CHAPTER XVI.

FIRST PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-85—EXPEDITION UP THE NILE.

General description of the possessions of the Khedive in 1882—Rebellion in the Sudan; rapid rise of the Mahdi—Policy of the British Government—General Gordon sent to Khartum; he is cut off and besieged there—General Lord Wolseley goes to Egypt—Formation of a Camel Corps, of which the Guards compose a Regiment—Problem how to effect the rescue of Gordon—The Nile route selected—Advance to Korti—News from General Gordon—Two columns advance from Korti: one across the Bayuda Desert, the other up the river—Battles of Abu Klea and Abu Kru—The Nile reached near Metemmeh—Sir C. Wilson’s effort to proceed to Khartum—Death of General Gordon—Change of plan entailed by this event—Battle of Kirbekan—Retrograde movement of both columns—Troops placed in summer quarters.

Egypt proper is generally a long and narrow strip of land formed by the valley of the Nile.[425] Outside the influence of that river, there is nothing but desert, and it is due to the fact that the stream branches out into a Delta at Cairo, that there is any breadth at all in the country. This great water artery receives no affluents for more than 1500 miles from its mouth—the Atbara River, meeting it above Berber, being the last tributary that joins it,—and throughout a considerable portion of its lower course, reckoned from the Nubian Desert northwards, the people can only live by congregating close to its banks. A great part of the soil, in fact, which is situated a few miles from the Nile or from the canals that are fed by it, constructed for purposes of irrigation, is a mere barren waste, covered by sand, and unfit for habitation. To the south of the Nubian Desert there is the fertile province of Dongola, and, separated from it by another desert, a rich country, which, owning Khartum as its chief town, is watered by the tributaries of the great river that flow down from the Abyssinian mountains. This large region, usually called the Sudan,—which includes the seaboard from Suakin to Massowa, and extends to about the line of latitude eleven degrees north,—was for many a century overrun by wild tribes of nomad Arabs, until 1820, when the Egyptians, having begun then to invade it, gradually brought it under their rule. Later, the territories lying still further to the south, were opened up to the energy of the Khedives; and at the time of the war in 1882, Tewfik’s sway, outside Egypt proper, stretched to the great water reservoirs in the heart of the African continent close to the equator, where the Nile takes its rise. In the government of these enormous dominions the Khedives had been assisted by more than one Englishman, who succeeded in partially checking the evils of the slave-trade that prevailed among the natives, and in introducing some form of civilization in their midst. By far the most celebrated of these administrators was Colonel, afterwards Major-General, C. Gordon, C.B., whose illustrious name is now a household word in England.

Footnote 425:

Map No. 9, p. 379.

In 1881, a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, and this calamity was mainly brought about by two causes. In the first place, the Egyptians misgoverned the country, and had been obliged to relax their hold upon it, on account of the troubles that eventually involved them in war with England. Their administration, always corrupt, became weak, and as a matter of course the Arabs grew discontented with it. But, in the next place, the people were deeply stirred by a tradition that fixed this time—the completion of twelve centuries from the Hegira, November 12, 1882—as the moment when a great chief was to arise, to regenerate Islam, and to restore the Mussulman world to its former power, glory, and magnificence. Nor had the Sudanese to wait for the exact date fixed in the prophecy; for a native of Dongola, named Muhammad Ahmad, proclaiming himself to be the long-expected Mahdi, enrolled his followers, whom we call Dervishes, headed a serious revolt, and preached a “Jehad,” or a “Holy War,” against the authority of the Khedive. By October, 1882, when the British were in possession of Egypt, the struggle had begun in earnest, and the rebels had obtained some important advantages. To meet the danger, 10,000 men of Arabi’s late army were despatched during the winter to the south; and in March, 1883, General Hicks Pasha, a retired British Officer who had served in India, reached Khartum to direct military operations against the enemy. It is sad to relate that he was poorly supported at Cairo; that, in endeavouring to drive the Mahdi from his head-quarters at El-Obeid, he cut himself off from his communications; and that his whole force was surrounded and entirely destroyed. General Hicks and his Staff died with arms in their hands on the field of battle, and none survived to tell the tale of their misfortunes (October 7, 1883).[426] With this disaster, the bulk of the Egyptian forces were annihilated; the dervishes acquired an immense addition to their former strength, both material and moral: Khartum was in danger, and there were only some 2000 men left to defend it.[427]

Footnote 426:

Colonel Arthur Farquhar (late Coldstream Guards) accompanied this ill-fated expedition, and perished in it. Some account of the good services rendered by this Officer is given in Slatin Pasha’s recent publication (_Fire and Sword in the Sudan, 1879-95_ , by Rudolf C. Slatin Pasha, C.B.; translated by Major F. R. Wingate, C.B., D.S.O., R.A.; London, 1896; chap. viii.).

Footnote 427:

_History of the Sudan Campaign_ (compiled at the Intelligence Department of the War Office, by Colonel Colvile, C.B., Grenadier Guards), part i. p. 16 (London, 1889).

Nor was this the only trouble, for the dervishes of the Eastern Sudan, led by one Osman Digna, also raised the standard of revolt, and gained several successes over the Egyptians in the autumn of 1883. In order to save so important a port as Suakin from the ruin that seemed imminent, a force of nearly 4000 men was despatched to oppose the rebels, under a former British Officer, General Baker Pasha, who had rendered distinguished service in the Turkish army during the war with Russia in 1877. But all his efforts were of no avail, for his troops also were overwhelmed and destroyed, February 4, 1884.

These events showed how impossible it was for the Khedive to cope single-handed with the Mahdi; so also did they put the British Government in no small difficulty. Our intervention in Egypt had weakened the military resources of the country, and had imposed responsibilities upon us which had not been foreseen when we began hostilities by the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria. We little imagined then, that we should not only have to guard the frontiers from the irruption of savage hordes of Arabs, but also be obliged to try to save the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan from the perils that menaced them, and to prevent that slave-dealing region from relapsing into the darkness and barbarism that oppressed it in the past. And yet little was done. The revolt was not met at once, and it had time to grow into formidable proportions. The power of the Mahdi increased with great rapidity; the native tribes were unsupported, and had to submit to the terror he inspired. It was then too late to act, unless we were prepared to re-conquer the huge provinces which had already been devastated. It is indeed a calamity that the first-fruits of the regeneration we determined to effect in Egypt, should thus have been unfortunately coupled with the abandonment of many of the Khedive’s troops to a merciless foe, and with the obliteration of the work of civilization in an immense tract of country, by the most cruel form of a hateful tyranny.

It was determined to evacuate the Sudan; and General Gordon was requested by the British Government to accomplish this difficult and perilous mission. Accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Donald Stewart, 11th Hussars, he cheerfully accepted it, and reached Khartum unattended by any force, February 18, 1884. He immediately placed the town in a state of defence, infused new life and hopes into the panic-stricken garrison and inhabitants, and took early measures to carry out his instructions. But it was not long before he perceived the impossible nature of the task that had been allotted to him. He had no soldiers available to secure the withdrawal of the many for whose safety he was responsible, and soon the Mahdi surrounded him, intercepted his supplies, and cut off his communications with Egypt. In March, the enemy threatened Shendi. The month following, he established himself in the vicinity of that place. And towards the end of May, Berber fell. Gordon was thus shut out from the rest of the world, and he was little more than a prisoner in Khartum—besieged there, and fighting for his life and for those entrusted to his charge. Retreat was impossible, and the end must infallibly come, as soon as his powers of resistance were exhausted, unless an expedition were sent to his relief.

Meanwhile Major-General Sir G. Graham and a British field force of some 5000 men had been landed in the neighbourhood of Suakin, to defend that seaport and coast from the inroads of Osman Digna (February 28, 1884). In less than a month, he had inflicted severe losses upon the followers of that chieftain, and had pacified the district. But this was all; and these successes bore no fruit. Graham was not ordered to advance in force upon Berber to guard that important town and the communications thereto with the Red Sea.[428] Instead of this, he was withdrawn from Suakin on the 3rd of April, leaving only a small garrison behind him. Hence, just at this critical moment, when it was obvious that the nearest and the ordinary road to Khartum should have been secured and made easily accessible by a light railway, the opportunity of approaching General Gordon was neglected, and the means of enabling him to accomplish his mission were denied him.[429] On General Graham’s departure there was a pause for several months, during which no further operations took place as far as we were concerned,[430] though the Arabs continued to advance northwards; and, unopposed, they re-occupied their former positions in the Eastern Sudan from which they had just been expelled.

Footnote 428:

A proposition had been made at this time to send 200 or 300 cavalry to Berber, which probably they could have reached. But the General Commanding in Egypt (Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, K.C.B.) opposed it, on the grounds that it was undesirable to fritter away our troops in small detachments, that so weak a force in the Mahdi’s country and unsupported there, could achieve no success, and must only add to the numbers who had to be rescued from the Sudan.

Footnote 429:

The reader will presently see that a strong force was landed at Suakin in the spring of 1885, to construct a railway to Berber, _when it was too late_.

Footnote 430:

Except some battalions pushed to the frontier of Egypt to guard it against invasion, that appeared to be threatening; also the first preparations for laying a line of railway from Suakin to Berber, but which was stopped at the end of August. Major-General A. Lyon Fremantle (late Coldstream Guards) assumed command at Suakin at the end of July.

During this interval of inaction in the field, the British Cabinet deliberated on the situation, and, having asked for advice, considered the merits of the various schemes relating to the invasion of the Sudan that were placed before them by the military authorities at home and on the spot. As a result, they at length announced their determination in a despatch, dated August 8th, when Khartum had been already beleaguered and hidden from their view for many months. In this paper[431] they expressed their opinion that “General Gordon, acting on his instructions,” might still “secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either by the employment of force or of pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons and of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave;” they announced their intention “to undertake operations for the relief of General Gordon, should they become necessary, and to make certain preparations in respect thereof;” and they further indicated their resolution that the expedition—“whose general scope” was to enable Government “to give directions at a very short notice for the despatch of a brigade of troops of all arms to proceed to Dongola,”—was to advance, “should the necessity arise,” along the valley of the Nile.

Footnote 431:

Given in full in Colvile’s _History of the Sudan Campaign_ , part i. p. 45. Hereafter referred to as “Colvile, _Official Account_ .”

In order to produce an early moral effect upon the enemy, and to facilitate a prompt advance into the Sudan, which every one knew was imperative if Gordon was to be saved, Sir F. Stephenson, on the receipt of this despatch, was anxious to send up troops without delay to Dongola. But such a proceeding did not at once commend itself to Government, and they still hesitated before venturing so far, even though the movement could have been made with perfect safety. At the same time, 400 boats, each suitable for the conveyance of 12 men and 100 rations per man up the Nile, were ordered in England on the 12th of August, and a further number of 400 were also put in hand on the 22nd. But it was not till a month later (September 20th) that the first British battalion entered Dongola, and it was also only then decided (on the 21st) that, “if necessary,” the expedition might proceed beyond that place.[432]

Footnote 432:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 53.

Meantime, General Lord Wolseley, having been sent to Egypt to take command, reached Cairo on the 9th of September, and two days later he wrote home to request that a special Camel Corps might be immediately placed at his disposal, in addition to the troops whom he proposed should take part in the campaign. The new corps, 1200 strong, was composed of detachments of 40 men, with one or two Officers, taken from every Battalion of the Foot Guards (280 men), from the 16 Regiments of Cavalry at home (640 men), and from two Battalions of the Rifle Brigade (80 men); also 100 men from the three Regiments of Household Cavalry, and a similar number from the Royal Marines. The corps was divided into three sections, viz. the Guards (to which the Marines were eventually attached), the Heavy, and the Light Camel regiments. The detachments were quickly got together; they left England on the 26th of September, and landed at Alexandria on the 7th of October.

The command of the Guards Camel regiment was assigned to Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards; the Adjutant being Lieutenant C. Crutchley, Scots Guards; the Signalling Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bonham, Grenadier Guards; and the Medical Officer, Surgeon J. Magill, Coldstream Guards. The following Officers, two from each Battalion, also formed part of the corps:[433]—

Lieut.-Colonels C. Rowley and I. Herbert; Captain E. Crabbe; Lieutenants Count Gleichen, D'Aguilar, and R. Wolridge-Gordon: Grenadier Guards.

Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Graves-Sawle; Captain Vesey Dawson; Lieutenants Douglas Dawson, and Hon. H. Amherst: Coldstream Guards.

Lieut.-Colonels M. Willson, and Sir W. Gordon-Cumming, Bart.; Lieutenants A. Drummond, and B. Baden-Powell: Scots Guards.

Footnote 433:

The detachments furnished by the Coldstream amounted to: from the 1st Battalion, three sergeants, two corporals, one drummer, and 38 privates; from the 2nd Battalion, two sergeants, three corporals, one drummer, and 38 privates. Total, 92 of all ranks.

The rest of the British troops required for field operations were drawn from our force already in occupation of Egypt.[434] Of these, 3½ battalions of infantry, and one of Marines, one squadron, most of the artillery, and a portion of the Royal Engineers were left in garrison at Alexandria, Cairo, and Suakin. The remainder, 9 battalions, 3 squadrons (of the 19th Hussars), the Mounted infantry, a Camel battery, and Royal Engineers took part in the expedition, and were disposed along the Nile to guard the communications, and to form the fighting force.[435] In addition, the Egyptian army was also utilized, but all, except a Camel battery which was pushed to the front later on, were left upon the lines of communication, not further south than Hannek.

Footnote 434:

Except one Battalion, which came from India, and some 390 Canadians (called “Voyageurs”), under Lieut.-Colonel Denison, brought to Egypt to help our men to pilot the boats up the Nile.

Footnote 435:

The numerical strength, together with the Camel corps, appears to have been about 10,000 men and 6 guns, and eventually 6 additional guns, belonging to the Egyptian army. Subsequently Dongolese troops fought with us against the enemy.

N^o. 9.

Khartum, inaccessible from the south, is cut off from all ordinary communications with the north by large tracts of almost waterless desert, that lie between the town and Egypt and the Red Sea. The determination, therefore, to relieve Gordon entailed a military problem of considerable difficulty, relating to the manner in which he should be reached in time, by a sufficient number of troops and quantities of food supplies, and thus be enabled to retreat from the Sudan together with those he was pledged to save. This problem has been enunciated as follows: How to “place a force of about 5000 fighting men at or near Shendi, at the latest by the end of the year, and to carry with them, not only supplies for themselves, but also for the inhabitants and garrison of Khartum.”[436] Two proposals had been made to solve it:—

1. By taking the Nile route, and advancing to the neighbourhood of Dongola, to continue either along the river by Abu Hamed, or else to strike across the Bayuda Desert to Metemmeh, situated on the Nile opposite Shendi. There were many difficulties attending this proposal. The distance from Cairo to Shendi, or Metemmeh, is as much as 1527 miles, and the navigation of the river is greatly obstructed by cataracts, so that frequent disembarkations of men and stores would be necessary to surmount these obstacles. Hence much time, which was an essential element in the problem, would be consumed. Between Cairo and Dongola (1033 miles), and indeed for quite 100 miles further on, no enemy was to be expected; but beyond this point it was uncertain where he might be met. The desert road from Korti, some 100 miles above Dongola, to Metemmeh, had the advantage of avoiding the loop of the Nile that passes round Abu Hamed, and of thus saving a distance of more than 200 miles. But it was likely to be occupied by the enemy; a distance of 24 miles, in the face of the dervishes, would have to be traversed without water from station to station; and even if the route were opened up, it did not offer facilities for the transport of stores, which was a far more serious difficulty to be overcome than the mere conveyance of the troops. The desert, in short, was only suited to enable the British Commander to take a short cut towards Khartum, and to make a dash forward to Gordon’s relief, should his position become critical; and it was in view of this consideration that he requested (September 9th) to have a Camel corps allotted to him, as we have just seen. But under any circumstances the expedition would have to proceed forward across many obstacles, for more than 1100 miles from Cairo, before he could avail himself of the services of that corps.

Footnote 436:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 58. Shendi is about one hundred miles north of Khartum.

2. The other plan was to base the army of relief at Suakin, and to push therefrom to Berber, a comparatively short distance of 245 miles. But this project, though it contained several important advantages, also presented no small difficulties. Instead of having to form a fighting base at so very remote and inaccessible a place as Dongola, or Korti, it would have been established at Suakin, in easy and direct communication with the centre of our national resources, and where men, and stores of even the heaviest description, could be readily accumulated as they were required. Owing to the fact that Osman Digna had been unmolested since the spring of the year, he had again taken up an offensive attitude in the Eastern Sudan; Berber also was occupied by the enemy, and hence it was hopeless to suppose that there would be any less fighting upon this route than there would be on the other. This, however, taken by itself was not of great moment. But another circumstance of the utmost importance has to be mentioned. There appears to be a more serious dearth of water in one section of the desert, between the Red Sea and the Nile, than in the worst place on the road from Korti to Metemmeh; and a greater distance to be traversed from well to well in the former (58 miles) than in the latter (24 miles). Herein lay the main difficulty of the Suakin-Berber route. To overcome it, a light railway was necessary to span the whole distance; and it had been calculated that it would have taken three months to achieve such an undertaking. If successful, the advance from Berber to Shendi (95 miles) would have been easily accomplished.

It is not our intention to compare these two methods of solving the problem that had to be faced—rendered exceedingly difficult, and perhaps not in any manner to be solved, within the short space of time allotted, by the unfortunate way in which the Mahdi had been allowed to consolidate his power, and to become a formidable foe. An effort has rather been made to give, as clearly as it is possible in a few words, a short account of the obstacles which beset both these routes, of the conditions which surrounded the two proposals, and to explain some of the considerations that had to be weighed when the Nile route was adopted.

The first stage of the campaign is the history of the advance over more than a thousand miles to Dongola, and across the many obstacles, formed by rapids and cataracts, that interfere with the navigation of the river. The most troublesome obstructions blocking the passage did not begin till Gemai was reached, just above Wady Haifa, and about 780 miles from Cairo. Up to this place, progress was made by rail and by river steamers; though even in this section, the journey entailed five disembarkations. Here the boat service began, and the first serious difficulty had soon to be met; afterwards many others had to be surmounted, always at the expense of much labour and of valuable time.

“To write a detailed account,” says Sir H. Colvile, “of the prolonged struggle between man and nature which the ascent of these cataracts by six hundred English boats involved,—how company after company, and battalion after battalion, unloaded and loaded, rowed and tracked, day by day, and hour by hour, under a blazing sun, against that ever-rushing, ever-changing torrent, between unchanging walls of burning basalt,—to tell all this in detail would be to tell an unequalled tale of pluck, determination, and endurance, but one which would be of little practical use in a military history.”[437]

Footnote 437:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part i. p. 117.

The boats ordered in England had been despatched to Egypt with the utmost promptitude, and such was the energy displayed that the first troops embarked in them at Gemai on the 1st of November.[438] Assisted by the Canadian “Voyageurs,” nearly three-fourths of the fighting force were past that station on the 18th, struggling forward; though only some 1300 men were as far as Dongola. The Guards Camel regiment marched from Assuan (547 miles from Cairo), and on this date were south of Dal. Korti having been selected as the point of concentration instead of Dongola, it was now calculated that the first infantry battalion should arrive there by the middle of December, and the last on January 22, 1885.

Footnote 438:

The last left Gemai on December 19th.

The Mounted infantry, provided with camels, had throughout the advance been near the head of the column, and early in December were as far forward as Shabatut (some 40 miles above Dongola). The Guards Camel regiment reaching that place on the 4th, was brigaded with them under the orders of Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart, and until the 10th, the force was practised in their new formations and drill.[439] On the 11th, the whole advanced to Korti, and arrived on the 15th; the Marines detachment joined the Guards here. Shortly afterwards a portion of the Heavy Camel regiment marched into that camp, and two battalions and a squadron of the 19th Hussars also reached it.

Footnote 439:

Article in the _Nineteenth Century_ , Nov., 1885, by Lieutenant Douglas Dawson, Coldstream Guards.

While these operations were in progress, some news had been received from General Gordon. On the 17th of November a letter, dated the 4th, announced that he could “hold out forty days with ease,” but “after that it will be difficult;” also that there were at Metemmeh five of his steamers with nine guns, awaiting orders.[440] Again, on the 31st of December, a diminutive piece of paper had reached Lord Wolseley at Korti, bearing the words, “Khartum all right, 14/12/84.—C. G. GORDON,” but supplemented by a verbal message to the effect that the garrison were in great straits, that provisions were running low, and would therefore be exhausted before long.[441]

Footnote 440:

The letter is given in Colvile’s _Official Account_ , part i. p. 121.

Footnote 441:

_Ibid._ , i. 138.

Before the arrival of this last communication, however, arrangements had already been made to advance in two directions from Korti: one column, called the River column, under Major-General Earle, was to push along the Nile through Abu Hamed towards Berber, while the other, under Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, was to march across the desert and seize Metemmeh.

Now, it was known that there were no supplies to be obtained at the latter place; and as a sufficient number of camels do not seem to have been procurable, it was found impossible to convey the Desert column, with the whole of its stores, to its destination in one journey. The distance to be traversed (176 miles) is, moreover, so great, that it was imperative to establish one or two posts on the route. The principal station was fixed at Jakdul wells, where water was plentiful, 98 miles from Korti. Owing, however, to the scarcity of camels, it was necessary, before the final advance could be made, to occupy that place and to make several journeys to it, in order to victual it and organize it as a depôt for future requirements. This preliminary operation took some days to accomplish, and was not completed until the 14th of January, upon which date Sir H. Stewart was enabled to start for Metemmeh.

The orders he received were to attack and occupy that town, to leave there a portion of his force, and to return with the remainder to Jakdul. Colonel Sir C. Wilson, R.E. (the Chief of the Intelligence Department), and Captain Lord C. Beresford, R.N., with a small party of seamen, accompanied the column, and both had special instructions given to them. The latter was to take over one or two of the steamers which were known to be at Metemmeh, and, when he had reported them to be ready, the former was to proceed in them to Khartum, and to deliver a letter to General Gordon. Sir C. Wilson was to be accompanied by a small detachment of infantry; he might march the men through the city, and show them to the garrison; but they were not to sleep there; and they were to return with him to Metemmeh. Further, he was only to stay long enough to confer fully with General Gordon, and, having done so, he was to get back to Korti with all convenient despatch.[442] Lastly, he was supplied with an estimate showing the approximate dates upon which the troops were calculated to arrive at the different stations along the route to Khartum. According to this estimate, General Earle was to reach Abu Hamed about the 10th of February, Berber the 22nd, and Shendi the 5th of March; while the remainder “will commence to reach Metemmeh the 16th of January, and should be concentrated there with sixty days' supplies by the 2nd of March,” adding, “If we hire many camels this date may be anticipated.”[443]

Footnote 442:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 6, etc., where the full text of all these orders are given.

Footnote 443:

Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, K.C.B., R.E., _From Korti to Khartum_ , p. 3, where this paper is given in full. (London, 1885.)

Sir H. Stewart started from Korti on the 30th of December, with 78 Officers, 1029 men, 221 natives, 2206 camels, and 45 horses, among them the Guards Camel regiment. Marching in the afternoons and at night, he reached Jakdul, without opposition, early on the 2nd of January, and the same day returned, leaving the Guards and Royal Engineers behind, under Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. He was again in Jakdul on the 12th. During the interval, the water arrangements were improved, and the post strengthened. In respect to this duty, Sir H. Stewart reports as follows on the 14th January:—

The post at Jakdul has been vastly improved by Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen and the Guards Camel regiment, during the eight days they have been quartered there.... I think it right to state that nothing but extreme hard work on the part of Officers and men could have effected so complete a metamorphosis in this post, and I venture to submit that it reflects the highest credit on the Guards Camel regiment.

Leaving a garrison behind of 150 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment, the force started from Jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th, consisting of two squadrons of the 19th Hussars, the Naval division, half a Camel battery, Royal Engineers, Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments, a wing Royal Sussex (on camels), Medical and Transport details; approximately, 115 Officers, 1687 men, 351 natives, 153 horses, 2888 (of whom 860 transport) camels, 3 guns, and one Gardner. Next day, evidence of the enemy’s proximity became apparent, and on the 16th the cavalry, which had been pushed well to the front, reported that he had taken up a position to bar our access to the Abu Klea wells. The advance was continued, and in the afternoon, when it was too late to attack, we got into close touch with him. A zeriba was then constructed, strengthened by a hastily made wall and by mimosa thorn; and during the night the Arabs fired into it, but without doing much mischief. Early on the 17th, a small garrison was placed there, and the remainder emerged in square, with skirmishers in front and on the flanks. The formation was as follows:—Front face, Coldstream on the right, Royal Artillery in the centre, Mounted infantry on the left; Right face, Scots Guards on the left, then Grenadier Guards, Marines, Sussex Regiment; Left face, Mounted infantry on the right, then Heavy Camel regiment; Rear face, Heavies on the right, then Naval division, with the Gardner gun, and Sussex; the 19th Hussars were outside on the left. We soon became engaged, and several casualties occurred, the dervishes firing, and apparently being driven back behind the folds of the ground. Our progress was slow, for the cumbrous square formation had to be maintained, and the camels, carrying the wounded, to be prevented from straying outside.[444] We were making for a line of flags that was to be seen in front of us, and many now believed that the enemy was in full retreat.

Footnote 444:

Nevertheless, some did lag behind, and would have been cut off, but for the courage of Lieut.-Colonel Rowley, Grenadier Guards, who drove them into the square, just as the Arabs began the attack which is about to be described.

“Just at this moment, when about 450 yards from the flags, as if they had risen from the earth, up rose a line of spearmen all across the wady, [gully], and at the same moment the whole wady behind appeared black with them.”[445]

“The skirmishers at once retired, but as they did so directly in the line of advance of the enemy, they screened him from the fire of the square during the first stage of his charge, and it was not until the spearmen were within 200 yards of the square that the fire could be developed.”[446]

Footnote 445:

_Nineteenth Century_ , loc. cit.

Footnote 446:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 18.

The sudden and fierce onslaught of some 5000 fanatics, who

held death in contempt, was eventually directed against the left rear corner; and such was the impetus of the rush, that the Heavies were pressed back by sheer weight of numbers into the centre of the square, where the camels were, and almost as far as the front and right faces. The square was practically broken, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight followed, but it happily was only of brief duration. The Guards and Marines had been unmoved by the shock; and keeping up a steady fire with the front rank upon the masses of the Arabs, who were hovering near to complete the victory should the rush be successful, they turned about the rear rank to assist in the struggle that was going on behind them.[447] In a few minutes the violence of the dervishes had expended itself, and they fell back, slowly and sullenly, until we got our guns to play upon them, and they left us in possession of the ground. The cavalry then pushed forward to the wells, and, when the square was reformed, it followed slowly on, the men elated by success, but suffering agonies from thirst. At 5 p.m. the water was reached, but it was not until early on the 18th that the zeriba was transferred to Abu Klea, and the post there was then established and strengthened.

Footnote 447:

“I was much struck by the demeanour of the Guards Officers. There was no noise or fuss; all the orders were given as if on parade, and they spoke to their men as if nothing unusual was going on” (_From Korti to Khartum_ , p. 36).

Our losses, which fell principally on the Heavies and the Naval division, were very great, and amounted to 9 Officers and 65 men killed, and 9 Officers[448] and 85 men wounded; total 168 of all ranks. Of the former, Colonel Fred Burnaby (Royal Horse Guards) fell, well known for his travels and for his adventurous character. Of the Coldstream detachment 2 men (one a sergeant) were killed; Surgeon James Magill and 10 were wounded, of whom one died of his wounds. The strength of the enemy is not accurately known; it is supposed to have been from 9000 to 11,000: his losses were considerable, and 800 lay dead in the open ground close to the square.

Footnote 448:

Two subsequently died of their wounds.

In the afternoon of the 18th, the column started for the Nile, and continued to move throughout the night. The troops, the native drivers, and the animals were becoming exhausted by the toil they had undergone; the men found it difficult to keep awake; the camels, insufficiently fed, and at work incessantly for nearly three weeks, lagged behind, or got off the track. The line of advance led through a thick mimosa scrub; there was no moon, and, on account of the enemy’s proximity, bugles could not be sounded to keep the column together. During the darkness, therefore, there was much confusion, and it was not until dawn that order could be restored. In a short time the river came into sight, some four miles away. To the left front appeared a large and well-built town, now recognized to be Metemmeh, and looking far more important and strong than was represented on our maps or indicated in our reports. As the British column, from its position near Abu Kru, gazed on the fertile valley beneath, they perceived large crowds of armed men issuing from the walls of Metemmeh, and it soon became clear that no water was to be obtained without a fight.

A zeriba was at once formed, wherein to guard the stores and baggage, before a force could advance to cut its way through the enemy. But as this was being accomplished, the latter, creeping up through the long grass and scrub, opened fire from concealed positions, and several casualties occurred. Sir H. Stewart at this moment was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Sir C. Wilson.

At 2.30 the zeriba was ready, and garrisoned by half the Heavies, the Cavalry, Artillery, and Naval division, while the remainder, under Sir C. Wilson, emerged therefrom in square, the executive command of which was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. An important duty now devolved upon this Officer, viz. to lead the square past the enemy in the bush to the river, and to keep it as much as possible on the open ground. That the losses at this particular period of the day were comparatively few, may be ascribed to the manner in which the column was directed and manœuvred at this time. Warned by the tactics of the dervishes at Abu Klea, no skirmishers were extended; but as long as the enemy kept up his fire from the scrub, our men, unable to reply with effect, were at a disadvantage. Fortunately this did not last long; for the Arabs, unable to restrain their fiery ardour, charged the square with fury, and were met by the steady and withering fire of our soldiers. In less than five minutes the fight was over.

“The seething mass of fanatics who had headed the charge were now a heap of lifeless bodies, their comrades in rear had melted away into the distance, and the British troops (sadly reduced in numbers since their first fight at Abu Klea) made the echoes ring with a loud cheer.”[449]

Footnote 449:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , ii. 27.

There was no more resistance that day, and Sir C. Wilson, having gone forward to select a bivouac, the column was halted on the river as dusk began to fall.

The joy of being once more near a plentiful supply of water, and the sense of relief that the march across the desert had been at last successfully accomplished, now filled the minds of our men, and atoned in some degree for the hardships and privations they had just undergone; but rest was also required, for not only the labours, but the excitement and the dangers of the last few days had told severely upon them, and a much-needed sleep was only partially obtained during the night of January 19th-20th. Next day the bivouac was shifted to the village of Gubat, which was placed in a state of defence; and the zeriba, formed the day before, having been evacuated, the wounded and stores were brought there.[450] The enemy was hovering near, but made no attempt to interfere with our operations. In view of the orders given to the Commander of the Desert column, and to secure our position at Gubat from attacks which could be easily organized against us in Metemmeh, Sir C. Wilson determined to capture that place, if this could be accomplished without serious risk. On the 21st, therefore, he advanced against it with the greater part of his force, but found it stronger than he anticipated. During the day, Gordon’s steamers appeared on the scene, and assisted in the attack; but they also brought news that another horde of Arabs might be soon expected from the direction of Khartum, and orders were therefore given to fall back upon Gubat.

Footnote 450:

The horses had all been fifty-eight hours, and some even as many as seventy-five hours, without water (_Nineteenth Century_ , loc. cit.). The camels had not received anything to drink for six or seven days, having been previously accustomed to be watered every second or third day (_From Korti to Khartum_ , p. 95).

The casualties during the 19th, 20th, and 21st, amounted to one Officer and 22 men killed, and 9 Officers and 93 men wounded; total, 125: added to this, two war correspondents to London newspapers (the _Morning Post_ and _Standard_ ) also lost their lives. Among the severely wounded, belonging to the Guards Camel regiment, were Lieutenant Crutchley, Scots Guards, and Major H. Poë, Royal Marines; in the Coldstream detachment two men were wounded. It is extremely sad to have to relate that the brilliant Commander of the column, Sir H. Stewart, never recovered from his wound, and died on the 17th of February, before he could be taken even as far as Korti, deeply regretted by all who served under his command, as well as by every one who knew his kindly, generous, and manly character.

Directly the Queen learnt that the column had reached the Nile, and heard of the pluck and endurance exhibited by her soldiers, Her Majesty caused the Secretary of State to signify by telegram “her satisfaction and warm thanks to her brave troops, and her deep concern for their losses and sufferings, but especially for General Stewart’s severe wound;” and in consideration of that Officer’s gallant service, Her Majesty was also pleased to promote him to the rank of Major-General. The Khedive, moreover, telegraphed his congratulations and thanks to the men for the success they had achieved.

Sir C. Wilson had now a double function to discharge. His original mission was to communicate a letter to General Gordon, and to give him that moral support which the appearance of a few red-coats for a day or two in Khartum might confer upon him.[451] But a new duty also obliged him to provide for the safety of the small and sadly diminished force which had just been unexpectedly placed under his command. To this most important task he therefore applied himself. It was reported that enemies were closing about him from Berber and from the south; Metemmeh also was too strong to be taken by a _coup de main_. Thus it was essential that he should see for himself the extent of the Arab resources which might be brought to bear upon Gubat; and while he sent the cavalry up the river, early on the 22nd, he embarked in a steamer, and made his way down the stream. The results of these reconnaissances were satisfactory, and he returned convinced that the dervishes were not in such numbers as he had been led to believe. Meanwhile, the position we occupied was strengthened, and communications with the Nile were secured; Gubat, situated on a height about half a mile from the water, could not be evacuated, and it was garrisoned by the Guards; and another fort, connected with an island by a _tête de pont_, was constructed near the river.

Footnote 451:

Three British Officers were, moreover, to accompany Wilson to Khartum, and to be left there with Gordon.

Then a vexatious delay occurred. The steamers required repair, and it was not until the afternoon of the 23rd, when too late to start on that day, that they were reported fit to move. Accompanied by 20 men of the Royal Sussex and 240 black troops, Sir C. Wilson left for Khartum on the morning of the 24th. The passage up the river was rapidly made, in a falling Nile, and on the 28th the beleaguered city was approached. It would be outside the scope of this volume to give any account of the numerous thrilling adventures and hairbreadth escapes that marked this perilous journey. It is sufficient to say that Khartum had fallen on the 26th, and Gordon was killed. The whole place was in the hands of the Mahdi, and the little band of Englishmen ran the gauntlet past the enemy right up to Khartum, and under its guns, until they made sure that the end had indeed come, and that there was no further use in remaining where they were.[452] We now know that Gordon had been starved out, and that his food ran short on the 3rd or 4th of January, when the last issue of rations took place; that Omdurman, having fallen soon afterwards (January 15th), the dervishes drew closer round Khartum; that they could have entered it any day they chose, as the falling Nile laid bare the weak points of the defences of the city; that at dawn on the 26th this helpless quarter was stormed; and that the place fell after a few minutes' fighting. The expedition had been sent a month too late, and the “game was played out before the British troops reached Gubat; at that period nothing could save Khartum.”[453]

Footnote 452:

An account of this journey is to be found in Colvile’s _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 33, etc.—how the steamers ascended the river with difficulty and advanced to Khartum in the teeth of hostile batteries and under fire from the city; how the fall of the place became undoubted; how the native crews of the steamers showed signs of disaffection; how both steamers were wrecked on the return journey, and how the small British party were exposed to imminent danger; how Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley was sent down the river in an open row-boat, and succeeded in reaching Gubat; and how a rescue party was immediately organized under Lord Charles Beresford, who went to the relief of Sir Charles Wilson, and those with him, in another steamer, amid many difficulties, and in spite of the opposition of the dervishes.

Footnote 453:

Major C. M. Watson, C.M.G., R.E., _Royal Engineers' Journal_, June 1, 1892. See _Fire and Sword in the Sudan_ , p. 342.

Little occurred to the small British force near Metemmeh during this interval. Convoys, under Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Talbot (1st Life Guards), of about a thousand camels and 300 to 400 men, started for Jakdul, to bring up supplies to the Nile, on January 23rd and on February 2nd. Sir C. Wilson, also, after his gallant effort to reach Khartum, left Gubat on the 6th, with an escort of twelve men of the Coldstream, under Captain V. Dawson, and reached Korti on the 9th. These and other movements took place without opposition on the part of the enemy, and thus it appeared that the desert had been effectively swept of Arabs; but they were still to be feared, and rumours were not wanting to the effect that they were concentrating and were converging upon our advanced position on the river. When Lord Wolseley heard of Sir H. Stewart’s wound, he decided to send his Chief of the Staff, Major-General Sir Redvers Buller, to replace him, and to despatch some infantry to reinforce the Desert column. Accompanied by six companies of the Royal Irish Regiment, who marched on their feet the whole way from Korti, the new General reached Gubat on the 11th, and assumed command there.

The fall of Khartum, reported at head-quarters on the 4th of February, made a change in the conduct of the war, and the object of his mission being no longer possible, the British Commander was left without instructions as to his future proceedings.[454] He was thus unable to send any precise orders to Sir R. Buller, who had already left Korti before the death of General Gordon was known there, until he had ascertained the views of Government upon the new situation that had arisen. But these views were not at once forthcoming; for, the first telegram, dated London, February 6th, gave no indication of the policy to be pursued in the Sudan, and it was only after a more explicit statement had been requested, that he was informed that “the power of the Mahdi at Khartum must be overthrown.” Orders were then despatched to the Desert column to hold on to the Nile, and, when Metemmeh was taken, to combine with General Earle in an attack upon Berber. But before this message was received, arrangements had been already taken for the evacuation of Gubat. This determination had been rendered necessary because the camels were insufficient in number, and were too much reduced by hard work, to perform the transport service across the desert; supplies were liable to run short; and a hostile force was reported to be marching from Khartum.

Footnote 454:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 57.

Accordingly, the last of the wounded left the Nile on the 13th under escort, commanded by Colonel Talbot, consisting of portions of the Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments. Early next day the enemy showed signs of renewed activity, by attacking the convoy, which, encumbered by wounded, many of whom were carried on stretchers, and by Egyptian soldiers and camp followers who had come from Khartum in the steamers, was not advantageously circumstanced to ward off a serious attack. After keeping the enemy at bay by some sharp fighting, the Light Camel regiment, which was luckily in the vicinity, came up to the support of the convoy, and with their assistance the Arabs were soon driven away. Our losses were two killed and six wounded, of whom one belonged to the Coldstream.[455] On the same day, the 14th, Gubat was finally evacuated by our troops. Abu Klea was reached on the 15th, and, in order to reduce the consumption of water, for the wells were only capable of supplying a moderate force, the Hussars, Guards, Heavies, and the Sudanese who manned the steamers, were sent to Jakdul on the 16th.[456]

Footnote 455:

This man, Lance-Sergeant Leaning, who died of his wounds, was noted for his gallantry upon this occasion.

Footnote 456:

Owing to the amount of hard work done, the Guards were now without boots; and this seems to have been the reason why they were selected to go back.

The River column, under Major-General Earle, had meanwhile started on its way to Berber by Abu Hamed (January 24th), and found the ascent of the Nile, through a hostile and practically unexplored country, by no means an easy operation. The physical difficulties of the route seemed to increase day by day, but by dint of hard work and perseverance the troops continued to push on slowly. On the 10th of February, meeting the enemy at Kirbekan, where he attempted to make a stand, they attacked and defeated him; but the victory was unfortunately accompanied by the death of the General—killed by a bullet fired from a stone hut, in which some Arabs had taken refuge. The advance was immediately resumed, and was continued until the 24th, when a point, 26 miles from Abu Hamed, was reached. Here the troops were stopped by a message, dated head-quarters 20th, which ordered the column to return. A retrograde movement was therefore at once commenced. The cause of this fresh order has now to be briefly explained.

On receiving instructions directing the overthrow of the Mahdi’s power at Khartum, Lord Wolseley decided that the first step was to reduce Berber, and he therefore wished, as we have seen, to combine both the River and Desert columns to secure that object. But insuperable difficulties presented themselves to the execution of that design. In the first place, the absence of all means of rapid communication between Korti and the two columns was a serious obstacle to any form of combined operations. Supplies for immediate and future use had, moreover, to be carried along with the troops, over the formidable obstructions which everywhere opposed our progress. The camels of the Desert column had completely broken down, and there was no transport available; the men’s boots were also worn out, and their marching powers were in consequence diminishing day by day. The River column, moreover, though able to move forward,—but only slowly, on account of the physical difficulties in the way and the low condition of the Nile,—had not sufficient carrying power to store Berber with the supplies which it would have been necessary to place there.[457]

Footnote 457:

Colvile, _Official Account_ , part ii. p. 72.

These difficulties entailed a change of plan, and both columns were therefore ordered to return. Sir R. Buller had been annoyed by hostile demonstrations against him near Abu Klea since the 16th, and on that day and on the next he lost three men killed, and 4 Officers, and 23 wounded. As soon as this advanced position had no longer to be held, he evacuated it on the 23rd and 24th, in the face of a large number of Arabs, estimated at not less than 8000 men, with such skill and judgment that, having deceived them, they made no effort to interfere with his movements. The retirement was everywhere continued, the Guards reaching Korti on the 9th of March, and the last troops leaving the desert on the 16th. From Korti, the Guards went to Dongola on the 16th, and remained there for some months; while the rest of the army also took up summer quarters on the Nile, not further forward than Merowi,—to await the coming of the autumn, when a fresh advance was to be made to free Khartum from the despotism of the Mahdi.