. But no difficulties of any sort arose, and for more than two hours the two parties were completely mixed. This was the first example of that amicable spirit which reigned between the hostile armies all through the war, and which in its later years developed into that curious code of signals (often described by contemporaries), by which French and English gave each other notice whenever serious work was intended, refraining on all other occasions from unnecessary outpost bickering or sentry-shooting.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA: THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT

(JULY 28)

The informal armistice which had followed the combat of the early morning had drawn to an end, when at about 10 o’clock the British observers on the Cerro de Medellin saw a large and brilliant staff riding along the French line from right to left. It finally halted, and took post on the most commanding point of the Cascajal heights. This was the entourage of King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, who had determined to make a careful examination of the allied lines before committing themselves to any further action. When they halted on the summit of the hill, from which the best general view was obtainable, Victor came to meet them, and a council of war was held.

It soon developed into a lengthy and animated dispute; lasting for more than an hour. Jourdan was of opinion that, considering the strength of the hostile position, and the decisive way in which the 1st Corps had been repulsed, it would be unwise to proceed with another attack. He pointed out that Wellesley would now be perfectly aware that his left was the point which must be assailed, and that movements visible behind the British line showed that it was already being reinforced. The only good move now available was to endeavour to turn the Cerro by the little valley to its north-east, which separates it from the Sierra de Segurilla: but it was clear that the enemy realized this as well as themselves. A considerable body of cavalry was already appearing at its southern end. If the Duke of Belluno, instead of delivering two frontal assaults, had been prudent enough to push men down this valley under cover of the darkness, so as to have a lateral attack ready at dawn, something might have been done. But now the imperial troops would have to win the valley by hard fighting, before they could use it as a starting-point for the assault on the hill. If a general attack were delivered, and the army were once more repulsed, it risked its line of communication and its retreat on Madrid. For the whole Spanish host might come out of the woods and fall upon its flank, while it was engaged with the British, and in that case the Madrid road would be cut, and the King would have to retreat on Avila, sacrificing his capital and his arsenals. On the whole Jourdan held that it would be wise and prudent to assume a defensive posture, and either to hold the present position or to retire to the more favourable ground behind the Alberche, four miles to the rear. In a few days the enemy would hear of Soult’s operations upon their line of communication, and would be forced to break up and retire.

Very different, as might have been expected, were Victor’s views. He declared that the British position was far from impregnable, and that the prestige of the French army would be destroyed if it retired, after two partial checks, from in front of an enemy who had not been seriously attacked. The only fault in the preceding operations had been that the whole army had not joined in, at the moment when the Cerro had been stormed. If the King would undertake to use the 4th Corps against the allied centre, he pledged himself to break their right with his own three divisions of infantry. He would not only assail the Cerro from in front, but would turn it from both flanks. If such an attack did not succeed _il faudrait renoncer à faire la guerre_. This phrase he dinned into Joseph’s and Jourdan’s ears so repeatedly that they both saved it up for future use, and taunted him with it in the acrimonious correspondence which followed the battle.

King Joseph would have preferred to follow Jourdan’s cautious plan, and to hold back. Sebastiani, whose opinion he asked, agreed with him. But both seem to have been terrorized by the Marshal’s stormy tirades, and still more by the thought of what the Emperor would say, if he heard that battle had been refused, contrary to Victor’s advice. The ultimate decision was still in the balance, when two pieces of news were received: the first was a dispatch from General Valence, the Governor of Toledo, to effect that the army of Venegas, whose position had hitherto been unknown--for nothing had been heard of him since Sebastiani had escaped from his front--had at last come on the scene. His advanced guard had presented itself before the bridges of Toledo, and was already skirmishing there. The second item of intelligence was a dispatch from Soult, acknowledging the receipt of the orders which had been sent to him upon the twenty-second, and stating his intention of carrying them out at the earliest possible moment. But he complained that the promised train of artillery had not yet reached the 2nd Corps, and declared that he could not move till it had come to hand, and till he had brought down the 6th Corps from Astorga. He was therefore of opinion that he could not possibly reach Plasencia till August 3, perhaps not till two days later.

This news was decisive: it was now clear that the Duke of Dalmatia would not be able to bring pressure to bear upon the rear of the allies for some six or seven days. Meanwhile Venegas was within two marches of Madrid, and had nothing in front of him save the four Polish battalions at Toledo. If the King refused to fight, and took up a defensive position on the Alberche, he would have to detach 15,000 men to hold back the army of La Mancha from the capital. This would leave him with only 30,000 men to resist Wellesley and Cuesta, and it was clear that such a force would be overmatched by the allies. If he kept a larger number in their front, Venegas would be able to capture Madrid, the thing of all others which Joseph was resolved to prevent. Accordingly the King and Jourdan reluctantly fell in with Victor’s plans, and consented to fight in the afternoon. If they defeated the British and the Estremadurans on the twenty-eighth, the army of La Mancha could easily be disposed of upon the twenty-ninth or thirtieth.

This decision once made, it only remained to settle the details of the attack. The King determined to assail the British centre and right with the infantry of Sebastiani’s corps--twenty-three battalions in all, or some 14,000 men. Victor with the three infantry divisions of the 1st Corps--thirty-three battalions, still over 16,000 strong in spite of their losses--undertook to fall upon the English left, to storm the Cerro de Medellin and also to turn it on its northern side, so as to envelop Wellesley’s flank. The Spaniards were to be left alone behind their walls and orchards--only Milhaud’s dragoons were told off to watch the exits from Talavera. Of the rest of the cavalry a few could be utilized in Victor’s turning movement in the valley below the Sierra de Segurilla: but the main body--all Beaumont’s and Latour-Maubourg’s eight regiments--were ranged in a second line, to act as a reserve for the frontal attack of the infantry, and to aid it if it were checked. The King’s Guards and the brigade of Dessolles were to be kept back, and only utilized to clinch the victory or to retrieve a repulse.

The 30,000 men who were to deliver the grand assault on the allied position were drawn up as follows. Leval’s Germans advanced on the left, taking as their objective the battery on the Pajar de Vergara. They faced Campbell’s British division, and slightly overlapped it, so as to cover the three or four battalions on the extreme northern wing of Cuesta’s line. In their rear as supports followed the two Polish battalions from Valence’s division. On Leval’s right, Sebastiani’s four French regiments continued the line: this was the strongest division on the field and counted over 8,000 bayonets. It faced the Guards and the right battalion of Cameron’s brigade. Here ended the troops of the 4th Corps: beyond them Victor’s 2nd division, that of Lapisse, was about to assail the German Legion and Cameron’s left-hand regiment, the 83rd. Still further north Villatte’s division lay opposite the steepest slopes of the Cerro de Medellin. This position looked more formidable in the eyes of the Duke of Belluno since he had seen his first two assaults upon it fail. It was now heavily manned: Tilson’s, Richard Stewart’s, and Donkin’s brigades were all visible upon its crest. After some hesitation the Marshal resolved to leave it alone for the present, and not to attack it till some impression should have been made upon other parts of Wellesley’s line. Accordingly he left in front of it only Villatte’s second brigade--the six battalions of the 94th and 95th regiments. The other brigade--the 27th and 63rd--was directed to join in the flanking movement to the north of the Cerro, which was to encompass Wellesley’s extreme left. But the main force told off for this advance consisted of the much-tried remnants of Ruffin’s division, now not more than 3,700 strong. The employment of these troops for such a critical operation seems to have been a mistake--they had already received two bloody checks, and had lost more than a third of their officers and 1,500 men in the late fighting. Though good regiments, they could now be considered as little more than ‘a spent force.’ This fact sufficiently explains the feebleness of the French advance upon this part of the field during the afternoon hours.

Behind the French infantry of the 4th and 1st Corps were deployed no less than twelve regiments of horse: Latour-Maubourg’s three brigades of dragoons were drawn up in the rear of Lapisse and Sebastiani: Beaumont supported Villatte, and lastly the four regiments of Merlin’s (late Lasalle’s) division followed Ruffin in his turning movement. Far to the rear Dessolles and Joseph’s Guards took up a position facing the British centre, from which they could support the right or the left of their own front line as might be necessary.

The drawing up of this line of battle took time, and while the French were shifting their positions and establishing their new front, Wellesley had ample leisure to provide against the oncoming storm. He had established himself upon the crest of the Cerro, and from thence could overlook every movement of the enemy. Of the new dispositions the only one which struck him as likely to cause trouble was the extension of Ruffin and Villatte to the northward. It was clear that they were intending to advance up the valley that separates the Sierra de Segurilla from the Cerro de Medellin, in order to take the hill in the flank, and assail the 2nd Division from the side. It was therefore necessary to make arrangements for checking this manœuvre. Wellesley’s first order was that Fane’s and Anson’s cavalry should move round the back of the Cerro, and take up new ground at the head of the valley. From this position they would be able to charge in the flank any force that might push up the trough of the depression, in order to get behind Hill’s line. He also withdrew half Rettberg’s battery from the front of the height, and placed it on a projecting lateral spur from which it could enfilade the valley. Nor were these his only precautions; he sent a hasty message to Cuesta, pointing out that the greater part of the Spanish line was not threatened, and asking if he could spare reinforcements for the left wing. The Spanish general behaved in a more liberal fashion than might have been expected from his previous conduct. He consented to lend Wellesley his reserve division, that of Bassecourt, about 5,000 strong, and also put at his disposition a battery of twelve-pounders, heavier guns than any which the British army possessed. The French were so slow in moving that there was ample time, before the battle grew hot, to send Bassecourt’s division round the rear of the British line, and to place it on the lower slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla, so as to continue to the northward the front formed by the British cavalry. Of the Spanish guns placed at Wellesley’s disposition, four were put into the Pajar de Vergara redoubt, by the side of Lawson’s battery: the other two accompanied Bassecourt’s infantry, and were placed on the northern spur of the Cerro de Medellin, near Rettberg’s six-pounders. Somewhat later the Duke of Albuquerque brought round the whole of his cavalry division--six regiments and a horse-artillery battery--to the same quarter, and drew them up in two lines to the rear of Anson’s and Fane’s brigades. But before he arrived the battle had already begun.

When the whole of the French infantry was ready, at about two o’clock in the afternoon, the King gave orders for the artillery to open, and eighty guns of the 1st and 4th Corps began to play upon the British line. In some places the troops were only some 600 yards from the enemy’s batteries, and the loss in many regiments was very appreciable before a single musket had been fired. Only thirty British and six Spanish pieces could reply: they were overwhelmed from the first by the superior number of the French guns. It was therefore with joy that Wellesley’s infantry saw that the artillery engagement was not to last for long. All along the hostile line the battalion-columns of Ruffin, Lapisse, Sebastiani, and Leval were moving up to the attack, and when they reached the front, and threw out their screen of tirailleurs, the guns grew silent. Only from the Cerro de Cascajal, where Villatte was hanging back in obedience to Victor’s orders, did the cannonade against Hill’s brigades continue.

The first troops to come into collision with the allies were Leval’s Germans, upon the extreme left of the French line. This, it is said, was contrary to the King’s orders; he had intended to hold this division somewhat back, as it was in danger of being outflanked by the Spaniards if it made a premature advance[657]. But Leval had a tangled terrain of vines and olive groves in his front: when once he had entered it he lost sight of the troops on his right, and fearing to be late on account of the obstacles in his front, committed the opposite fault. He came rushing in upon Campbell’s outpost line half an hour before the other divisions had closed with the British centre, the time being then 2.30 in the afternoon.

[657] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 260.

The nine battalions of the German division were arrayed in a single line of battalion columns[658], with a thick screen of tirailleurs in their front. But their order had been so much broken up by the walls and thickets that the 4,500 bayonets appeared to the British like one confused mass of skirmishers. They came on fast and furiously, chasing the pickets of the 7th and 53rd before them, till they emerged into the comparatively open ground in front of the Pajar de Vergara[659]. Here the defence was standing ready for them: Campbell had brought up one battalion of his rear brigade into his front line, so that the 40th, as well as the 53rd and 7th, were facing the attack. On his right lay the redoubt with its ten guns: further to the south the two left-hand units of the French division were opposed to troops of Cuesta’s army. Hence it came that while the Nassau and Dutch regiments faced the British infantry, the Baden regiment was in front of the guns, while the Hessians and the Frankfort battalion had to do with the Spaniards.

[658] Their order from left to right was as follows: Frankfort-Hesse (two batts.), Baden (two batts.), Holland (two batts.), Nassau (two batts.).

[659] There is a legend which occurs in all French narratives of Talavera--starting with the contemporary accounts, and including Desprez’s and Jourdan’s _Mémoires_. It is to the effect that Leval’s division, in its first advance, came upon an English battalion, which several writers call the 45th, lying in front of the rest of the allied line. It is alleged that the Nassau regiment surrounded and almost captured it--that they would have taken it prisoner indeed _en masse_, if the troops on their left (Holland and Baden) had held firm. But at least ‘on lui prit une centaine d’hommes, le major, le lieutenant-colonel, et le colonel--ce dernier mourut de ses blessures’ (Jourdan). No such incident can have occurred, for (1) no English regiment lost more than twenty-one ‘missing’ on this side of the field. (2) No English officer of higher rank than a captain was taken prisoner in the battle. (3) Only one officer was killed in the whole of Campbell’s division, and he was a lieutenant of the 7th Fusiliers. (4) The 45th was not engaged with Leval’s men, but lay to the left and supported the Guards in resisting Sebastiani: it lost one officer (a captain) and twelve men missing, but this was in the great _mêlée_ in the centre, at the end of the day’s fighting: it had no officer killed. I am driven to conclude that the whole is some gross exaggeration of the surprise of Campbell’s pickets in the vineyards, and that instead of a ‘battalion’ we should read the light companies of the division. Cooper of the 7th Fusiliers, who was in the skirmishing line, says that the Germans got close among them by calling out ‘Españoles’ and pretending to be Spaniards. A few prisoners (twenty-six in all) were lost in this way.

When the Germans surged out from among the olive groves into the comparatively open ground in front of the Pajar de Vergara, the musketry opened along both lines at a distance of about 200 yards, the assailants delivering a rolling fire, while the defenders of the position answered with regular battalion volleys. Several times Leval’s men advanced a few score paces, and the distance between the two divisions was growing gradually less. But the attacking force was evidently suffering more than the allies: in the centre especially, where the ten guns of the redoubt were firing canister into the disordered mass, the casualties of the Baden battalions were terrible: they could not bear up against the blasts of _mitraille_, and after their colonel, von Porbeck, had fallen, they broke and began to recoil. Seeing part of the enemy’s line falling into disorder, General Campbell ordered his front line to charge. Then Colonel Myers of the 7th, seizing the King’s colour of his regiment, ran out in front of the line and calling ‘Come on, Fusiliers,’ led the advance[660]. His own battalion, the 40th and the 53rd, at once closed with the Nassau and Dutch regiments, who shrank back into the thickets and melted away from the front. The victors pursued them for some distance, capturing in their onward career a whole battery of six guns, which was being brought forward to reply to the artillery of the redoubt, but had failed to reach the clearing before the line in front of them gave way. The three battalions on Leval’s extreme left, which had the Spaniards in front of them, had been exchanging volleys with their opponents without notable advantage on either side, when the rest of the division broke. When their companions retired they also were forced to draw back, in order to prevent themselves from being turned on both flanks. Campbell was cautious enough to stop his men before they had gone far forward among the thickets, and brought them back to their old position: he spiked the guns that he had taken, and left them in the clearing in front of the redoubt. His losses had been very small, owing to his admirable self-restraint in calling back his charging regiments before they got out of hand.

[660] This was the Myers who fell in storming the famous hill of Albuera in 1811. See Cooper (of the 7th), p. 22.

Leval therefore was able to rally his division at leisure, upon the two Polish battalions which formed its supports. He had lost in the three-quarters of an hour during which he was engaged some six or seven hundred men. The battle was raging by now all down the line, and when the Germans were re-formed, they received orders to advance for a second time, to cover the flank of Sebastiani’s division, now hotly engaged with Sherbrooke’s right brigades. Neglecting chronological considerations, in order to finish the narrative of the action in this quarter, it may suffice to say that Leval’s second attack was made at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon: it was not delivered with so much energy as had been shown in his first. It encountered the same obstacles, and could not surmount them. Once more the advance rolled up through the olive groves, and reached the clearing in front of the battery. Again the head of the attacking masses withered away under the musketry fire and the salvos from the English and Spanish guns, and the whole finally went to the rear in disorder. Campbell, in repelling this attack, used his second brigade as well as his first, and pushed the enemy further back than he had done during the earlier fighting: the Spaniards also came out of their line and continued to flank the retreating enemy with two or three battalions and a half-battery[661]. As the Hessians and Frankforters in their front began to give way, they were assailed by one of Henestrosa’s cavalry regiments, the _Regimiento del Rey_, which charged with great spirit, and cut up many men before they could form square. The bulk of the two battalions, however, clubbed together in a mass and retired into the woods, defending themselves as best they could. The victorious Spanish horsemen while following them, came upon a second French battery which (like that captured by the British brigade on their left) was being brought forward by a narrow lane between two olive groves. They cut down the gunners and took four pieces, which were dragged back into the redoubt. This was by far the best piece of work done by Spanish cavalry during the whole of the first years of the war, and did much to atone for the panic of the previous night in the eyes of the British observers upon the right wing.

[661] ‘Another lull in the storm, and fresh formation. “Here they come again” said many voices: so they did, but we were ready and gave them such a warm reception that they speedily went to the right-about. As in their first attack they now left behind several pieces of cannon, which we secured as before. After these two attacks and sharp repulses we were not troubled with their company any more.’ Cooper, p. 23.

The repulse of Leval’s division was complete, and its wrecks, once more rallied upon the two Polish battalions in their rear, drew back into the plain, and were completely put out of action. In this attack they lost not only the four guns taken by the Spaniards, but seven more pieces of artillery. Convinced that he could not carry the Pajar de Vergara position unless he could bring guns to bear upon the redoubt, and check the ravages of its salvos of canister, Leval had tried to push his remaining two batteries into the firing line. Again, as in the first attack, they were left helpless when the infantry broke, and became the prey of the pursuers. It would seem that he lost on this day seventeen guns in all[662]. The total of the casualties in his division were 1,007, nearly a quarter of its force: the colonels of the Baden and Frankfort regiments and the major commanding the Dutch battery had been left on the field[663]. Campbell had suffered on a very different scale--he had only lost 236 men, and it is improbable that the Spaniards on his right had more than 150 or 180 casualties, since they only fought with one wing of the attacking force. Wellesley, not without reason, gave the highest praise in his dispatch to Campbell, for the admirable and cautious defence which he had made. The management of the 4th Division, indeed, contrasted strongly with that of the troops to its left, where Sherbrooke’s brigades--as we shall see--risked the loss of the battle by their rash pursuit of the enemy, far beyond the limits of the position which had been given them to defend.

[662] There can be no rational doubt that the total number of guns taken was seventeen, as set forth in Charles Stewart’s report to Wellesley, as Adjutant-general, viz. ‘four eight-pounders, four six-pounders, one four-pounder, one six-inch howitzer, taken by Brigadier-general A. Campbell’s brigade, with one six-inch howitzer and six other guns left by the enemy and found in the woods’ of which four were in the hands of the Spaniards. Wellesley, in his dispatch, made the error of stating that twenty guns had been taken, being under the impression that the Spaniards had captured seven pieces, while they themselves only claim four--a Captain Piñero was mentioned in Eguia’s dispatch for causing them to be brought back to the Spanish line. The British took thirteen guns: three days after the battle Wellesley made them over to his allies. He writes to O’Donoju [Talavera, Aug. 1]: ‘We have got thirteen pieces of French artillery, which I wish to give over to the Spanish army--the other seven [four] you have already got. I shall be obliged if you will urge General Cuesta to desire the commanding officer of his artillery to receive charge of them from the officer commanding the British artillery.’ This is surely conclusive as to the numbers.

Jourdan in his _Mémoires_ acknowledges the loss of apparently _all_ Leval’s guns--three batteries. ‘L’artillerie du général Leval, qu’on avait imprudemment engagée au milieu des bois, des vignes et des fosses, ayant eu la plupart de ses chevaux tués, ne put pas être retirée; événement fâcheux qu’on eut le tort impardonnable de cacher au roi’ [p. 261]. Desprez says that _six_ pieces only were lost: Thiers allows _eight_.

But the most interesting point of the controversy comes out in Napoleon’s correspondence with his brother Joseph. On Aug. 25, the Emperor writes in hot anger to say that he sees from the English newspapers that Joseph had lost twenty guns, a fact concealed in the King’s dispatch. He desires to be told at once the names of the batteries that were captured and the divisions to which they belonged. Jourdan replies in the King’s behalf on Sept. 15, that _no_ guns have been lost--four pieces of Leval’s artillery had been for a moment in the hands of the British, but they were recaptured. Joseph himself writes to the same effect next day: ‘Wellesley n’a pris aucune aigle, il n’en montrera pas plus que de canons.’ On the nineteenth, Jourdan writes to Clarke, the Minister of War, to say that he has just found out that _two_ guns had been lost by Leval. Sénarmont, the artillery chief of the 4th Corps, explains to Jourdan, in a letter of September 27, that _ten_ pieces had been lost in the olive groves, but that all were recovered save _two_, one Dutch six-pounder, and one French eight-pounder. The truth comes out in Desprez’s narrative. He says that the King, hearing that Leval had left guns abandoned in front of the Pajar de Vergara, ordered Sebastiani to have them brought in: ‘Le général assura que déjà elles avaient été reprises. Cette assertion était inexacte. Le général Sebastiani était-il lui-même en erreur? Ou les ordres donnés lui paraissaient-ils inexécutables? Je n’ai jamais eu le mot de l’énigme: quoi qu’il en soit, les pièces tombèrent le lendemain au pouvoir de l’ennemi. Le Général Sénarmont, qui commandait l’artillerie, ne rendit pas compte de cette perte. Le général Sebastiani l’avait prié avec instance de la cacher. Aussi dans son rapport sur la bataille Joseph déclara-t-il positivement qu’on n’avait pas perdu un canon. Plus tard les journaux anglais firent connaître la vérité. L’Empereur, qui savait apprécier leur exactitude, reprocha à son frère de l’avoir trompé. Joseph eut assez de délicatesse pour accepter ces reproches et ne point déclarer de quelle manière les choses s’étaient passées’ [p. 491].

In short, Sebastiani and Sénarmont conspired to hide the truth, and Joseph, who liked them both (see his letters in Ducasse, especially vi. 456, where on Sept. 30 he sends Sénarmont a gold box as a sort of ‘consolation prize’), hushed the matter up in their interests. The most curious part of the matter is that on Sept. 27, Sénarmont was able to say with literal exactness that only two pieces were missing, for fifteen of the lost guns had been retaken on August 5, behind the bridge of Arzobispo, during the retreat of Cuesta’s army. They had been given back to their owners long before September, so were no longer missing. But this can hardly be called ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth.’

[663] The losses were killed: officers six, men ninety-seven: wounded, officers twenty-four, men 803: prisoners, seventy-seven men. Campbell lost killed: officers one, men thirty-two: wounded, officers six, men 171: missing, officers one, men twenty-five--a total of 236. The Spaniards may have had 150 casualties--it is difficult to see that they can have suffered much more, as they had only two hostile regiments in front of them.

We must now turn to their doings--the most desperate fighting that occurred during the day. Sherbrooke’s eight battalions had to endure the preliminary cannonade for more than half an hour after Campbell’s men were closely engaged with the enemy. It was not till three o’clock that the two French divisions opposed to them began to descend towards the Portiña, in an orderly and imposing array. Each of the French generals had drawn up his twelve battalions in two lines--the front line deployed in column of divisions, the supporting line in solid column of battalions. But there was this difference in their arrangements, that Lapisse had placed his brigades one behind the other, while Sebastiani had preferred to work his brigades side by side, each with one regiment in first and one in second line. The former therefore had Laplannes’ brigade (16th Léger and 45th Line) opposed to Low’s and Langwerth’s regiments of the German Legion and Cameron’s 2/83rd. The latter had the 28th of Rey’s and the 58th of Liger-Bellair’s brigades ranged over against the 1/61st and the British Foot-Guards. When the cannonade of the French batteries ceased, the twelve battalions of their first line, preceded by the usual swarm of _tirailleurs_, moved down toward the Portiña. They crossed the brook and pressed on towards the red line that stood awaiting their approach, driving before them with ease the comparatively insignificant screen of light troops that lay in front of the British centre. Sherbrooke, who was responsible for the whole line of the defence, since his division exactly covered the ground on which the French attack was delivered, had issued orders that the troops were not to fire till the enemy came within fifty yards of them, and that they were then to deliver a single volley and charge. This programme was executed with precise obedience: though suffering severely from the enemy’s musketry, the division held in its fire till the hostile columns were close upon them, and then opened with one tremendous discharge which crashed out simultaneously along the whole eight battalions. The leading ranks of Lapisse’s and Sebastiani’s front line went down in swathes,--one French witness says that the infantry of the regiments of the 4th Corps lost a third of their numbers in less than ten minutes. When the charge which Sherbrooke had ordered followed close upon the blasting musketry fire, the enemy retired in disorder and fell back beyond the Portiña.

The divisional general had apparently forgotten to caution his colonels against the danger of carrying their advance too far. Instead of contenting themselves with chasing the broken enemy as far as the brook, and then returning to their positions, the four brigades of the 1st division all crossed the water and pursued the French into their own ground; the German Legion on the left actually began to push them up the lower slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal, while the Guards on the right went forward far into the rolling plain in front of them. Cameron halted his two battalions not far beyond the Portiña; but on each side of him the pursuit was pressed with reckless energy, and without any remembrance of the fact that the enemy had strong reserves.

Thus it came to pass that a disaster followed the first success of Sherbrooke’s division. Both the Germans on the left and the Guards on the right found themselves in face of intact troops, behind whom the broken front line of the enemy took refuge. They were in no condition to begin a new combat, for they were in complete disorder, and there was a broad gap on the inner flank of each brigade, owing to the fact that Cameron had halted and refused to push forward into danger. Hence came a perilous crisis: the French reserves moved forward, the guns on the Cascajal height enfiladed the German Legion, while two regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons moved in upon the right flank of the Guards. The whole of the six battalions that had joined in the reckless advance were forced to recoil, fighting desperately but losing ground every moment, and pressed into clumps and masses that presented no trace of their former line of battle. When they fell back to the point where Cameron had stopped, the 61st and 83rd became involved in their retreat, and were forced to repass the Portiña in their company. The French followed with shouts of victory, pushing their advantage to the utmost and slaughtering the disordered battalions by hundreds. The disaster was worst on the left, where half the strength of the 2nd Line Battalion of the German Legion--387 men--was destroyed in twenty minutes, and the 5th battalion of that same corps lost over 100 prisoners. The Guards suffered almost as heavily: out of their 2,000 men 611 went down killed or wounded: but they left no prisoners behind.

It seemed that the day might well be lost, for Wellesley’s reserves were small. Such as they were, however, they were at once put into action. Mackenzie brought forward his brigade to the ground which the Guards had originally covered, and drew them up to withstand the rush of Sebastiani’s division--the 2/24th on the right, the 2/31st on the left, with the 1/45th between them. The disordered household troops passed through their intervals, and rallied behind them with splendid promptness: ‘their good humour and determination after such dreadful losses’ says an eye-witness, ‘was shown by their giving a loud hurrah as they took up their new ground[664].’ At the same time Cotton brought up the single brigade of light cavalry which was in reserve, and drew them up on Mackenzie’s right, so as to cover his flank. Sebastiani came up with great boldness against the fresh front thus presented to him, and for twenty minutes there was a furious musketry battle in the British right centre. Mackenzie himself fell, and his three battalions lost 632 men out of about 2,000: but they held their own, and finally the enemy recoiled. They were helped somewhat in their inclination to retreat by a charge of the Light Dragoons upon the flank of their left-hand regiment, the 75th, which had about 150 men sabred[665]. Thus on this point the battle was saved: the main credit must go to Mackenzie’s brigade, which has never received the praise that was its due, for its general was killed, and thus no report from the 3rd division was sent in to Wellesley, who omitted all mention of its doings in his Talavera dispatch[666]. It is never too late to do homage to forgotten valour, and to call attention to a neglected feat of arms. The services of the 24th, 31st, and 45th saved the day for Britain[667].

[664] Lord Munster, p. 231.

[665] General Desprez, relating the doings of Sebastiani’s division, says that the 75th were cut up by _Spanish_ light horse: but there were no cavalry of that nation in this part of the field, and it would seem that the French were misled by the blue uniforms of the Light Dragoons.

[666] Except that he mentioned the colonels of the 31st and 45th among the officers who had done well in the battle.

[667] The only place where a good account of the doings of Mackenzie’s brigade is to be found is in the excellent regimental history of the 24th. I fully share the indignation expressed by its author at the unmerited oblivion in which its splendid doings have been lying for so many years. [See Paton’s _Annals of the 24th Regiment_.]

Sebastiani therefore drew back terribly mauled: his division had lost _all_ its four colonels, seven of its twelve battalion-chiefs, seventy other officers and 2,100 rank and file--including some sixty prisoners. There was no more fight left in them. They recoiled into the plain, and drew up at last not far from the wrecks of Leval’s division, a full mile beyond the Portiña.

Meanwhile, however great may have been the danger in the British right-centre, that in the left-centre was even greater. Cameron’s, Low’s, and Langwerth’s brigades were all in the most desperate position: the former, not having pushed so far to the front as the four German battalions, had suffered least of the three--though it had lost 500 men out of 1,400. But the Legionary troops were in far worse case--Langwerth had been killed, and his brigade was reduced from 1,300 to 650 bayonets--just fifty per cent. of the men had been lost. Low had gone into action with only 950 rank and file, owing to the heavy casualty-list of the preceding night. Of these he now lost 350, including 150 made prisoners in the disorderly retreat down the slope of the Cerro de Cascajal. That these troops ever rallied and made head at all, when they had recrossed the Portiña, is much to their credit.

The situation was saved by Wellesley’s own prescience. The moment that he saw the rash attack on the French line to which Sherbrooke had committed himself, he looked round for supports which might be utilized to stay the inevitable reaction that must follow. Mackenzie’s brigade was available on the right-centre, and was used as we have seen. But there were no infantry reserves behind the left-centre: it was necessary to send down troops from the Cerro de Medellin. Villatte was then threatening its front, Ruffin was marching to turn its northern flank, and Wellesley did not dare to detach a whole brigade from the key of the position. He took, however, Richard Stewart’s strongest battalion, the 1/48th under Colonel Donnellan (which had still over 700 bayonets in line even after its losses in the morning) and sent it at full speed down the southern slope of the Cerro. It arrived in time to take position on the old ground of the British line, at the moment that the retreating masses came rolling back across the Portiña. If the 48th had been carried away in the general backward movement, the day would have been lost: but the regiment stood firm, and allowed Cameron’s and Langwerth’s troops to pass by its flanks and form up in its rear. While it was holding back Lapisse’s central advance, the defeated brigades rallied and re-formed with admirable celerity, and the battle was restored. Here, as further to the right, the fighting now resolved itself into a furious musketry-combat between enemies both of whom were now spent and weakened by their previous exertions[668]. In such a duel the line had always the advantage over the column in the end. The French, when once brought to a standstill by the 1/48th, lost their _élan_, and stood heaped together in disorderly masses, keeping up a rolling fire but gaining no ground. Howorth turned upon them the batteries on the Cerro de Medellin, which enfiladed their flank and added to their confusion. General Lapisse himself was killed at this moment, as he was trying to urge on his men to a final advance. It was probably, however, not his death--on which all the French accounts lay great stress--but rather the defeat of Sebastiani’s division on their immediate right which finally shook the _morale_ of the French regiments, and induced them to move back, first at a slow pace, then in undisguised retreat. The shattered remnants of the German Legion and of the 1/48th, 1/61st, and 2/83rd were in no condition to follow. Seldom have two combatants so thoroughly mauled each other as had the twelve French and the seven allied battalions which fought in this part of the field. Of the 6,800 men of Lapisse’s division, the general, sixty-nine other officers, and 1,700 men were _hors de combat_. Of 4,300[669] British and German troops opposed to them almost exactly the same number had been lost--a general (Langwerth), seventy-seven officers, and 1,616 men. That the smaller force should ever have held its ground after losing more than a third of its number is almost miraculous. There was no such a victory as this during the whole war, save Albuera.

[668] In most modern English narratives of Talavera it is stated that the 1/48th supported the Guards. This must be a mistake, caused by a misreading of Wellesley’s dispatch. It is certain that the Guards fell back on Mackenzie’s brigade. Contemporary accounts by officers of the 2/24th speak of the Coldstreams passing through them to re-form: the Scots Fusiliers therefore must have had the 2/31st and 1/45th behind them. Donnellan and the 1/48th really supported Langwerth’s German battalions, as Lord Londonderry (the only historian who has got the facts right) clearly shows (i. p. 410). It is curious that the historians of the battle have not seen that the Germans, in their dreadfully mauled condition, could not have been rallied without external aid: this aid was given by Donnellan, while Mackenzie was saving the Guards.

[669] The figures are (after deducting the losses of the earlier combats): Low’s brigade 964, Langwerth’s 1,315, Cameron’s 1,306, 1/48th 700, a total of 4,285. The losses were: Low 326, Langwerth 721, Cameron 547, 1/48th _about_ 100, a total of 1,694, including officers. (See tables in Appendix.)

While the main stress of the battle had been rolling across the lower slopes, above the middle course of the Portiña, matters had been comparatively quiet on the Cerro de Medellin. Victor, it will be remembered, had ordered that Villatte was to make no serious attack on the height until the divisions to his left had made some impression upon the British centre. But Lapisse and Sebastiani, in spite of their temporary successes, had never broken into Wellesley’s position. The assault on the Cerro therefore was never made, though a furious artillery fire was kept up against its garrison throughout the afternoon. The handful of British guns upon the crest could make no adequate reply: hence the three brigades of Tilson, Richard Stewart, and Donkin were suffering very serious losses from the long cannonade. Wellesley had made them shelter themselves, as far as was possible, behind the sky-line. Nevertheless the storm of shot and shell that beat upon the position was not without effect. In Donkin’s brigade no one, save the light companies skirmishing along the lower slopes, discharged a musket that afternoon, yet the casualties in its ranks were no less than 195[670]. Hill’s two brigades, though better covered, had still many killed and wounded. That the return-fire of the British artillery and skirmishers was not altogether ineffective is shown by the fact that the two regiments of Villatte’s second brigade, which held the opposite slope, lost 185 men, and even the squadrons of Beaumont in its rear had a few troopers disabled[671]. Nevertheless the fighting in this part of the field was not only indecisive but comparatively innocuous to both sides, when compared with the awful slaughter that was going on to their right.

[670] For a description of the sufferings of the 88th, whose battalion companies did not fire a single shot, during the cannonade of the afternoon, see Grattan’s _Connaught Rangers_, vol. iii. p. 91.

[671] For these losses, see the Talavera Appendix.

It only remains to tell of the combat to the north of the Cerro, in the narrow valley that separated the British position from the Sierra de Segurilla. Here the engagement began at a much later hour than in the centre. All the observers on the hill speak of the first contest of Campbell and Leval as being concluded, and of that of Sherbrooke and Sebastiani as being at its height, before the French right wing began to move.

The French troops in this direction, it will be remembered, were the three regiments of Ruffin, now mere wrecks of their former selves, and the first brigade of Villatte’s division, that of Cassagne. The six battalions of the latter force were near the Cerro de Medellin, while Ruffin’s men stood further to the north, under the Sierra de Segurilla. In support of them both lay Merlin’s division of light cavalry.

At the moment when Victor had received permission to turn the flank of the Cerro, it had appeared that he would meet little opposition. But long ere the French were ready to advance, they had seen allied troops arriving in haste and taking up their position at the southern end of the valley. First Fane’s and Anson’s cavalry had drawn up on the level ground, then Bassecourt’s Spanish infantry had appeared on the rocky slopes of the Sierra, and had thrown out a long skirmishing line opposite Ruffin’s right. Lastly Albuquerque’s whole cavalry division had ridden round from the rear of the centre, and taken post behind Anson and Fane. There were now over 5,000 bayonets and 5,000 sabres in face of the French brigades.

It was clear that any attempt to storm the northern face of the Cerro would expose the troops that attempted it to a flank attack from the allied troops in the valley. It was this that made Ruffin and Villatte (who was present in person with Cassagne’s brigade) very chary of molesting Hill’s position. On the other hand if the French advanced up the valley to attack the cavalry at its southern end, they would expose themselves to a flanking fire from the guns on the Cerro and from Hill’s right-hand infantry brigade.

Nevertheless, when the roar of the invisible battle on the other side of the Cascajal height was at its loudest, the two French generals began a cautious advance towards the front. They at once came under a tiresome flanking artillery fire from the Cerro: half Rettberg’s battery of the German Legion had been placed on a spur from which it enfiladed Villatte’s nearest regiment. Two heavy Spanish twelve-pounders opened from another part of the slope[672], and Albuquerque had also placed his horse-artillery guns in a position from which they bore up the valley. The pieces that accompanied the French advance, being in the trough of the depression, could do little harm in return.

[672] Hartmann of the K.G.L. artillery has a note on these pieces: they were useful because of their heavy calibre, none of the British guns being heavier than six-pounders. They were bright new brass cannon from the arsenal at Seville: their machinery for sighting and elevation was of a most primitive type--a century out of date. The lieutenant in command seemed unable to hit anything with them, whereupon Hartmann got off his horse, himself laid a gun, and had the luck to dismount a French piece in the valley. After this the Spaniards fired better and did very good service.

After advancing as far as the path which leads from Talavera to Segurilla, Ruffin deployed his right regiment, the much depleted 9th Léger, and sent it up the Sierra to form a screen opposite Bassecourt’s infantry. The other six battalions, the 24th and 96th, advanced in column along the valley, with the 27th from Cassagne’s brigade on their left; presently the whole came level with the northern slope of the Cerro, just reaching the farm of Valdefuentes at its foot.

At this moment Lapisse’s attack had already been beaten off, and Wellesley was able to turn his attention from the centre to the flank of his line[673]. Crossing the crest of the Cerro, he studied for a moment the situation of the French regiments, and then sent down orders for Anson’s brigade of light dragoons to charge them, with Fane’s heavy cavalry in support. The moment that the British horsemen were seen to be advancing the enemy hastily formed squares--the 24th and 96th slightly to the west of the Segurilla road, the 27th in a more advanced position just under the walls of the farm of Valdefuentes. A battalion of _grenadiers réunis_, and the 63rd of the Line, which formed Villatte’s supports, also fell into square far to the rear. The concentration of the French regiments in vast masses of three battalions each gave a great opportunity to the allied artillery, which found easy targets in the square blocks of men at their feet.

[673] That the charge of Anson’s light dragoons came after victory had been secured in the centre is clear from several eye-witnesses, e.g. Leith-Hay of the 29th, who was on top of the Cerro, and close to Wellesley, writes: ‘The favourable termination of the battle in the centre created great excitement: the cheer, which had been re-echoed from the height had hardly died away, when a scene of another character was in preparation. The movements of the divisions Ruffin and Villatte had during the late contest been vacillating and uncertain. Formed to all appearance to attack the height, they had even advanced some distance towards its base. Sir Arthur crossed with rapid steps from the right of the 29th to the part of the hill looking down on Anson’s brigade. It was immediately known that a charge would take place’ (i. p. 158).

As Anson’s brigade advanced, the right regiment, the 23rd Light Dragoons, found itself opposite the large square of the 27th Léger, while the 1st Light Dragoons of the German Legion faced the smaller masses of the 24th and 96th. The ground seemed favourable for a charge, and though an attack on unbroken infantry is always hazardous, the squadrons came on with great confidence and were soon closing in at headlong speed upon the hostile line.

An unforeseen chance of war, however, wrecked the whole plan. The long dry waving grass of the valley seemed to show a level surface, but the appearance was deceitful. About a hundred and fifty yards in front of the French squares was a narrow but deep ravine, the bed of a small winter-torrent which discharges its waters into the Portiña during the rainy season. It was about fifteen feet broad and ten feet deep in the northern part of the field, a little narrower in its southern course. There were many places at which it could be crossed with ease by a horseman moving alone and at a moderate pace. But for squadrons riding knee to knee at headlong speed it was a dangerous obstacle, and indeed a trap of the most deadly sort. It was wholly invisible to the horsemen till they came upon it. Colonel Elley, the second in command of the 23rd, who rode two lengths ahead of the front line of his regiment, mounted on a grey horse, and conspicuous to every observer on the Cerro de Medellin, was the first man to discover the peril[674]. His charger cleared it at a bound; but knowing that the inferior mounts of the rank and file would certainly come to grief, he wheeled round on the further bank, threw up his hand and tried to wave back his followers. It was too late: the two squadrons of the front line were on the brink of the ravine before they could understand his action. Some of the troopers cleared the obstacle in their stride; some swerved in time and refused to take the leap; others scrambled into and over the less difficult points of the ditch: but many fell horse and man into the trap, and were then crushed by the rear rank falling in on top of them. There were several broken necks, and scores of broken arms and legs in the leading squadrons. The second line got warning of the obstacle by seeing the inexplicable disorder into which their fellows had fallen. They slackened their pace, but were borne into the confused mass at the ravine before they could entirely bring themselves to a stand. Meanwhile the front face of the square formed by the 27th Léger opened fire on the unhappy regiment.

[674] Leith-Hay, p. 159.

The German light dragoons, on the northern side of the valley, came upon the fatal cutting at a point where it was somewhat shallower and broader than in front of the 23rd--one of their officers estimates it in his narrative at eighteen feet in width and six or eight in depth. Their disaster therefore was not so complete as that of their British comrades. But many troopers of the first line were unhorsed, and others, though keeping their saddles, could not manage to scramble up the further side of the ravine. The rear squadrons came up in time to add to the confusion, and reined up among the survivors of the front[675].

[675] Napier, ii. 176, has a story that Col. Arentschildt of the German dragoons discovered the ravine in time, and checked his line, crying, ‘I will not kill my young mans’--thereby saving his regiment and taking no part in the charge. This is entirely disproved by the narratives of the officers of the 1st K.G.L. Dragoons, quoted in Beamish’s _History of the King’s German Legion_. The evidence of Colonel von der Decken alone suffices to show that the regiment fell into the trap, suffered severe losses therein, and then executed a disorderly and ineffective charge on Ruffin’s squares, after which it returned to its old position, with a loss of nearly forty men. Napier seems to have been misled by the statement of Major Ponsonby of the 23rd, to the effect that the Germans turned back at the ravine. He also says that Seymour, Colonel of the 23rd, was wounded, but that officer’s name does not appear in the casualty list.

The two regiments were now in utter confusion, and had already suffered severe loss both by the fall into the ravine and by the French musketry which had opened upon them. Their colonels would have been wise to give up the attempt to advance and to fall back in their old position. How could squadrons in such a disordered state hope to break into French squares? But both Seymour of the 23rd and Arentschildt were officers of high mettle, and throwing prudence to the winds they collected such of their men as had leaped or scrambled over the ravine, and led them against the hostile infantry. Probably little more than half of either corps took part in the final charge.

Be this as it may, both the 23rd and the Legionary dragoons made an attempt to gallop in upon the squares in their front. The Germans rode at that of the 24th regiment, received its fire, and were repulsed, though a few men fell close in upon the bayonets. They then galloped off and fell back up the valley. Far more disastrous was the fate of the English regiment. The survivors of the two left squadrons charged the square of the 27th Léger, were repulsed with heavy loss, recrossed the ravine, and struggled back to the British lines. But Colonel Elley and the right squadrons, having no enemy immediately in their front, rode furiously between the French square and the farm of Valdefuentes, and charged a line of cavalry which was visible a few hundred yards to the rear[676]. This was the leading brigade [10th and 26th Chasseurs] of Merlin’s division, which was acting in support of Villatte and Ruffin. The squadrons in front of the 23rd swerved to the side when charged[677], but on passing them the British dragoons found another regiment of Merlin’s second line opposed to them[678]. They dashed at it, whereupon the regiment that had evaded them swung round and fell upon their rear. Encircled by fivefold numbers the remnant of Drake’s and Allen’s squadrons of the 23rd were annihilated. Only a few well-mounted officers[679], including their leader Elley, and two or three troopers cut their way through the enemy, rode off to the northward, and ultimately escaped to Bassecourt’s Spanish line on the Sierra de Segurilla. The total loss of the regiment was 207 killed, wounded and missing out of 450 sabres who took the field in the morning. Of these, three officers and 105 men were prisoners--most of them wounded.

[676] In this charge they carried away with them, and almost captured, Generals Villatte and Cassagne, who had failed to take refuge in the square of the 27th, and were caught outside it. [Sémélé’s Report.]

[677] In the French official reports it is said that General Strolz, the brigadier, drew aside the 10th Chasseurs, in order to fall upon the British dragoons from the flank. Rocca (p. 104) says that the regiment was charged and broke, but rallied again. _Victoires et Conquêtes_ has: ‘le 10me de chasseurs ne pouvait soutenir cette charge, ouvrit ses rangs, mais bientôt rallié il chargea ses adversaires en queue.’ As the regiment only lost five killed it does not seem likely that it was broken. The French records do not give the number of its wounded.

[678] This was the Westphalian _Chevaux-légers_ regiment.

[679] Among the other officers who cut their way through was Lord George William Russell, desperately wounded by a cut on the shoulder. Only three officers (two wounded) were taken prisoners from these two squadrons: two others were killed: it would seem therefore that out of twelve present with the two right squadrons, several succeeded in getting out of the trap. Elley says that the whole body that followed him did not exceed 170 sabres, and that seven or eight only cut their way through the enemy.

It was late in the afternoon when the survivors of the 23rd found their way back to the western end of the valley, and the battle in the centre had long died down to a cannonade. Ruffin and Villatte now had it in their power to advance again, but did not do so. If they had gone further forward they would have lent their flank still more to Hill’s troops upon the Cerro, and would have had to deploy, a movement which would have exposed them, when no longer protected by formation in square, to charges from the mass of allied cavalry still visible in their front--Fane’s brigade and Albuquerque’s strong division. Bassecourt’s Spaniards were holding their ground against the flank-guard which had been sent up on to the Sierra de Segurilla, and to drive them back Ruffin would have had to detach more battalions from his main column. News had been received that the central attack had completely failed. It was natural, therefore, that after some hesitation the French right wing retired, and fell back up the valley of the Portiña. Villatte’s two regiments had lost about 200 men while standing in square under the fire of the guns on the Cerro. They could no longer be regarded as fresh troops fit for a prolonged advance, while the wrecks of Ruffin’s battalions, having now been under fire three separate times in eighteen hours, were utterly exhausted. It is clear that Victor could not have dared to risk a serious attack upon the British left with these forces.

The battle had now come to a standstill: of the five French infantry divisions in the front line those of Leval, Sebastiani, and Lapisse were reforming their diminished ranks in the plain, far to the east of the Portiña, while Villatte and Ruffin had fallen back on to the slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal. The only intact infantry still remaining at the disposition of the King were his own 1,800 Guards, and the 3,300 bayonets of Dessolles. With these and with Villatte’s two brigades, which had only lost 400 men, it would have been possible to prepare one more assault upon the British position. Victor, raging with anger at his third repulse, was anxious to continue the action, though he had lost nearly one man in four of his infantry, and had not won an inch of ground. The King was less hopeful: the frightful slaughter had subdued his spirits, and he asked himself whether the 5,000 men of his reserve would suffice to break the thin red line against which the whole of the 1st and 4th Corps had hurled themselves in vain. For a moment he seemed inclined to risk his last stake, and the Guards and Dessolles were ordered to move forward. But they had not gone far when a counter-order was sent to check them: Milhaud, whose dragoons had spent the whole day in observing the Spanish lines, had sent in a message to the effect that Cuesta was at last showing signs of life, and that he could see numerous troops pushing to the front among the olive groves in front of the town. The news was not true, for nothing more than vedettes and small exploring parties had been sent out by the Spanish general. But the very suspicion that the Army of Estremadura might at last be preparing to take the initiative was enough to damp the very moderate ardour of King Joseph. If he committed himself to one final dash at the English, and engaged both his reserve and the rallied divisions of his front line, in an attack upon their allied centre and left, what could he do in the event of the sudden appearance of the whole Spanish army in the act of turning his southern flank? Twenty-five thousand men, or more, might suddenly sally out from the screen of groves, and fling themselves upon the left flank of Sebastiani’s corps. To hold them back nothing would be available but the 5,000 sabres of Milhaud and Latour-Maubourg; of infantry not one man would be left to parry such a stroke. The King could not flatter himself that anything but a disaster could ensue. Even if it were not true that the Spaniards were already in motion, there was every reason to believe that they might deliver an attack when they saw the last French reserves put into action against the British. Few generals would have resisted such a tempting opportunity. It was to be remembered also that some of the Spaniards had actually come out of their lines, and fallen upon Leval’s flank, when the last assault had been pressed against the Pajar de Vergara. A third advance in this quarter might yet rouse the whole Estremaduran army out of its apathy, and induce it to charge home upon Sebastiani’s left wing.

Jourdan and most of the members of Joseph’s staff were convinced that it would be mad to deliver a last attack on the British line, in face of the possible consequences of an advance by the Spaniards. The Marshal declared that[680] it was impossible to proceed with any further scheme of advance, and that the only safe course was to draw back the whole army towards the Alberche. His master was relieved to find a good reason for ending a battle which had been begun without his permission, and continued under his very reluctant sanction. Orders were sent along the whole line, directing both the 1st and the 4th Corps to abandon their fighting-ground and fall back to their old position of the twenty-seventh. The cavalry divisions of Merlin, Latour-Maubourg, and Milhaud were to cover the retreat.

[680] The best account of all this comes from the _Mémoire_ of General Desprez, who was riding with the head-quarters staff at this moment.

Victor was furious at receiving these directions. He averred to the officer who bore the King’s dispatch that from his point of vantage on the Cascajal he could command a view of the whole Spanish army, and that he was positive that not a Spaniard had moved. He even pretended to observe signs of a retreat in Wellesley’s lines, and persisted that the mere demonstration of a fourth attack would induce the allies to abandon their position. How he came to form any such conclusion it is hard to see, for the whole British army was still preserving its old ground, and no one from the Commander-in-chief down to the youngest private was dreaming of a movement to the rear. It would indeed have been insane to desert a strong position, in order to retreat across the open in face of an army possessing 7,000 excellent cavalry! But Victor, still loth to withdraw and to own himself beaten, sent word to the King that he took it upon himself to remain on the slopes of the Cascajal till he should receive further orders, and that he yet hoped that the reserve might be sent forward and the battle renewed.

When Victor’s message reached the King, it had already been discovered that all the rumours concerning the advance of the Spaniards were false. But the hour was now late, and (as Jourdan observed) if the army were to gain a final success--a most problematical occurrence--there would be no daylight left in which to push it to its legitimate end. He thought it better to take the prudent course, to refuse to risk the reserve, whose defeat would have the most fatal consequences, and to prepare for a retreat. The orders were accordingly issued that the army should fall back to its old camping-ground of the morning, deferring the passage of the Alberche till the next day[681].

[681] All this is again derived from Desprez, who both carried the King’s orders to Victor, and bore back Victor’s remonstrances to the King.

While the French commanders were in controversy concerning their movements, the battle had died down into a cannonade, kept up with great vehemence by the batteries on the Cerro de Cascajal. The British and German guns never ceased their reply, but--as had been the case during the whole day--they were far too few to subdue the enemy’s fire: considering how they were overmatched, it is wonderful that there was but one piece disabled, and that only sixty-six gunners were put _hors de combat_. The opposing batteries were hit almost as hard, for the artillery of the 1st Corps had sixty-four casualties.

A distressing accident took place during this final strife between the hostile batteries: a large area of dry grass on the lower slopes of the Cerro de Medellin took fire, from smouldering wadding fanned by the wind. Many of the severely wounded of both sides were scorched, and some burnt to death, by the short but devouring conflagration that ran along the hillside[682].

[682] Lord Munster, p. 235; Leith-Hay, p. 162.

By dusk the whole of the 4th Corps was rolling to the rear, and the last rays of daylight showed Wellesley the welcome view of a general retreat opposite his right and centre. Victor clung obstinately to the Cerro de Cascajal till far into the hours of darkness. But at last the cold fit supervened, his spirits sank, and he withdrew at 3 A.M. full of resentment, and well stocked with grievances for the acrimonious correspondence with Joseph and Jourdan in which he indulged for the next six weeks.

There can be little doubt that Jourdan was right in refusing to fall in with the younger marshal’s plans for a fourth assault on the British. Wellesley was well settled into his fighting-ground: at the southern end of his line Campbell was perfectly safe at the Pajar de Vergara redoubt. He had lost no more than 236 men, so that his whole division was practically intact. Hill’s brigades on the Cerro were also in perfectly good order--they had not been attacked since the morning, and would have been quite competent to defend themselves at five o’clock in the afternoon. The cannonade which they had been enduring had done some harm, but there were still 3,000 men in line, to hold a most formidable position. The only point of the British front on which the French could have hoped to make any impression was the centre. Here the Guards and Cameron’s brigade had suffered heavily, and the four battalions of the German Legion even worse--they had lost a full fifty per cent. of their numbers. But Mackenzie’s division was now in line with Sherbrooke’s, its first brigade supporting the Guards, its second (Donkin’s) linked to the Germans. Considering the way in which the British centre had dealt with the 15,000 bayonets of Sebastiani and Lapisse during the main engagement, the French critics who hold that they would have given way before the 5,000 men of Dessolles and the Royal Guard, even when backed by the rallied divisions, show a very optimistic spirit. Moreover when the battle had waxed hot in this quarter, the French would have had no certainty that Campbell and the Spaniards might not have fallen upon their flank. For Leval’s much depleted division was no longer in front of the British right--it had been withdrawn behind Sebastiani[683], and there was nothing to prevent the reserve-brigade of the 4th division from going to the aid of Sherbrooke’s men. The chances of war are incalculable, but there seems no reason to believe that Victor’s judgement as to the probability of success was any better at five o’clock in the afternoon than it had been at five o’clock in the morning. Jourdan was the wiser man.

[683] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 262.

Thus ended the battle of Talavera, in which 16,000 British supported and repulsed the attack of 26,000 French infantry--omitting from the total of the assailants the division of Villatte, which was only slightly engaged. The Cerro de Medellin was strong ground, but not so strong as to counterbalance a superiority of 10,000 men. The real fighting power of Wellesley’s foot-soldiery was shown in the lower parts of the field, where Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s 8,000 bayonets achieved their marvellous success over the 15,000 men of Lapisse and Sebastiani. Doomed to apparent ruin by their own rash valour in pursuing the enemy across the Portiña, they yet recovered their line, re-established the battle, and finally won an almost incredible victory. The ‘First Division’ of the Peninsular army,--the Guards and the German Legion who fought side by side throughout the whole war,--had many proud days between 1809 and 1814, but surely Talavera was the most honourable of them all. Yet probably Mackenzie’s brigade and Donnellan’s 48th must claim an even higher merit--it was their prompt and steady help which gave their comrades time to re-form, and warded off the possibility of disaster at the critical moment.

The Spaniards had little to do upon July 28, but what little they had to do was well done. The charge of the cavalry regiment Rey was well timed and gallantly delivered. The few battalions engaged near the Pajar de Vergara and in Bassecourt’s division behaved steadily. The artillery sent to aid the British was manfully worked and did good service. But if only the Spanish army had been able to manœuvre, what a difference there must have been in the battle! When Leval, Sebastiani, and Lapisse fell back in disorder at 4 P.M., what would have been the fate of the French if Cuesta could have led out 25,000 men upon their flank and rear? He did not attempt to do so, and probably he was right. Yet it was hard for a British army to have to fight in line with allies who were perfectly useless for any large offensive movement.

The losses of Talavera, as we have already shown, were tremendous on both sides. Adding together the casualties of the twenty-seventh and the twenty-eighth, the British lost 5,365 men, 801 killed, 3915 wounded, and 649 missing. Of the last-named 108 belonged to the unfortunate 23rd Dragoons, and nearly 300 to the German Legion. Two generals, Mackenzie and Langwerth, had been killed, and three colonels, Ross of the Coldstream Guards, Donnellan of the 48th, and Gordon of the 83rd.

The French losses were decidedly heavier, though the percentage in the regiments was in most cases far lower than that in the victorious British force. The total was 7,268, of whom 761 were killed, 6,301 wounded, and 206 missing[684]. General Lapisse and von Porbeck of the Baden regiment, one of Leval’s brigadiers, were the only officers of distinction slain. But the number of field-officers wounded was enormous--in Sebastiani’s division _all_ the colonels, and seven out of twelve of the battalion commanders were disabled.

Cuesta never issued any proper return of his casualties. He stated in one of his dispatches that they amounted to 1,201 men. This figure cannot possibly represent killed and wounded alone. Only one cavalry regiment, five or six battalions, and three batteries were engaged, none of them heavily. The British troops which fought in their neighbourhood had very modest losses, which made it incredible that the comrades in line with them should have suffered to the extent of more than 400 or 500 men. The balance must represent the missing from the stampede of Portago’s division upon the night of the twenty-seventh. Major-General Manglano, who commanded one of the divisions near the Pajar de Vergara, and de Lastra, the gallant colonel of the _regimiento del Rey_, were wounded.

The only trophies taken on either side were the seventeen guns of Leval’s division captured by Campbell and the Spanish cavalry.

[684] These ‘missing’ do not include the French wounded taken on the field, and recovered when Victor came back to Talavera on Aug. 6 and captured the British hospitals. The French return was drawn up only after Aug. 18, when these men had been released.

N.B.--I have used of British sources mainly Lord Londonderry, Lord Munster, Leslie and Leith-Hay of the 29th, Stothert of the Guards, Cooper of the 2/7th, Hawker of the 14th Light Dragoons, and letters of Elley and Ponsonby of the 23rd Light Dragoons. Of French sources I have found Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, Victor’s dispatches and controversial letters with King Joseph, Sémélé’s journal of the 1st Corps, and Desprez’s narrative the most useful. From Colonel Whinyates I have received an unpublished map, drawn on the spot by Unger of the K.G.L., which fixes all the artillery position with admirable accuracy.

NOTES ON THE TOPOGRAPHY OF TALAVERA

I looked over the proofs of the last three chapters, seated on the small square stone that marks the highest point of the Cerro de Medellin, after having carefully walked over the whole field from end to end, on April 9, 1903. The ground is little changed in aspect, but the lower slopes of the Cerro, and the whole of its opposite neighbour the Cascajal hill, are now under cultivation. The former was covered with barley nine inches high, and the rough vegetation of thyme and dry grass, which the narratives of 1809 describe, was only to be seen upon the higher and steeper parts of the hill, and on the sides of the ravine below. The latter is steep but neither very broad nor particularly difficult to negotiate. Even in April the Portiña had shrunk to a chain of pools of uninviting black water. The ditch fatal to the 23rd Light Dragoons, in the northern valley, is still visible. In its upper part, where the German regiment met it, the obstacle is practically unchanged. But nearer to the farm of Valdefuentes it has almost disappeared, owing to the extension of cultivation. There is only a four-foot drop from a field into a piece of rough ground full of reeds and bent-grass, where the soil is a little marshy in April. I presume that when the field was made, the hollow was partly filled up, and the watercourse, instead of flowing in a well-defined narrow ditch, has diffused itself over the whole trough of the ground.

In the central parts of the field the Portiña forms a boundary, but not an obstacle. Where Cameron and the Guards fought Sebastiani’s 8,000 men, the ground is almost an exact level on both sides of the little stream. There is no ‘position’ whatever on the English bank, which is, if anything, a little lower than the French. The Pajar de Vergara is a low knoll twenty feet high, now crowned by a large farmhouse, which occupies the site of the old battery. The ground in front of it is still covered with olive groves, and troops placed here could see nothing of an advancing enemy till he emerges from the trees a hundred yards or so to the front. On the other hand an observer on the summit of the Cerro de Medellin gets a perfect bird’s-eye view of this part of the ground, and could make out the enemy all through his progress among the olives. Wellesley must have been able to mark exactly every movement of Leval’s division, though Campbell could certainly not have done so. In the Spanish part of the line the groves have evidently been thinned, as there are now many houses, forming a straggling suburb, pushed up to and along the railway, which now crosses this section of the line. In 1809 Talavera was still self-contained within its walls, which it has now overstepped. The Cascajal is practically of the same height as the main eastern level of the Cerro de Medellin: but the triple summit of the latter is much loftier ground; and standing on it one commands the whole of the Cascajal--every one of Villatte’s battalions must have been counted by Wellesley, who could also mark every man along the whole French front, even into and among the olive groves occupied by Leval’s Germans. Victor on the Cascajal could get no such a general view of the British position, but could see very well into Sherbrooke’s line. Hill’s troops, behind the first crest of the Cerro de Medellin, and Campbell’s in the groves must have been much less visible to him. There is a ruined house, apparently a mill, in the ravine between the two Cerros. As it is not mentioned in any report of the battle, I conclude that it was not in existence in 1809. The Pajar de Vergara farm is also modern, and the only building on the actual fighting-ground which existed on the battle-day was evidently the farm of Valdefuentes, which is alluded to by several narrators, French and English.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VIII

THE RETREAT FROM TALAVERA

When the dawn of July 29 had arrived, the plain and the rolling hills in front of the allied position were seen to be absolutely deserted. No trace of the French army was visible save the heaps of dead upon the further side of the Portiña: the wounded had been carried off, with the exception of those who had fallen within the British lines, and so become prisoners of war. It was soon discovered that the enemy had left a screen of cavalry along the western bank of the Alberche: but whether his main body lay close behind the stream, or had retired towards Madrid, could not be ascertained without making a reconnaissance in force. Such an operation was beyond Wellesley’s power on the morning after the battle. He was neither able nor willing to send out a large detachment to beat up the enemy’s camps, with the object of ascertaining his situation and intentions. The British army was utterly exhausted: on the preceding day the men had fought upon half-rations: when the contest was over they had found that only a third of a ration had been issued: this scanty pittance was sent up to the regiments in the evening, as they still lay in battle-order on the ground that they had held during the day. Water was almost equally deficient: it was difficult to procure: nothing but the wells of the few houses in the rear of the position being available. Only on the morning of the twenty-ninth, when the departure of the enemy had become certain, were the troops allowed to return to their old bivouacs in the rear, and there to seek repose. Even then it was only a minority of the men who could be spared from duty. The gathering in of the vast numbers wounded--French as well as English--and their removal into Talavera demanded such enormous fatigue-parties that the larger number of the survivors had to be told off to this work and were denied the rest that they had so well earned.

It is certain that the British army could have done nothing upon the twenty-ninth even if their commander had desired to push forward against the enemy. The men were not only tired out by two days of battle, but half-starved in addition. But Wellesley was far from feeling any wish to pursue the French. His infantry had suffered so dreadfully that he could not dream of exposing them to the ordeal of another engagement till they had been granted a respite for the refreshment of body and spirit. Of his divisions only that of A. Campbell--the smallest of the four--was practically intact. The others had suffered paralysing losses--in Hill’s ranks one man out of every four had been stricken down, in Mackenzie’s one man in every three, while Sherbrooke’s frightful casualty-list showed that nearly two men out of five were missing from the ranks. Never, save at Albuera, was such slaughter on the side of the victors seen again during the whole course of the Peninsular War. ‘The extreme fatigue of the troops,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘the want of provisions, and the number of wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving from my position[685].’

[685] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 1, _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. p. 553.

On the morning of the twenty-ninth the depleted strength of the army was partly compensated by the arrival of the first of those reinforcements from Lisbon which Wellesley had been anxiously expecting. At about six o’clock Robert Craufurd came upon the scene with the three regiments of his Light Brigade--all old battalions who had shared in Moore’s Corunna campaign. He was accompanied by a battery of horse artillery (A troop), the first unit of that arm which came under Wellesley’s command. But the Light Brigade were almost as weary as their comrades who had fought in the battle: they had only reached Talavera by a forced march of unexampled severity. Hearing at Navalmoral that the two armies were in presence, Robert Craufurd had hurried forward with almost incredible swiftness. Dropping his baggage and a few weakly men at Oropesa he had marched forty-three miles in twenty-two hours, though the day was hot and every soldier carried some fifty pounds’ weight upon his back. All day long the cannon was heard growling in the distance, and at short intervals the brigade kept meeting parties of Spanish fugitives, interspersed with British sutlers and commissaries, who gave the most dismal accounts of the progress of the fight. In spite of his desperate efforts to get up in time Craufurd reached the field thirteen hours too late, and heard to his intense chagrin that the battle had been won without his aid[686]. Weary though his men were, they were at once hurried to the front, to relieve A. Campbell’s division on the line of advanced posts. There they found plenty of employment in burying the dead, and in gathering up the French wounded, whom it was necessary to protect from the fury of the Spanish peasantry.

[686] For excellent accounts of this forced march see Col. Leach (95th), _Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier_ (pp. 81-2), and Sir George Napier’s _Autobiography_, pp. 108-10. The distance was forty-three miles, not as W. Napier states sixty-two. That all the stragglers met on the way were not Spaniards is unfortunately evident from both narratives. Nor were all the British stragglers non-combatants.

The arrival of Craufurd’s brigade did something towards filling up the terrible gap in the ranks of the British infantry, but was far from enabling Wellesley to assume the offensive. Indeed the advent of fresh troops only accentuated the difficulty of feeding the army. Corn was still almost unobtainable; the supplies from the Vera de Plasencia showed no signs of appearing, and even oxen for the meat-ration, which had hitherto been obtainable in fair quantities, were beginning to run short. Nothing was to be had from Talavera itself, where Victor had exhausted all the available food many weeks before, nor could any assistance be got from the Spanish army, who were themselves commencing to feel the pinch of starvation.

All Wellesley’s hopes at this juncture were founded on the idea that the diversion of Venegas upon the Upper Tagus would force the French host in his front to break up, in order to save Madrid from an attack in the rear. The army of La Mancha had failed to keep Sebastiani in check, and to prevent him from appearing on the field of Talavera. But since the enemy had concentrated every available man for the battle, it was certain that Venegas had now no hostile force in his front, and that the way to the capital was open to him. If he had pushed on either by Aranjuez or by Toledo, he must now be close to the capital, and King Joseph would be obliged to detach a large force against him. That detachment once made, the army behind the Alberche would be so much weakened that it would be unable to face the British and Cuesta. If it offered fight, it must be beaten: if it retired, the allies would follow it up and drive it away in a direction which would prevent it from rejoining the troops that had been sent against Venegas. On the twenty-ninth Wellesley was under the impression that the army of La Mancha had already brought pressure to bear upon the French, for a false report had reached him that on the previous day it had captured Toledo. His dispatches written after the arrival of this rumour indicate an intention of moving forward on the thirtieth or thirty-first. The King, he says, must now detach troops against Venegas. This being so, it will be necessary to induce Cuesta to advance, supporting him with the British army ‘as soon as it shall be a little rested and refreshed after two days of the hardest fighting that I have ever been a party to. We shall certainly move towards Madrid, if not interrupted by some accident on our flank[687].’

[687] Wellington to Beresford, Talavera, July 29, 1809.

The last words of this sentence are of great importance, since they show that already upon the day after Talavera Wellesley was beginning to be uneasy about his left flank. Some time before the battle he had received news from the north, to the effect that both Ney and Kellermann had returned to the valley of the Douro, after evacuating Galicia and the Asturias[688]. He had therefore to take into consideration the chance that the enemy might move southward, and fall upon his line of communication with Portugal, not only with the corps of Soult, but with a large additional force. Unfortunately the information that had reached him from the plains of Leon had been to the effect that Ney’s and Kellermann’s troops were much reduced in numbers and efficiency, so that even when they had joined Soult the total of the French field army upon the Douro would not much exceed 20,000 men[689]. This misconception affected all his plans: for if the hostile force about Salamanca, Zamora, and Benavente was no greater than was reported, it followed that any expedition sent against his own communications could not be more than 12,000 or 15,000 strong, since Soult would be forced to leave a containing force in front of Beresford and Del Parque, who now lay in the direction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Any French advance against Bejar and Plasencia, therefore, would, as Wellesley supposed, be a mere raid, executed by a comparatively small force. He doubted whether Soult dared undertake such an operation: ‘the enemy,’ he wrote, ‘would not like to venture through the passes into Estremadura, having me on one side of him, and you [Beresford] and Romana upon the other[690].’ He was therefore not much disturbed in mind about the movements of the French in the valley of the Douro. If he had but known that not 20,000 men but 50,000 men were now concentrating at Salamanca, his feelings would have been far different. But it was not till some days later that it began to dawn upon him that Soult was far stronger than he had supposed, and that there might be serious danger to be feared from this quarter. Meanwhile he hoped to prevent any advance of the French in the direction of Plasencia, by causing a strong demonstration to be made in the valley of the Douro. He wrote to Beresford that he must contrive to arrange for joint action with La Romana and the Army of Galicia. If they appeared in strength in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo, the Duke of Dalmatia might be deterred from making any movement to the south. If, however, the Spaniards proved helpless or impracticable, the Portuguese army would have to confine itself to the defence of its own frontier.

[688] On July 14 Wellesley writes to Beresford that he does not believe that Ney has quitted Galicia [_Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 510], because of the tenour of the captured dispatches of Soult to King Joseph. These, of course, had been written under the idea that the 6th Corps was still holding on to Corunna and Lugo: it was not till some days later that Soult learned of his colleagues’ unexpected move. But Wellesley knew of Ney’s move before the battle of Talavera, as is shown by _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 545.

[689] ‘The enemy have on the Douro and in the neighbourhood not less than 20,000 men, being the remains of the Corps of Soult, Ney, and Kellermann.’ To Frere, July 30.

[690] To Beresford, from Talavera, July 29, 1809.

On the morning of July 30 Wellesley received the first definite information which led him to conclude that the French forces from the north were actually contemplating the raid upon his communications which on the preceding day he had regarded as doubtful. The Marquis Del Reino, whom, as it will be remembered, Cuesta had sent to the Puerto de Baños with two weak battalions, reported that troops from the Douro valley were threatening his front. At the same time messages were received from the Alcaldes of Fuente Roble and Los Santos, places on the road between Salamanca and Bejar, to the effect that they had received orders from Soult to prepare 12,000 and 24,000 rations respectively, for troops due to arrive on July 28. The numbers given counted for little in Wellesley’s estimation, since it is the commonest thing in the world for generals to requisition food for a far larger force than they actually bring with them. But at least it seemed clear that some considerable detachment from Salamanca was on its way towards the Puerto de Baños. In consequence of this fact Wellesley wrote to the Spanish government, and also informed Cuesta, that in the event of a serious attempt of the enemy to cut his communications, he should ‘move so as to take care of himself,’ and do his best to preserve Portugal[691]--in other words, that he should abandon the projected march on Madrid which had been his main purpose on the preceding day. He was still, however, under the impression that Soult had no very large force with him, as is sufficiently shown by the fact that on the thirty-first he suggested to Cuesta that it would be well to detach one of his divisions--say 5,000 men--to strengthen the insignificant force which was already in position at the Puerto de Baños. ‘I still think,’ he wrote, ‘that the movements of General Beresford with the Portuguese army on the frontier, and that of the Duque del Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo, combined with the natural difficulties of the country, and the defence by the Marquis Del Reino, may delay the enemy’s advance till the arrival of your division[692].’ It is clear that when he wrote in these terms Wellesley was still labouring under the delusion that Soult’s advance was a mere raid executed by one or two divisions, and not a serious operation carried out by a large army.

[691] Wellesley to Frere, July 30. ‘My first duty is to attend to the safety of Portugal: at all events if my flank and communication with Portugal are not secured for me, while I am operating in the general cause, I must move to take care of myself, and then the general cause will suffer.’

[692] Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 31, 1809.

While Wellesley was spending the three days which followed the battle of the twenty-eighth in resting his men and pondering over his next move, the enemies whom he had defeated at Talavera were in a state of even greater uncertainty and indecision. By daylight on July 29, as we have already seen, the whole French army had retired behind the Alberche, leaving only a screen of cavalry upon its western bank. The King was under the impression that Wellesley and Cuesta would probably follow him up ere the day had passed, and drew up his whole force along that same line of heights which Victor had occupied upon the twenty-second and twenty-third of the month. But when nothing appeared in his front during the morning hours save a few vedettes, he realized that he might count upon a short respite, and took new measures. After sending off to his brother the Emperor a most flagrantly mendacious account of the battle of Talavera[693], he proceeded to divide up his army. As Wellington had foreseen, he detached a large force to hold back Venegas and the army of La Mancha, who were at last coming into the field upon his flank. He was bound to do so, under pain of imperilling the safety of Madrid.

[693] A few lines of this astounding document may be worth quoting--‘Sire, hier l’armée anglaise a été forcée dans ses positions. Outre les 25 à 30 mille Anglais de Wellesley, nous avons eu affaire à l’armée de Cuesta, qui s’élevait de 35 à 40 mille hommes. Le champ de bataille _sur lequel nous sommes établis_ (!) est jonché de leurs morts.... Je me mets en marche pour secourir Madrid, qui est menacé par un corps de Portugais arrivés à Navalcarnero, et par l’armée de Venegas, qui tente de pénétrer par Aranjuez.... J’ai un regret, sire, c’est celui de n’avoir pas fait prisonnière toute l’armée anglaise.’ _Mémoires de Joseph_, vi. 284. Napoleon, not deceived for a moment by this rhodomontade, sent back a scathing rebuke to his brother for endeavouring to hide the truth from him. (Napoleon to Jourdan, Aug. 21.)

It is time to cast a glance at the operations of the incompetent general whose sloth and disobedience had wrecked the plan that Wellesley and Cuesta had drawn out at their conference near Almaraz. On July 16 Venegas had begun to move forward from El Moral, Valdepeñas, and Santa Cruz de Mudela, in accordance with the directions that had been sent him. He occupied Manzanares and Daimiel, and then came into collision with Sebastiani’s cavalry at Villaharta and Herencia, for the 4th Corps had not yet begun to withdraw towards Madrid. Owing to the profound ignorance in which the enemy still lay as to the advance of Wellesley and Cuesta, Sebastiani had not, on the nineteenth, received any order to fall back or to join Victor and the King. Thus, when pressed by the advanced troops of Venegas, he did not retire, but held his ground, and showed every intention of accepting battle. Learning from the peasantry that he had the whole of the 4th Corps in front of him, and might have to deal with nearly 20,000 men, the Spanish general halted, and refused to advance further. In so doing he was fulfilling the spirit of the instructions that had been sent him, for Cuesta and Wellesley had wished him to detain Sebastiani and keep in touch with him--not to attack him or to fight a pitched battle. They had taken it for granted that the Frenchman would receive early news of their own advance, and would already be in retreat before Venegas came up with him. But it was not till July 22, as we have already seen, that Victor and King Joseph obtained certain intelligence of the march of the allies upon Talavera. Until the orders for a retreat arrived from Madrid, the 4th Corps was kept in its old position at Madridejos, and courted rather than avoided an engagement with the army of La Mancha[694].

[694] For these operations I am relying on General Arteche’s excerpts from the _Vindicacion de los Agravios_, published by Venegas in his own defence.

Venegas, after summoning his divisional generals to a council of war, refused to attack Sebastiani, and wisely, for his 23,000 men would certainly have been beaten by the 20,000 Frenchmen who still lay in front of him. From the nineteenth to the twenty-second the two armies faced each other across the upper Guadiana, each waiting for the other to move. Late on the twenty-third, however, Sebastiani received his orders to evacuate La Mancha, and to hasten to Toledo in order to join Victor and the King, in a combined assault upon Wellesley and Cuesta.

It was on the next day that Venegas committed the ruinous error which was to wreck the fate of the whole campaign. On the morning of the twenty-fourth the 4th Corps had disappeared from his front: instead of following closely in the rear of Sebastiani with all speed, and molesting his retreat, as his orders prescribed, he made no attempt to prevent the 4th Corps from moving off, nor did he execute that rapid flanking march on Aranjuez or Fuentedueñas which his instructions prescribed. He moved forward at a snail’s pace, having first sent off to Cuesta an argumentative letter, in which he begged for leave to direct his advance on Toledo instead of on the points which had been named in his orders. On the twenty-sixth he received an answer, in which his Commander-in-chief authorized him to make his own choice between the route by Aranjuez and that by Toledo.

Venegas had already committed the fatal error of letting Sebastiani slip away unmolested: he now hesitated between the idea of carrying out his own plan, and that of obeying Cuesta’s original orders, and after much hesitation sent his first division under General Lacy towards Toledo, while he himself, with the other four, marched by Tembleque upon Aranjuez. So slow and cautious was their advance that Lacy only arrived in front of Toledo on July 28--the day that the battle of Talavera was fought, while Venegas himself occupied Aranjuez twenty-four hours later, on the morning of the twenty-ninth. He had taken six days to cross the sixty miles of open rolling plain which lie between the Guadiana and the Tagus, though he had been absolutely unopposed by the enemy whom he had allowed to slip away from his front. Sebastiani had marched at the rate of twenty miles a day when he retired from Madridejos to Toledo, Venegas and Lacy followed at the rate of ten and twelve miles a day respectively. Yet the special duty imposed on the army of La Mancha had been to keep in touch with the 4th Corps. Further comment is hardly necessary.

On the morning of the day when Wellesley was assailed by the forces of Victor and King Joseph, General Lacy appeared in front of Toledo. The town was held by 3,000 men of Valence’s Polish division: it is practically impregnable against any attack from the south, presenting to that side a front of sheer cliff, overhanging the river, and accessible only by two fortified bridges. To make any impression on the place Lacy would have had to cross the Tagus at some other point, and then might have beset the comparatively weak northern front with considerable chances of success. But he contented himself with demonstrating against the bridges, and discharging some fruitless cannon-shot across the river. General Valence, the Governor of Toledo, reported to Jourdan that he was attacked, and his message, reaching the battle-field of Talavera after Victor’s second repulse, had a certain amount of influence on the action of King Joseph. The place was never for a moment in danger, as Lacy made no attempt to pass the Tagus in order to press his attack home.

On the following morning (July 29) Venegas reached the other great passage of the Tagus, at Aranjuez, with two of his divisions, and occupied the place after driving out a few French vedettes. He pressed his cavalry forward to the line of the Tajuna, and ere nightfall some of them had penetrated almost as far as Valdemoro, the village half way between Aranjuez and Madrid. No signs of any serious hostile force could be discovered, and secret friends in the capital sent notice that they were being held down by a very weak garrison, consisting of no more than a single French brigade and a handful of the King’s Spanish levies. There was everything to tempt Venegas to execute that rapid march upon the capital which had been prescribed in his original orders, but instead of doing so this wretched officer halted for eight whole days at Aranjuez [July 29 to August 5].

On the day after Talavera Jourdan and Joseph had not yet discovered the whereabouts of the main body of the army of La Mancha: but Lacy had made such a noisy demonstration in front of Toledo that they were inclined to believe that his chief must be close behind him. Accordingly the garrison of Toledo was reinforced by the missing brigade of Valence’s Polish division, and raised to the strength of 4,700 men. The King, with the rest of Sebastiani’s corps and his own Guards and reserves, marched to Santa Ollala, and on the next day [July 30] placed himself at Bargas, a few miles in rear of Toledo. In this position he would have been wholly unable to protect Madrid, if Venegas had pressed forward on that same morning from Aranjuez, for that place is actually nearer to the capital than the village at which Joseph had fixed his head quarters. The sloth displayed by the Spanish general was the only thing which preserved Madrid from capture. On August 1, apprised of the fact that the main body of the army of La Mancha was at Aranjuez and not before Toledo, Joseph transferred his army to Illescas, a point from which he would be able to attack Venegas in flank, if the latter should move forward. Only Milhaud’s division of dragoons was thrown forward to Valdemoro, on the direct road from Aranjuez to Madrid: it drove out of the village a regiment of Spanish horse, which reported to Venegas that there was now a heavy force in his front. For the next four days the King’s troops and the army of Venegas retained their respective positions, each waiting for the other to move. The Spaniard had realized that his chance of capturing Madrid had gone by, and remained in a state of indecision at Aranjuez. Joseph was waiting for definite news of the movements of Wellesley and Cuesta, before risking an attack on the army of La Mancha. He saw that it had abandoned the offensive, and did not wish to move off from his central position at Illescas till he was sure that Victor was not in need of any help. Yet he was so disturbed as to the general state of affairs that he sent orders to General Belliard at Madrid to evacuate all non-combatants and civilians on to Valladolid, and to prepare to shut himself up in the Retiro.

The doings of Victor, during the five days after he had separated from the King, require a more lengthy consideration. Left behind upon the Alberche with the 1st Corps, which the casualties of the battle had reduced to no more than 18,000 men, he felt himself in a perilous position: if the allies should advance, he could do no more than endeavour to retard their march on Madrid. Whether he could count on any further aid from the King and Sebastiani would depend on the wholly problematical movements of Venegas. Somewhat to his surprise Wellesley and Cuesta remained quiescent not only on the twenty-ninth but on the thirtieth of July. But an alarm now came from another quarter: it will be remembered that the enterprising Sir Robert Wilson with 4,000 men, partly Spaniards, partly Portuguese of the Lusitanian Legion, had moved parallel with Wellesley’s northern flank during the advance to Talavera. On the day of the battle he had ‘marched to the cannon’ as a good officer should, and had actually approached Cazalegas, at the back of the French army, in the course of the afternoon. Learning of the results of the fight, he had turned back to his old path upon the twenty-ninth, and had entered Escalona on the upper Alberche. At this place he was behind Victor’s flank, and lay only thirty-eight miles from Madrid. There was no French force between him and the capital, and if only his division had been a little stronger he would have been justified in making a raid upon the city, relying for aid upon the insurrection that would indubitably have broken out the moment that he presented himself before its gates.

It was reported to Victor on the thirtieth not only that Wilson was at Escalona, but also that he was at the head of a strong Portuguese division, estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 men. The Marshal determined that he could not venture to leave such a force upon his rear while the armies of Wellesley and Cuesta were in his front, and fell back ten miles to Maqueda on the high road to Madrid. On the following day, still uneasy as to his position, he retired still further, to Santa Cruz, and wrote to King Joseph that he might be forced to continue his retreat as far as Mostoles, almost in the suburbs of Madrid [Aug. 2]. He was so badly informed as to the movements of the allies, that he not only warned the King that Wilson was threatening Madrid, but assured him that the British army from Talavera had broken up from its cantonments and was advancing along the Alberche towards the capital[695]. Joseph, better instructed as to the actual situation of affairs, replied by assuring him that Wellesley and Cuesta were far more likely to be retreating on Almaraz than marching on Madrid, as they must have heard ere now of Soult’s advance on Plasencia. He ordered the Marshal to fall back no further, and to send a division to feel for Wilson at Escalona. On detaching Villatte to execute this reconnaissance [Aug. 5] Victor was surprised to find that Sir Robert’s little force had already evacuated its advanced position, and had retreated into the mountains. For the last four days indeed Victor had been fighting with shadows--for the British and Estremaduran armies had never passed the Alberche, while Wilson had absconded from Escalona on receiving from Wellesley the news that Soult had been heard of at the Puerto de Baños. In consequence of the needless march of the 1st Corps to Maqueda and Santa Cruz, the allied generals were able to withdraw unmolested, and even unobserved, from Talavera, and were far upon their way down the Tagus before their absence was suspected. The erratic movements of Victor may be excused in part by the uniform difficulty in obtaining accurate information which the French always experienced in Spain. But even when this allowance is made, it must be confessed that his operations do not tend to give us any very high idea of his strategical ability. He was clearly one of those generals, of the class denounced by Napoleon, _qui se font des tableaux_, who argue on insufficient data, and take a long time to be convinced of the error of their original hypothesis.

[695] Jourdan to Belliard, Aug. 3, from Illescas: ‘Le duc de Belluno dit que toute l’armée anglaise marche sur la rive droite de l’Alberche, et qu’hier elle était à une lieue d’Escalona.’

Neither Victor nor King Joseph, therefore, exercised any influence over the doings of Wellesley and Cuesta at Talavera between the 29th of July and the 3rd of August. The allies worked out their plans undisturbed by any interference on the part of the old enemies whom they had beaten on the battle day. Down to August 1 the British general had been unconvinced by the rumours of Soult’s approach, at the head of a large army, which were persistently arriving from the secret agents in the direction of Salamanca[696]. It was only on the evening of that day that he received news so precise, and so threatening, that he found himself forced to abandon for the moment any intention of pushing on towards Madrid, in consequence of the impending attack on the line of his communications with Portugal. It was announced to him that the vanguard of the French army from the north had actually entered Bejar on the twenty-ninth and was driving in the trifling force under the Marquis Del Reino, which Cuesta had sent to the Puerto de Baños.

[696] There are two letters of Wellington to Castlereagh, written on Aug. 1; both indicate that Wellesley was still unconvinced as to Soult’s intention, and the second states that he does not believe that the French will pass the Puerto de Baños. The definite news came at night.

Whatever might be the force at Soult’s disposal--and Wellesley was still under the delusion that it amounted at most to a single corps of 12,000 or 15,000 men--it was impossible to allow the French to establish themselves between the British army and Portugal. If they were at Bejar on the twenty-ninth they might easily reach Plasencia on the thirty-first. On receiving the news Cuesta, who had hitherto shown the greatest reluctance to divide his army, detached his 5th division under Bassecourt, with orders to set out at the greatest possible speed, and join the Marquis Del Reino. This move was tardy and useless, for it is four long marches from Talavera to Plasencia, so that Bassecourt must arrive too late to hold the defiles. If he found the French already established on the river Alagon, his 5,000 men would be utterly inadequate to ‘contain’ double or triple that number of Soult’s troops. As a matter of fact the enemy had entered Plasencia on the afternoon of August 1, before the Spanish division had even commenced its movement to the west[697].

[697] Napier seems to have the dates wrong here: he says that the 5th Corps seized Plasencia on July 31 [vol. ii. p. 184], But Soult’s official report to the Minister of War, dated Aug. 13, says that his vanguard forced the Puerto de Baños on the twenty-ninth, but only captured Plasencia on Aug. 1. If Plasencia had fallen on the thirty-first, Wellesley and Cuesta would have known the fact on the second: but as it was captured on the first only, they were still in ignorance when their conference took place.

On the morning of August 2 Wellesley and Cuesta held a long and stormy conference. The Captain-General proposed that Wellesley should detach half his force to assist Bassecourt, and stay with the remainder at Talavera, in order to support the Army of Estremadura against any renewed attack by Victor and King Joseph[698]. The English commander refused to divide his force--he had only 18,000 effectives even after Craufurd had joined him, and such a small body would not bear division. But he offered either to march against Soult with his entire host, or to remain at Talavera if his colleague preferred to set out for Plasencia with his main body. Cuesta chose the former alternative, and on the morning of the third Wellesley moved out with every available man, intending to attack the enemy at the earliest opportunity. He was still under the impression that he would have to deal with no more than a single French corps, and was confident of the result. His only fear was that Victor might descend upon Talavera in his absence, and that Cuesta might evacuate the place on being attacked. If this should happen, the English hospitals, in which there lay nearly 5,000 wounded, might fall into the hands of the enemy. On halting at Oropesa he sent back a note to O’Donoju, the chief of the staff of the Estremaduran army, begging him to send off westward all the British wounded who were in a condition to travel. He asked that country carts might be requisitioned for their assistance, if no transport could be spared by the Spanish troops[699].

[698] Wellesley’s letters in these critical days are full of complaints as to his colleague’s impracticability: ‘I certainly should get the better of everything,’ he writes to Castlereagh, ‘if I could manage General Cuesta: but his temper and disposition are so bad that this is impossible.’ _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. p. 553.

[699] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Oropesa, afternoon of Aug. 3.

Wellesley was setting out with 18,000 men to attack not the mere 15,000 men that he believed to be in his front, but three whole _corps d’armée_, with a strength of 50,000 sabres and bayonets. In his long career there were many dangerous crises, but this was perhaps the most perilous of all. If he had remained for a little longer in ignorance of the real situation, he might have found himself involved in a contest in which defeat was certain and destruction highly probable.

The real situation in his front was as follows. On receiving the dispatch from Madrid which permitted him to execute his projected march upon Plasencia, Soult had begun to concentrate his army [July 24]. Mortier and the 5th Corps were already in march for Salamanca in pursuance of earlier orders: they arrived in its neighbourhood the same day on which Foy brought the King’s orders to his chief. The 2nd Corps was already massed upon the Tormes, and ready to move the moment that it should receive the supply of artillery which had been so long upon its way from Madrid. Ney and the 6th Corps from Benavente and Astorga had far to come: they only reached Salamanca on July 31; if we remember that the distance from Astorga to the concentration point was no less than ninety miles we cease to wonder at their tardy arrival.

Soult had strict orders from the Emperor to march with his troops well closed up, and not to risk the danger of being caught with his corps strung out at distances which would permit of their being met and defeated in detail[700]. He was therefore entirely justified in refusing to move until the 6th Corps should be in supporting distance of the rest of his army, and the 2nd Corps should have received the cannon which were needed to replace the pieces that they had lost in Portugal. For this reason we must regard as unfounded all the vehement reproaches heaped upon him by Joseph and Jourdan during the acrimonious correspondence that followed upon the end of the campaign. It would have been wrong to start the 5th Corps upon its way to Plasencia till the 2nd Corps was ready to follow, and the much needed guns only came into Salamanca on the twenty-ninth, though their approach had been reported on the preceding day.

[700] Orders of Napoleon from Schönbrunn, June 12: ‘Les trois corps doivent fournir 50 à 60 mille hommes. Si cette réunion a lieu promptement les Anglais doivent être détruits; mais il faut se réunir, _et ne pas marcher par petits paquets_. Cela est le principe général pour tous les guerres, mais surtout pour un pays où l’on ne peut pas avoir de communication.’

We cannot therefore blame Soult for sloth or slackness when we find that he started Mortier upon his way on July 27, and followed him with his own corps upon July 30, the day after the guns arrived, and the day before Ney and his troops were due to reach Salamanca from the north.

The order of march was as follows: the vanguard was composed of the whole corps of Mortier, nearly 17,000 strong[701], reinforced by three brigades of dragoons under Lahoussaye and Lorges with a strength of 2,000 sabres. The 2nd Corps followed; though it started three days later than the 5th it was gradually gaining ground on the vanguard all through the march, as it had no fighting to do or reconnaissances to execute. Hence it was only twenty-four hours behind Mortier in arriving at Plasencia. Its strength was 18,000 men, even after it had detached the brigades of dragoons to strengthen the vanguard, and placed five battalions at the disposal of General Kellermann[702]. During its stay at Zamora and Toro it had picked up a mass of convalescents and details, who had not taken part in its Galician campaign. The rear was formed by Ney’s troops, which started from Salamanca only one day behind the 2nd Corps. The infantry was not complete, as a brigade of 3,000 men was left behind on the Douro, to assist Kellermann in holding down the kingdom of Leon. Hence, even including a brigade of Lorges’ dragoons, the 6th Corps had only some 12,500 men on the march. The whole army, therefore, as it will be seen, was about 50,000 strong.

[701] By the return of July 15, the 5th Corps had 16,916 men, the attached brigades of dragoons, 1,853: the 2nd Corps had 18,740 (deducting Lorges and Lahoussaye): the 6th Corps 15,700, of whom one brigade of infantry (3,200 bayonets) was left behind. The total then was 50,009.

[702] The Marshal had dissolved one of his four divisions, that of Mermet, making over the 122nd of the line, reduced to two battalions, and the Swiss units to Kellermann, and distributing the other regiments between Merle, Delaborde, and Heudelet.

Just before he marched from Salamanca Soult had heard that Beresford’s Portuguese were commencing to show themselves in force in the direction of Almeida, while Del Parque’s small division at Ciudad Rodrigo was beginning to be reinforced by troops descending from the mountains of Galicia. Trusting that the danger from this quarter might not prove imminent, the Marshal left in observation of the allies only the remains of the force that Kellermann had brought back from the Asturias--the 5th division of dragoons and a few battalions of infantry, strengthened by the five battalions from the 2nd Corps and the one brigade detached from Ney. The whole did not amount to more than 9,000 or 10,000 men, scattered along the whole front from Astorga to Salamanca. It was clear that much was risked in this direction, for Beresford and Del Parque could concentrate over 20,000 troops for an attack on any point that they might select. But Soult was prepared to accept the chances of war in the Douro valley, rightly thinking that if he could crush Wellesley’s army on the Tagus any losses in the north could easily be repaired. It would matter little if the Spaniards and Portuguese occupied Salamanca, or even Valladolid, after the British had been destroyed.

Mortier, starting on July 27, on the road by Fuente Roble and Los Santos, made two marches without coming in touch with any enemy. It was only on the third day that he met at La Calzada the vedettes of the trifling force under the Marquis Del Reino which Cuesta had sent to hold the Puerto de Baños. After chasing them through Bejar, the Marshal came upon their supports drawn up in the pass [July 30]. Del Reino thought himself obliged to fight, though he had but four battalions with a total of 2,500 or 3,000 bayonets[703]. He was of course dislodged with ease by the overwhelming numbers which Mortier turned against him--the first division of the 5th Corps alone sufficed to drive him through the pass. Thereupon he retired down the Alagon, and after sending news of his defeat to Cuesta fell back to Almaraz, where he took up the bridge of boats and removed it to the southern bank of the Tagus.

[703] Cuesta, in a dispatch in the _Deposito de la Guerra_, which seems unpublished, says that Del Reino fought with four battalions. He had started with no more than two, so must have rallied two others. I can find no trace of what they were, but conclude that they must have been some of those battalions of the Army of Estremadura which are not named in the _Ordre de Bataille_ of the divisions present at Talavera. As I have shown in my Talavera Appendix, there were eight regiments which had belonged to Cuesta’s army in March but do not appear in the divisional return of July. Most of these were in garrison at Badajoz: but two or three may well have been sent to guard the passes when the army advanced from the Guadiana in the end of June.

Having cleared the passes upon the thirtieth, the 5th Corps advanced to Candelaria and Baños de Bejar upon the thirty-first, and entered Plasencia on the first of August. Here Mortier captured 334 of Wellesley’s sick, who had been left behind as being incapable of removal. On the preceding day the town had been full of British detachments: the place was the half-way house between Portugal and Talavera, and many commissaries, isolated officers going to or from the front, and details marching to join their corps, had been collected there. Captain Pattison, the senior officer present, withdrew to Zarza, with every man that could march, when he heard of Mortier’s approach, taking with him a convoy which had recently arrived from Abrantes. But he was obliged to leave behind him a considerable amount of corn, just collected from the Vera, which had been destined for Wellesley’s army. The whole civil population of Plasencia fled to the hills, in obedience to an order of the local Junta, and the British soldiers in the hospital were the only living beings whom the French vanguard found in the city. The men of the 5th Corps plundered the deserted houses, as was but natural, but behaved with much humanity to the captured invalids[704].

[704] For details of Mortier’s march see the memoir of Naylies, of Lahoussaye’s Dragoons, who was with the vanguard. According to the _Diary_ of Fantin des Odoards, Soult pushed his kindness to the British invalids so far as to leave with them a small supply of muskets, with which to defend themselves against guerrillas.

After seizing Plasencia Mortier halted for a day, in obedience to Soult’s orders, that he might allow the 2nd Corps to close up before he pressed in any further towards Wellesley. The Duke of Dalmatia was determined to run no risks, when dealing with an adversary so enterprising as his old enemy of Oporto. On August 2 he himself and the leading divisions of his corps reached Plasencia: the rest were close behind. On the same afternoon, therefore, the advance could be resumed, and Mortier set out on the high road towards Almaraz and Talavera, having eight regiments of horse--3,000 men--in his front. He slept that night at Malpartida, seven miles in advance of Plasencia, and moved on next morning to the line of the Tietar and the village of Toril. One of his reconnoitring parties approached the bridge of Almaraz and found it broken: another reached Navalmoral. He was now drawing very close to Wellesley, who had encamped that day at Oropesa, and was only thirty miles away: indeed the British and the French cavalry came in contact that evening in front of Navalmoral.

On August 3, by a curious coincidence, each Commander-in-chief was at last informed of his adversary’s strength and intentions by a captured dispatch. A Spanish messenger was arrested by Soult’s cavalry, while bearing a letter from Wellesley to General Erskine dated August 1. In this document there was an account of the battle of Talavera, which had hitherto been unknown to Soult. But the most important clause of it was a request to Erskine to find out whether the rumours reporting the advance of 12,000 French towards the Puerto de Baños were correct. The Duke of Dalmatia thus discovered that his adversary, only two days before, was grossly underrating the numbers of the army that was marching against his rear. He was led on to hope that Wellesley would presently advance against him with inferior numbers, and court destruction by attacking the united 2nd and 5th Corps[705].

[705] See Le Noble, p. 320.

This indeed might have come to pass had not the allies on the same day become possessed of a French dispatch which revealed to them the real situation of affairs. Some guerrillas in the neighbourhood of Avila intercepted a friar, who was an agent of King Joseph, and was bearing a letter from him to Soult. They brought the paper to Cuesta on August 3: it contained not only an account of the King’s plans and projects, but orders for the Marshal, which mentioned Ney and the 6th Corps, and showed that the force marching on Plasencia was at least double the strength that Wellesley had expected[706]. This letter Cuesta sent on to his colleague with laudable promptness; it reached the British commander in time to save him from taking the irreparable step of marching from Oropesa to Navalmoral, where the vanguard of Mortier’s cavalry had just been met by the vedettes of Cotton’s light horse. Wellesley had actually written to Bassecourt to bid him halt at Centinello till he himself should arrive, and then to join him in an attack on the French[707], when he was handed the intercepted letter which showed that Soult had at least 30,000 men in hand.

[706] See Arteche, vi. 342, and _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 561; the letter itself is not published by Gurwood, but Lord Londonderry, then on Wellesley’s staff, gives an analysis of it. It contained, according to him, orders to Soult to hasten his march, and to bring up Ney’s corps with all speed, while the king himself undertook to threaten Talavera again with Victor’s forces [Londonderry, i. p. 416].

[707] Wellesley to Bassecourt, from Oropesa, August 3. So confident was the British commander at this moment, that he wrote to Beresford on the same morning, telling him that Soult when assailed would probably retire at once, either by the pass of Perales or that of Baños. He wished his lieutenant to send Portuguese troops to the outlets of those defiles, to intercept the retreating enemy.

This unpalatable news changed the whole prospect of affairs: it would be mad to assail such an enemy with a force consisting of no more than 18,000 British troops and Bassecourt’s 5,000 Spaniards. Wellesley had therefore to reconsider the whole situation, and to dictate a new plan of campaign at very short notice, since his cavalry were actually in touch with the enemy at the distance of a single day’s march from Oropesa. On the morrow he must either fight or fly. The situation was made more complicated by the fact that Cuesta, when forwarding the French dispatch, had sent information to the effect that he considered his own situation at Talavera so much compromised that he was about to retreat at once, with the design of crossing the Tagus at Almaraz, and of taking up once more his old line of communications, which ran by Truxillo to Badajoz. It may be asked why the Captain-General did not adopt the simpler course of crossing the Tagus at Talavera, and moving under cover of the river, instead of executing the long flank march by Oropesa to Almaraz on the exposed bank, where the French were known to be in movement. The answer, however, is simple and conclusive: the paths which lead southward from Talavera are impracticable for artillery and wheeled vehicles. Infantry alone could have retreated by the route which climbs up to the Puerto de San Vincente, the main pass of this section of the Sierra de Guadalupe: nor was the track along the edge of the river from Talavera to Arzobispo any better fitted for the transport of a large army. It is this want of any adequate communication with the south which makes Talavera such a dangerous position: no retreat from it is possible save that by the road to Oropesa, unless the retiring army is prepared to sacrifice all its impedimenta.

Cuesta has been criticized in the most savage style by many English writers, from Lord Londonderry and Napier downwards, for his hasty departure from Talavera. It is fair to state in his defence the fact that if he had tarried any longer in his present position he might have been cut off not merely from Almaraz--that passage was already impracticable--but also from the bridge of Arzobispo, the only other crossing of the Tagus by which artillery and heavy wagons can pass southward. If he had started on the fourth instead of the third he might have found Mortier and Soult interposed between him and this last line of retreat. He would then have been forced to abandon all his _matériel_, and to hurry back to Talavera, in order to take the break-neck track to the Puerto de San Vincente. But there was every reason to believe that Victor might arrive in front of Talavera on the evening of the fourth or the morning of the fifth, so that this last road to safety might have been already blocked. Thus the Spanish army, if it had started on the fourth for Oropesa, might have found itself caught between the two French corps, and vowed to inevitable destruction. As a matter of fact Victor moved slowly and cautiously, and only reached Talavera on the sixth--but this could not possibly have been foreseen. We cannot therefore blame Cuesta’s precipitate departure upon the night of August 3.

His main body marched under cover of the darkness to Oropesa, where they arrived, much wearied and in some disorder, on the following morning. He left Zayas’s division and Albuquerque’s horse as a rearguard, to hold Talavera till midday on the fourth, with orders to make a semblance of resistance and to detain Victor for a few hours if he should appear. But no hostile force showed itself: by his unwise retreat to Santa Cruz the Marshal had drawn back so far from the enemy that he could not take advantage of their retrograde movement when it became known to him. Villatte’s division and Beaumont’s cavalry only reached Talavera on the morning of the sixth.

The departure of the Estremaduran army had one deplorable result. It exposed the English hospitals at Talavera, with their 4,000 wounded, to capture by the enemy. Wellesley, before he had marched off, had given orders that all the men capable of being moved should be sent off towards Plasencia and Portugal as soon as possible. But he had no transport that could cope with the task of transferring such a mass of invalids towards his base. He wrote from Oropesa begging Cuesta to requisition carts from the country-side for this purpose[708]. But it was notorious that carts were not to be had--all Wellesley’s letters for the last three weeks were full of complaints to the effect that he could not procure them by money or by force. When the Spaniards were themselves departing, bag and baggage, it was an inopportune moment at which to ask them to provide transport: yet since the British wounded had been left to their care they were bound in honour to do all that could be done to save them. It is said that Cuesta made over[709] no more than seven ox-carts and a few mules to Colonel Mackinnon, the officer charged with the task of evacuating the hospitals. These and about forty vehicles of various kinds belonging to the British themselves were all that could be procured for the use of the wounded. They could only accommodate a tithe of the serious cases: the men with hurts of less consequence were forced to set out upon their feet. ‘The road to Oropesa,’ writes one of their fellow sufferers, ‘was covered with our poor limping bloodless soldiers. On crutches or sticks, with blankets thrown over them, they hobbled woefully along. For the moment panic terror lent them a force inconsistent with their debility and their fresh wounds. Some died by the road, others, unable to get further than Oropesa, afterwards fell into the hands of the enemy[710].’ The rest trailed onward to the bridge of Arzobispo, where Wellesley provided transport for many of them by unloading baggage-wagons, and ultimately reached Truxillo, at which place the new hospitals were established. Of the whole 4,000 about 1,500 had been left at Talavera as hopeless or dangerous cases, and these became the captives of the French: 2,000 drifted in, at various times, to Truxillo: the remaining 500 expired by the wayside or were taken by the French in the villages where they had dropped down[711].

[708] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Aug. 3, 1809.

[709] I am bound to say that after reading the Spanish narratives, I doubt whether Cuesta had at his disposal the large amount of spare vehicles of which Londonderry and Napier speak.

[710] Boothby, _A Prisoner of France_, p. 40. For the adventures of two wounded officers on their weary way to Truxillo see the _Diary_ of Hawker, and the narrative of Colonel Leslie. The latter made a personal appeal to Cuesta, whose carriage he had met by the roadside. The old general sent for the Alcalde, and made him provide a mule--though it turned out to be a very bad one--for the wounded officer. This small fact to his credit needs recording, after the copious abuse heaped on him.

[711] The invalids were admirably cared for by the enemy. See Boothby.

Long before Cuesta and his host had arrived at Oropesa, Wellesley had made up his mind that the only course open to him was to abandon the march towards Navalmoral and Almaraz, and to turn aside to the bridge of Arzobispo. As the French were known to be at Navalmoral, it would have been impossible to force a passage to Almaraz without a battle. If the enemy were to be estimated at two corps, or 30,000 men, according to the indications of the intercepted letter, they would probably be able to detain the Anglo-Spanish army till Victor should arrive from the rear. For, without accepting a pitched battle, they would be strong enough to harass and check the allies, and to prevent them from reaching Almaraz till the 1st Corps should come upon the scene. ‘I was not certain,’ wrote Wellesley to Beresford two days later, ‘that Ney was not with Soult: and I _was_ certain that, if not with him, he was at no great distance. We should therefore have had a battle to fight in order to gain the road to Almaraz--Plasencia was then out of the question--and if Victor had followed Cuesta, as he ought to have done, another battle, probably, before the bridge could be re-established[712]. Then it was to be considered that, Cuesta having left Talavera, the bridge of Arzobispo would have been open to the enemy’s enterprise: if they had destroyed it, while we had failed in forcing Soult at Navalmoral, we were gone.’

[712] The Marquis del Reino (it will be remembered) had broken the boat-bridge of Almaraz on August 2, after abandoning the Puerto de Baños.

It is impossible not to bow before Wellesley’s reasoning. The French critics object that only Mortier was at Navalmoral on August 4, Soult being twenty miles behind him at Bazagona on the Tietar, so that it would have been possible for the British army to have driven back the 19,000 men of the Duke of Treviso, and to have forced its way to Almaraz[713]. But even if Wellesley had fought a successful action with Mortier on August 4, Soult would certainly have joined his colleague on the fifth, before the bridge could have been repaired, or at any rate before the whole Anglo-Spanish army and all its impedimenta could have crossed the Tagus. If attacked during their passage by the 37,000 men of the 2nd and 5th Corps they would have fared badly. Wellesley was perfectly correct in his decision; indeed the only point in which he was deceived was that he believed the enemy in his front to be Soult’s and Ney’s Corps, whereas they were in reality those of Soult and Mortier. Ney only reached Plasencia on August 4, and did not join the main body of the army till two days later.

[713] See for example, Le Noble, pp. 339-40.

When Wellesley and Cuesta met at Oropesa, early on the morning of August 4, they found themselves as usual engaged in a heated controversy. The British general had directed his divisions to hold themselves ready to march on the bridge of Arzobispo without further delay. Cuesta on the other hand had been attacked by a recrudescence of his old disease, the mania for fighting pitched battles[714]. He proposed that the allied armies should remain on the north bank of the Tagus, adopt a good defensive position, and defy Soult to attack them. Wellesley would not listen for a moment to this project, and finally declared that in spite of all arguments to the contrary, he should cross the Tagus that day at the head of his army. The two generals parted in wrath, and at six o’clock the British commenced their march to Arzobispo, only nine miles distant; the whole force crossed its bridge before evening, and established itself in bivouac on the south side of the river.

[714] ‘As usual, General Cuesta wanted to fight general actions,’ writes Wellesley to Beresford, from Arzobispo, on the afternoon of this same day.

Cuesta remained at Oropesa for the whole day of August 4, and was there joined both by Bassecourt, who had fallen back from Centinello, and by Zayas and Albuquerque, who had evacuated Talavera at noon and made a forced march to join their chief. He appeared disposed to fight even though his ally had abandoned him. In the afternoon Mortier’s cavalry pressed in against him. He turned fiercely upon them, deployed a whole division of infantry and 1,200 horse in their front, and drove them back towards their supports. This vigorous action had a result that could not have been foreseen: Mortier jumped to the conclusion that he was himself about to be attacked by the whole Spanish army--perhaps by Wellesley also[715]. He halted the 5th Corps in advance of Navalmoral, and wrote to implore Soult to come up to his aid without delay. The Duke of Dalmatia hurried up with all speed, and on August 5 brought the 2nd Corps to Casatejada, only six miles in the rear of his colleague. Ney, following with a like promptness, advanced that day to Malpartida, a march behind the position of Soult.

[715] ‘M. le Maréchal duc de Trévise crut qu’il serait attaqué,’ says Soult in his report of August 13. He therefore held back, and sent for the 2nd Corps. Hence came Cuesta’s salvation.

On the sixth, therefore, the whole army from the Douro was practically concentrated, and Soult and Mortier advanced against Cuesta with Ney close in their rear. They found that they were too late: after remaining in battle order in front of the bridge of Arzobispo during the whole of the fifth, courting the attack which Mortier had been too cautious to deliver, the Captain-General had crossed the Tagus that night, and had occupied its further bank. He had left in front of the bridge only a small rearguard, which retired after a skirmish with the advanced cavalry of the 5th Corps. For once Cuesta had found luck upon his side; if Mortier had ventured to assail him on the fifth, and had forced him to an engagement, in a position from which retreat was difficult, and with the Tagus at his back, his situation would have been most perilous. For even if he had kept the 5th Corps at bay, he could not easily have withdrawn in face of it, and Soult would have been upon him on the next morning. In escaping across the narrow bridge of Arzobispo his losses must have been terrible: indeed the greater part of his army might have been destroyed.

Finding, on the evening of August 6, that both the British and the Estremaduran armies were now covered by the Tagus, whose line they appeared determined to defend, Soult was forced to think out a new plan of campaign. His original design of taking the allies in the rear and cutting off their retreat had miscarried: he must now either halt and recognize that his march had failed in its main purpose, or else deliver a frontal attack upon the line of the Tagus. The bridge of Almaraz was broken, and troops (the detachment of the Marquis Del Reino) were visible behind it. The bridge of Arzobispo was not destroyed, but the Spaniards were obviously ready to defend it. It was barricaded, the mediaeval towers in its midst were manned by a detachment of infantry, and a battery for twelve guns had been placed in an earthwork erected on a knoll thirty yards in its rear, so as to sweep all the approaches. Considerable forces both of cavalry and of infantry were visible on the hillsides and in the villages of the southern bank. Cuesta, in fact, while proposing to fall back with his main body to Meza de Ibor and Deleytosa, in order to recover his communication with his base at Badajoz, had left behind a strong rearguard, consisting of Bassecourt’s infantry division and Albuquerque’s six regiments of cavalry, a force of 5,000 bayonets and nearly 3,000 sabres. They were ordered to defend the bridge and the neighbouring ford of Azutan till further orders should reach them. The ground was very strong; indeed the ford was the one perilous point, and as that passage was narrow and hard to find, Cuesta trusted that it might be maintained even against very superior numbers. So formidable did the defence appear that Soult halted during the whole day of August 7, while he took stock of the Spanish positions, and sought up-stream and down-stream for means of passage other than the bridge. He was not at first aware of the existence of the ford: it was only revealed to him by the imprudence of the Spanish cavalry, who rode their horses far into the stream when watering them, thus showing that there were long shallows projecting from the southern bank. By a careful search at night the French intelligence-officers discovered that the river was only deep for a few yards under their own bank[716]: for the rest of its breadth there were only two or three feet of water. Having found the point, not far from the bridge, where the more dangerous part of the channel was fordable, they advised the Marshal that the passage of the river would present no insurmountable difficulties. Soult resolved to deliver an assault both on the bridge and on the ford upon the morning of August 8. Nor was it only at Arzobispo that he determined to force the line of the Tagus. He directed Ney, who was bringing up his rear at the head of the 6th Corps, to turn aside to the broken bridge of Almaraz, and to endeavour to cross the river by aid of a ford which was said to exist in that neighbourhood. Sketch-maps were sent to the Marshal in order to enable him to locate the exact point of passage--it would seem that they must have been very faulty.

[716] General Arteche, who has examined the ford, notes that the main channel, narrow but with a rocky bottom, is close under the northern, i.e. the French, bank. The remaining two-thirds of the breadth of the river has a hard sandy bottom and is in August extremely shallow. If once, therefore, the deep water under the nearer bank was crossed, the French had no difficulties before them.

Meanwhile Wellesley had passed the Tagus four days and Cuesta three days before the Marshal’s attack was ready, and both had been granted time to proceed far upon their way. It was fortunate that they were not hurried, for the road from Arzobispo to Meza de Ibor and thence to Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, though passable for guns and wheeled vehicles, was steep and in a deplorable condition of disrepair. It took Wellesley two days to march from the bridge to Meza de Ibor, a distance of only seventeen miles, because of the endless trouble caused by his artillery. There were places where he had practically to remake the roadway, and others where whole companies of infantry had to be turned on to haul the cannon up slopes where the half-starved horses could make no headway. These exertions were all the more exhausting because the men were falling into a state of great bodily weakness from insufficient supplies. Even at Talavera they had on many days received no more than half rations: but after passing Oropesa regular distributions of food ceased altogether for some time: there were still a few slaughter-oxen with the army, but bread or biscuit was unobtainable, and the troops had to maintain themselves on what they could scrape up from the thinly peopled and rugged country-side. A diet of overripe _garbanzos_, parched to the hardness of bullets, was all that many could obtain. Better foragers eked them out with honeycomb stolen from the peasants’ hives, and pork got by shooting the half-wild pigs which roam in troops among the woods on the mountain side. Many, in the ravenous eagerness of hunger, ate the meat warm and raw, and contracted choleraic complaints from their unwholesome feeding[717].

[717] For details of these privations see the diary of Leach of the 95th, p. 92.

Divining that Soult would probably make a dash at Almaraz as well as at Arzobispo, Wellesley sent on ahead of his main body the brigade of Robert Craufurd, to which he attached Donkin’s much depleted regiments, in order to make up a small division. As they were unhampered by guns or baggage this detachment reached Almaraz on the sixth, after a fifteen hours’ forced march on the preceding day. They took over charge of the broken bridge and the ford from the Spanish troops of the Marquis Del Reino, and proceeded to entrench themselves in the excellent positions overlooking the point where the river was passable. Thus Ney, when he reached Almaraz on the following day, found the enemy already established opposite him, and ready to dispute the crossing. About 4,000 British troops and 1,500 Spanish troops were holding the river bank: immediately at their backs was the narrow and eminently defensible defile of Mirabete, which completely commands the road to Truxillo: it was an even stronger position than that which covered the ford and the ruined bridge.

On August 7 therefore Wellesley considered himself in a comparatively satisfactory situation. The passage at Almaraz was held by a vanguard consisting of the best troops in the army. Two divisions, the cavalry, and all the guns had traversed the worst part of the road, and had reached Deleytosa, only nine miles behind Craufurd’s position. If the French should attack on the following day, the main body could reinforce the light brigade in a few hours. One division, in the rear, was holding the position of Meza de Ibor, which Wellesley did not wish to evacuate until the Spanish army was ready to occupy it. He had discovered that there were points between Arzobispo and Almaraz where the passage of the Tagus was not wholly impracticable for small bodies of infantry[718], and dreaded that the enemy might throw a detachment across the stream to make a dash for the Meza. If this position had been lost the communication between the two armies would have been broken.

[718] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Deleytosa, Aug. 7.

Cuesta, meanwhile, was engaged in the steep and stony mountain road over which Wellesley had toiled on the 5th and the 6th of August. His vanguard was now close to Meza de Ibor: the rest of the army was strung out between that point and Val de la Casa: the Captain-General himself had his head quarters on the night of the seventh at Peraleda de Garbin, ten miles west of Arzobispo. Bassecourt and Albuquerque were still covering the rear, with Mortier’s corps now plainly visible in their front. On their steadiness depended the safety of the whole army, for Cuesta had more baggage and more guns[719] than Wellesley, and therefore the road over the hills was even more trying to him than to his colleague. There was a congestion of wheeled transport at certain spots on the road which created hopeless confusion, and barred the march of the cavalry and even of the infantry divisions. It was only removed by setting whole battalions to work to drag the wagons out of the way. Cuesta’s ultimate destination was the Meza de Ibor, a position of unparalleled strength, which could be held even after the enemy had crossed the Tagus. That they would ultimately win their way over the river was certain, for already news had arrived that Victor, after reaching Talavera on Aug. 6, had pushed infantry over its bridge on the road to Herencia and Aldea Nueva. Troops coming from this direction would outflank the Arzobispo position, and compel Albuquerque to abandon it. Even without cavalry or guns this detachment of the 1st Corps would be strong enough to dislodge the guard of the bridge, by falling upon its rear, while Mortier was attacking it in front. As the cavalry of Victor and Soult had met, half way between Oropesa and Talavera, upon the afternoon of the seventh, the two marshals were now in full communication, and able to concert any plans that they might please for joint operations.

[719] Beside his own thirty guns he had the seventeen captured French pieces which had been won at Talavera. Wellesley, it will be remembered (p. 543), had handed them over to him.

The Duke of Dalmatia, however, preferred to win all the credit for himself, and attacked without allowing his colleague’s troops time to approach the Spanish position. It was fortunate for Albuquerque that the rivalry of the two hostile commanders saved him from the joint assault, which would have been far more ruinous to him than the actual combat of Aug. 8 was destined to prove.

Having full knowledge of the existence and the locality of the ford of Azutan, Soult had resolved to launch his main attack upon this point, while directing only a subsidiary attack upon the fortified bridge. This last was only to be pushed home in case the troops sent against the ford should succeed in making good their footing upon the further bank. A careful observation of the Spanish lines showed that both Albuquerque and Bassecourt were holding back the main body of their divisions at some distance from the water’s edge, in the groves around the three villages of Pedrosa, Burgillo, and Azutan. There was only a single regiment of cavalry watching the river bank, and two or three battalions of infantry manning the towers of the bridge of Arzobispo and the redoubt in its rear. The Spaniards showed every sign of a blind confidence in the strength of their position behind the broad but shallow Tagus.

Knowing their habits, Soult selected for the moment of his attack the hour of the _siesta_. It was between one and two o’clock in the afternoon when he bade his columns, which had been drawn up under cover, and at some distance from the water’s edge, to advance to force the passage. For the assault upon the ford he had collected the whole of his cavalry, no less than twelve regiments. Lahoussaye’s dragoons formed the van, then came Lorges’ brigade, then the division of light horse belonging to the 2nd Corps, in the rear the corps-cavalry of Mortier. This mass of 4,000 horsemen was to be followed by the first brigade of Girard’s infantry division of the 5th Corps, while its second brigade was to assault the bridge, when Lahoussaye and Lorges should have won the passage of the ford and have established themselves on the flank of the Spanish defences. Gazan’s division, the second of the 5th Corps, was to support Girard, while the masses of the infantry of the 2nd Corps remained in reserve. All the light artillery of the army was to gallop down to the water’s edge at various selected points, when the attacking columns were first put in movement, and to distract the attention of the enemy’s guns so far as lay in their power.

At about 1.30 P.M. Caulaincourt’s brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, a force of about 600 sabres, sallied out from its cover behind the village of Arzobispo, and moved down to the ford at a sharp trot. It plunged into the water, had passed the deeper part of the channel almost before the Spaniards had guessed its intention, and soon reached the shallows on the opposite bank. The only hostile force ready to meet it was a single regiment (the 1st Estremaduran Hussars) which was watching the ford, and a battalion of infantry which Bassecourt sent down in haste from the redoubt behind the bridge. A fierce charge of Caulaincourt’s dragoons dispersed and routed the Spanish horse; after they had been driven off the victors turned upon the battalion, which tried to form square on their approach, but was late in finishing its manœuvre. It was assailed before the rear side had been formed, broken up, and cut to pieces.

Soult had thus gained a precious half-hour, during which the remainder of his cavalry, squadron after squadron, came pouring over the ford, and began to form up on the southern bank. When several regiments had passed he also let loose the infantry brigade which was to attack the bridge. So narrow was the approach that only a single battalion (the 1st of the 40th of the line) could deliver the assault. But the _tirailleur_ companies of several other battalions, and two batteries of horse artillery, opened a lateral fire from various points of the northern bank, to distract the Spaniards from the frontal attack. The fraction of Bassecourt’s division which was in position at the bridge and the redoubt had already been completely cowed by seeing Lahoussaye’s cavalry forming up in their flank and rear. If they waited to resist the infantry attack, it was clear that they would be cut off from their sole line of retreat by the dragoons. They abandoned their positions after firing a couple of scattering volleys, and fled eastward along the river bank towards the village of Azutan. The heavy guns in the redoubt were left behind, and fell into the hands of Caulaincourt. Girard’s infantry was therefore able to cross the river almost without loss, two regiments at the bridge, two at the ford which the cavalry had already utilized. A few men were drowned in the second column, having strayed into deep water by swerving to the right or left of the proper route.

Meanwhile Albuquerque’s horse and Bassecourt’s second brigade, roused from their ill-timed siesta, were pouring out of the villages which had sheltered them from the noontide heat. The infantry--four battalions apparently--drew up beside a wood, on the slope a mile above the bridge, and waited to be attacked. The cavalry, however, came on in one great mass, and charged down upon Lahoussaye’s division, which was covering the deployment of the rest of the French horse. Albuquerque’s only thought was to engage the enemy before he had succeeded in passing the whole of his squadrons over the ford. Vainly hoping to atone for his previous slackness by haste that came too late, he had hurried his five regiments forward as soon as the men could saddle and bridle their horses. Fractions of the different corps were mixed together, and no proper first or second line had been formed. The whole mass--some 2,500 sabres--in great disorder, galloped down upon the two brigades of Lahoussaye, and engaged them for a short time. But Lorges’ dragoons and part of Soult’s light horse were now at hand to aid the leading division; the Spaniards were beset in flank as well as in front, and broke after the first shock. Albuquerque, who showed plenty of useless personal courage, tried in vain to rally them on the 2nd Estremaduran Hussars, the only regiment which remained intact. It was borne away by the backrush of the rest, and scattering over the hillsides the whole body fled westward and northward, some towards Peraleda de Garbin, others towards Pedrosa. Bassecourt’s infantry went off to the rear as soon as they saw their comrades routed, and took to the hills. By keeping to rocky ground they suffered comparatively little loss.

The French urged the pursuit of Albuquerque’s fugitive horsemen for many miles, chasing them as far as the defile of La Estrella in the Sierra de Guadalupe in one direction, and beyond Val de la Casa in the other. On the latter road the chase only ceased when the dragoons came upon the divisions of Henestrosa and Zayas, from Cuesta’s main army, drawn up across their path. The losses of the Spaniards were very considerable--600 men and 400 horses were captured, and over 800 killed and wounded. One flag was taken, that of the regiment cut to pieces by Lahoussaye’s dragoons at the commencement of the fighting. The pieces in the redoubt, and the divisional battery of Albuquerque, 16 guns in all, were lost. By an additional mischance the French also recovered fourteen of their own seventeen guns that had been taken at Talavera. Cuesta had not been able to utilize these pieces for want of gunners: they were trailing along in the rear of his army, very indifferently horsed, when the French dragoons swept along the road to Peraleda. On the approach of the pursuers they were abandoned by the wayside. This capture enabled Soult to assert that he had taken in all 30 cannon, and emboldened Sebastiani, a few weeks later, to declare that he had never lost his guns at Talavera[720]. Having recovered them he could exhibit them--all save two or three--in evidence of his mendacious statement.

[720] The fact that these guns were actually French explains Le Noble’s statement that the captured pieces were largely ‘de modèle français.’ Napier has a strange statement, whose source I cannot discover, to the effect that ‘Cuesta on his march to Meza d’Ibor left fifteen guns upon the road, which Albuquerque’s flight uncovered. A trumpeter attending an English flag of truce treacherously or foolishly made known the fact to the French, who immediately sent cavalry to fetch them off.’ Napier, ii. 189.

Soult declared in his official report that his cavalry had lost only 28 killed and 83 wounded, his artillery 4 wounded, his infantry hardly a man, save some few drowned at the ford.

The rout of the Spanish rearguard and the capture of the bridge of Arzobispo gave Soult a foothold on the southern bank of the Tagus, but little more. The road by which he could now advance against the allies was detestable--we have already seen how its cliffs and ravines had tried the British and the Estremaduran armies. To reach Cuesta’s new position on the Meza de Ibor the Duke of Dalmatia would have had to make a two days’ march through these defiles, dragging his guns with him. His cavalry he would have been forced to leave behind him, as there would have been no means of employing it in the mountains. Meanwhile Wellesley had established himself in the ground which he had selected behind the broken bridge of Almaraz, and Cuesta had got the whole of his infantry and half his artillery over the Ibor stream and arrayed them on the Meza, where the rocky slopes are impregnable against a frontal attack, if the defending army shows ordinary determination[721]. All through the ninth and the morning of the tenth the Spaniards were dragging the rest of their guns and their baggage up the steep zigzag path between the river and the summit of the plateau, and it was not till the end of the latter day that everything was in position. It is probable therefore that if Soult had pressed his pursuit with all possible speed, he might have captured some of the Spanish _impedimenta_ on the morning of the tenth. But there were defiles between Peraleda and the Ibor river where Cuesta’s rearguard might possibly have detained him till the guns and baggage were in safety[722].

[721] It will he remembered that on March 17, Victor turned Del Parque’s division out of the Meza de Ibor position. But the latter had only 5,000 men, not enough to man the whole line, while the Duke of Belluno had two divisions for the frontal attack, and turned the Meza with another, that of Villatte. Cuesta had 30,000 men and more, quite sufficient to hold the entire position.

[722] Wellesley went to visit his allies on the Meza upon the morning of Aug. 10, and found that half the guns and baggage had been dragged up on the ninth, but that there was still a great accumulation at the foot of the steep slope, between the Ibor river and the lower edge of the plateau. He was in great distress at the notion that the French might come up at any moment, drive in the rearguard, and capture the rear sections of the Spanish train; see _Wellington Dispatches_, v. 22, to Lord Wellesley, from Deleytosa, Aug. 10.

The Duke of Dalmatia, however, paused at the bridge of Arzobispo before committing himself to a second advance against the allies. He was averse to making an isolated attack upon the admirable position now occupied by the Estremaduran army, and wished to combine it with a simultaneous assault upon the British. It will be remembered that he had detached Ney’s corps from the rear of his line of march, and ordered it to attempt the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, by the ford which he knew to exist close to the ruined bridge. He also wrote to Victor to desire him to push forward the two infantry divisions which had crossed the river at Talavera, and to direct them on Mohedas and Alia, so as to turn Cuesta’s flank by a long circuitous march among the rugged summits of the Sierra de Guadalupe.

Neither of these subsidiary movements was carried out. One division of Ney’s corps, and Fournier’s brigade of dragoons reached Almaraz on Aug. 8: the other division and the light cavalry had followed the 2nd Corps so closely that it had passed Navalmoral on its way eastward, and had to make a long counter-march. It was not till the ninth or tenth therefore that the Duke of Elchingen would have been in a position to attempt the passage of the Tagus. Craufurd’s detachment had been established at Mirabete, behind the broken bridge, since Aug. 6, and two days later the main body of the British army had reached Deleytosa, where it was within a few hours’ march of the vanguard, and perfectly ready to support it. If Ney had endeavoured to pass the Tagus on the ninth or tenth with his 12,500 men, it is clear that the head of his column must have been destroyed, for the ford was narrow and difficult, and indeed barely passable for infantry even in the middle of August[723]. But the Marshal did not even attempt the passage, for the simple reason that his intelligence officers failed to discover the ford, and reported to him that none existed. He sent word to Soult that the scheme was impracticable, and drawing back from the water’s edge concentrated his whole corps at Navalmoral [Aug. 9].

[723] From Soult’s dispatch of Aug. 13, it appears that a Colonel Ornano, with a regiment of dragoons, was detailed to examine the banks of the Tagus in search of the ford, but failed to find it. The cause is not hard to seek, for it crosses the river diagonally on a narrow shelf of rock with deep water on either side. It is not less than four feet deep, and Leach of the 95th, who was on guard at its southern end, describes it as ‘not exactly practicable for infantry even at the driest season of the year’ (p. 94). The English, knowing its exact course, were established in positions from which they could concentrate upon it in a few minutes. We may rationally suppose, therefore, that Ney would have found the Tagus not less difficult to pass on Aug. 9, than the Oitaben had been on June 8.

Victor, at the other end of the French line, showed no desire to adventure his infantry among the defiles of the Sierra de Guadalupe, without guns or cavalry, and refused to move up into the mountains in order to turn Cuesta’s right flank. Thus the whole plan concerted by the Duke of Dalmatia for a general attack on the allies came to an ignominious conclusion.

It would appear, indeed, that his chance of inflicting a serious blow on the enemy had passed away long ere he brought the 2nd and 5th Corps down to the bridge of Arzobispo. It was on the fifth, when Mortier refused to close with Cuesta and allowed him to withdraw across the Tagus, that Soult had lost his best opportunity. On that day the Spaniards were still on the wrong side of the river, and the British vanguard had not yet reached the broken bridge of Almaraz. If Mortier had engaged the army of Cuesta, and Ney had found and attacked the ford at Almaraz before Craufurd’s arrival, the position of the allies would have been forlorn indeed. But on the fifth Soult had not yet discovered the real position of affairs; and the head of Ney’s corps was only just debouching from Plasencia, two long marches from Almaraz. In short ‘the fog of war,’ as a modern writer has happily called it, was still lying thick about the combatants, and Soult’s best chance was gone before he was even aware of it.

On August 9, matters looked far less promising, even though the bridge of Arzobispo had been won. Since Ney sent word that he could not cross at Almaraz, while Victor declined to commit himself to any schemes for an advance into the eastern mountains, Soult saw that he must construct another scheme of operations. His own preference was for a march into Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Branco. Such an attack upon Wellesley’s base, made by the 50,000 men of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, would compel the British to abandon Almaraz, to give up their connexion with Cuesta, and to march in haste by Truxillo, Caceres, and Portalegre on Abrantes, in order to cover Lisbon. It was even possible that, if the invading army made great haste, it might reach Abrantes before the British: in that case Wellesley would be forced to keep to the southern bank of the Tagus and cross it at Santarem, comparatively close to the capital. Thus all Central Portugal might be won without a battle, and Lisbon itself might fall ere the campaign ended, since the 20,000 men of the British general, even when aided by the local levies, could not (as Soult supposed) hold back three French _corps d’armée_[724]. There was another alternative possible--to march not on Lisbon but on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and to invade Portugal by the northern road. But this plan would take a longer time to execute, and promised less decisive results.

[724] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 9, from Arzobispo: ‘Je serai disposé soit à marcher sur Lisbonne pour détruire les établissements anglais avant que leur armée ne puisse y arriver, et à lui rendre son embarquement difficile, soit à marcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo pour en faire le siège.... Dans le cas du premier mouvement (qui produira infailliblement de grands résultats) j’aurai l’honneur de prier V. M. d’avoir la bonté de faire connaître à MM. les maréchaux ducs de Trévise et d’Elchingen que telle est son intention, afin que toute observation soit ainsi prévenue, et qu’on ne puisse m’attribuer aucun sentiment d’amour-propre.’

But even before the combat of Arzobispo had taken place, Joseph and Jourdan had determined that they would not permit Soult to carry out any schemes of advance against Portugal. They could show very good grounds for their decision. If the Duke of Dalmatia marched off to attack Lisbon, he would leave the 1st and 4th Corps and the King’s reserve,--less than 50,000 men in all, after the losses of Talavera,--opposed to Cuesta, Wellesley, and Venegas, who between them would have at least 75,000[725]. If the British army should refuse to be drawn away towards Portugal, and should recross the Tagus at Almaraz with Cuesta in its wake, the situation would be deplorable. Victor would be exposed, just as he had been on July 22 and 23, to a joint attack from the two armies. And on this occasion Sebastiani and the King would not be able to bring him help, for they were now closely engaged with Venegas near Aranjuez. If they moved away from the front of the army of La Mancha, Madrid would be lost in two days. If they did not so move, Wellesley and Cuesta might crush Victor, or drive him away on some eccentric line of retreat which would uncover the capital. Jourdan therefore, writing in the name of Joseph, had informed Soult in a dispatch dated Aug. 8, that it was impossible to permit him to march on Portugal, as his departure would uncover Madrid and probably bring about a fatal disaster. He also urged that the exhaustion of the troops rendered a halt necessary, and that it would be impossible to feed them, if they advanced into the stony wilderness on the borders of Portugal before they had collected magazines. For the present the King would be contented to keep the allies in check, without seeking to attack or disperse them, until the weather began to grow cooler and the troops had rested from their fatigues.

[725] Joseph, exaggerating the enemy’s force, was under the impression that they had fully 100,000 men: see his letter to Napoleon of July 31.

As if intending to put it out of Soult’s power to undertake his projected expedition into Portugal, Jourdan and Joseph now proceeded to deprive him of the control of one of his three army corps. They authorized Ney to recross the mountains and to return to Salamanca, in order to protect the plains of Leon from the incursions of the Spaniards of Galicia. Deprived of such a large section of his army, Soult would be unable to march against Abrantes, as he so much desired to do. There were good military reasons, too, for sending off Ney in this direction: Kellermann kept reporting that La Romana was on the move, and that unless promptly succoured he should find himself obliged to abandon Benavente and Zamora and to fall back on Valladolid. The Spaniards from Ciudad Rodrigo had already taken the offensive, and Del Parque’s advanced guard had even seized Salamanca.

Ney accepted with alacrity the chance of withdrawing himself from the immediate control of his old enemy Soult; he received his permission to return to Leon on Aug. 9: on the tenth his whole corps was on the move, and on the eleventh he had retired to Plasencia. On the following day he plunged into the passes and made for Salamanca with all possible speed[726].

[726] Ney has been accused of deserting Soult, and retiring from Almaraz and Navalmoral on his own responsibility, and contrary to the orders of his immediate superior. But Jourdan’s dispatch of Aug. 9 to the Minister of War shows that the Duke of Elchingen was obeying directions sent to him from the royal head quarters. ‘Le roi a pensé,’ he writes, ‘qu’on ne devait pas, quant à présent, chercher à pénétrer ni en Andalousie ni en Portugal.... Le duc de Dalmatie renverra promptement le 6me corps sur Salamanque pour en chasser les ennemis, et couvrir la Vieille Castille conjointement avec le Général Kellermann.’ Ney then was strictly correct in stating in his dispatch of Aug. 18, that he had acted in obedience to his orders.

While the 6th Corps was dispatched to the north, the King directed Soult to take up, with the rest of his troops, a defensive position opposite the allied armies on the central Tagus. The 2nd Corps was to occupy Plasencia, the 5th to watch the passages at Almaraz and Arzobispo, while keeping a detachment at Talavera. Thus all Soult’s plans for an active campaign were shattered, and he was told off to act as a ‘containing force.’ Meanwhile Joseph drew Victor and the 1st Corps away from Talavera, towards Toledo and La Mancha, with the intention of bringing them into play against Venegas. For just as Soult had always ‘an eye on Portugal,’ so Joseph had always ‘an eye on Madrid.’ He could not feel secure so long as a Spanish army lay near Toledo or Aranjuez, only two marches from the gates of his capital, and was determined to dislodge it from this threatening position before taking any other operation in hand. He had accepted as true rumours to the effect that part of Cuesta’s troops had retired in the direction of Ocaña[727] to join the army of La Mancha, and even that 6,000 British[728] had been detached in this same direction. Thus he had persuaded himself that Venegas had 40,000 men, and was desirous of drawing in Victor to his head quarters before delivering his attack, thinking that Sebastiani and the central reserve would be too weak for the task.

[727] Joseph to Napoleon, from Valdemoro, August 7.

[728] Jourdan to Belliard, from Bargas, August 8.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IX

THE END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN: ALMONACID

While King Joseph’s orders were being carried out, Wellesley and Cuesta found themselves, to their great surprise, unmolested by any hostile force. The army which had been in their front at Almaraz and Arzobispo disappeared on August 10, leaving only small detachments to watch the northern bank of the Tagus. It was soon reported to Wellesley that Victor had passed away towards Toledo, and that another corps--or perhaps two[729]--had retired to Plasencia. The object of this move however had to be determined, before the British general could take corresponding measures. Was Soult about to invade Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Branco, or was he merely taking up cantonments, from which he could observe the British and Estremaduran armies, while the King and Victor moved off against Venegas? On the whole Wellesley was inclined to believe that the latter hypothesis was the correct one, and that the enemy was about to ‘refuse’ his right wing, and to use his left for offensive action against the army of La Mancha. As was generally the case, his prescience was not at fault, and he had exactly divined the King’s intentions[730]. He had nevertheless to guard against the possibility that the other alternative might prove to be correct, and that Central Portugal was in danger--as indeed it would have been if Joseph had allowed Soult to carry out his original plan.

[729] See Wellesley’s letter of Aug. 14 to Beresford, concerning the departure of the French. Robert Craufurd estimated the force that had marched on Plasencia at 15,000 men, Donkin at 25,000. If the latter had judged the numbers correctly, Wellesley supposed that both Ney and Soult must have gone by this road: this was actually the case.

[730] Wellesley to Villiers, Aug. 12: ‘The French having been moving since the ninth towards Plasencia.... I can form no decided opinion respecting their intentions. I think, however, that if they meditated a serious attack on Portugal they would not have moved off in daylight, in full sight of our troops. I suspect these movements are intended only as a feint, to induce us to separate ourselves from the Spaniards, in order to cover Portugal.’

Wellesley resolved therefore to maintain his present position at Jaraicejo and Mirabete till he should be certain as to the intentions of the French. If they were really about to invade Portugal, he would march at once for Abrantes. If not, he would keep his ground, for by holding the passage at Almaraz he was threatening the French centre, and detaining in his front troops who would otherwise be free to attack the Spaniards either in La Mancha or in Leon.

Meanwhile measures had to be taken to provide a detaining force in front of Soult, lest an attack on Portugal should turn out to be in progress. This force was provided by bringing down Beresford and the Portuguese field army to Zarza and Alcantara, and sending up to their aid the British reinforcements which had landed at Lisbon during the month of July. Beresford, it will be remembered, had received orders at the commencement of the campaign directing him to concentrate his army behind Almeida, to link his operations with those of Del Parque and the Spanish force at Ciudad Rodrigo, but at the same time to be ready to transfer himself either northward or southward if his presence should be required on the Douro or the Tagus. In accordance with these instructions Beresford had collected thirty-two battalions of regular infantry, with one more from the Lusitanian Legion, and the University Volunteers of Coimbra, as also five squadrons from various cavalry regiments, and four batteries of artillery--a force of 18,000 men in all[731]. On July 31 he had crossed the Spanish frontier, and lay at San Felices and Villa de Cervo, near Ciudad Rodrigo. There he heard of Soult’s march from Salamanca towards Plasencia, and very properly made up his mind to bring his army down to Estremadura by a line parallel to that which the French had taken. He crossed the Sierra de Gata by the rough pass of Perales, and on August 12 fixed his head quarters at Moraleja, near Coria, on the southern slope of the mountains. His cavalry held Coria, while his right wing was in touch with the English brigades from Lisbon, which had just reached Zarza la Mayor. These were the seven battalions of Lightburne and Catlin Craufurd[732], which Wellesley had vainly hoped to receive in time for Talavera. They numbered 4,500 bayonets, and had with them one battery of British artillery.

[731] These regiments were, Line infantry, nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, all (save no. 15) two battalions strong, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Cazadores, with no. 2 of the Lusitanian Legion, and the ‘Voluntarios Académicos’ of Coimbra.

[732] Viz. 2/5th, 2/11th, 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/42nd, 2/39th, 2/88th.

Thus even before Soult reached Plasencia, there was an army of 18,000 Portuguese and 4,500 British on the lower Tietar, ready to act as a detaining force and to retard the Marshal’s advance, if he should make a serious attempt to invade Portugal. On Aug. 15, by Wellesley’s orders, Beresford left Moraleja and transferred his whole army to Zarza, in order to be able to fall back with perfect security on Castello Branco should circumstances so require. If he had remained at Moraleja he might have been cut off from the high-road to Abrantes by a sudden movement of the enemy on Coria[733].

[733] See Wellesley to Beresford, Aug. 14.

Wellesley now felt comparatively safe, so far as matters strategical were concerned. If the enemy, contrary to his expectation, should march into Portugal, he could join Beresford at Abrantes, and stand at bay with some 24,000 British and 18,000 Portuguese regulars, a force sufficient to check the 30,000 men who was the utmost force that Soult could bring against him after Ney’s departure. Meanwhile, till the Marshal should move, he retained his old position at Mirabete and Jaraicejo. Though the French showed no signs of activity in his front, the weary fortnight during which the British army lay in position behind the Tagus were perhaps the most trying time that Wellesley spent during his first campaign in Spain. It was a period of absolute starvation for man and beast, and the army was going to pieces under his eyes. Ever since the British had arrived in front of Talavera on July 22, rations as we have already seen had been scanty and irregular. But the fourteen days spent at Deleytosa and Jaraicejo were even worse than those which had preceded them. The stores collected at Plasencia had been captured by the French: those gathered at Abrantes were so far distant that they could not be drawn upon, now that the high-road north of the Tagus had been cut by the enemy. The army had to live miserably on what it could wring out of the country-side, which Victor two months before had stripped to the very bones. Wellesley had hoped to be fed by the Spanish Government, when he threw up his line of communication with Abrantes, and took up that with Badajoz. But the Spanish Government was a broken reed on which to lean: if it fed its own armies most imperfectly, it was hardly to be expected that it would deal more liberally with its allies. The trifling stores brought from Talavera had long been exhausted: the country-side had been eaten bare: from the South very little could be procured. The Spanish Commissary-General Lozano de Torres[734] occasionally sent up a small consignment of flour from Caceres and Truxillo, but it did not suffice to give the army even half-rations. It was to no purpose that at Abrantes provisions abounded at this moment, for there was no means of getting them forward from Portugal[735]. The enemy lay between the army and its base dépôt, and there was no transport available to bring up the food by the circuitous route of Villa Velha and Portalegre. Even so early as August 8 Wellesley began to write that ‘a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. They plunder in the very presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and almost as bad as the men. With the army that a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half that strength.’ On the eleventh he wrote to warn Cuesta that unless he was provided with food of some sort he should remain no longer in his advanced position, but fall back towards Badajoz, whatever might be the consequences. ‘It is impossible,’ he stated, ‘for me to remain any longer in a country in which no arrangement has been made for the supply of provisions to the troops, and in which all the provisions that are either found in the country or are sent from Seville (as I have been informed for the use of the British army) are applied solely and exclusively to the use of the Spanish troops[736].’

[734] That this official did something, if not so much as Wellesley required, is shown by the letter to Cuesta of Aug. 11, in which it is said that ‘the British army has received no provisions since it was at Deleytosa, excepting some sent from Truxillo by Señor Lozano de Torres,’ while again on Aug. 8, Wellesley says that ‘we have had nothing since the third, save 4,000 lbs. of biscuit, and that was divided among 30,000 [say 23,000] mouths.’

[735] On Aug. 12, Wellesley writes from Jaraicejo to say that the dépôt at Abrantes is much too large, and that some of the flour ought to be sent back to Santarem, or even to Lisbon, till only 300,000 rations should be left.

[736] Wellesley to his brother Lord Wellesley, at Seville, Aug. 8.

The Junta sent Wellesley a letter of high-flown praise for his doings at Talavera, a present of horses, and a commission as Captain-General in their army. But food they did not send in any sufficient quantities. All the convoys that came up from Andalusia were made over to Cuesta’s army, and the Estremaduran districts which were supposed to be allotted for the sustenance of the British had little or nothing to give. When we remember that in June Victor had described this same region as absolutely exhausted and incapable of furnishing the 1st Corps with even five days’ supplies, we shall not wonder that Wellesley’s troops starved there in August. It was impossible however to convince the British general that the suffering of his men were the result of Spanish penury rather than of Spanish negligence and bad faith. There was much just foundation for his complaints, for the Junta, after so many promises, had sent him no train from Andalusia. Moreover detachments and marauding bands from Cuesta’s army frequently intercepted the small supplies of food which British foraging parties were able to procure[737]. When taxed with their misdoings, Cuesta replied that Wellesley’s men had not unfrequently seized and plundered his own convoys, which was undoubtedly true[738], and that the British soldiers were enjoying such abundance that he had been told that some of them were actually selling their bread-ration to the Spaniards because they had no need of it--which was most certainly false[739].

[737] See Wellesley to Cuesta from Jaraicejo, Aug. 11.

[738] Lord Munster (p. 251) confesses that ‘so pressing were our wants that one of our commissaries took from them (the Spaniards) by force a hundred bullocks and a hundred mule loads of bread.’ Cuesta needs no further justification. But it is clear that his own men were doing things precisely similar.

[739] See the above-quoted dispatch to Cuesta of Aug. 11.

That Wellesley was using no exaggerated terms, when he declared that his army was literally perishing for want of food, is proved by the narratives of a score of British officers who were present in the Talavera campaign[740]. That his ultimate retreat was caused by nothing but the necessity of saving his men is perfectly clear. The strategical advantage of maintaining the position behind the Almaraz passage was so evident, and the political disadvantages of withdrawing were so obvious, that a man of Wellesley’s keen insight into the facts of war must have desired to hold on as long as was possible. Unless Soult were actually attacking Portugal, Mirabete and Jaraicejo afforded the best ground that could be selected for ‘containing’ and imposing upon the enemy. So long as the British army lay there it was practically unassailable from the front, while it was admirably placed for the purpose of making an irruption into the midst of the enemy’s lines, if he should disperse his corps in search of food, or detach large forces towards La Mancha or Leon. ‘If I could only have fed,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘I could, after some time, have struck a brilliant blow either upon Soult at Plasencia, or upon Mortier in the centre[741]. It is clear that by a dash across the Almaraz passage he could have fallen upon either of these forces, and assailed it with good hope of success before it could be succoured by the other. But such a venture was impossible to an army which had lost one-third of its cavalry horses from starvation within three weeks, and whose battalions were brought so low by physical exhaustion that few of them could be relied upon to march ten miles in a day.

[740] See especially the remarks of Leach, George Napier, Leith-Hay, Stothert, and Cooper.

[741] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Truxillo, Aug. 21, 1809.

Wellesley declared that, having once linked his fortunes to those of the Spanish army of Estremadura, he had considered himself bound to co-operate with it as long as was humanly speaking possible, and implicit credit may be given to his assertion[742]. The limit of physical endurance, however, was reached on August 20, the day on which he was finally compelled to commence his retreat in the direction of Truxillo and Badajoz.

[742] In his dispatch to the Marquis Wellesley, from Merida, Aug. 24, he observes that he had considered himself in honour bound to continue his co-operation unless (1) Soult should invade Portugal, or (2) the Spaniards should move off towards another theatre of war, i.e. La Mancha, or (3) he should himself be starved out, as actually happened.

Before that day arrived one event occurred which seemed to make useful co-operation between the two allied armies more feasible than it had been at any date since the campaign began. On the night of August 12-13 Cuesta, whose health had been steadily growing worse since the injuries that he had received at Medellin, was disabled by a paralytic stroke which deprived him of the use of one of his legs. He resigned on the following day, and was succeeded by his second-in-command Eguia, an officer whose conciliatory manners and mild disposition promised to make communication between the head quarters of the two allied armies comparatively friendly. Cuesta, after receiving from the Central Junta a letter of recall couched in the most flattering terms, retired to the baths of Alhama. When he had somewhat recovered his strength, he turned his energies to writing a long vindication of his whole conduct in 1809, and then engaged in a furious controversy with Venegas, concerning the latter’s disobedience of orders in July. Engaged in these harmless pursuits he ceased to be a source of danger to his country. Unfortunately his removal from the theatre of war was not of such benefit to the common cause as might have been hoped. The Junta found ere long a general just as rash and incapable, if not quite so old, to whom to entrust the command of its largest army. Juan Carlos Areizaga, the vanquished of Ocaña, was entirely worthy to be the spiritual heir of Cuesta’s policy.

But for the present General Eguia was for some weeks in charge of the Army of Estremadura. His first idea was to persuade Wellesley to postpone his departure, and to retain his advanced position. He urged this request upon his colleague with more zeal than tact, and to no good effect. By using in one of his dispatches the phrase that other considerations besides the want of food must be determining the movements of the British army[743], he roused Wellesley’s wrath. The famine was so real that any insinuation that it was a mere pretext for retreat was certainly calculated to wound the general whose troops were perishing before his eyes. Expressing deep indignation[744] Wellesley refused to listen to a proposal that he should divide with the Estremadurans the stores of food at Truxillo--which indeed were hopelessly inadequate for the sustenance of two armies. Nor would he even accept an offer made him on August 20 by Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, who came in haste from the Central Junta, to the effect that he might appropriate the whole of the magazine at Truxillo, leaving the Spanish army to provide for itself from other resources. The proposal was probably honest and genuine, but Wellesley knew the dilatory habits of the Junta so well that he was convinced that the dépôt made over to him would never be properly replenished, and would soon run dry[745].

[743] Eguia’s unhappy phrase was ‘If notwithstanding this answer [to the effect that the Truxillo magazines should be placed in charge of a British commissary] your Excellency should persist in marching your troops into Portugal, I shall be convinced that other causes, and not only the want of subsistence, have induced your Excellency to decide on taking such a step.’ [From Deleytosa, Aug. 19.]

[744] ‘I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency’s letter of this day’s date, and I feel much concerned that anything should have occurred to induce your Excellency to express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. As however your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further correspondence between us appears unnecessary, and accordingly this is the last letter which I shall have the honour of addressing to you.’ Wellesley to Eguia, Aug. 19.

[745] ‘It is said that Don L. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army, upon which I have only to observe that I had already trusted too long to the promises of Spanish agents, and I had particular reason for want of confidence in Don L. de Calvo. At the moment when he was assuring me that the British army should have all the food the country could afford, I had in my possession an order from him directing the magistrates of Guadalupe to send to the Spanish head quarters provisions which a British commissary had prepared for the magazine at Truxillo.’ Oct. 30, to Marquis Wellesley.

Marching therefore by short stages, for the exhaustion of his troops made rapid progress impossible[746], he started from Jaraicejo on August 20, and moved by Truxillo and Miajadas to the valley of the Guadiana, where he cantoned the army about Merida, Montijo, and Badajoz. The British head quarters were fixed at the last-named place from September 3 till December 27, 1809, and, excepting for some small changes in detail, the army retained the position which it had now taken up for nearly four months. In the fertile region along the Guadiana the troops were fed without much trouble: but they did not recover the health that they had lost in the time of starvation among the barren hills behind Arzobispo and Mirabete. In spite of the junction of reinforcements and the return of convalescents to the ranks, the army could never show more than from 23,000 to 25,000 men under arms during the autumn months. When the rainy season began, the intermittent ague which was known to the British as ‘Guadiana fever’ was never absent: it did not often kill, but it disabled men by the thousand, and it was not till Wellesley moved back into Portugal at midwinter that the regiments recovered their normal health.

[746] ‘I have no provisions, no horses, no means of transport, I am overloaded with sick; the horses of the cavalry are scarcely able to march, or those of the artillery to draw their guns. The officers and soldiers alike are worn down by want of food and privations of every description.’ Wellesley to Marquis Wellesley, Miajadas, Aug. 22.

If he had been free to follow his personal inclination, it is probable that Wellesley would have moved back into Portugal in September. But strategical and political reasons made this impossible. While based on Badajoz he still threatened the French hold on the valley of the Tagus, and compelled the King to keep two army corps at least in his front. Since it was always possible that he might return to Almaraz and threaten Madrid, a containing force had to be told off against him. He was also in a position from which he could easily sally out to check raids upon Portugal: from Badajoz he could either join Beresford in a few marches, or fall by Alcantara upon the flank of any detachment that Soult might lead forward in the direction of Castello Branco and Abrantes. He was convinced that no such raids would be made, but their possibility had to be taken into consideration, and while lying in his present cantonments he was well placed for frustrating them. But political considerations were even more powerful than military considerations in chaining him to Badajoz. The Junta at Seville were most anxious to keep the British army in their front: they were convinced that, if it retired on Portugal, Joseph and Soult would at once organize an invasion of Andalusia, and they were well aware that Eguia and Venegas would not suffice to hold back the 70,000 men who might then be directed against them. In the dispatches which the Marquis Wellesley (who had superseded Frere at Seville on August 11) kept sending to his brother, the main fact conveyed was the absolute despair with which the Spanish Government viewed the prospect of the removal of their allies towards Portugal. ‘Don Martin de Garay [the secretary to the Junta] declared to me with expressions of the deepest sorrow and terror’--wrote the Marquis on August 22--‘that if your army should quit Spain, at this critical moment, inevitable and immediate ruin must ensue to his government, to whatever provinces remain under its authority, to the cause of Spain itself, and to every interest connected with the alliance so happily established between Great Britain and the Spanish nation.... No argument produced the effect of diminishing the urgency of his entreaties, and I have ascertained that his sensations are in no degree more powerful than those of the Government and of every description of people within this city and its vicinity.... Viewing the painful consequences that would follow your retreat into Portugal, I feel it my duty to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting some intermediate plan, which may have some of the advantages of retreat into Portugal, without occasioning alarm in Spain, and so endangering the foundations of the alliance between that country and Great Britain[747].’

[747] Lord Wellesley to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, Aug. 22.

A stay at Badajoz was obviously the only ‘intermediate plan’ that was worth taking into consideration; and considering the urgency of his brother’s representations Wellesley could not refuse to halt within the Spanish border. The military advantages of the position that he had now taken up were not inconsiderable, and no profit that could have been got by returning into Portugal could have counterbalanced the loss of the Spanish alliance. In the valley of the Central Guadiana, therefore, the British army remained cantoned. But no arguments that the Junta could produce availed to persuade Wellesley to engage in another campaign with a Spanish colleague at his side. Not even when the tempting offer was made that Albuquerque should be given command of half of the Estremaduran army, and placed under his orders, would he consent to pledge himself to offensive operations.

Meanwhile, dispatches had arrived from England, containing the official news that the Austrian War was at an end: rumours to that effect had already reached the British camps from French sources before Wellesley left Oropesa[748]. The whole character of the continental struggle was changed by the fact that the Emperor had once more the power to send reinforcements to Spain, or even to go there himself. The situation required further consideration, and the British Government resolved to place upon Wellesley’s shoulders the all-important task of deciding whether the struggle in the Peninsula could still be maintained, and how (in the event of his giving an affirmative answer) it could best be carried on[749]. He replied that in the existing state of affairs, and considering the bad state of the Spanish armies, neither 30,000 nor even 40,000 British troops would suffice to maintain Andalusia against the unlimited numbers of French whom the Emperor could now send across the Pyrenees. But he held that Portugal might be defended with success, if the Portuguese army and militia could be completed to their full strength, and the country well organized for resistance. It was probable that the borders of Portugal could not be maintained; ‘the whole country is frontier, and it would be difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating by some point or other.’ He would have therefore ‘to confine himself to preserving what is most important,--the capital.’ But this he was prepared to undertake, and strongly advised the ministry to make no attempt to defend both Andalusia and Portugal, but to leave the Junta to their own vain devices, and to make sure of Lisbon[750].

[748] The Armistice of Znaim was signed July 12. The Falmouth packet with the news reached Lisbon only on Aug. 9. Yet Wellesley had heard rumours of peace as early as Aug. 4 [_Well. Disp._ iv. 560].

[749] Canning to Lord Wellesley, London, Aug. 12: ‘The question which first arises is whether the state of things in Spain be such as that a British army of 30,000 men, acting in co-operation with the Spanish armies, could be reasonably expected either to effect the deliverance of the whole Peninsula, or to make head against the augmented force which Bonaparte may now be enabled to direct against that country. Upon this question your Excellency will receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley, to whom a copy of this dispatch is transmitted. If the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley shall be that, with so limited a force as 30,000 men, offensive operations in Spain could not prudently be attempted, and if he shall conceive that the utmost object to which such an army would be adequate is the defence of Portugal, your Excellency will then only have to state to the Spanish Government the nature of the instructions under which Sir A. Wellesley now acts.... If on the other hand Sir A. Wellesley shall entertain the opinion that with an effective British army of 30,000, combined with the Spanish and Portuguese armies, it might be possible either to expel the French from Spain, or to resist even their augmented force with a reasonable prospect of success ... your Excellency will then also receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley as to the conditions necessary to be obtained from the Spanish Government, as a preliminary to entering on any concerted system of joint military operations.’

[750] For Wellesley’s answer to Canning see his reply to his brother on Sept. 5, containing his ‘Observation on Mr. Secretary Canning’s Dispatch of Aug. 12,’ combined with the reference to his own dispatch of Aug. 24, which (as he writes to Castlereagh on Sept. 4) ‘gives the government my opinion upon all the points referred to in Mr. Canning’s dispatches.’ The quotation above comes from this last-named document of Aug. 24.

Thus, in September 1809 Wellesley enunciated with great clearness the policy that he was about to employ in the next year. The lines of Torres Vedras are already hovering before his imagination, and after a flying visit to Lisbon in October they took definite shape in his ‘Memorandum for Colonel Fletcher’ of the twentieth of that month. In that document the whole project for defending the Portuguese capital by a series of concentric fortifications is set forth, and the modifications which it afterwards suffered were only in matters of detail. In short the Lines which were to check Masséna had been thought out in the British general’s provident mind exactly twelve months before the French army appeared in front of them.

In following the fortunes of Wellesley we have now got far beyond the point to which we have conducted the general history of the Talavera campaign. It is time to turn back to the movements of Soult and King Joseph, and to explain the reasons which made it possible for the British army to remain unmolested at Jaraicejo and Mirabete till August 20, and then to retire to Merida and Badajoz without imperilling the safety of their Estremaduran allies.

The King, as we have already seen, had made up his mind that the all-important point, at this stage of the campaign, was to make an end of the army of Venegas, and to relieve Madrid from danger. He had therefore called Victor towards Toledo, and directed Mortier to relieve the divisions of the 1st Corps which lay at Talavera with troops from the 5th Corps. The result of this movement was to leave Soult too weak to undertake any important operations against Portugal. For Mortier’s men, being strung out on the long line from Talavera to Navalmoral, with both Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s armies in their front, could not be relied upon to lend aid for an advance on Castello Branco or Abrantes. The Duke of Dalmatia therefore, when he had reached Plasencia, could dispose of nothing but his own 2nd Corps and Lahoussaye’s four regiments of dragoons. He dared not march on Portugal with no more than 20,000 men, when the allies had it in their power to fall upon Mortier the moment that his back was turned. Accordingly he waited at Plasencia, sending out cavalry to Coria and Torejoncillo, but did nothing more. Meanwhile Beresford and the two British brigades from Lisbon were drawing near him, and on August 16 the Portuguese cavalry, advancing from the pass of Perales and Moraleja, drove out the two French squadrons which were occupying Coria, and thus warned Soult that a new army was coming into play against him. Two days later Beresford had transferred himself to the Castello Branco road, and a force of 23,000 men had been thrown between the 2nd Corps and the Portuguese frontier.

Meanwhile the King had met with unexpected good fortune in his attack on Venegas. On August 5 he had set out from Valdemoro with the intention of attacking the army of La Mancha in its position at Aranjuez. It seemed unlikely that he would find it there, for Venegas had displayed such excessive caution in his advance from the Sierra Morena to the Tagus, and had so tamely refused to take his opportunity of pouncing upon Madrid, that it seemed probable that he would retreat at the first sign of the King’s approach. But rushing to the opposite extreme of conduct, the Spanish general was now ready to court destruction. He had received on the preceding night, that of August 4, Cuesta’s dispatch of the third, informing him that Soult had crossed the mountains and that both the British and the Estremaduran armies were quitting Talavera. The Captain-General warned him that he might expect an attack from the King’s army, and ordered him to avoid an action, and to fall back towards the Despeña Perros if he were pressed. Serenely putting aside the orders of Cuesta, Venegas refused to retreat, and announced that he should not copy the conduct of a superior who had fled even before the enemy was in sight. He announced his intention of fighting, and directed his army to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. Of his five divisions, three were holding that town when the French came in sight; the other two were écheloned between Aranjuez and Tembleque, apparently in order to watch the roads from Toledo and Añover. The enemy might, as Venegas saw, turn his flank either by crossing the bridges of the former place, or by passing the easy ford at the latter. A detachment of 800 men had been left to watch the debouches from Toledo, and a couple of battalions observed the ford of Añover.

King Joseph meanwhile, marching with a force composed of Sebastiani’s corps, the Central Reserve, and Milhaud’s division of dragoons, arrived in front of Aranjuez on August 5. Sebastiani, whose troops led the advance, drove in the Spanish outposts, who retired across the Tagus and broke the town bridge behind them. But beyond the river the greater part of the army of La Mancha was visible in battle order, prepared to receive the attack: Venegas himself, however, chanced to be absent at the moment, as he had ridden over that morning to visit his left wing, and General Giron was in temporary charge of the defence. Sebastiani risked an attack on the Spanish position, which was accessible by means of two fords. But finding that the enemy was in great force and stood firm, he drew off his men after a sharp skirmish.

King Joseph now determined not to press the attack on Aranjuez and its fords, but to cross the Tagus at points where he could secure a less difficult passage. He countermarched Sebastiani’s corps to the bridge of Toledo, and gave Milhaud orders to force the ford of Añover. This manœuvre cost him three days; it was only on the evening of August 8 that he succeeded in concentrating his main body at Toledo. On the following morning Sebastiani passed the bridges and drove off the Spanish detachment that was observing them: it fell back on a larger force, and the 4th Corps pressing its advance, came into contact with a whole hostile division.

Venegas had not failed to guess the plan which the King would adopt, and had moved off from Aranjuez towards Toledo, by roads parallel to those which the French had employed. His 5th division, 4,000 bayonets, under Major-General Zerain, was in front, and thus was the first to meet Sebastiani’s attack. It was driven in after a sharp skirmish, and retired a few miles to the small town of Almonacid, on the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. On the same evening Milhaud’s dragoons assailed the ford of Añover, drove off the small force that was guarding it, and fell into line on Sebastiani’s left flank. On the next morning Venegas came up with his remaining four divisions, those of Lacy, Vigodet, Giron, and Castejon, and joined Zerain at Almonacid. Thus both sides were concentrated for battle, save that Joseph and his reserves, owing to the delay caused by a defile over the narrow bridge of Toledo, were some ten miles to the rear of Sebastiani. The Spanish army, after the deduction of men in hospital or detached, amounted to about 23,000 men, of whom nearly 3,000 were horse: it had forty guns. The King and Sebastiani had some 21,000 sabres and bayonets, but of these nearly 4,000 were cavalry, so that the French army enjoyed its usual preponderance in that arm, in numbers no less than in efficiency. Two of its infantry divisions, those of Leval and Sebastiani, had suffered heavily at Talavera: the rest of the infantry--Valence’s Poles and the King’s guards and reserves--had not been engaged in that battle; all the cavalry was equally intact[751].

[751] The French force at Almonacid stood as follows:--4th Corps; Sebastiani’s division 6,000 men, Valence’s 4,000, Leval’s 3,000, and corps-cavalry (Merlin) 1,000. Milhaud’s dragoons had 2,200 men present; the King had brought up 600 horse and about 4,800 foot of his guards and of Dessolles’ division. The total therefore was about 3,800 cavalry and 17,800 foot.

Both armies were prepared to fight: King Joseph had resolved that Madrid would never be safe till the army of La Mancha had been beaten. Venegas was eager to meet him: he had persuaded himself that the French troops which had passed the bridge of Toledo did not amount to more than 14,000 men, and hoped for an easy victory. He held a council of war on the night of the tenth, and found his subordinates as ready to fight as himself. They determined to attack Sebastiani on the dawn of August 12, and the Commander-in-chief exclaimed with exultation that, whatever other Spanish officers might do, he at least would never earn the nickname of _El General Retiradas_[752].

[752] This remark I find in the narrative of General Bouligni, the commanding officer of engineers in the Army of La Mancha [Arteche, vi. 370]. Venegas was aiming his sneer at Castaños and at La Romana, who had got the nickname of ‘Marquis de la Romeria’ from his perpetual strategical movements to the rear.

The French, however, anticipated Venegas, for on the morning of August 11, at half-past five o’clock, Sebastiani presented himself in front of the Spanish position and opened a furious attack, without waiting for the arrival of King Joseph and the reserve. The army of La Mancha had therefore to fight a defensive engagement, and never got the chance of carrying out the ambitious designs of its chief.

The battle-field of Almonacid bears a strong resemblance to that of Ucles, where Venegas six months before had made such a deplorable début in the character of a ‘fighting general.’ As at Ucles, the Spanish army was arrayed on a series of eminences on each side of a small town, with a long array of infantry and guns in its centre, and the cavalry on the wings. As if to emphasize the resemblance, Venegas committed his old fault of keeping no adequate reserve in hand, and distributed his whole force in one thin line, with no more than four battalions and two cavalry regiments drawn up in support to the rear of the centre! The only points in which there was a marked difference between Ucles and Almonacid was that on the latter field the eminence on the Spanish left--a hill called Los Cerrojones--was so much higher than the rest of the ground that it formed the key of the position, just as the Cerro de Medellin had done at Talavera. Moreover, there was a long hill behind Almonacid--the Cerro del Castillo--which gave an admirable rallying-point for the army if it should be forced out of its first fighting-ground.

The main line of the Spanish order of battle was formed, counting from right to left, by the divisions of Vigodet (no. 2), Castejon (no. 4), Zerain (no. 5), and Lacy (no. 1), with a brigade of the division of Giron (no. 3) continuing the array on to the Cerrojones. The second brigade of Giron formed the sole reserve; it was drawn up on the Cerro del Castillo, where the ruins of the mediaeval fort that gave the hill its name were turned to account as a place of strength. It had two cavalry regiments in its rear: the rest of the troops of that arm were distributed between the two flanks.

When Sebastiani came upon the field he fell upon the Spanish line without a moment’s hesitation. Apparently he thought that delay would only give the enemy time to rearrange his troops and strengthen his weak points. At any rate he did not wait for the arrival of the King and the reserve, but attacked at once. It was the same fault that Victor had committed at Talavera, but Sebastiani was not destined to receive the condign punishment that befell the Duke of Belluno. Noting that the steep hill on the Spanish left was the key of the position, he resolved to storm it before attacking the rest of the hostile line. Accordingly he threw out Milhaud’s dragoons and his own French division to ‘contain’ the Spanish centre and right, while Leval’s Germans and Valence’s Poles were directed to assail the Cerrojones. The former division turned the flank of the hill, while the latter attacked it in front.

The Spanish brigade on the hill made a stubborn resistance, and even held back the Poles till its flank was turned by the Germans. Venegas sent to its aid his miserably inadequate reserve under Giron, and some battalions drawn from the first division. But these troops came too late, the Cerrojones were lost, and the reinforcements only succeeded in checking the French advance behind the hill, on the slopes between it and Almonacid. The key of the position was thus in Sebastiani’s hands, and, seeing the Spanish centre outflanked, he let loose upon it his French division, which drove in Lacy and Zerain, and captured the town of Almonacid and three guns. Venegas was thus forced to draw back his whole line, and re-formed it on the Cerro del Castillo, which lay behind his original position. The troops were much disordered by this retrograde movement, yet made a very creditable effort to maintain their new ground. But King Joseph and the reserve had now come on the field, and Dessolles’ troops were thrown into the front line to aid the infantry of the 4th Corps. After a stubborn fight the Spanish left and centre again broke, and Venegas was only able to save them from complete destruction by bringing up Vigodet’s division, which was almost intact, and throwing it in the way of the advancing enemy. It held out long enough to allow the main body to escape, and then followed its comrades in retreat down the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. The French cavalry was let loose in pursuit, but does not seem to have been so successful in its work as had been the case at Ucles and Medellin. At any rate the bulk of the Spaniards escaped in more or less order, and only the stragglers were cut up.

The losses of Venegas’s army would appear to have been about 800 killed and 2,500 wounded[753], besides a considerable number of prisoners--perhaps 2,000 in all, for Sebastiani’s dispatch giving the figure of 4,000 cannot be trusted. The army of La Mancha had also lost twenty-one of its forty guns, all its baggage and several standards. Still the defeat was far less crushing than Medellin had been, and the whole army was rallied at the passes with no great difficulty. It had fought very creditably, as is sufficiently vouched for by the fact that Sebastiani acknowledged a loss of 319 killed and 2,075 wounded. The Polish division in especial had suffered very severely while storming the Cerrojones at the opening of the combat.

[753] But see General Arteche’s calculation in vi. 392 of his _Guerra de la Independencia_.

Thus ended the part taken by the Army of La Mancha in the Talavera campaign. No words are too strong to use in condemnation of Venegas’s conduct. After wrecking the plan of campaign drawn up by Wellesley and Cuesta by his criminal slackness and timidity in July, he then proceeded to the extreme of culpable rashness. He had ample time to retire to the South, when his position was compromised by the departure of the British and Estremaduran armies from Talavera. Instead of doing so he remained behind, and courted an unnecessary battle, in which his unskilful dispositions secured the defeat of an army which tried to do its duty and defended itself far better than could have been expected. He should have been court-martialled and shot for his repeated and impudent disobedience of Cuesta’s orders. But the Junta, conscious that they were themselves to blame for giving him secret directions which clashed with those of the Commander-in-chief, spared him, and only removed him from command some weeks later, in order to replace him by Areizaga, an officer of exactly the same level of merit and intelligence.

After his--or rather Sebastiani’s--victory at Almonacid King Joseph established the 4th Corps in cantonments around Toledo and Aranjuez, and sent Victor and the 1st Corps into La Mancha to observe the passes and to contain the wrecks of Venegas’s army. He returned himself with his guards and the reserve to Madrid on August 15, celebrated a _Te Deum_, and published an extravagant account of his own achievements, in which he claimed to have discomfited the attempt of 120,000 enemies (there were but 80,000 at the most liberal estimate) with the aid of 40,000 invincible French troops. The co-operation of Soult’s 50,000 men was consigned to oblivion in this extraordinary document.

The moment that he heard of the defeat of Venegas, Soult wrote to the King, renewing the demand which he had made ten days before for permission to invade Portugal. Now that the army of La Mancha had been disposed of, he considered that Victor might come back to Talavera and Almaraz, so as to set free Mortier and the 5th Corps for the attack on Portugal. He also suggested that Ney, having put things right at Salamanca, might now be recalled to the valley of the Tagus, and rejoin the 2nd and 5th Corps. He supported his demands by an unfounded assertion that Wellesley was on his march to unite with Beresford by way of Alcantara, and asked for leave to attack the latter before the main British army should have joined him. In a few days more, he said, it would be too late to move, for Beresford and Wellesley would have concentrated their forces, so that he would have 45,000 Anglo-Portuguese in his front[754].

[754] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 18, from Plasencia.

Joseph refused to listen to these arguments, and had fair reasons to show for his negative reply to the Marshal’s requests. Wellesley, as he truly remarked, was not marching for Alcantara to join Beresford: he was still at Jaraicejo in close touch with the Estremaduran army. If Mortier were removed to the Portuguese border, Wellesley and Eguia might descend upon Victor and crush him. It was impossible to leave less than two corps to defend the Middle Tagus. As for Ney, he could not quit Leon, for Del Parque and the Galicians were concentrating in great force upon his front. Indeed, he had just written to request that the 2nd Corps might be moved up to Salamanca to support him[755]. It was not now the time to engage in further offensive operations either against Portugal or against Andalusia. The troops were exhausted; the hospital of Madrid contained at the moment 12,000 sick and wounded, the cavalry was so distressed by incessant work that few regiments could put 250 men in line. The transport was worn out, and new horses and mules were impossible to procure, for the King had no money with which to purchase them. Finally, and this was the most conclusive point of all, orders had been received from the Emperor countermanding all active operations till the hot season should be over[756]. It was impossible to say what his intentions might be, now that he was freed from the Austrian War. He might come himself to Spain, or he might send large reinforcements to the King. In any case it would be impossible to move till his will was known and his mind made up[757].

[755] Ney to Jourdan, from Salamanca, Aug. 22.

[756] See Joseph to Clarke, Aug. 22, and Napoleon to Clarke, Sept. 7.

[757] For a presentment of Joseph’s case see Chapter xii. of Jourdan’s _Mémoires_.

These arguments were conclusive, and Soult was forced to remain quiescent: all that he could do was to push small parties to Zarza and Coria when Beresford had evacuated those places.

Thus the Talavera campaign came to an end. There was now a long pause in the movements both of the allies and of the French. The subsequent fighting in October belongs to a totally independent series of operations. The combatants who had been engaged in July and August rested in September: Soult was left at Plasencia, Mortier at Talavera and Navalmoral, Ney at Salamanca; Victor’s head quarters were at Daymiel in La Mancha, Sebastiani lay along the Tagus from Aranjuez to Toledo. Of the allied troops Wellesley’s army was cantoned about Badajoz and Merida. The Estremadurans under Eguia covered the passages of the Tagus from Deleytosa, Jaraicejo, and Truxillo: Venegas was reorganizing his depleted corps at his old quarters in the passes by La Carolina. Beresford was observing Soult from Castello Branco, and lastly, the Galicians were moving down by divisions to join Del Parque’s forces at Ciudad Rodrigo, where a formidable army was now beginning to be collected.

The Talavera campaign, in short, had settled nothing. The attempt of the allies to capture Madrid had failed, but the attempt of the French to surround Wellesley and Cuesta by Soult’s flank march had failed also. Looking to the net results of all the fighting since May, it could be said that the balance of loss stood against the French. They had abandoned Galicia and the Asturias, as well as their precarious hold on Northern Portugal. They had gained nothing, save that their forces were concentrated in a good central position, instead of being scattered from Corunna and Oporto as far as Merida and Manzanares. The next move was in the hands of the Emperor: it remained to be seen how he would deal with the situation in the Peninsula, now that he, at last, had time to study it in detail.

Before passing on to the new series of operations which took place in the late autumn, one minor side-issue of the Talavera campaign remains to be narrated--the fate of the small roving column of 4,000 Spaniards and Portuguese under Sir Robert Wilson, which had been threatening Madrid in the King’s absence, and which had caused so many misgivings in the mind of Marshal Victor. Wilson’s doings were to give one more proof of his extraordinary resourcefulness and vigour, if any further evidence were needed after his masterly handling of Lapisse in the spring. It will be remembered that on August 4 he had slipped away from Escalona, on hearing from Wellesley that Soult had descended upon Plasencia. He intended to join the main army at Talavera, but on nearing that place discovered that it had already been evacuated, and that both the British and the Estremaduran armies had disappeared in the direction of Oropesa. Accordingly he directed his steps to the westward, hoping to overtake Wellesley on his march. On his way, however, he was caught up by Villatte’s division of Victor’s corps, which had been vainly hunting for him at Nombella and Escalona since the fifth. Thrown out of his path by this force, Wilson turned up into the mountains, intending to escape by the northern bank of the Tietar. He soon learnt, however, from the peasantry that Soult had sent a brigade under Foy to look for him in the Vera of Plasencia, and that Hugo, the governor of Avila, had come down to hold against him the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran. Thus ringed around with foes, he did not lose his nerve, but turning up into the Sierra de Gredos, by a mule-path that leads from Aldea Nueva to the upper valley of the Alagon, escaped in the direction of Bejar. From thence he intended to strike across towards Portugal. But a new enemy now came upon him: he had evaded Villatte and Foy only to run into the arms of Ney, who on this day [August 12] was preparing to cross the Puerto de Baños on his way to Salamanca. There was still time to escape from the Marshal’s front and to retire to Ciudad Rodrigo unmolested. But Wilson saw the rocky defile of the Puerto in front of him, and could not resist the temptation of holding it against the enemy, though he was well aware that with a force of less than 4,000 men, destitute of artillery, he could not seriously hope to repulse a whole army corps. Nevertheless he offered battle in the pass, and fought a running fight for nine hours against Ney’s vanguard, defending three successive positions, from each of which he had to be expelled. In his last stand he held on too long, and allowed the enemy to close. His four battalions were all broken, and fled over the hills to Miranda de Castañar, where they rallied on the next day. The Marshal acknowledged in his dispatch to King Joseph a loss of five officers and thirty men killed, and ten officers and 140 men wounded, which shows that he had been forced to fight hard to clear the pass. He claimed to have ‘destroyed’ Wilson’s detachment, and declared that 1,200 Spaniards and Portuguese had fallen. But Wilson’s returns show that his total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, was under 400, among whom there was not a single field officer or captain. Having assuaged his thirst for a fight by this gallant, if unnecessary, engagement, Wilson escaped to the Pass of Perales, and finally reached Castello Branco on August 24, where he fell in with Beresford, and was at last in safety, after his many wanderings among the summits of the Sierra de Gredos and the Sierra de Gata. This hazardous march was his last achievement in the Peninsula; after a bitter quarrel with Beresford concerning the status of his Lusitanian Legion in the Portuguese army, he sailed for England in October, and never returned to Portugal.

APPENDICES

I

THE ‘ARMY OF THE CENTRE,’ JAN. 11, 1809

THE SPANISH ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF UCLES

[N.B.--From the Tables in Arteche, vol. v.]

The Battalions which fought at Ucles are indicated by a star *.

Vanguard Division, Major-General Duke of Albuquerque: Corona (1st and 3rd batts.) 415, *Murcia 652, *Cantabria (1st batt.) 315, *Provincial of Jaen 342, *Provincial of Chinchilla 354, *Voluntarios Catalanes 499, *Cazadores de Barbastro 221, *Campomayor 465, Tiradores de Castilla 666 = 3,929

1st Division, Lieut.-General Marquis de Coupigny: Reyna (1st and 3rd batts.) 494, *Africa (1st and 3rd batts.) 771, *Burgos (1st and 3rd batts.) 519, 1st of Seville 193, *3rd of Seville 106, Provincial of Granada 176, Provincial of Bujalance 101, *Provincial of Cuenca 626, Provincial of Ciudad Real 268, Provincial of Plasencia 180, Voluntarios de Valencia 327, *Navas de Tolosa 542, *Tiradores de Cadiz 818 = 5,121

2nd Division, Major-General Conde de Orgaz: *Ordenes Militares (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 848, *4th of Seville 224, 5th of Seville 304, 1st Voluntarios de Madrid 688, Provincial de Leon 484, Provincial de Logroño 265, *Provincial de Toro 265, Provincial de Valladolid 378, *Baylen 472, Tiradores de España 407, *Voluntarios de Carmona 456, Voluntarios de Ledesma 497 = 5,288

Reserve, Lieut.-General La Peña: Spanish Guards (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,217, *Walloon Guards (1st batt.) 425, *Granaderos Provinciales de Andalucia 522, *Irlanda (1st batt.) 377, Granaderos del General 324, Provincial de Cordova 622, Provincial de Guadix 391, Provincial de Lorca 417 = 4,295

CAVALRY.

*Reyna 276, *Principe 141, *Borbon 119, *España 342, *Santiago 74, *Tejas 131, *Pavia 428, *Lusitania 158, *Dragones de Castilla 125, Farnesio ?, Montesa ?, Calatrava ?, Sagunto ?, Alcantara ? = 1,814

Estimating the 5 regiments without returns at 1,000 sabres, we get 2,814 in all.

ARTILLERY 386.

*SAPPERS 383.

Total of the Army, 21,216.

Of these the following, with a strength of 11,500 men, were present at Ucles,

Of the Vanguard 2,848 ” 1st Division 2,804 ” 2nd ” 1,917 ” Reserve 1,634 ” Cavalry 1,814 ” Sappers 383 ” Artillery 100 ------ Total 11,500

There is a discrepancy between this total and the numbers borne in the battalions above. It is caused by the fact that Irlanda, Ordenes Militares, and Tiradores de Cadiz were not complete on the battle-morning, but had companies detached.

II

THE GARRISON OF SARAGOSSA

[From the return of Jan. 1, 1809, given by Ibieca, corrected by reference to Arteche iv. 550-1, and the Conde de Clonard, ii. 284-93.]

INFANTRY.

1st DIVISION, Brigadier-General F. BUTRON:

_Present _Gross under Total._ arms._ Walloon Guards 530 450 Estremadura 610 390 Granaderos de Palafox 1,005 752 Fusileros del Reyno 1,571 1,291 Don Carlos 1,014 534 Batallon del Carmen 771 661 Batallon del Portillo 834 594 Batallon de Torrero 720 485 Batallon de Calatayud 967 881 1st Ligero de Zaragoza 680 566 2nd Ligero de Zaragoza 666 546 1st Cazadores Catalanes 625 465 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon 1,200 1,060 ------ ----- Divisional Total 11,193 8,675

2nd Division, Brigadier-General D. FIBALLER:

Spanish Guards 898 676 2nd of Valencia 954 726 1st Volunteers of Aragon 1,183 970 Cazadores de Fernando VII (Aragonese) 545 345 ----- ----- Divisional Total 3,580 2,717

3rd Division, Brigadier-General JOSÉ MANSO:

Peñas de San Pedro 594 241 1st of Huesca 1,274 973 Florida Blanca 352 229 1st Tiradores de Murcia 750 343 1st of Murcia 1,272 631 2nd of Murcia 1,159 477 3rd of Murcia 1,098 438 Suizos de Aragon 496 361 ----- ----- Divisional Total 6,995 3,693

4th Division, Major-General F. ST. MARCH:

Voluntarios de Borbon 436 317 Voluntarios de Castilla 542 292 Voluntarios de Chelva 789 529 Voluntarios de Turia 903 483 Cazadores de Fernando VII (Valencians) 304 190 Segorbe 412 313 Soria [Militia] 172 130 1st of Alicante 730 309 5th of Murcia 1,040 423 2nd Tiradores de Murcia 131 91 ----- ----- Divisional Total 5,459 3,077

ROCA’S DIVISION of the ‘Army of the Centre’:

1st of Savoia 347 105 Orihuela 731 315 1st Cazadores de Valencia 505 275 Murcia [Militia] 633 426 America ? 148 Avila [Militia] ? 277 ----- ----- Total 2,216 1,546

Details from Regiments of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions of the ‘Army of the Centre’: viz.:--

Carmona, Guadix [Militia], Voluntarios de Madrid, Ordenes Militares, Toro (Militia) Africa, Burgos [Militia] Navas de Tolosa, Baylen, 5th of Seville, Campomayor, Cadiz, Cuenca, Tiradores de Cartagena, 1st of Valencia--all small fragments of regiments which had fought at Tudela in the left wing, but had taken refuge in Saragossa: the numbers vary from 200 to ten men Total, perhaps 1,200

CAVALRY.

Rey, Numancia, Fuensanta, Husares de Palafox, Cazadores de Fernando VII, Husares de Aragon. With fragments of the following regiments of the ‘Army of the Centre’: Borbon, Lusitania, Olivenza, Pavia, Reyna, Santiago, Tejas Gross Total sabres, about 2,000

ARTILLERY about 1,800

ENGINEERS.

Zapadores de Aragon, ditto de Valencia, ditto de Calatayud 800

TOTALS.

_Effectives _Gross._ Present._ Infantry of the four Aragonese Divisions 27,227 18,162 Cavalry 2,000 1,600 Artillery 1,800 1,600 Engineers 800 700 Details of the Army of the Centre 4,191 2,746 ------ ------ 36,018 24,808

All these are regularly organized corps. It is impossible to state the figures of the irregulars with any certainty.

N.B.--Ibieca errs in including Doyle, La Reunion, Fieles Zaragozanos and 3rd of Valencia in the Garrison, they were detached in Aragon, the first at Jaca, the two next with the Marquis of Lazan. See the tables on pp. 284-293 of vol. vi. of the Conde de Clonard’s great work.

III

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN,

FEBRUARY 1, 1809

N.B.--This return includes effective men, _présents sous les armes_, only, not sick or detached.

1st Corps, Marshal VICTOR:

1st Division, Ruffin [9th Léger, 24th and 96th Line (three batts. each)] 5,429 2nd Division, Lapisse [16th Léger, 8th, 45th, and 54th Line (three batts. each)] 7,692 3rd Division, Villatte [27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, and 95th Line (three batts. each)] 6,376 Corps-Cavalry, Beaumont [2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs] 1,386 Westphalian Chevaux-Légers 487 Artillery [with 48 guns] 1,523 État Major 33 ------ Total 22,926

2nd Corps, Marshal SOULT:

1st Division, Merle [2nd and 4th Léger, 15th (four batts. each) and 36th Line (three batts.)] 6,498 2nd Division, Mermet [31st Léger (four batts.), 47th Line (four batts.), 122nd (four batts.), 2nd, 3rd, 4th Swiss (one batt. each)] 5,459 3rd Division, Delaborde [17th, 70th, 86th Line (three batts. each)] 4,954 4th Division, Heudelet [26th Line (two batts.), 66th Line (two batts.), 15th Léger (one batt.), 32nd Léger (one batt.), 82nd Line (one batt.), _Légion du Midi_ (one batt.), Hanoverian Legion (one batt.), _Garde de Paris_ (one batt.)] 3,158 Corps-Cavalry, Franceschi [1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd Chasseurs, Hanoverian Chevaux-Légers] 1,340 Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 54 guns État Major 43 ------ Total 21,452

N.B.--Lahoussaye’s Dragoons, and one brigade of Lorges’ Dragoons, were also present with the corps, with a strength of 2,000 sabres.

3rd Corps, General JUNOT:

1st Division, Grandjean [14th Line (three batts.), 44th Line (three batts.), 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula (two batts. each)] 5,866 2nd Division, Musnier [114th and 115th Line (three batts. each), 1st of the Vistula (two batts.), 2nd Legion of Reserve] 3,544 3rd Division, Morlot [5th Léger (one batt.), 116th and 117th Line (four batts. each), 121st Line (four batts.)] 2,637 Corps-Cavalry, Wathier [13th Cuirassiers, 4th Hussars, Polish Lancers, Provisional regiments] 1,652 Engineers and Sappers (for siege of Saragossa) 2,336 Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 40 guns État Major 36 ------ Total 16,071

4th Corps, General SEBASTIANI:

1st Division, Sebastiani [28th, 32nd, 58th, 75th Line (three batts. each)] 5,660 2nd Division, Leval [Holland, Nassau, Baden, Hesse (two batts. each), Frankfort (one batt.)] 3,127 3rd Division, Valence [4th, 7th, 9th Polish (two batts. each)] 3,915 Corps-Cavalry [5th Dragoons, 3rd Dutch Hussars, Polish Lancers] 1,781 Artillery (with 30 guns) 894 État Major 22 ------ Total 15,399

5th Corps, Marshal MORTIER:

1st Division, Suchet [17th Léger, 40th, 64th, 88th Line (three batts. each), 34th Line (four batts.)] 8,477 2nd Division, Gazan [21st, 28th, 100th, 103rd Line (three batts. each)] 7,110 Corps-Cavalry, Delaage [10th Hussars, 21st Chasseurs] 926 Artillery (with 30 guns) 1,420 État Major 26 ------ Total 17,959

6th Corps, Marshal NEY:

1st Division, Marchand [6th, 39th, 69th, 76th Line (three batts. each)] 6,853 2nd Division, Maurice Mathieu [25th Léger, 27th, 50th, 59th (three batts. each)] 6,917 Corps-Cavalry, Lorcet [3rd Hussars, 15th Chasseurs] 840 Artillery (with 30 guns) 1,534 État Major 32 ------ Total 16,176

N.B.--One brigade of Lorges’ Dragoons was also present with the corps.

7th Corps, General GOUVION ST. CYR:

1st Division, Souham [1st Léger (three batts.), 3rd Léger (one batt.), 7th Line (two batts.), 42nd Line (three batts.), 67th Line (one batt.)] 6,220 2nd Division, Chabran [2nd, 10th, 37th, 56th, 93rd Line, and 2nd Swiss (one batt. each)] 4,037 3rd Division, Chabot [Chasseurs des Montagnes (one batt.), 2nd Neapolitans (two batts.)] 1,633 4th Division, Reille [2nd Line (one batt.), 32nd Léger (one batt.), 113th Line (two batts.), 16th and 56th Line (one batt. each), Valais (one batt.)] 3,980 5th Division, Pino [Italian 1st and 2nd Léger, 4th and 6th Line (three batts. each), 7th Line (one batt.)] 8,008 6th Division, Lecchi [Italian 2nd, 4th, 5th Line, Velites (one batt. each), 1st Neapolitans (two batts.)] 3,941 German Division, Morio [2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 1st Light of Westphalia] 5,321 Cavalry, French [24th Dragoons, 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers, 3rd ditto Chasseurs] 1,730 Cavalry, Italian [Dragoons of Napoleon, Royal Chasseurs, Chasseurs of the Prince Royal, Neapolitan Chasseurs] 1,862 Artillery, French 2,050 Artillery, Italian 585 Artillery, German 48 ------ Total 39,415

RESERVE CAVALRY.

1st Division of Dragoons, Latour-Maubourg: 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 26th Dragoons 2,527 2nd Division of Dragoons, Milhaud: 12th, 16th, 20th, 21st Dragoons 2,125 3rd Division of Dragoons, Lahoussaye: 17th, 18th, 19th, 27th Dragoons 1,335 4th Division of Dragoons, Lorges: 13th, 15th, 22nd, 25th Dragoons 1,228 5th Division of Dragoons, Millet: 3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th Dragoons 1,470 Light-Cavalry Division of Lasalle: 10th, 26th Chasseurs, 8th Dragoons 1,495 Artillery, batteries attached to the Cavalry Divisions: 712 ------ Total 10,892

RESERVE AT MADRID:

Division Dessolles [12th Léger, 43rd, 51st, 55th Line (each three batts.), 8,507; Royal Guards, 2,200; 27th Chasseurs, 500] 11,207

GARRISONS OF THE NORTH (Marshal BESSIÈRES):

In Biscay, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Santander, Old Castile, and Leon 19,902

GRAND PARK OF ARTILLERY 2,579

GRAND TOTAL OF ‘_Présents sous les armes_,’ 193,978.

At the same time there were Sick 56,404, Detached 36,326, Prisoners 1,843.

GROSS TOTAL of the whole army in Spain, 288,551.

IV

THE SPANISH ARMY AT MEDELLIN

Cuesta’s army at Medellin was composed of the following regiments. It is, unfortunately, impossible to say how they were brigaded at the moment, as the only return available is that of April 4, when the original distribution of the army had been broken up, and the Andalusian division distributed among the other four. The Estremaduran battalions were very strong, some few of them ranging up to 1,100 and even 1,400 bayonets, though others had but 500 or 700.

(1) Troops of Belvedere’s old army of Estremadura:

*Spanish Guards (4th batt.); *Walloon Guards (4th batt.); *2nd of Majorca; *2nd Light of Catalonia; †Provincial of Badajoz; †Provincial Grenadiers; ‡Badajoz (two batts.); ‡Zafra; ‡Truxillo; ‡Merida; ‡Plasencia; ‡La Serena; ‡Leales de Ferdinando VII (two batts.)

Total. Fifteen batts.

(2) Troops of San Juan’s old ‘Army of Reserve of Madrid’:

Walloon Guards (2nd batt.); *Jaen (two batts.); *Irlanda (two batts.); †Provincial of Toledo; †Provincial of Burgos; ‡2nd Volunteers of Madrid; ‡3rd of Seville

Total. Nine batts.

(3) Troops under Albuquerque, from the Army of the Centre:

*Campomayor; †Provincial of Guadix; †Provincial of Cordova; ‡Osuna (two batts.); ‡Granaderos del General; ‡Tiradores de Cadiz

Total. Seven batts.

N.B.--Of these troops, Plasencia, Zafra, Truxillo, and the ‘Leales de Ferdinando VII’ (two batts.) were in garrison at Badajoz and not present in the field.

The probable strength of the infantry engaged at Medellin was about 20,000 bayonets.

CAVALRY.

(1) Old troops of the Army of Estremadura:

*4th Hussars (‘Volunteers of Spain’); *1st Hussars of Estremadura [late Maria Luisa].

(2) Old troops of La Romana’s army, from Denmark:

*Rey; *Infante; *Almanza.

(3) New Levies:

‡Cazadores de Llerena; ‡Imperial de Toledo.

There was also present one regiment from Andalusia, which had joined with Albuquerque, apparently *Reyna.

Eight regiments in all, with an odd squadron of Carabineros Reales in addition. Effectives very low. Total about 3,000 or 3,200 sabres. Several regiments had a squadron detached in Andalusia, in search of remounts.

ARTILLERY.

Thirty guns, about 650 men; Sappers, two companies, about 200 men. Total, about 24,000 men.

V

ORGANIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY IN 1809

The numbers are from the first complete return available, that of Sept. 15 in the Record Office.

INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

N.B.--Each regiment consisted of two battalions of seven companies each, which should have numbered 770 officers and men, the regiment totalling 1,550, with staff.

_Strength._ 1st Regt. (1st of Lisbon or La Lippe) 1,330 2nd Regt. (Lagos or Algarve) 1,301 3rd Regt. (1st of Olivenza[758]) 679 4th Regt. (Freire) 1,477 5th Regt. (1st of Elvas) 759 6th Regt. (1st of Oporto) 1,082 7th Regt. (Setubal) 1,312 8th Regt. (Evora) 369 9th Regt. (Viana) 1,511 10th Regt. (2nd of Lisbon) 1,370 11th Regt. (1st of Almeida) 1,498 12th Regt. (Chaves) 1,491 13th Regt. (Peniche) 1,361 14th Regt. (Tavira) 1,239 15th Regt. (2nd of Olivenza[758]) 577 16th Regt. (Viera Telles) 696 17th Regt. (2nd of Elvas) 1,218 18th Regt. (2nd of Oporto) 1,371 19th Regt. (Cascaes) 1,519 20th Regt. (Campomayor) 1,218 21st Regt. (Valenza) 193 22nd Regt. (Serpa) 1,479 23rd Regt. (2nd of Almeida) 1,521 24th Regt. (Braganza) 505 ------ Total 27,076

[758] Though named from Olivenza these regiments were actually raised in Northern Beira, with head quarters at Lamego, Olivenza having been ceded to Spain in 1801 at the treaty of Badajoz.

CAZADORES.

N.B.--These were single-battalion corps with a proper effective of 770 men.

_Strength._ 1st (Castello de Vide) 620 2nd (Moura) 425 3rd (Villa Real) 607 4th (Vizeu) 619 5th (Campomayor) 321 6th (Oporto) 560 ----- Total 3,152

The 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores were formed later, out of the three battalions of the Lusitanian Legion. The 10th, 11th, and 12th were raised in the year 1811.

The brigading of the Portuguese regular infantry was practically permanent, very few changes having been made after 1810, when the greater part of the regiments were attached in pairs to the British divisions. The arrangement was as follows, 1811-14:--

1st Brigade 1st (Lisbon) and 16th (Viera Telles) [attached to 1st Division]. 2nd ” 2nd (Lagos) and 14th (Tavira). 3rd ” 3rd (1st of Olivenza) and 15th (2nd of Olivenza) [attached to 5th Division]. 4th ” 4th (Freire) and 10th (2nd of Lisbon) [attached to 2nd Division]. 5th ” 5th (1st of Elvas) and 17th (2nd of Elvas). 6th ” 6th (Oporto) and 18th (2nd of Oporto). 7th ” 7th (Setubal) and 19th (Cascaes) [attached to 7th Division]. 8th ” 8th (Evora) and 12th (Chaves) [attached to 6th Division]. 9th ” 9th (Viana) and 21st (Valenza) [attached to 3rd Division]. 10th ” 11th (1st of Almeida) and 23rd (2nd of Almeida) [attached to 4th Division]. 11th ” 13th (Peniche) and 24th (Braganza). The 20th (Campomayor) and 22nd (Serpa) were never brigaded. The 1st and 3rd Cazadores were attached to the Light Division. The 2nd was attached to the 7th Portuguese Brigade, in the 7th Division. The 4th was attached to the 1st Portuguese Brigade, in the 1st Division. The 6th was attached to the 6th Portuguese Brigade.

CAVALRY.

N.B.--Each regiment should have had 594 men, in four strong squadrons.

_Strength._ 1st (Alcantara Dragoons) 559 2nd (Moura) 400 3rd (Olivenza) 394 4th (Duke of Mecklenburg, Lisbon) 559 5th (Evora) 581 6th (Braganza) 578 7th (Lisbon) 564 8th (Elvas) 287 9th (Chaves) 572 10th (Santarem) 475 11th (Almeida) 482 12th (Miranda) 589 ----- Total 6,040

ARTILLERY.

Four regiments with head quarters respectively at (1) Lisbon, (2) Faro in Algarve, (3) Estremoz in Alemtejo, (4) Oporto. The total strength was 4,472 officers and men.

There were also a few garrison companies, largely composed of invalids, which were mainly stationed in the forts round Lisbon. Their force is not given in Beresford’s _General State_ of the Regular Army.

THE LUSITANIAN LEGION.

This abnormal force, under Sir Robert Wilson, comprehended in 1809-10 three battalions of infantry, with an establishment of ten companies and 1,000 men each, one regiment of cavalry of three squadrons, which never seems to have been complete, and one battery of field artillery. Its total force was about 3,500 men. In 1811 the three battalions were taken into the regular army as the 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores.

ENGINEERS.

There were a few officers of the old army, who were engaged in raising new companies of sappers, which were not yet ready when Beresford’s report was drawn up. No figures are there given.

It would appear then that the total Regular force of Portugal in 1809 amounted to about 33,000 foot, 6,300 horse, and 5,000 artillery.

MILITIA.

The Portuguese Militia was raised by conscription, on a local basis, the kingdom being divided into forty-eight regions, each of which was to supply a regiment. These districts were combined into three divisions, called the North, South, and Centre, each of which gave sixteen regiments. The unit was a two-battalion corps, with nominally 1,500 men in twelve companies: this number was in practice seldom reached. It was usual to keep the battalions under arms alternately, for periods of two, three, or six months: it was seldom that the whole regiment was embodied at once. In 1809 the whole force was but in process of organization, many corps had not even been officered or armed, and the majority had not commenced to raise their second battalion. The local distribution was as follows:--

1ST DIVISION: ‘THE SOUTH.’ Comprising Algarve, Alemtejo, and Beira Alta.

Regiments of Lagos, Tavira, Beja, Evora, Villaviciosa, Portalegre, Castello Branco, Idanha, Vizeu, Guarda, Trancoso, Arouca, Tondella, Arganil, Covilhão, Lamego.

2ND DIVISION: ‘THE CENTRE.’ Comprising Estremadura and Beira Baixa.

Four Lisbon regiments, and one each from Torres Vedras, Santarem, Thomar, Leyria, Soure, Lousão, Alcazar do Sul, Setubal, Coimbra, Figueira, Aveiro, and Oliveira de Azemis.

3RD DIVISION: ‘THE NORTH.’ Comprising Tras-os-Montes and Entre-Douro-e-Minho.

Regiments of Oporto, Villa de Conde, Braga, Viana, Barcelos, Guimaraens, Penafiel, Arcos, Feira, Barca, Baltar, Mayo, Chaves, Villa Real, Miranda and Braganza.

VI

PAPERS RELATING TO THE INTRIGUES AT OPORTO, APRIL-MAY 1809

I. GENERAL RICARD’S CIRCULAR.

_Le général Ricard, chef d’état-major du 2e corps d’armée en Espagne, à M. le général de division Quesnel._

Oporto, le 19 avril 1809.

Mon général,

Son Excellence M. le maréchal duc de Dalmatie m’a chargé de vous écrire pour vous faire connaître les dispositions que la grande majorité des habitants de la province du Minho manifestent.

La ville de Braga, qui une des premières s’était portée à l’insurrection, a été aussi la première a se prononcer pour un changement de système, qui assurât à l’avenir le repos et la tranquillité des familles, et l’indépendance du Portugal. Le corrégidor que son Excellence avait nommé s’était retiré à Oporto lors du départ des troupes françaises, dans la crainte que les nombreux émissaires que Sylveira envoyait n’excitassent de nouveaux troubles, et n’attentassent à sa vie. Les habitants ont alors manifesté le vœu que ce digne magistrat leur fût renvoyé, et une députation de douze membres a été à cet effet envoyée près de Son Excellence. Pendant ce temps les émissaires de Sylveira étaient arrêtés et emprisonnés.

A Oporto, et à Barcelos, les habitants ont aussi manifesté les mêmes sentiments, et tous sentent la nécessité d’avoir un appui auquel les citoyens bien intentionnés puissent se rallier pour la défense et le salut de la patrie, et pour la conservation des propriétés. A ce sujet de nouvelles députations se sont présentées à Son Excellence, pour la supplier d’approuver que le peuple de la province du Minho manifestât authentiquement le vœu de déchéance du trône de la maison de Bragance, et qu’en même temps S. M. l’Empereur et roi fût suppliée de désigner un prince de sa maison, ou de son choix, pour régner en Portugal, mais qu’en attendant que l’Empereur ait pu faire connaître à ce sujet ses intentions, Son Excellence le duc de Dalmatie serait prié de prendre les rênes du gouvernement, de représenter le souverain, et de se revêtir de toutes les attributions de l’autorité suprême: le peuple promettant et jurant de lui être fidèle, de le soutenir et de le défendre aux dépens de la vie et de la fortune contre tout opposant, et envers même les insurgés des autres provinces, jusqu’à l’entière soumission du royaume.

Le maréchal a accueilli ces propositions, et il a autorisé les corrégidors des Comarques à faire assembler les Chambres, à y appeler des députés de tous les ordres, des corporations, et du peuple dans les campagnes, pour dresser l’acte qui doit être fait, et y apposer les signatures de l’universalité des citoyens. Il m’a ordonné de vous faire part de ces dispositions, pour que, dans l’arrondissement où vous commandez, vous en favorisiez l’exécution, et qu’ensuite vous en propagiez l’effet sur tous les points du royaume, où vous pourrez en faire parvenir la nouvelle.

M. le Maréchal ne s’est pas dissimulé qu’un évènement d’aussi grande importance étonnera beaucoup de monde et doit produire des impressions diverses; mais il n’a pas cru devoir s’arrêter à ces considérations: son âme est trop pure pour qu’il puisse penser qu’on lui attribue aucun projet ambitieux. Dans tout ce qu’il fait il ne voit que la gloire des armes de Sa Majesté, le succès de l’expédition qui lui est confiée, et le bien-être d’une nation intéressante, qui, malgré ses égarements, est toujours digne de notre estime. Il se sent fort de l’affection de l’armée, et il brûle du désir de la présenter à l’Empereur, glorieuse et triomphante, ayant rempli l’engagement que Sa Majesté a elle-même pris, de planter l’aigle impériale sur les forts de Lisbonne, après une expédition aussi difficile que périlleuse, où tous les jours nous avons été dans la nécessité de vaincre.

Son Excellence ne s’est pas dissimulé non plus que depuis Burgos l’armée a eu des combats continuels à soutenir; elle a réfléchi sur les moyens d’éviter à l’avenir les maux que cet état de guerre occasionne, et elle n’en a pas trouvé de plus propre que celui qui lui est offert par la grande majorité des habitants des principales villes du Minho, d’autant plus qu’elle a l’espoir de voir propager dans les autres provinces cet exemple, et qu’ainsi ce beau pays sera préservé de nouvelles calamités. Les intentions de Sa Majesté seront plus tôt et plus glorieusement remplies, et notre présence en Portugal, qui d’abord avait été un sujet d’effroi pour les habitants, y sera vue avec plaisir, en même temps qu’elle contribuera à neutraliser les efforts des ennemis de l’Empereur sur cette partie du continent.

La tâche que M. le Maréchal s’impose dans cette circonstance est immense, mais il a le courage de l’embrasser, et il croit la remplir même avec succès, si vous voulez bien l’aider dans son exécution. Il désire que vous propagiez les idées que je viens de vous communiquer, que vous fassiez protéger d’une manière particulière les autorités ou citoyens quelconques qui embrasseront le nouveau système, en mettant les uns et les autres dans le cas de se prononcer et d’agir à l’avenir en conséquence. Vous veillerez plus soigneusement que jamais à la conduite de votre troupe, l’empêcherez de commettre aucun dégât ou insulte qui pourrait irriter les habitants, et vous aurez la bonté, monsieur le général, d’instruire fréquemment Son Excellence de l’esprit des habitants et du résultat que vous aurez obtenu.

J’ai l’honneur de vous prier d’agréer l’hommage de mon respect et de mon sincère attachement.

_Le général chef de l’état-major général_ _Signé_: RICARD.

Pour copie conforme à l’original resté dans les mains du général de division Quesnel.

Paris, le 11 juillet 1809.

_Le ministre de la guerre_ Comte d’Hunebourg.

II. WELLESLEY’S ACCOUNT OF ARGENTON’S PLOT.

‘To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘Villa Nova, 15th May, 1809.

‘My Lord,

‘In my secret dispatch, of the 27th ultimo, I apprised your Lordship that I had had certain communications with an Officer of the French army, in respect to the discontent which prevailed against Marshal Soult. I have since had further communications with the same Officer, with the details of which I proceed to acquaint your Lordship.

‘Captain Argenton met me within the posts of the British army, between Coimbra and Aveiro on the night of the 6th instant, accompanied by Mons. Viana, in the presence of Lieut.-Colonel Bathurst. He informed me that the discontent had increased, and that there were a larger number of Officers who were determined to seize their General than when he had last seen me. He said, however, that they were divided into two parties, one discontented with Buonaparte himself, and determined to carry matters to extremities against him: the other, consisting of Loison, Laborde, and others (whom he had before mentioned as attached to the cause of the Emperor,) were dissatisfied with Soult’s conduct, particularly with an intention which he was supposed to entertain to declare himself King of Portugal; and that they were determined, if he should take that step, to seize him and to lead the army back into France, where it was understood the Emperor wished to see it.

‘Captain Argenton then urged me again to lose no time in pressing upon Soult, as the mode most likely to induce the more violent of the two parties to endeavour to accomplish their purpose. But he said that if my attack was likely to be delayed, it was desirable that I should endeavour to prevail upon some of the towns over which I was supposed to have influence, such as Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., to follow the example of Oporto, and petition Soult to take upon himself the government of the kingdom, as King; and that I even should write to him to urge the adoption of this measure.

‘In answer to this, I told him, that I certainly should make my attack as soon as it was in my power, but that I could not fix any day, nor state to him the plan of my operations; and that in respect to his propositions, regarding the measures to be adopted by me to induce Soult to declare himself King of Portugal, they were quite out of the question; that I could not risk the loss of the confidence of the people of Portugal by doing what he desired in respect to the people of Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., nor my own character by writing the letter which he proposed I should. I told him at the same time that I considered that, notwithstanding all that had passed between him and me, I had a full right to take what steps I pleased, even if the Officers of the French army should seize their General.

‘He then went away, and Mons. Viana returned with me to Coimbra, and confirmed all the statements which Captain Argenton had made of the discontent of the Officers of the army.

‘I heard no more of Captain Argenton till the 13th, the day after the capture of Oporto, on which day the original orders for the arrest and secret detention of Captain Argenton, Colonel Lafitte of the 18th dragoons, and Colonel Donadieu of the 47th regiment of infantry, were found among some papers sent to me by the police of the town; the order for the arrest of the first bearing date the 9th, and of the last two the 10th instant.

‘In a few hours afterwards, on the same day, Captain Argenton came into Oporto, and informed me that, on the night of the day he had returned from his last interview with me, he had been arrested, and his papers had been seized, among which had been found the three passports which I had given him. He said that he attributed his arrest to the General of Division Lefevre, a man of weak intellect, to whom he had formerly been aide de camp, and on whom he had endeavored to prevail, as he thought successfully, to join the party. General Lefevre had, however, informed Soult of all the circumstances, requiring only his promise that Argenton should not be injured, and should retain his commission and his military pretensions.

‘Soult examined him in presence of General Lefevre respecting his accomplices, but he declined to name any, and he was sent back to prison in charge of a Captain of Gendarmerie. This person prevailed upon him, with promises of pardon and indemnity to all concerned, to consent to tell Soult the names of his accomplices, which he did on the following night, notwithstanding, as he says himself, similar promises in his own favor, made to General Lefevre, had not been performed, and that as soon as he had named Colonels Lafitte and Donadieu, immediate orders were sent for their arrest and secret detention. They marched, in confinement, with the army from Oporto on the 12th, and on the 13th, at five o’clock in the morning, Captain Argenton made his escape, at the desire of Colonel Lafitte, from the party of Gendarmes in whose charge he was detained. He now declares that the conspiracy still exists, and that sooner or later it must burst forth and fall heavily upon the head of the usurper; and he talked of the war in Spain as being odious to the army and to the whole nation.

‘Captain Argenton expressed a desire to return secretly to France, and to bring to England his wife and family, she having, as he says, some property, to enable him to live in England till the arrival of better times in France.

‘I told him that I would send him to England when an opportunity should offer to apply for permission to go to France; and I shall have the honor of addressing him to your Lordship when the opportunity shall occur of sending him.

‘I have the honor to be, &c., ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.’

III. RÉSUMÉ DE L’AFFAIRE ARGENTON.

(This analysis of the documents in the French archives relating to the Oporto conspiracy has been placed at my disposal by the great kindness of Commandant Balagny.)

Le 8 mai 1809, dans la nuit, le capitaine Argenton était arrêté à Oporto par ordre du maréchal Soult. Son arrestation avait été provoquée par les déclarations que, dans cette même nuit du 8, le général Lefebvre et son aide de camp Favre étaient venus faire au maréchal. Argenton leur avait, disent-ils, fait à l’un et à l’autre, dans la journée du 8, des confidences sur l’objet de deux voyages successifs à Lisbonne et à Coïmbre, près des généraux anglais, et leur avait développé le plan d’une vaste conspiration militaire, dont les ramifications s’étendaient dans toutes les armées impériales et dans plusieurs départements de la France. Malgré la promesse formelle qu’ils avaient faite à Argenton de garder un secret absolu, après s’être concertés à Richuza, ils vinrent, dans la nuit, à Oporto, et, après avoir obtenu du maréchal une audience secrète (à 10 heures et demie du soir), lui dévoilèrent ce que leur avait confié Argenton. Aux termes de leurs déclarations, il aurait dit, à l’un et à l’autre séparément, qu’il était l’agent d’un comité, composé des généraux Laborde, Loison, Merle, Lorges, Lahoussaye, Debelle, et des colonels Donadieu, Mejean, Lafitte, Girardin, Corsin, et dont le but était de renverser l’Empereur pour mettre fin au régime de guerres continuelles et de perpétuelles conscriptions, que la France était lasse de supporter pour servir l’ambition de Napoléon. Pour réaliser ce projet, le comité devait par son intermédiaire passer une convention avec l’armée anglaise en Portugal. Aux termes de cette convention, l’armée française évacuerait le Portugal, suivie de l’armée anglaise, qui l’escorterait jusqu’aux Pyrénées, où cette dernière resterait en observation pour l’appuyer et pour déterminer les départements du Midi à se déclarer pour le nouvel état de choses. A la faveur de trois passe-ports, délivrés par les généraux anglais, trois officiers français[759], dont lui, Argenton, devaient se rendre, l’un aux armées d’Espagne, l’autre à l’armée d’Autriche, un troisième en France, pour rallier à la cause de l’entreprise les mécontents de l’intérieur et des armées. L’Angleterre promettait d’appuyer de son argent le succès de l’entreprise, et Wellesley aurait promis à Argenton 60,000 fr. pour les débuts. Le général Moreau devait être ramené d’Amérique par un navire anglais, et prendre, sous un titre non encore désigné, la place de Napoléon déchu. Le maréchal Soult serait invité à se mettre à la tête du mouvement. Si le maréchal refusait, on devait s’emparer de sa personne, de façon à ce que son opposition ne nuisît en rien à la réussite de l’entreprise.

[759] Ces passe-ports devaient être délivrés aux noms supposés de _Dupont_ et _Garis_, d’après les déclarations d’Argenton lui-même, du maréchal Soult, du général Ricard, &c. L’un de ces passe-ports devait être utilisé par le capitaine Favre, aide de camp du général Lefebvre, qui voulait rentrer en France pour démissionner. L’autre devait servir à un officier supérieur _qu’Argenton ne nomme pas_, qui devait aller rendre compte de la situation à l’Empereur.

En présence de pareilles révélations, le maréchal Soult fit arrêter sur-le-champ et conduire chez lui le capitaine Argenton, qui, devant le général Lefebvre et Favre, refit, dans les mêmes termes, la narration du plan du Comité, insistant, paraît-il, à diverses reprises, pour tenter de décider le maréchal à entrer dans ses vues, en lui dépeignant, sous des couleurs séduisantes, la grandeur et la noblesse de l’entreprise, dont le but principal était de rendre à la France et à l’Europe entière une paix que tout le monde souhaitait ardemment, et que la folle ambition de l’Empereur rendait seule impossible. Mais ne pouvant obtenir du maréchal la promesse formelle qu’aucun des officiers dont il citerait les noms ne serait inquiété, il se refusa à désigner les membres du Comité qui l’avait fait agir. Plus tard, dans ses interrogatoires en France, il déclara que devant ce refus de sa part le maréchal s’emporta violemment, le menaça de le faire fusiller sur-le-champ, et qu’il ne dut son salut qu’à l’intervention généreuse du général Lefebvre, qui rappela durement au Duc de Dalmatie la promesse solennelle qu’il lui avait faite (à lui, Lefebvre), sur l’honneur, qu’Argenton ne serait point inquiété. Il fut réintégré dans sa prison, à son grand étonnement, dit-il. Furieux de se voir sous les verrous, malgré la promesse formelle que lui aurait faite le maréchal, prétend-il, il s’obstina d’abord dans un mutisme absolu, refusant, pendant toute la matinée du 9, de se prêter à aucun nouvel interrogatoire. Cependant, sur les instances réitérées et pressantes du lieutenant de gendarmerie Bernon, que le maréchal envoya, à plusieurs reprises, le voir dans sa prison, et sous la foi de la promesse solennelle que lui apporta ce dernier, de la part du Duc, que lui et tous les officiers compromis auraient l’honneur et la vie saufs, et qu’un voile épais serait jeté à jamais sur cette affaire, il se décida dans la soirée à écrire au maréchal qu’il consentait à lui faire des aveux complets. Mais se ravisant, il lui écrivit une deuxième lettre où il mettait comme condition à ses aveux qu’il n’y aurait _qu’un seul témoin_ présent à ses déclarations, et qu’il désirait que ce témoin fût le général Lefebvre. Pour des raisons qui sont demeurées inconnues, le maréchal substitua, comme témoin, au général Lefebvre, le général Ricard et le lieutenant Bernon. Argenton accepta cependant de faire ses aveux et fut introduit à 10 heures du soir dans le salon du maréchal. Le lieutenant Bernon et le général Ricard firent, dès le 10 mai, une déclaration écrite des révélations faites devant eux au maréchal par Argenton dans l’entrevue du 9 mai. Leurs déclarations concordent entièrement avec celles du général Lefebvre et du capitaine Favre, et ce serait toujours le fameux projet de renversement de l’Empire qu’Argenton aurait indiqué comme but du Comité.

A la suite de ces aveux, Argenton est reconduit dans sa prison et le maréchal, faussant sa promesse, fait arrêter le colonel Lafitte, qui commandait le régiment ou servait Argenton.

Mais cependant l’armée anglaise se portait en avant et, à la suite de circonstances demeurées bien obscures, le maréchal Soult était surpris dans Oporto et sur le point de ne pouvoir s’en échapper. Argenton, confié à la garde du lieutenant Bernon et d’un détachement d’infanterie, est emmené dans la retraite. Le second jour il s’évade subitement, dans des circonstances tellement romanesques que, malgré le rapport du lieutenant Bernon au Duc de Conégliano, on est quelque peu porté à croire que sa fuite fut facilitée par le commandement.

Le 14 mai, au soir, Argenton fugitif gagnait Oporto, et de là se rendait à Lisbonne d’où l’amiral anglais le faisait conduire à Londres sur un vaisseau anglais, avec des lettres de recommandation pour le ministre de la marine. Bien accueilli par ce dernier, qui lui proposa même, dit-il, de le pensionner, il séjourna quelque temps à Londres. Mais pris bientôt de la nostalgie du pays natal et dévoré du désir de venir rejoindre sa femme pour vivre en France ‘ignoré dans quelque coin perdu,’ il avise aux moyens de passer la Manche. Il fabrique un faux cartel d’échange au nom de ‘Dessort,’ sous la signature du général Ricard, chef d’état-major du maréchal Soult, et sur les recommandations de l’Amirauté anglaise il s’embarque à Deal et atterrit à Sangatte le 28 juin 1809. Malgré son faux nom, Argenton ne tarde pas en effet à être arrêté.

Dès son premier interrogatoire, il s’était décidé à reconnaître son identité et, avouant son faux de cartel d’échange, il abandonne le pseudonyme de ‘Dessort’ et redevient Argenton. Mais ici la scène change: se prêtant volontiers aux interrogatoires, il ne fait aucune difficulté pour expliquer ses voyages près des généraux anglais; mais il leur donne un but tout autre et il assigne au Comité, dont il se dit toujours avoir été l’agent, des intentions totalement différentes de celles que, selon Lefebvre, Ricard, Favre, et Bernon, il aurait indiquées à Oporto. Il n’est plus question de conspiration contre l’Empereur, de projets de renversement dynastique. Bien au contraire, le Comité, entièrement dévoué à Napoléon et à sa cause, voulait lui ramener une armée dont le sort était gravement compromis par la maladresse du maréchal Soult, qui ne rêvait rien moins que de faire de cette armée la sienne propre, et de s’en servir pour la réalisation de ses projets ambitieux. Devant ses projets ouvertement affichés de se faire décerner la couronne de Portugal, un parti de mécontents s’était formé pour déjouer ses vues et le mettre dans l’impossibilité de commettre le crime de lèse-majesté qu’il méditait. A la tête de ce parti, se trouvait, dit Argenton, un comité composé des généraux Laborde et Loison, des colonels Lafitte et St. Géniéz et d’un colonel aide-de-camp du général Loison. Le Comité devait, dès que le maréchal aurait mis en exécution son projet, nullement déguisé, de s’emparer de la couronne, se saisir de sa personne, et, à la suite d’une convention passée avec les généraux anglais, ramener en France l’armée restée fidèle à Napoléon, et sauvée par cette intervention d’une perte infaillible. Mais pour mener à bonne fin l’exécution de ce projet, il fallait obtenir des généraux anglais qu’ils consentissent à retarder leur attaque, qui était imminente, et se faire délivrer par eux des passe-ports pour les officiers qui devaient aller rendre compte à l’Empereur de ce qui se passait en Portugal. Argenton accepta la mission d’aller à l’armée anglaise soumettre les propositions du Comité. On l’adressa, dit-il, au nommé Viana, à qui il fut présenté par le colonel Donadieu qui logeait chez lui, et ce fut ce Viana qui lui servit de guide et d’escorte jusqu’à l’armée anglaise. Il se rendit à Lisbonne, où il obtint du général Wellesley trois passe-ports et la promesse d’une suspension d’armes de quelques jours. Revenu à Oporto, il y resta quatre jours chez Viana, qui lui remit, à destination du Comité, un dialogue intitulé ‘Le Moineau et le Perroquet,’ qui n’était, paraît-il, que le sommaire d’une longue conversation entre Viana et le maréchal, où ce dernier aurait développé ses projets ambitieux et exposé en détail la ligne de conduite qu’il comptait suivre. Porteur de ce document, il va rendre compte de sa mission au Comité. Le général Laborde étant malade, il rendit compte au colonel Lafitte et, le général Loison survenant à ce moment, il y eut chez Laborde une conférence entre ces deux généraux et Lafitte. Lui, Argenton, n’y assista pas; mais à l’issue de cette conférence son colonel lui déclara qu’il fallait retourner près des Anglais, et lui fit tenir une lettre écrite par le général Loison au général Wellesley. Toujours accompagné de Viana, il partit d’Oporto le 1er mai, et se rendit à Coïmbre, où il eut, en présence de Viana, une conférence avec Wellesley et finit, après quelques difficultés, par obtenir une nouvelle suspension d’hostilités pendant quatre jours, à la condition que le Comité tiendrait le général anglais au courant des faits et gestes du Duc de Dalmatie. De retour à Oporto, le 8 mai, il était arrêté au moment où il s’apprêtait à partir pour se rendre près du Comité.--Telle est la thèse qu’Argenton ne cesse de soutenir avec la dernière énergie, depuis son retour en France jusque devant le peloton d’exécution qui va le fusiller. Il subit trois interrogatoires à Boulogne, trois autres au Ministère de la Police, quatre devant la Commission militaire chargée d’instruire sa cause. Toujours avec la même impassibilité et le calme le plus absolu, il répète la même chose, ne variant que sur quelques questions de détails. Quand on lui donne lecture des dépositions accablantes des généraux Lefebvre et Ricard, du capitaine Favre et du lieutenant Bernon, il leur oppose froidement les dénégations les plus formelles. Il est confronté avec les colonels Donadieu et Lafitte, qui, arrêtés par ordre du Ministre de la Guerre, prétendent n’avoir jamais eu connaissance de l’existence d’un comité dans l’armée, et n’avoir jamais servi d’intermédiaire entre Argenton et ce comité. Vis-à-vis d’eux, le capitaine garde toujours la même attitude. Lui seul dit la vérité, assure-t-il, et il s’étonne du peu de mémoire des colonels.

Traduit devant un conseil de guerre le 21 décembre 1809, le capitaine Argenton se retranche toujours derrière les mêmes moyens de défense et produit les mêmes arguments. Il a agi par ordre (verbal, il est vrai), et il a cru servir à la fois les intérêts de l’armée qu’il a sauvée et ceux de l’Empereur. Malgré une plaidoirie très éloquente et très habile de son défenseur Falconnet, qui, pour défendre son client, n’épargne pas le duc de Dalmatie, Argenton est condamné à mort. Jusqu’à la dernière heure, il proteste de la pureté de ses intentions, et maintient qu’il a toujours dit la vérité et qu’il est victime de l’égoïsme de ceux qui l’ont fait agir. Avec une calme résignation, il commande lui-même son peloton d’exécution et tombe sous les balles avec ce courage romanesque qui caractérisait en lui l’homme extraordinaire qui, à Tarvis, fit _seul_ toute une compagnie prisonnière.

VII

MORNING STATE OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN PORTUGAL, UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, K.B.

HEAD QUARTERS, COIMBRA, MAY 6, 1809.

TABLE LEGEND: A = _Officers._ B = _Present._ C = _Sick._ D = _On Command._ E = _Total._ F = _Total Efficients Present, Officers and Men._

-------------------------------+-----+---------------------++-------++---------- | |_Sergeants, Drummers,|| || | |Rank and File, &c._ || || -------------------------------+-----+-------+-----+-------++-------++---------- | | | | || || | A | B | C | D || E || F | | | | || || -------------------------------+-----+-------+-----+-------++-------++---------- CAVALRY. | | | | || || | | | | || || 1st Brigade [Stapleton Cotton] | | | | || || 14th Light Dragoons | 27 | 628 | 21 | 73 || 749 || 655 16th ” ” | 37 | 673 | 20 | 35 || 765 || 710 20th ” ” [two squadrons]| 6 | 237 | 6 | 63 || 312 || 243 3rd Light Dragoons K.G.L. | | | | || || [one squadron] | 3 | 57 | 2 | 77 || 139 || 60 | | | | || || ----1,668 | | | | || || 2nd Brigade [Fane] | | | | || || 3rd Dragoon Guards | 25 | 698 | 10 | -- || 733 || 723 4th Dragoons | 27 | 716 | 13 | -- || 756 || 743 | | | | || || ----1,466 | --- | ----- | -- | --- || ---- || --------- Total Cavalry | 125 | 3,009 | 72 | 248 || 3,454 || 3,134 | --- | ----- | -- | --- || ---- || --------- INFANTRY. | | | | || || | | | | || || Brigade of Guards [H. Campbell]| | | | || || Coldstream Guards, 1st batt. | 33 | 1,194 | 75 | 3 || 1,305 ||1,227 3rd Foot Guards, 1st batt. | 34 | 1,228 | 79 | 8 || 1,349 ||1,262 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 61 | 4 | -- || 67 || 63 | | | | || || ----2,552 | | | | || || 1st Brigade [Hill] | | | | || || 3rd Foot, 1st batt. | 28 | 719 | 104 | 50 || 901 || 747 48th ” 2nd ” | 32 | 721 | 52 | -- || 805 || 753 66th ” 2nd ” | 34 | 667 | 38 | 10 || 749 || 701 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 61 | 4 | -- || 67 || 63 | | | | || || ----2,264 | | | | || || 2nd Brigade [Mackenzie] | | | | || || 27th Foot, 3rd batt. | 28 | 726 | 134 | 2 || 890 || 754 31st ” 2nd ” | 27 | 765 | 99 | 6 || 897 || 792 45th ” 1st ” | 22 | 671 | 125 | 27 || 845 || 693 | | | | || || ----2,239 | | | | || || 3rd Brigade [Tilson] | | | | || || 5/60th Foot [5 companies] | 14 | 306 | 32 | 2 || 354 || 320 87th ” 2nd batt. | 32 | 669 | 88 | 1 || 790 || 701 88th ” 1st batt. | 30 | 608 | 143 | 28 || 809 || 638 1st Portuguese, 1st batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- | | | | || || ----1,659 4th Brigade [Sontag] | | | | || || 97th Foot | 22 | 572 | 74 | 20 || 688 || 594 2nd batt. of Detachments | 35 | 787 | 221 | 16 || 1,059 || 822 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 61 | 6 | -- || 69 || 63 16th Portuguese, 2nd batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- | | | | || || ----1,479 5th Brigade [A. Campbell] | | | | || || 7th Foot, 2nd batt. | 26 | 559 | 50 | 3 || 638 || 585 53rd ” ” ” | 23 | 691 | 59 | 3 || 776 || 714 1 company 5/60th Foot | 4 | 64 | 11 | 1 || 80 || 68 10th Portuguese, 1st batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- | | | | || || ----1,367 6th Brigade [R. Stewart] | | | | || || 29th Foot | 26 | 596 | 85 | 7 || 714 || 622 1st batt. of Detachments | 27 | 803 | 169 | 24 || 1,023 || 830 16th Portuguese, 1st batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- | | | | || || ----1,452 7th Brigade [Cameron] | | | | || || 9th Foot, 2nd batt. | 27 | 545 | 227 | 22 || 821 || 572 83rd ” ” ” | 39 | 833 | 73 | 23 || 968 || 872 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 60 | 3 | 1 || 66 || 62 10th Portuguese, 2nd batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- | | | | || || ----1,506 King’s German Legion Brigade | | | | || || [Murray] | | | | || || 1st Line batt. K.G.L. | 34 | 767 | 125 | 9 || 935 || 801 2nd ” ” ” | 32 | 804 | 52 | 9 || 897 || 836 5th ” ” ” | 28 | 720 | 101 | 12 || 861 || 748 7th ” ” ” | 22 | 688 | 83 | 10 || 803 || 710 | | | | || || ----3,095 Unattached Troops (Lisbon) | | | | || || 24th Foot, 2nd batt. | 18 | 750 | 26 | 3 || 797 || 768 30th ” ” ” | 15 | 447 | 49 | 197 || 708 || 462 Independent Light Co. K.G.L. | 3 | 35 | 14 | 4 || 56 || 38 | | | | || || ----1,268 | --- |------ |-----| ---- || ------|| --------- Total Infantry | 703 |18,178 |2,405| 501 || 21,787|| 18,881 | | | | || || ARTILLERY. | | | | || || | | | | || || British | 31 | 550 | 83 | 499 || 1,163 || 581 King’s German Legion | 18 | 331 | 34 | 134 || 517 || 349 Wagon Train attached | 3 | 61 | 18 | 83 || 165 || 64 | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- Total Artillery | 52 | 942 | 135 | 716 || 1,845 || 994 | | | | || || ENGINEERS. | 12 | 27 | 1 | -- || 40 || 39 | | | | || || WAGON TRAIN. | 2 | 65 | 21 | 17 || 105 || 67 -------------------------------+-----+-------+-----+-------++-------++---------- General Total 894 22,221 2,634 1,482 27,231 23,115

VIII

SOULT’S REPORT ON GALICIA,

JUNE 25, 1809.

N.B.--The first half of this report, a lengthy narrative of the Marshal’s march from Lugo to Puebla de Senabria, is omitted.

Je me permettrai, avant de terminer ce rapport, de présenter à Votre Majesté quelques observations sur la situation actuelle de Galice. Cette province est toujours en état de fermentation. Les menaces de mort et d’incendie qu’employe La Romana; les nombreux agents qui agissent en son nom; les exécutions qu’il fait; les dévastations qui ont inévitablement lieu par les fréquents mouvements des troupes; la ruine de la plupart des habitants; l’absence de toute autorité qui représente Votre Majesté; l’influence des prêtres, qui sont très-nombreux, et la grande majorité opposante; l’argent que les Anglais répandent; la détresse des généraux français, qui, faute des moyens, ne peuvent souvent payer les émissaires qu’ils employent: toutes ces causes contribuent à augmenter de jour en jour le nombre des ennemis, et à rendre la guerre qu’on fait dans ce pays très-meurtrière, infiniment désagréable, et d’un résultat fort éloigné. On s’y battra encore longtemps avant que Votre Majesté en retire quelque avantage, à moins qu’elle n’adopte le système de faire fortifier sept à huit postes importants, susceptibles de contenir chacun 5,000 à 6,000 hommes de garnison, un hôpital, et des vivres pour quatre mois, pour maintenir la population, fermer et garder les principaux débouchés dont l’ennemi ne pourrait plus profiter, et aussi pour offrir aux colonnes qui agiraient dans la province des appuis, quelque direction qu’elles suivissent. Ainsi elles pourraient recevoir des secours et déposer leurs malades. Cette dernière considération est très-puissante, et je ne dois pas dissimuler à Votre Majesté qu’elle fait beaucoup sur le moral des soldats, qui, dans l’état actuel des choses, sont exposés à périr de misère, ou sous les coups des paysans, s’ils ont le malheur d’être blessés, ou atteints de la fièvre, et de se trouver éloignés d’un lieu sûr pour y chercher des secours.

Je crois qu’avec une dépense d’un million on parviendrait à mettre en état de défense la Galice, et certes jamais argent n’aurait été mieux employé, d’autant plus que par la suite on pourrait diminuer le nombre des troupes qui pour le moment y sont nécessaires; dans cette persuasion j’ai engagé M. le Maréchal Ney à faire fortifier Lugo, et à ordonner la construction de trois blocus sur la ligne de Villa Franca; les places de Tuy, de Monterey, de Viana et de Puebla de Sanabria, qui toutes peuvent contenir des canons, ont une enceinte et un reste de fortification, pourraient aisément être rétablies et rempliraient parfaitement cet objet; et, s’il le fallait, il est encore d’autres postes qui par leur situation seraient à même de concourir à la défense, sans que les frais fussent considérablement augmentés. Si cette mesure, que je considère comme urgente et d’un résultat assuré, n’est point adoptée, il deviendra nécessaire que des renforts soient envoyés à M. le Maréchal Ney, ne fusse que pour remplacer ses pertes et maintenir libres les communications, quoique aujourd’hui il puisse être assez fort pour tenir tête au corps de La Romana et de Carrera réunis, s’ils se présentaient en ligne. Mais leur système étant d’harceler sans cesse et d’éviter une affaire générale, avec le temps ils auraient l’avance la plus forte, et ils finiraient, même sans combattre, par le détruire s’il n’était soutenu, et on ferait une perte d’hommes incalculable sans obtenir le résultat qu’on se propose.

Il est probable que je ne serai plus dans le cas d’entretenir Votre Majesté au sujet de la Galice; ainsi, pour cette dernière fois, j’ai cru de mon devoir de lui rendre compte des observations que mon séjour dans cette partie de ses états et la connaissance que j’ai acquise du caractère de ses habitants m’ont mis à même de faire. J’ai donc l’honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner excuser cette digression en faveur et en considération des motifs qui l’ont dictée.

J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c., MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

Puebla de Senabria, 25 juin 1809.

IX

A

SUCHET’S ARMY OF ARAGON [3rd CORPS],

MAY 15, 1809.

Total _présents sous les armes._

1st Division, General LAVAL: 14th Line (two batts.), 1,080; 44th Line (two batts.), 1,069; 2nd of the Vistula (two batts.), 880; 3rd ditto, 964 3,993

2nd Division, General Musnier: 114th Line (three batts.), 1,627; 115th Line (three batts.), 1,732; 1st of the Vistula (two batts.), 1,039 4,398

3rd Division, General MORLOT: 116th and 117th Line (each three batts.), _absent in Castile_; 121st Line, _three batts. absent in Navarre_, one present in Aragon, 400; 5th Léger (one batt.), 890

Troops detached from 5th Corps: 64th Line (one batt.), one voltigeur company of 40th Line 450

CAVALRY BRIGADE, General WATHIER: 4th Hussars, 326; 13th Cuirassiers, 390; Polish Lancers (one squadron), 80 796

ARTILLERY 450 ------ General Total 10,977

N.B.--Of the nine absent battalions the 116th and 117th with a strength of somewhat over 3,000 men rejoined Suchet on the day of Maria (June 15), thus raising this available force to about 13,000 men. The 121st never came up from Navarre.

B

BLAKE’S ARMY OF ARAGON,

JUNE 15, 1809.

Total present under arms at Maria.

Vanguard Brigade, Colonel J. CREAGH: Almeria (two batts.), Cazadores de Valencia (one batt.) 2,298

1st Division, Major-General P. ROCA: 1st of Savoia (three batts.), Granada (one batt.), Avila Militia, Tiradores de Cariñena (one batt.), Tercio of Tortosa 4,888

2nd Division, Lieut.-General Marquis of LAZAN: 1st Volunteers of Saragossa (one batt.), 3rd Cazadores de Valencia (one batt.), 1st of Valencia (three batts.), America (two batts.) 5,837

Cavalry Brigade, Colonel J. O’DONNELL: Olivenza (four squadrons), Santiago (one squadron) 698

Artillery (seventeen guns) 200

Sappers (three companies) 309 ------ Total present 14,230

3rd Division, Lieut.-General C. AREIZAGA (absent at Botorrita): Fernando 7th (one batt.), Grenadiers (four companies), 1st Volunteers of Aragon (one batt.), 2nd ditto (one batt.), Volunteers of Valencia (one batt.), Cazadores de Palafox (one batt.), Daroca (one batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (one batt.), Tiradores de Murcia (one batt.) 5,842

Cavalry: Husares Españoles, Santiago (one squadron each) 368

Artillery (eight guns) 120

Sappers 103 ------ Total absent at Botorrita 6,433

X

APPENDICES RELATING TO THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN

1

THE BRITISH FORCE AT TALAVERA

FROM THE MORNING STATE OF JULY 25, 1809

Present and fit for Duty.

CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-Gen. PAYNE).

Fane’s Brigade: 3rd Dragoon Guards 525 4th Dragoons 545

Cotton’s Brigade: 14th Light Dragoons 464 16th ” ” 525

Anson’s Brigade: 23rd Light Dragoons 459 1st ” ” K.G.L. 451 ----- Total Cavalry 2,969

INFANTRY.

1st (SHERBROOKE’S) DIVISION.

H. Campbell’s Brigade: 1st batt. Coldstream Guards 970 1st batt. 3rd Guards 1,019 One company 5/60th Foot 56 ----- 2,045

Cameron’s Brigade: 1/61st Foot 778 2/83rd ” 535 One company 5/60th Foot 51 ----- 1,364

Langwerth’s Brigade: 1st Line batt. K.G.L. 604 2nd ” ” ” 678 Light Companies K.G.L. 106 ----- 1,388

Low’s Brigade: 5th Line batt. K.G.L. 610 7th ” ” ” 557 ----- 1,167

Total of the 1st Division 5,964

2nd (HILL’S) DIVISION.

Tilson’s Brigade: 1/3rd Foot 746 2/48th Foot 567 2/66th ” 526 One company 5/60th 52 ----- 1,891

R. Stewart’s Brigade: 29th Foot 598 1/48th Foot 807 1st batt. of Detachments 609 ----- 2,014

Total of the 2nd Division 3,905

3rd (MACKENZIE’S) DIVISION.

Mackenzie’s Brigade: 2/24th Foot 787 2/31st ” 733 1/45th ” 756 ----- 2,276 Donkin’s Brigade: 2/87th 599 1/88th 599 Five companies 5/60th 273 ----- 1,471

Total of the 3rd Division 3,747

4th (CAMPBELL’S) DIVISION.

A. Campbell’s Brigade: 2/7th Foot 431 2/53rd Foot 537 One company 5/60th 64 ----- 1,032

Kemmis’s Brigade: 1/40th Foot 745 97th ” 502 2nd batt. of Detachments 625 One company 5/60th Foot 56 ----- 1,928

Total of the 4th Division 2,960

ARTILLERY.

British: Three batteries, Lawson, Sillery, Elliot 681

German: Two batteries, Rettberg and Heyse 330

Total of Artillery 1,011

ENGINEERS. 22

STAFF CORPS. 63

Total Present 20,641

The Army had also sick left in Portugal, about 3,246: sick at Plasencia and Talavera about 1,149: on detachment in Portugal about 1,396: on detachment in Spain about 107. Total absent or non-effective 5,898. The newly arrived regiments at Lisbon, and the troops on their way to the front under R. Craufurd are, of course, left out of this return.

2

THE ARMY OF ESTREMADURA AT TALAVERA

[From an unpublished document in the Deposito de la Guerra, Madrid.]

General-in-Chief, Lieut.-Gen. Gregorio de la Cuesta. Second in Command, Lieut.-Gen. Francisco de Eguia. Major-General of Infantry, Major-Gen. J. M. de Alos. ” ” of Cavalry, Major-Gen. R. de Villalba, Marques de Malaspina. Officer Commanding Artillery, Brigadier-Gen. G. Rodriguez. ” ” Engineers, Brigadier-Gen. M. Zappino.

INFANTRY.

Vanguard--Brigadier-Gen. José Zayas: 2nd Voluntarios of Catalonia, Cazadores de Barbastro (2nd batt.), Cazadores de Campomayor, Cazadores de Valencia y Albuquerque, Cazadores Voluntarios de Valencia (2nd batt.) five batts.

1st Division--Major-General Marques de Zayas: Cantabria (three batts.), Granaderos Provinciales, Canarias, Tiradores de Merida, Provincial de Truxillo seven batts.

2nd Division--Major-General Vincente Iglesias: 2nd of Majorca, Velez-Malaga (three batts.), Osuna (two batts.), Voluntarios Estrangeros, Provincial de Burgos eight batts.

3rd Division--Major-General Marques de Portago: Badajoz (two batts.), 2nd of Antequera, Imperial de Toledo, Provincial de Badajoz, Provincial de Guadix six batts.

4th Division--Major-General R. Manglano: Irlanda (two batts.), Jaen (two batts.), 3rd of Seville, Leales de Fernando VII (1st batt.), 2nd Voluntarios de Madrid, Voluntarios de la Corona eight batts.

5th Division--Major-General L. A. Bassecourt: Real Marina, 1st Regiment (two batts.), Africa (3rd batt.), Murcia (two batts.), Reyna (1st batt.), Provincial de Sigüenza seven batts.

CAVALRY.

1st Division, Lieut.-General J. de Henestrosa: Rey, Calatrava, Voluntarios de España, Imperial de Toledo, Cazadores de Sevilla, Reyna, Villaviciosa, Cazadores de Madrid.

2nd Division, Lieut.-Gen. Duque de Albuquerque: Carabineros Reales (one squadron), Infante, Alcantara, Pavia, Almanza, 1st and 2nd Hussars of Estremadura.

Totals, inclusive of sick, and troops on detachment: 35,000 Infantry, 7,000 Cavalry, 30 guns.

It is most unfortunate that no regimental or divisional totals are given, but only the gross total of the whole army.

N.B.--There were _at least_ four battalions detached, viz. Merida and 3rd of Seville, with Sir R. Wilson, and two others (names not to be ascertained, Cuesta does not give them) under Del Reino at the Puerto de Baños. Another was apparently dropped at Almaraz to guard the bridge. Allowing 3,000 for these troops, and 5,000 for sick and men ‘on command,’ the Army of Estremadura marched to Talavera with about 28,000 foot, more than 6,000 horse, and 800 artillery.

The following troops which had all been with the Army of Estremadura in April are not named in the above return. Most of them were in garrison at Badajoz, but some were in the Northern Passes--Spanish Guards (one batt.), Walloon Guards (one batt.), Zafra, Plasencia, La Serena, Leales de Fernando VII (2nd batt.), Provincial de Cordova, Tiradores de Cadiz.

3

STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT TALAVERA

(Figures of July 15, excluding sick and men detached.)

1st Corps, Marshal Victor: _Strength._ État-Major 47 1st Division (Ruffin), 9th Léger, 24th and 96th of the Line, three batts. each 5,286 2nd Division (Lapisse), 16th Léger, 8th, 45th, 54th of the Line, three batts. each 6,862 3rd Division (Villatte), 27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, 95th of the Line, three batts. each 6,135 Corps-Cavalry (Beaumont), 2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs 980 ------ 19,310

4th Corps, General SEBASTIANI: État-Major 13 1st Division (Sebastiani), 28th, 32nd, 58th, 75th of the Line, three batts. each 8,118 2nd Division (Valence), one regiment only, 4th Polish, two batts. 1,600 3rd Division (Leval), Nassau, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Holland, two batts. each: Frankfort, one batt. 4,537 Merlin’s Light Cavalry, 10th and 26th Chasseurs, Polish Lancers, Westphalian _Chevaux-Légers_ 1,188 ------ 15,456

Reserve Cavalry: 1st Dragoon Division (Latour-Maubourg), 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 26th Dragoons 3,279 2nd Dragoon Division (Milhaud), 5th, 12th, 16th, 20th, 21st Dragoons, and 3rd Dutch Hussars 2,356 ------ 5,635

From Madrid: One Brigade of Dessolles’ Division, 12th Léger, 51st Line, three batts. each 3,337 King’s Guards, infantry 1,800 ” ” cavalry 350 27th Chasseurs (two squadrons) 250 ------ 5,737 The artillerymen are included in the divisional totals. ------ Total 46,138

4

TALAVERA.--BRITISH LOSSES ON JULY 27

Table Legend: A = _Officers._ B = _Men._

(1) IN THE COMBAT OF CASA DE SALINAS.

----------------------------++-----------++------------++------------++-------- || _Killed._ || _Wounded._ || _Missing._ || _Regiments._ || A | B || A | B || A | B ||_Total._ ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- Cavalry: || | || | || | || 14th Light Dragoons || -- | -- || -- | 1 || -- | -- || 1 1st ” ” K.G.L. || -- | 2 || 1 | 1 || -- | -- || 4 3rd DIVISION || | || | || | || Mackenzie’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 2/24th Foot || -- | 1 || 1 | 6 || -- | 1 || 9 2/31st ” || 1 | 23 || 5 | 88 || -- | 2 || 119 1/45th ” || -- | 4 || 1 | 13 || -- | 7 || 25 Donkin’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 5/60th Foot || -- | 3 || 1 | 4 || -- | 19 || 27 2/87th ” || 1 | 26 || 10 | 127 || -- | 34 || 198 1/88th ” || 2 | 7 || -- | 25 || -- | 30 || 64 ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- Total || 4 | 66 || 19 | 265 || -- | 93 || 447

(2) IN THE COMBAT IN FRONT OF TALAVERA AT 9 P.M.

Staff || 1 | -- || -- | -- || -- | -- || 1 1st DIVISION || | || | || | || H. Campbell’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1st Coldstream Guards || 1 | -- || -- | 2 || -- | -- || 3 Cameron’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1/61st Foot || -- | 3 || 1 | 3 || -- | -- || 7 Langwerth’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1st Line batt. K.G.L. || -- | 2 || -- | 7 || -- | -- || 9 2nd ” ” ” || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 Light Companies, K.G.L. || -- | 4 || 2 | 25 || -- | 5 || 36 Low’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 5th Line batt. K.G.L. || -- | 6 || -- | 34 || -- | 11 || 51 7th ” ” ” || -- | 19 || 1 | 49 || -- | 77 || 146 2nd DIVISION || | || | || | || Tilson’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 2/48th Foot || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 R. Stewart’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 29th Foot || -- | 10 || 1 | 43 || -- | 1 || 55 1/48th Foot || -- | -- || -- | 8 || -- | -- || 8 1st batt. Detachments || 1 | 14 || -- | 40 || 2 | 13 || 70 || | || | ||[760]| || ARTILLERY || -- | -- || -- | 2 || -- | -- || 2 ENGINEERS || -- | -- || 1 | -- || -- | -- || 1 ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- Total || 3 | 58 || 6 | 219 || 2 | 107 || 385 ----------------------------++-----+-----++---+--------++-----+------++--------

[760] The official report gives _three_ missing officers here. But one of them was not a prisoner but turned up at Oropesa next morning, nominally sick. For this distressing story, see Leslie, pp. 155-6.

5

BRITISH LOSSES AT TALAVERA

SECOND DAY. JULY 28, 1809.

Table Legend: A = _Officers._ B = _Men._

----------------------------++-----------++------------++------------++-------- || _Killed._ || _Wounded._ || _Missing._ || _Regiments._ || A | B || A | B || A | B ||_Total._ ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- Staff || 4 | -- || 9 | -- || -- | -- || 13 CAVALRY. || | || | || | || Fane’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 3rd Dragoon Guards || -- | -- || 1 | 1 || -- | 1 || 3 4th Dragoons || -- | 3 || -- | 9 || -- | -- || 12 || | || | || | ||----15 Cotton’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 14th Light Dragoons || -- | 3 || 6 | 6 || -- | -- || 15 16th ” ” || -- | 6 || 1 | 5 || -- | 2 || 14 || | || | || | ||----29 Anson’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1st Light Dragoons K.G.L. || -- | 1 || 2 | 32 || -- | 2 || 37 23rd Light Dragoons || 2 | 47 || 4 | 46 || 3 | 105 || 207 || | || | || | ||----244 ----------------------------++-----+-----+------+------++-----+------++------- INFANTRY. || | || | || | || 1st DIVISION (General || | || | || | || SHERBROOKE): || | || | || | || H. Campbell’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1st Coldstream Guards || 1 | 33 || 8 | 251 || -- | -- || 293 1st 3rd Guards || 5 | 49 || 6 | 261 || -- | 1 || 322 || | || | || | ||----615 Cameron’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1/61st Foot || 3 | 43 || 10 | 193 || -- | 16 || 265 2/83rd ” || 4 | 38 || 11 | 202 || -- | 28 || 283 || | || | || | ||----548 Langwerth’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1st Line batt. K. G. L. || 2 | 37 || 10 | 241 || -- | 1 || 291 2nd ” ” ” || -- | 61 || 14 | 288 || -- | 24 || 387 Light Companies, K. G. L. || -- | 6 || -- | 37 || -- | -- || 43 || | || | || | ||----721 Low’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 5th Line batt. K. G. L. || 3 | 27 || 6 | 118 || -- | 101 || 255 7th ” ” ” || -- | 17 || 4 | 35 || -- | 54 || 110 || | || | || | ||----365 2nd DIVISION (General HILL):|| | || | || | || Tilson’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1/3rd Foot || -- | 26 || 2 | 107 || -- | 7 || 142 2/48th ” || -- | 12 || 2 | 53 || 1 | -- || 68 2/66th ” || -- | 16 || 11 | 88 ||-- | 11 || 126 || | || | || | ||----336 R. Stewart’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 29th Foot || -- | 26 || 6 | 98 || -- | 2 || 132 1st batt. Detachments || -- | 26 || 9 | 166 || -- | 2 || 203 1/48th Foot || -- | 22 || 10 | 135 || -- | 1 || 168 || | || | || | ||----503 3rd DIVISION (General || | || | || | || MACKENZIE): || | || | || | || Mackenzie’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 2/24th Foot || -- | 44 || 10 | 268 || -- | 21 || 343 2/31st ” || -- | 21 || 3 | 102 || -- | 5 || 131 1/45th ” || -- | 9 || 2 | 134 || 1 | 12 || 158 || | || | || | ||----632 Donkin’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 5/60th Foot || -- | 7 || 6 | 25 || -- | 12 || 50[761] 2/87th ” || -- | 9 || 3 | 43 || -- | 5 || 60 1/88th ” || 1 | 12 || 3 | 69 || -- | -- || 85 || | || | || | ||----195 4th DIVISION (General || | || | || | || A. CAMPBELL): || | || | || | || Campbell’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 2/7th Foot || 1 | 6 || 3 | 54 || -- | 1 || 65 2/53rd ” || -- | 6 || 2 | 30 || -- | 1 || 39 || | || | || | ||----104 Kemmis’s Brigade: || | || | || | || 1/40th Foot || -- | 7 || 1 | 49 || -- | 1 || 58 97th ” || -- | 6 || -- | 25 || 1 | 21 || 53 2nd batt. Detachments || -- | 7 || -- | 13 || -- | 1 || 21 || | || | || | ||----132 ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++------- ARTILLERY. || | || | || | || British || 1 | 7 || 3 | 21 || -- | -- || 32 German || -- | 3 || -- | 30 || -- | 1 || 34 || | || | || | || ENGINEERS || -- | -- || 1 | -- || -- | -- || 1 STAFF CORPS || -- | -- || 2 | -- || -- | -- || 2 ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++------- Total || 27 | 643 || 171 |3,235 || 6 | 439 || 4,521 ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------

Total of the two days:--killed: 34 officers, 767 men; wounded: 196 officers, 3,719 men; missing: 8 officers, 639 men. Grand Total, 5,363.

[761] Many of the casualties of the 5/60th were in the companies detached from the head quarters of the regiment, and not serving in Donkin’s brigade. It is unfortunately impossible to distinguish them, as all the regimental losses are given _en bloc_ in the return.

6

TALAVERA.--THE FRENCH LOSSES

N.B.--I owe these figures to the kindness of Commandant Balagny, who has caused them to be copied in detail from the French Archives.

Table Legend: A = _Officers._ B = _Men._

----------------------------++-----------++------------++------------++--------- || _Killed._ || _Wounded._ ||_Prisoners._|| _Regiments._ || A | B || A | B || A | B || _Total._ ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- 1st Corps (MARSHAL VICTOR): || | || | || | || État-Major Général || -- | -- || 1 | -- || -- | -- || 1 || | || | || | || 1st Division (Ruffin): || | || | || | || 9th Léger || 3 | 35 || 14 | 340 || -- | 65 || 457 24th Line || 1 | 92 || 17 | 456 || 1 | -- || 567 96th Line || 3 | 36 || 19 | 548 || -- | -- || 606 État-Major || -- | -- || 2 | -- || -- | -- || 2 || | || | || | ||----1,632 2nd DIVISION (Lapisse): || | || | || | || 16th Léger || 8 | 49 || 8 | 342 || -- | -- || 407 8th Line || 3 | 41 || 17 | 376 || -- | -- || 437 45th Line || 3 | 43 || 12 | 328 || -- | 2 || 388 54th Line || 2 | 54 || 14 | 462 || -- | -- || 532 État-Major || -- | -- || 3 | -- || -- | -- || 3 || | || | || | ||----1,767 3rd DIVISION (Villatte): || | || | || | || 27th Léger || 1 | 25 || 4 | 159 || -- | -- || 189 63rd Line || -- | 2 || 2 | 36 || -- | -- || 40 94th Line || 1 | 20 || 1 | 123 || -- | -- || 145 95th Line || -- | -- || -- | 27 || -- | -- || 27 || | || | || | ||---- 401 CORPS-CAVALRY (Beaumont): || | || | || | || 2nd Hussars || -- | 3 || 2 | 11 || -- | -- || 16 5th Chasseurs || -- | 1 || 3 | 19 || -- | -- || 23 || | || | || | ||---- 39 ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS || 1 | 9 || 1 | 53 || -- | -- || 64 ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++ ----- Total of 1st Corps || 26 | 410 || 120 |3,280 || 1 | 67 || 3,904 || | || | || | || 4th CORPS (GENERAL || | || | || | || SEBASTIANI): || | || | || | || || | || | || | || 1st DIVISION (Sebastiani): || | || | || | || 28th, 32nd, 58th, || 13 | 187 || 67 |1,852 || -- | 61 || 2,180 75th Line || | || | || | || || | || | || | || 2nd DIVISION (Leval): || | || | || | || Baden, Hesse, Nassau, || | || | || | || Holland, Frankfort || 6 | 97 || 24 | 803 || -- | 77 || 1,007 || | || | || | || 3rd DIVISION (Valence): || | || | || | || 4th Polish Regiment || -- | 3 || -- | 37 || -- | -- || 40 ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- Total of 4th Corps || 19 | 287 || 91 |2,692 || -- | 138 || 3,227 ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- || | || | || | || CAVALRY DIVISIONS-- || | || | || | || || | || | || | || 1st DIVISION of Dragoons || | || | || | || (Latour-Maubourg): || | || | || | || 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, || | || | || | || 14th, 26th Dragoons || -- | 13 || 9 | 61 || -- | -- || 83 || | || | || | || 2nd DIVISION of Dragoons || | || | || | || (Milhaud): || | || | || | || 5th, 12th, 16th, 20th, || | || | || | || 21st Dragoons || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 || | || | || | || Milhaud’s Artillery || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 || | || | || | || Merlin’s Light Cavalry || | || | || | || DIVISION: || | || | || | || 10th, 26th Chasseurs, || | || | || | || || | || | || | || Polish Lancers, || | || | || | || Westphalian || | || | || | || Chevaux-Légers || -- | 6 || -- | 42 || -- | -- || 48 ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++ ---- Total of Cavalry Divisions || -- | 19 || 9 | 109 || -- | -- || 137 ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++---------

GENERAL TOTALS:--45 officers, 716 rank and file _killed_; 220 officers, 6,081 rank and file _wounded_; 1 officer, 205 rank and file _missing_ = 7,268.

NOTE.--No distinction is made in the French returns between losses on July 27 and July 28, which cannot therefore be ascertained separately.

These ‘Missing’ do not include the French wounded who were left within the British lines on the night of July 28, and became prisoners, but were freed again on Aug. 6 when Victor reoccupied Talavera and captured the British hospitals. They must have been numerous in the divisions of Ruffin, Lapisse, and Sebastiani. The French returns are those made up for the Emperor’s use, some weeks after the battle--those of the 4th Corps as late as Sept. 19. The men in question therefore appear as ‘wounded,’ but not as ‘prisoners.’

XI

THE BRITISH ROYAL ARTILLERY IN THE PENINSULA IN 1809

N.B.--I owe this Appendix to Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R.A., who has been good enough to compile it for the volume.

STAFF.

Brigadier-General E. Howorth arrived at Lisbon in April 1809, and took over the command of the R.A. from Lieut.-Colonel W. Robe.

Brigade-Major R.A., Captain A. Dickson until appointed to the Portuguese Artillery in June, when Captain J. May took over that position.

FIELD-OFFICERS IN PORTUGAL.

Lieut.-Col. H. Framingham, Lieut.-Col. W. Robe, Lieut.-Col. G. B. Fisher, Major Julius von Hartmann, K.G.L.

Troops R.H.A. and Companies R.A. in Portugal in 1809:--

(_a_) Horse Artillery: _Strength._ 1. Captain H. Ross’s ‘A’ Troop, landed at Lisbon, July 2, or 3, 1809 162 2. Captain R. Bull’s ‘I’ Troop, landed at Lisbon, August 21, 1809 162

(_b_) Foot Artillery: 3. Captain C. D. Sillery’s[762] No. 6 company, 7th batt., landed at Lisbon, March 7, 1809 120 4. Captain A. Bredin’s No. 1 company, 8th batt., landed at Lisbon, August 1808 125 5. Captain J. May’s No. 2 company, 1st batt., landed at Lisbon, March 1809 127 6. Captain F. Glubb’s No. 10 company, 5th batt., landed at Lisbon, March 1809 93 7. Captain R. Lawson’s No. 7 company, 8th batt., landed at Lisbon, August 1808 66

[762] On arrival in Portugal, No. 6 company, 7th batt., was under 2nd Captain H. B. Lane; Captain C. D. Sillery joined shortly after the occupation of Oporto.

(_c_) K.G.L. Artillery: 1. Captain Tieling’s Company (No. 2). 2. Captain Heise’s Company (No. 4).

On taking up the command, General Howorth, with Colonel Robe’s assistance, equipped five brigades of guns to take the field with the army, viz. one brigade of heavy six-pounders, three brigades of light six-pounders, and one brigade of three-pounders. Captain Glubb’s company was stationed in Fort St. Julian, Lisbon, and Captain Bredin’s in the Forts at Cascaes. The other companies were with the field army.

BRIGADES R.A. AT OPORTO.

Captain C. D. Sillery’s No. 6 company, 7th batt., under 2nd Captain H. B. Lane. Light six-pounder guns.

Captain R. Lawson’s No. 7 company, 8th batt. Three-pounder guns.

Captain Tieling’s No. 2 company, K.G.L., under 2nd Captain de Rettberg. Heavy six-pounder guns.

Captain Heise’s No. 4 company, K.G.L. Light six-pounder guns.

[Captain May’s brigade was detached with Mackenzie’s force at Abrantes.]

BRIGADES R.A. AT TALAVERA.

Captain C. D. Sillery’s No. 6 company, 7th batt. Light six-pounder guns.

Captain J. May’s No. 2 company, 1st batt., under 2nd Captain W. G. Elliott. Light six-pounder guns.

Captain R. Lawson’s No. 7 company, 8th batt. Three-pounder guns.

Captain Tieling’s No. 2 company, K.G.L., under 2nd Captain de Rettberg. Heavy six-pounder guns.

Captain Heise’s No. 4 company, K.G.L. Light six-pounder guns.

CASUALTIES AT TALAVERA.

Killed: Lieut. H. Wyatt and seven men; wounded: Lieut.-Colonel H. Framingham, 2nd Captain H. Baynes and J. Taylor and twenty-one men, R.A.

K.G.L., killed: three men; wounded: thirty men.

In December 1809 the strength of the Royal Artillery under General Howorth was as follows, viz.:

R.H.A., 187 of all ranks, with 106 drivers attached.

Foot Artillery, 627 of all ranks, with 545 drivers attached.

K.G.L. 332 of all ranks with 160 drivers.

There were 951 horses, and 132 mules with the Artillery.

XII

VENEGAS’S ARMY OF LA MANCHA

FROM A RETURN OF JUNE 16, 1809.

1st Division, Brigadier-General PEDRO GIRON [afterwards Brigadier-General T. LACY]:

Burgos (two batts.), 1,085, Cuenca, 869, 1st of Loxa, 703, Alcala, 629, 1st of España, 548, 1st of Seville, 593 Total 4,427

2nd Division, Brigadier-General GASPAR VIGODET:

Corona (two batts.), 1,130, Ronda, 1,096, Ordenes Militares (two batts.), 836, Alcazar, 825, 1st of Guadix, 522, Ciudad Real, 258 Total 4,667

3rd Division, Major-General PEDRO GRIMAREST [afterwards Brigadier-General P. GIRON]:

2nd of Jaen, 985, Ecija, 902, 2nd of Cordova, 849, Baylen (two batts.), 1,121, 1st Walloon Guards, 663, Alpujarras, 579, Velez-Malaga, 445 Total 5,544

4th Division, Brigadier-General FRANCISCO CASTEJON:

5th of Seville, 535, 1st of Malaga, 743, 2nd Spanish Guards, 953, Jerez, 650, 2nd of Loxa, 510, Bujalance, 469, 3rd of Cordova, 422 Total 4,282

5th Division, Major-General T. ZERAIN:

2nd of España (two batts.), 1,064, 1st of Cordova (three batts.), 2,044, Provincial of Seville, 887 Total 3,995

CAVALRY:

Montesa, 349, Reina, 183, Granada, 322, España, 287, Farnesio, 404, Santiago, 295, Alcantara, 343, Principe, 324, Granaderos de Fernando VII, 527, Dragones de la Reina, 180, Cazadores de Cordova, 169 Total 3,384

ARTILLERY: 35 guns; sappers, five companies, about 1,100 in all.

Total, 27,399, including sick and men on detachment.

INDEX

Albergaria Nova, combat of, 325

Albuquerque, Duke of, attacks Digeon at Mora, 145; his quarrel with Cartaojal, 145; sent to join Cuesta’s army, 145, 157; at the battle of Medellin, 159-63; his intrigues against Cuesta, 465; at Talavera, 532, 545; at Oropesa, 583; routed by Soult at Arzobispo, 589-91.

Alcañiz, battle of, 418-20.

Alcantara, sacked by Lapisse, 261; combat of, 440, 441.

Almonacid, battle of, 614-6.

Alorna, Marquis of, raises an ‘experimental legion’ in the Portuguese army, 210.

Alvarez, Julian, Governor of Gerona, his attempt to relieve Rosas, 51.

Amarante, defended by Silveira, 267-71; captured by Loison, 271; Loison defeated at, 344, 345.

Aranjuez, Venegas at, 568; combat of, 612.

Areizaga, Juan Carlos, general, at Alcañiz, 418; his error at Maria, 431; commands army of Andalusia, 605.

Argenton, captain, his conspiracy against Soult, 279; makes overtures to the English, 284; his first interview with Wellesley, 315; his second visit to Wellesley, 321; his arrest and confession, 322-3; his escape and death, 323.

Arzobispo, combat of, 591.

Astorga, Marquis of, elected President of the Central Junta, 21.

Asturias, Junta and army of, their selfish policy, 370-1; dissolution of the Junta by La Romana, 375, 376; invaded by Ney and Kellermann, 379; evacuated by the French, 387.

Avé, passage of, by Soult, 239.

Badajoz, summoned to surrender by Victor, 168; Wellington retires to, 607.

Ballasteros, Francisco, general, in command at Colombres, 372; escapes from the advancing French, 382; his descent on Santander, 386; driven out by Bonnet, 387.

Barcelona, held by Duhesme against Vives, 41

Barrio, Manuel Garcia, Del, colonel sent by the Central Junta to lead Galician insurgents against Vigo, 263.

Bennett, captain, R. N. at the siege of Rosas, 50, 55, 56.

Beresford, William Carr, general, appointed Commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, 216; his reorganization of the army, 217, 218; joins Wellesley with ten line regiments, 314; commands flanking column at the advance on Oporto, 318; at Amarante, 344, 345; pursues Soult, 351, 360; his march to Perales and Coria, 599; retires to Castello Branco, 611.

Blake, Joaquin, general, commands in Aragon, 414; wins battle of Alcañiz, 418-20; defeated at Maria, 423-7; at Belchite, 429, 430.

Blanca, Florida, Marquis, President of the Junta, death of, 21.

Bogiero, Padre Basilio, chaplain of Palafox, shot by the French, 139.

Bonnet, general, his advance into Asturias, 382; his pursuit of Ballasteros, 386-7.

Botilho, general, commands Portuguese force on the Minho, 223; opposes Soult’s advance, 237.

Bouchard, captain, French engineer officer, his ingenious scheme for crossing the Tamega at Amarante, 270-1.

Bourke, colonel, sent by Wellesley to Cuesta, 437.

Braga, battle of, 235.

Cadiz, British proposal to garrison, 25; negatived by the Junta, 26; refusal of Villel to allow the British troops to land at, 28; tumults in, 29-31.

Caldagues, Conde de, commands the Catalonian troops round Barcelona, 38, 39; repulses sortie of Duhesme, 68; retreats on Molins de Rey, 68; taken prisoner by St. Cyr, 71.

Canning, George, proposes to garrison Cadiz, 25, 26; his correspondence with Wellesley, 609.

Cardadeu, battle of, 64-7.

Carrera, Martin La, checks Maucune at Santiago, 385.

Carrol, W. P., captain, his adventures in Asturias, 373, 380; in Galicia, 396, 401.

Cartaojal, general, takes command of the Army of the Centre, 33, 143; his quarrel with Albuquerque, 145; attacks Lasalle’s division at Yébenes, 146; routed by Sebastiani at Ciudad Real, 147; deprived of his command by the Junta, 148.

Casa de Salinas, combat of, 503.

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount, his confidence in Wellesley, 287.

Castro, general, routed at Igualada, 79.

Catalonia, army of, its composition, 33, 40; campaigns of St. Cyr, Vives, and Reding in, 38, 89.

Cavallero, colonel, his account of feeling in Saragossa, 99.

Cazadores (riflemen), new battalions of, raised in the Portuguese army, 212.

Chalot, colonel, surrenders Vigo, 263, 264.

Chaves, surrender of, to Soult, 225, 226; reoccupied by Silveira, 264.

Chinchon, revolt of, 7; massacre in, by the French, 8.

Cienfuegos, Captain-General of Asturias, 372.

Ciudad Real, the rout of, 143-7.

Ciudad Rodrigo, resists Lapisse, 260.

Cochrane, Lord, his raids on the coast of Languedoc, 39; his defence of Rosas, 48, 50-5.

Colmenar, insurrection of, against the French, is put down by Victor, 8.

Corunna, surrenders to Soult, 173; evacuated by Ney, 398.

Cotton, Stapleton, general, commands brigade at Albergaria Nova, 325.

Cradock, Sir John, general, dispatches British troops to Cadiz and Seville, 27, 206; condition of his force in Portugal, 201, 202; his timid policy, 203; retires to Passo d’Arcos, 205; at Lumiar, 206; advises Sir R. Wilson to retreat, 256; superseded by Wellesley, 207; Governor of Gibraltar, 313.

Craufurd, Robert, arrives with light brigade at Talavera, after the battle, 560; holds Almaraz against Ney, 586, 587.

Cuesta, Gregorio, general, commands Estremaduran army, 24, 143; his operations against Victor, 152-8; defeated at Medellin, 159-66; appointed Captain-General of the Estremaduran army, 167; his correspondence with Wellesley about the advance into Spain, 445-8; his jealousy of Wellesley, 464-7; receives Wellesley at Almaraz, 470-2; quarrel with Wellesley at Talavera, 489-92; pursues Victor, 492, 493; retreats on Talavera, 500; at the battle of Talavera, 509-56; retreats on Oropesa, 579, 580; withstands Mortier, 583; his final disputes with Wellesley, 603; retires from command, 605.

Dalmatia, Duke of: _see_ Soult.

Dantzig, Duke of: _see_ Lefebvre.

Decken, von der, Hanoverian general sent to Oporto by the British Government, 198; his report on the Portuguese army, 213.

Delaborde, general, opposed to Soult’s ambitions in Portugal, 279.

Del Reino, Marquis, defends the Pass of Baños, 572; breaks the bridge of Almaraz, 576.

D’España, Carlos, raises troops at Ciudad Rodrigo, 258; follows Lapisse, 260.

Digeon, general, captures artillery of the Spanish Army of the Centre at Tortola, 13; surprised at Mora, 144.

Donadieu, colonel, one of Argenton’s conspirators, 279, 281; his arrest, 323.

Douglas, major, receives Argenton, 284; brings him to meet Wellesley at Lisbon, 315.

Doyle, Charles, colonel, British agent at Tarragona, sends muskets to Saragossa, 101; his intrigues in favour of Infantado, 464.

Duhesme, general, at Barcelona, 37, 41, 58, 59; relieved by St. Cyr, 68.

Dulong, major, his exploit at the Ponte Nova, 355; and at the Saltador, 357.

Eben, Baron, Prussian colonel, sent to Oporto by the British Government, 198; sent to Freire’s army with the 2nd batt. of the Lusitanian Legion, 228; takes command of the army on Freire’s flight, 232; defeated at Braga, 235; at the siege of Oporto, 241.

Eguia, Francisco, general, succeeds Cuesta, 605; his quarrel with Wellesley, 606.

_Excellent_, the, at Rosas, 48-9.

Ferrol, surrenders to Soult, 175.

Fleury, de, colonel, holds the tower of San Francisco at Saragossa, and is killed, 133.

Foy, general, routs a detachment of Silveira’s force, 224; taken prisoner at Oporto, 243; delivered by Soult, 249; surprised by the English at Oporto, 337; sent by Soult to Joseph, 496; pursues Robert Wilson, 619.

Franceschi, general, receives the surrender of Vigo and Tuy, 178; routs La Romana’s rearguard, 194; at Lanhozo, 231; at Albergaria Nova, 325; at Grijon, 329; at Zamora, 402; his captivity and death, 402.

Freire, Bernardino, general, at Braga, 224, 228; his timidity, 228; his flight, 232; and death, 233.

Frere, John H., British ambassador, his negotiations regarding the British garrison for Cadiz, 26-31; correspondence with Wellesley, 290; supports Albuquerque against Cuesta, 465; urges Wellesley’s claims to be Commander-in-chief, 465, 466.

Galicia, Soult’s operations in, 170-95; its insurrection, 367-401; evacuated by Soult and Ney, 398-402.

Galindo, Mariano, leads a sortie from Saragossa, 119.

Galluzzo, general, defeated by Lefebvre at Almaraz, 4.

Garay, Don Martin de, Secretary to the Central Junta, declines the British proposal to garrison Cadiz, 26, 27, 29; his dealings with Lord Wellesley, 608.

Gazan, general, takes part in the siege of Saragossa, 104, 107, 109; present at Arzobispo, 589.

German Legion, the King’s, losses of, at Talavera, 510.

Girard, general, storms the bridge of Arzobispo, 589.

Giron, Pedro, general, commands at Aranjuez, 612; at Almonacid, 615.

Grijon, combat of, 328-30.

Henestrosa, Juan, general, commands cavalry of Cuesta’s army, checks Lasalle at Berrocal and at Miajadas, 155; at Medellin, 163.

Heudelet, general, sent out by Soult to relieve Tuy and Vigo, 262; relieves Tuy, 263; evacuates Tuy and Valenza, 265.

Hill, Sir Rowland, general, Wellesley’s appreciation of, 304, 305; in the advance on Oporto, 326-8; defends the Seminary, 338-9; at Talavera, 503, 517, 524; wounded, 525.

Igualada, combat of, 79.

_Impérieuse_, the, frigate, commanded by Lord Cochrane at Rosas, 48.

Infantado, Duke of, commands Army of the Centre, 5; at Cuenca, 5; his hesitation and delay, 6-8; starts to join Venegas, 12; his march to Chinchilla, 13; joins Del Palacio on the Despeña Perros, 32; removed from command by the Junta, 33; his intrigues against the Junta, 464.

Jaca, surrender of, 408.

Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, his position at Madrid, 2-8; makes formal entry into the capital, 13; his anxiety about Soult and Ney’s expedition, 377; dispatches an expedition to Galicia, 378; correspondence with Victor, 443, 444; leads his Guards from Madrid to pursue Venegas, 458; joins Victor, 499, 500; at the battle of Talavera, 527-54; his mendacious report to Napoleon, 565; retreats toward Madrid, 568; marches against Venegas, 569; his orders to Soult, 596; wins battle of Almonacid, 614.

Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste, marshal, military adviser to King Joseph, his controversy with Victor, 151; his comments on the Spanish resistance, 167; sends orders to Lapisse to go to Alcantara, 259; at Talavera, 527-54; his orders to Soult, 596.

Junot, general, Duke of Abrantes, besieges Saragossa, 110-19; superseded by Lannes, 119; removed from his command, 410.

Junta, the Central, flies from Aranjuez to Seville, 21; its refusal to allow a British garrison in Cadiz, 26, 27, 29, 31; refuses to appoint a single Commander-in-chief for Spanish troops, 35; rejects the offers of negotiation of Sotelo, 169; the plots against, 464; its negotiations with Wellesley, 466; its fears of Cuesta and intrigues with Venegas, 468-9; endeavours to prevent Wellesley’s return to Portugal, 608.

Kellermann, François Christophe, general, commands expedition to Galicia, 378; forces the pass of Pajares, 382; evacuates the Asturias, 388; commands in Leon, 575, 597.

Lacoste, general, commands engineers at the siege of Saragossa, 104, 109, 115; killed, 126.

Lafitte, colonel, one of Argenton’s conspiracy, 279; his arrest, 323.

Lamartinière, general, left by Soult at Tuy, 188; relieved by Heudelet, 262.

Lanhozo, combat of, 231, 232.

Lannes, Jean, marshal, besieges and takes Saragossa, 1, 119-36.

Lapisse, general, his instructions from Napoleon for the invasion of Portugal, 253; held in check by Wilson, 257, 258; escapes from Wilson and sacks Alcantara, 260, 261; joins Victor at Merida, 261; at Talavera, 504, 516, 522; killed, 543.

Lasalle, general, commands cavalry in Victor’s army, 150; at Berrocal, 155; at Medellin, 161.

Lazan, Marquis of, brings the Aragonese division to Gerona, 52; pursues St. Cyr, 61; fails to appear at the battle of Cardadeu, 67; his success in the Ampurdam, 73, 74; promises to succour Saragossa, 116, 120; unites with Francisco Palafox, 131; retreats before Lannes, 131; at Alcañiz, 417; at Maria, 424.

Lefebvre, general, delates Argenton to Soult, 321-2.

Lefebvre, marshal, Duke of Dantzig, defeats Galluzzo at Almaraz, 4; disobeys Napoleon’s orders, sent back to France, 4.

Leval, general, at Talavera, 530.

Lima-Barreto, general, at the defence of Oporto, 241; killed, 246.

Lippe, Conde de La (Frederick of Lippe-Bückeburg), his reorganization of the Portuguese regular army, 208, 211.

Lisbon, disturbed condition of, 200-1; Wellesley’s plans for defence of, 610.

Loison, general, his disinclination to advance into Portugal, 192; hatred of the people of Oporto for, 243; sent out by Soult to the Tras-os-Montes, 262; resisted by Silveira, 267; attacks Amarante, 267; his difficulties, 267-71; occupies Amarante, 271; and Villa Real, 272; disapproves of Soult’s ambitious views, 279; checked by the Portuguese and abandons Amarante, 344, 345; retreat of, to Guimaraens, 346.

Lusitanian Legion, the, raised by Sir R. Wilson, 168; on the Portuguese frontier, 199, 202; 2nd batt. of, sent under Eben to Braga, 228; at battle of Braga, 234; 1st batt. defends Alcantara, 441; engaged in Wilson’s march to Escalona, 479-570.

Mackenzie, general, commands brigade sent to garrison Cadiz, 28; returns to Lisbon, 32; commands ‘containing force’ left by Wellesley on his advance to Oporto, 317; killed at Talavera, 541.

Mackinley, captain, R.N., receives the surrender of French garrison of Vigo, 264.

Madrid, formal entry of Joseph into, 14.

Mahy, Nicolas, general, is defeated by Franceschi at La Trepa, 194; left in command of La Romana’s army, 375; retreats before Ney, 380; his descent on Lugo, 384. Maria, battle of, 423-8.

Maucune, general, defeated by Carrera near Santiago, 385.

Mayne, William, lieut.-col. of the Lusitanian Legion, governor of Almeida, 256-8; occupies Alcantara, 318; driven out by Victor, 440-1.

Medellin, battle of, 158-66.

Melgarejo, governor of Ferrol, surrenders to Soult, 175.

Mequinenza, refuses to surrender to Mortier, 409.

Meza de Ibor, combat of, 153; Cuesta at, 586, 592.

Miajadas, combat of, 155.

Milans, Francisco, leader of _miqueletes_, driven back by St. Cyr, 63; fails to come up at battle of Cardadeu, 67.

Minho, Soult repulsed at the, 182.

_Miqueletes_, the Catalonian, surround Barcelona, 38, 60.

Misarella, passage of the, 357.

Molins de Rey, battle of, 1, 70, 71.

Moncey, Bon Adrien de, marshal, in charge of the siege of Saragossa, 91, 103-10; recalled to Madrid, 110.

Moore, Sir John, his views on the defence of Portugal, 286.

Morella, taken and abandoned by Grandjean, 410.

Morillo, Pablo, leads Galicians against Vigo, 263; at combat of Santiago, 385.

Mortier, Edouard, marshal, Duke of Treviso, leads the 5th Corps to take part in the siege of Saragossa, 103-12; operations of, in Eastern Aragon, 409; recalled to Castile by Napoleon, 410, 411; leads the vanguard of Soult’s force to Plasencia, 574; meets Cuesta’s force at Oropesa, 583; movements of, in the Tagus valley, 589.

Murray, George, general, fails to stop the retreating French at Oporto, 340, 341; his pursuit of Soult, 350-1.

Napoleon, Emperor, his parting orders to Jourdan, 3; at Valladolid, 15-6; quits Spain, 18; his plan for the next campaign, 16; its impracticability, 18-21, 171; his dispatch to Soult on the invasion of Portugal, 175; receives news of Soult’s ambitious views, 276; his estimate of Wellesley, 297; his orders to Ney for the subjection of Galicia, 369; of the Asturias, 388; his criticism of Soult’s advance on Plasencia, 497; his rebukes to Joseph and Jourdan, 537, 565; orders the cessation of active operations, 618.

Ney, Michel, marshal, Duke of Elchingen, leaves Saragossa, 91; joins Soult, 178; his difficulties in Galicia, 191, 367-70; captures Oviedo, 379-81; his meeting with Soult at Lugo, 391; repulsed by Noroña at the Oitaben, 396-7; abandons Galicia, 398; joins Soult in pursuit of Wellesley, 583; fails at Almaraz, 594; returns towards Salamanca, 597; defeats Wilson at Baños, 620.

Noroña, Conde de, commands the ‘Division of the Minho,’ repulses Ney at the Oitaben, 394-7.

O’Daly, Pedro, colonel, commands garrison of Rosas, 47, 50-6.

O’Donoju, general, chief of Cuesta’s staff, 472.

Oitaben, the, Ney repulsed by Noroña at, 395-7.

Oporto, fortifications of, 240; stormed by Soult, 241-8; surprise and capture of, by Wellesley, 334-42.

Oporto, the bishop of (Antonio de Castro), unwise zeal in rousing the populace of Oporto, 198; gathers an army for the defence of Oporto, 240, 241; abandons the city, 242.

_Ordenanza_, the Portuguese _levée en masse_, called out by the Regency, 197; its organization, 221, 222; opposes Soult’s advance, 223-38.

Orense, occupied by Soult, 189.

Oviedo, captured and sacked by Ney, 381.

Paget, Edward, general, crosses the Douro at Oporto, 336.

Palacio, Del, Marquis, escapes from Victor, 13; commands Andalusian force, 25; Captain-General of Catalonia, his slowness, 40; recalled by the Central Junta, 41.

Palafox, Francisco, escapes from Saragossa to seek help for the garrison, 116; arms the local levies, 119; joins Lazan’s force, 131; retreats before Lannes, 131; intrigues against the Junta, 464.

Palafox, Joseph, defends Saragossa, 92-136; capitulates, 136-8; taken prisoner to Vincennes, 139; criticism of his defence, 140-2.

Parque, Duke del, commands division of the Army of Estremadura at Meza de Ibor, 153; at Medellin, 161, 163; commands at Ciudad Rodrigo, 574.

Parreiras, general, takes part in the defence of Oporto, 241-6.

Patrick, colonel, his gallant defence of the bridge of Amarante, 267.

Peso de Regoa, combat of, 344.

_Philadelphes_, the, secret society in France opposed to Napoleon, 279.

Pino, general, at Cardadeu, 66; at Valls, 87.

Pizarro, Magelhaes, his futile attempt to defend Chaves, 225, 226.

Ponte Nova, passage of the, 355-8.

Portugal, condition of, in the spring of 1809, 196-208; Soult’s and Wellesley’s campaign in March-May, 1809, 222-366.

Portuguese army, its history and reorganization, 208-22.

Puerto de Baños, combat of, 620.

Quiroga, Abbot of Casoyo, raises Galicians against Soult, 184.

Reding, Teodoro, general, sent by Vives against St. Cyr, 62, 63; at Cardadeu, 64, 65, 66, 67; joins Caldagues, at Molins de Rey, 69; defeated by St. Cyr, 70, 71; supersedes Vives as Captain-General of Catalonia, 73; in Tarragona, 76, 77; drives back Souham at Valls, 84; defeated by St. Cyr, 86, 87; wounded and dies, 89.

Regency, the Portuguese, fails in organizing national defence after Junot’s departure, 196, 197; calls out the _Ordenanza_, 197; asks for a British Commander-in-chief for the Portuguese army, 215; its report on the Oporto campaign, 218; attempts to mobilize the militia, 219.

Reille, general, withdraws to Figueras, 37; sufferings of his troops, 39; besieges and takes Rosas, 48-57.

Ricard, general, his circular letter on the subject of Soult’s election as King of Portugal, 276.

Roca, general, at Alcañiz, 417; at Maria, 424.

Rogniat, colonel, takes command of the French engineers at siege of Saragossa, 126, 135.

Romana, La, Marquis of, condition of his army, 23; his wanderings, 179; retreats to Monterey, 180; escapes from. Franceschi, 193-5; captures Villafranca, 374-5; his _coup d’état_ at Oviedo, 375, 376; routed by Ney at the passage of the Nova, 381; marches to Orense, 386; his operations against Soult, 399-400.

Rosas, siege of, 46-57.

Ruffin, general, commands division guarding Madrid, 3, 7; at battle of Ucles, 10, 11; leads night-attack at Talavera, 516-8; leads the second attack, 523, 525.

St. Cyr, Laurent Gouvion, general, commands French army in Catalonia, 34; his character, 43; sends Reille to besiege Rosas, 46-57; proceeds against Barcelona, 58-68; wins battle of Cardadeu, 64-7; of Molins de Rey, 70, 71; routs Castro’s troops at Igualada, 79; wins battle of Valls, 87, 88.

St. March, general, takes part in the defence of Saragossa, 106; receives military command of the city from Palafox, 136.

Salamonde, combat of, 357-8.

San Genis, colonel, fortifies Saragossa, 94; killed on the ramparts, 117.

Santander, Ballasteros’ descent on, 386; retaken by Bonnet, 387.

Santiago, combat near, 385.

Saragossa, second siege of, 90-136; its outworks stormed, 105-14, 123; street-fighting in, 123-35; capitulation of, 136; condition of, after the siege, 139.

Sass, Santiago, parish priest of Saragossa, shot by the French, 139.

Sebastiani, Horace, general, succeeds to command of the 4th Corps, 5; routs Cartaojal at Ciudad Real, 146, 147; at Talavera, 522, 527, 529; eludes Venegas, 566, 567; wins battle of Almonacid, 614.

Senra, general, joins Venegas before the battle of Ucles, 9.

Silveira, Francisco, general, military governor of the Tras-os-Montes, 223; assembles his forces at Chaves, 223; returns to San Pedro, 224, 225; to Villa Pouca, 228; recaptures Chaves, 266; attacks Loison, 267; defends Amarante, 267-71; escapes across the Douro, 272, 318; checks Loison at Peso de Regoa, 344; pursues Soult, 352, 359, 360.

Smith, Sir George, his endeavour to force a British garrison on Cadiz, 27-9; his death, 31.

_Somatenes_, their good work in Catalonia, 35, 38.

Sotelo, agent for Victor, tries to negotiate with the Governor of Badajoz and Central Junta, 168, 169.

Souham, general, repulsed by Reding at Valls, 84, 85.

Soult, Nicolas, marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, receives instructions from Napoleon for the invasion of Portugal, 18; their impracticability, 18, 170-2; difficulties of his task, 173; captures Ferrol, 174, 175; his final orders from Napoleon, 175, 176; starts his troops for Portugal, 178; fails to cross the Minho, 182; difficulties of his progress in Galicia, 184-9; occupies Orense, 189, and Chaves, 226; wins battle of Braga, 235, 236; storms Oporto, 242-8; his ambitious views, 273-276; his dealings with the Argenton conspiracy, 322, 323; surprised by Wellesley in Oporto, 332-41; his retreat, 343-60; meets Ney at Lugo, 390; abandons Galicia, 398-402; his justificatory letters, 403-5; appointed commander of the united army, 460, 461; advances on Plasencia to support Joseph, 497, 573; pursues Wellesley, 577-580; routs Albuquerque at Arzobispo, 589-91; his desire to invade Portugal, 595, 617; checked by King Joseph, 618.

Stewart, Charles, general, at combat of Grijon, 329; at battle of Oporto, 340; at conference of Mirabete, 470-1.

Suchet, general, takes command of the 3rd Corps, 412; defeated at Alcañiz, 418-20; wins battle of Maria, 423-7; and of Belchite, 429.

Tactics, the, of Wellesley, 300, 301.

Talavera, Victor retires to, 490; the allied armies at, 491-2; battle of, 502-56.

Tarragona, blockaded by St. Cyr, 89.

Troncoso, Mauricio, Abbot of Couto, raises the Galician peasantry against Soult, 184.

Tuy, surrendered to Franceschi, 178; occupied by Lamartinière, 188; relieved by Heudelet, 262; evacuated by the French, 264.

Ucles, battle of, 10-12; town of, sacked by the French, 12.

Valls, battle of, 82-9.

Vaughan, Sir Charles, his testimony to Palafox’s character, 142.

Venegas, Francisco, general, attempts to surprise Tarancon, 6; defeated by Victor at Ucles, 9-12; supersedes Cartaojal in command of the Army of the Centre, 148; advances to meet Sebastiani, 457; fails to carry out Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s orders, 478; at Toledo, 529; allows the army of Sebastiani to escape him, 566, 567; loses the opportunity of occupying Madrid, 568; his blunders, 612; defeated at Almonacid, 614.

Victor, Claude Perrin, marshal, Duke of Belluno, defeats Spaniards at Ucles, 9-12; marches to Almaraz, 143, 144; his controversy with Jourdan, 151; drives back the Duke del Parque at Meza de Ibor, 153; wins battle of Medellin, 158-66; remains stationary at Merida, 252; joined by Lapisse, 261; seizes Alcantara, 440-41; misery of his army, 443-4; retires from Talavera, 490; joined by Joseph and Jourdan, 500; at Talavera, 504-55; his night-attack, 516-8; his second attack, 522; his great attack, 531-54; retreats on Madrid, 570; reoccupies Talavera, 580; in La Mancha, 618.

Vigo, surrenders to Franceschi, 178; blockaded by Galicians, 263; surrenders to Capt. Mackinley, R.N., 264.

Villafranca, captured by La Romana, 374, 375.

Villatte, general, at the battle of Ucles, 11; at Talavera, 522, 531.

Villel, Marquis of, special commissioner at Cadiz, opposes landing of British troops, 28; his eccentric legislation, 29, 30; recalled by the Junta, 31.

Villiers, Hon. John, British minister at Lisbon, opposes Cradock’s timid policy, 205.

Vittoria, general, at the defence of Oporto, 241, 245.

Vives, appointed Captain-General of Catalonia, 41; invests Barcelona, 41; fails to send help to Rosas, 51; sends _miqueletes_ against St. Cyr, 61; defeated at Cardadeu, 66, 67; at Molins de Rey, 71; superseded by Reding, 73.

Waters, colonel, seizes barges for the crossing of the Douro, 334, 335.

Wellesley, Sir Arthur, takes command of British troops in Portugal, 207; declines the post of commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, 216; arrives in Lisbon, 283; his opinions on the defence of Portugal, 287, 290, 293; his character and abilities, 295-300; his limitations, 302-11; his tactics, 300, 301; his interviews with Argenton, 315, 321; advance on Oporto, 316-35; attacks and takes Oporto, 335-42; his pursuit of Soult, 354-66; correspondence with Cuesta, 445-8; reviews Cuesta’s troops at Almaraz, 470-2; quarrel with Cuesta at Talavera, 491, 492; his choice of the positions at Talavera, 503, 507; wins battle of Talavera, 513-54; marches on Plasencia, 573; on Oropesa, 583; holds the line of the Tagus, 600-1; retires to Badajoz, 606; his plans for the Defence of Portugal, 610.

Wellesley, Richard, Marquis, his diplomacy at Seville, 608.

West, captain, R. N., of the _Excellent_, at Rosas, 49, 50.

Wilson, Sir Robert, commands the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, 168; his differences with the bishop of Oporto, 199; his character and record, 253, 254; refuses to retreat as advised by Sir John Cradock, 256; holds Lapisse in check, 257, 258; joins Wellesley’s advance into Spain, 438; threatens Victor’s flank after Talavera, 570; his escape from Escalona, 619; defeated by Ney at Baños, 620.

Worster, lieut.-general, commands Asturian force, 372; escapes from Ney, 383.

END OF VOL. II

Oxford: Printed at the Clarendon Press, by HORACE HART, M.A.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected.

* Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant usage was found.

* To aid referencing places and names in present-day maps and documents, outdated and current spellings of some proper names follow:

Alariz, now Allariz, Albuquerque, now Alburquerque, Alemtejo, now Alentejo, Aljafferia, now Aljafería, Almanza, now Almansa, Arens de Mar, now Arenys de Mar, Arzobispo, now El Puente del Arzobispo, Ballasteros, now Ballesteros, Baylen, now Bailén, Busaco, now Buçaco, Cacabellos, now Cacabelos, Cangas de Oñis, now Cangas de Onís, Campo Saucos, now Camposancos Cardadeu, now Cardedeu, Cascaes, now Cascais, Cette, now Sète, Cevolla, now Cebolla, Compostella, now Compostela, Cordova, now Córdoba, Corunna, now La Coruña, Deleytosa, now Deleitosa, Despeña Perros, now Despeñaperros, El Moral, now Moral de Calatrava, Estremadura, now Extremadura (for Spain), Estremadura (for Portugal), Florida Blanca, now Floridablanca, Fuentedueñas, now Fuentidueña de Tajo, Giguela (river), now Gigüela, Grijon, now Grijó, Guimaraens, now Guimarães, Huerba (river), now Huerva, La Bispal, now La Bisbal, La Gudina, now La Gudiña, Lanhozo, now Lanhoso, Loxa, now Loja, Majorca, now Mallorca, Meza de Ibor, now Mesas de Ibor, Mondonedo, now Mondoñedo, Monmalo, now Montmeló, Monterey, now Monterrey, Osoño, now Villardevós (Osoño), Pampeluna, now Pamplona, Passo d’Arcos, now Paço de Arcos Pillar, now Pilar, Riva de Sella, now Ribadesella, San Boy, now Sant Boi de Llobregat, San Culgat, now Sant Cugat del Vallés, San Per, now Samper de Calanda, Saragossa, now Zaragoza, Sarreal, now Sarral, Senabria, now Sanabria, Tajuna, now Tajuña, Tortola, now Valdetórtola, Truxillo, now Trujillo, Vierzo, now El Bierzo, Villa de Cervo, now Villar de Ciervo, Villaharta, now Villarta de San Juan, Villa Nova de Famelicção, now Vila Nova de Famalicão, Villanueva de Sitjas, now Sitges, Villarodoña, now Villarrodona, Vincente, now Vicente, Vittoria, now Vitoria, Zornoza, now Amorebieta-Echano.

* Chapter headers and Table of contents have been made consistent.

* Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote is placed at the end of the paragraph that includes its anchor.

* In the following pages, the anchor placement for the mentioned footnote is conjectured; no anchor was found in the printed original: p. 27, n. 35; p. 49, n. 57; p. 293, n. 353; p. 316, n. 390; p. 343, n. 427; p. 372, n. 466; p. 420, n. 524.

* In Appendix IV, the meaning of the marks preceding regiment names seems to be those used in Volume I, App. VIII: “* marks an old regiment of the regular army; † a militia regiment; ‡ a regiment of new levies.”

End of Project Gutenberg's A History of the Peninsula War, by Charles Oman