CHAPTER XV.

THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882.

Origin of the war—Emancipation of Egypt from Turkish rule; introduction of European control—Deposition of Ismail Pasha—Tewfik becomes Khedive—Military revolts—Disorganization of the country—Joint action of the English and French; its failure—Naval demonstration—Bombardment of the forts of Alexandria—The French withdraw and leave Great Britain to act alone—British troops sent to Egypt—The Suez Canal seized—Base of operations established at Ismailia—Action of Tel el-Makhuta—Clearing the communications—Actions at Kassassin, August 28th and September 7th—Character of the Egyptian army—Night march on Tel el-Kebir—The enemy is overwhelmed, September 13th—Pursuit; losses—End of the war—Return of the Coldstream to England.

The hostilities conducted by England in Egypt in 1882 have been described as a mere bondholders' war. This, in a sense, is true, for our intimate relations with that country, which eventually led to military operations, were ostensibly due to our desire to protect the financial interests of those who had lent money to its ruler. But this is far from being the whole truth, because other and higher motives induced Great Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the native government. Facing alike the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and containing within its limits the isthmus of Suez, Egypt, besides being the key of the valley of the Nile, commands the most convenient water communications to India, to the further East, and to Australia. Having interests of a vital nature to defend in this far-distant quarter of the globe, it is evident we could never remain unconcerned if anarchy were to prevail in a region through which the main lines pass that connect together portions of the British Empire. Nor was the problem a new one. At the close of the last and at the commencement of the present century, England was struggling with the French for supremacy in India, and at that time Napoleon—then in the beginning of his great career—made a descent upon Egypt to secure a road to that Empire for his own nation. We were then obliged to drive his soldiers out, and, having succeeded in doing this, we prevented the French from forming an Asiatic dominion. Still the trouble continued, in a minor degree, until 1809, when we took the island of Mauritius from them, on which they depended, to base their operations against our possessions. From this date their power in the East declined; and England, relieved from rivalry, has thenceforward been able to exercise an undivided influence in India. If in the beginning of this century it was necessary to prevent France from interfering with our national expansion; so was it also the more necessary to restrain the Egyptians from obstructing (as we apprehended) our communications in 1882,—when the Suez canal having been opened (1869), nearly all our Eastern commerce was squeezed through that narrow passage, and when the importance of African exploration was adding greater value to the valley of the Nile.

Egypt has passed through some vicissitudes during the last sixty years. Still considered in theory to be a portion of the Turkish Empire, it was formerly ruled directly by the Porte, until Muhammad Ali, the Governor-General, or Vali, rebelled, and wrested concessions from the Sultan. In 1841, the Governorship was vested in him and in his heirs, and subsequent Firmans having been granted in his favour, Egypt became practically an independent principality. The last privilege accorded to his successors was the right to contract foreign loans without the previous consent of the Porte, and this right to run into debt was freely indulged in by Muhammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha. The latter, after becoming Viceroy—or Khedive, as the title is called—embarked in wild speculations, and indulged in unbounded extravagance. Desiring, like his grandfather, to erect an independent state by the adoption of European civilization, he failed to understand how this civilization was to be brought about. He hastened to produce its effects by an immense expenditure of money, but he omitted to establish an efficacious administration to curb peculation, or to introduce order into his affairs. Numerous speculators of every nationality rushed forward to help him to dissipate his fortune, and it was not long before he involved the people in financial ruin. As the import of alcohol corrupts a barbarous tribe, so did the influx of foreign gold demoralize this Muslim government.

Now, even if England had been prepared to let the bondholders shift for themselves in this crisis, so were not the other European nations; and to prevent so important a country from falling into the hands of any one of them, all agreed to intervene and regulate the evil that had been brought about. Thus Ismail, emancipated from the rule of Turkey, fell under the domination of European control. It is scarcely necessary to describe the various steps taken to secure reform in the financial concerns of Egypt. England and France were more interested in the matter than any other of the Powers. They acted harmoniously together, assumed a joint direction over the affairs of the country, and gradually tightened their hold upon the government. Thereupon the Khedive became restive, and as he would not fall in with the new order established to correct his maladministration, he was removed from Cairo. The authority of the Sultan, as Suzerain, was now requisitioned by Europe: Ismail was deposed, and his son, Tewfik Pasha, reigned in his stead, by favour of the Western Powers (June 26, 1879).

It was easy to see that such an undefined condition of things was not likely to last long. However beneficial to the people an honest administration might be, the interference of foreign officials in the internal affairs of another state, to whose ruler they owed no allegiance, could not but produce friction, and lead to trouble. It is true, Tewfik was pliant, and submitted without difficulty to the unprecedented constitution that was forced upon him; also, that there was little or no public opinion in the country, and apparently no centre of resistance to thwart the action of England and France. Nevertheless, the new Khedive soon lost his authority over his subjects, and resistance did arise, sooner than might have been expected. It originated where it ought least to have been found—in the army, where insubordination showed itself as soon as the native government was weakened and became contemptible in the eyes of the people, and when economy was introduced into the war department. Early in 1881, a military rising was threatened, and with difficulty was it appeased; but, later, a more serious event occurred (September 9th), when the Colonel of one of the native regiments, named Arabi Bey, took the lead, and, surrounding the Khedive’s palace with 4000 men, demanded, with arms in his hands, the redress of grievances from his Prince. Destitute of all real power, Tewfik was unable to crush this revolt; he met the mutineers, tried to conciliate them, and gave in to their demands. A change of government took place, and the Chamber of Notables was convened. From that moment Arabi’s influence grew stronger, the army became devoted to him, and around him rallied all groups of the people who were dissatisfied with foreign interference. “Egypt for the Egyptians” was now the cry, and the newly appointed Chamber, far from allaying the trouble, added fuel to the flames of discontent that were already kindled. It was evident the crisis could not be much longer deferred.

The French urged the British Government to take active measures to support the Joint Control which then existed in Egypt, and the latter were quite willing to carry out this advice. On the 6th of January, 1882, an Identical or Dual Note was presented to the Khedive, expressing the determination of the two nations “to ward off by their united efforts all cause of external or internal complications which might menace the _régime_ established in Egypt.” The Notables answered this challenge by claiming the right of regulating the national budget, and Tewfik’s action became somewhat uncertain. It could not be accurately ascertained whether he meant to stand by his European allies who had placed him upon the throne, or whether he was about to throw in his lot with the national party. At any rate, Arabi, advanced to the dignity of Pasha, became still more powerful, and was appointed Minister for War.

Now, in England, there was a certain feeling in favour of the Egyptians, and this might be expected to find expression among the supporters of the Liberal party then in power, who claim, perhaps with greater emphasis than others, to respect the liberties of mankind, and to listen to the grievances of all who complain. It is against our custom to stifle the voice of an assembly, however feebly it may be supposed to represent the wishes of a people, and in this crisis there were not wanting some who hesitated to sanction the use of coercive measures. Nor was there a total absence of a _primâ facie_ cause of discontent; for the European officials of every nationality had multiplied in Egypt, and in 1882 there were as many as 1324, receiving salaries from the taxes that amounted to a considerable proportion of the revenue,—to £373,704 per annum.[403] It is possible that if we had not deferred to the French at this juncture, we might have put an end to the commotion without resorting to war, and that, had we been the sole trustee for European interests, we might have found some satisfactory solution to the difficulty. But, as had happened before, we were fettered by our alliance with the French, which was not defined, and in order to maintain our relations with them, we followed their lead.

Footnote 403:

_Annual Register_, 1882, pt. i. 361 (note). See, also, D. Mackenzie Wallace, _Egypt and the Egyptian Question_, p. 135 (London, 1883).

The Dual Note having only intensified the trouble, our Government despaired of maintaining order unless some vigorous action were taken to disperse it. They believed that the best course under the circumstances was to resort to the only legal means which then existed: viz. to revive, in some shape, the dormant rights of suzerainty which the Sultan claimed, which in theory had never been abrogated, and which had been made use of, as we have seen, less than three years before, with the consent of all the European Powers. It was therefore contemplated to utilize the Turks, under certain conditions and restrictions, to put an end to the deadlock, and to prevent Egypt from becoming the prey to the anarchy that appeared to be imminent. Whether the remedy would have proved efficacious and satisfactory need not now be discussed; for the French objected to any such arrangement, and, to please them, we acquiesced in the objection. Then they proposed that the Anglo-French fleets should make a demonstration before Alexandria, and in this we readily concurred without any agreement as to subsequent action. The plan was therefore put into execution (May 20th). But far from appeasing the tumult, this step only aggravated it. The authority of the Khedive was now completely effaced, and Arabi became dictator. The excitement of the people increased, a serious riot occurred in Alexandria (June 11th), and earthworks for the defence of the town began to be thrown up. It was not easy to recede before this defiance. The British Admiral demanded that the construction of fortifications should be stopped, and, later, that they should be surrendered to him. The demand was resisted. It was then deemed necessary to take them at any risk, and to destroy by force the power of Arabi, who was proclaimed a rebel against his Prince.[404] And now a strange event occurred. The French, though they succeeded in inducing our Government to defer to their wishes, were not bound to us in any way. Having gone just far enough to ensure an armed intervention, they refused to take their share in it, and, when hostilities were imminent, their fleet sailed away from the scene where they must commence.

Footnote 404:

The precise date, says a writer of the day, on which the Khedive’s troops became rebels could be no more accurately ascertained than that of the discovery that the “military tyranny” imposed by Arabi, received the cordial sympathy and support of nearly every class throughout Egypt (_Annual Register_, 1882, i. 369). It was not until the 16th of July, after the war began, that the Khedive issued an order dismissing Arabi from his post as Minister of War (_Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt_, p. 16; prepared in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, by Colonel J. F. Maurice, Royal Artillery). As we have frequently drawn from this work, in future it will be referred to as “Maurice, _Official Account_.”

The bombardment of the earthworks followed on the 11th of July, and it is needless to say that our navy soon reduced the enemy’s guns to silence, and drove him out of Alexandria. Arabi’s troops having retired, blue-jackets and marines were landed to restore order in the town. Meanwhile a force, drawn from Malta and Gibraltar, had been concentrated at Cyprus, and was commanded by Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., K.C.B., who arrived in the island, July 14th. These troops were speedily moved therefrom, and, reaching Alexandria on the 17th, they took up a line fronting the Egyptian army at Kafr-ed-Dauer, that lay a few miles south of the coast covering the road to Cairo.[405]

Footnote 405:

See Maps No. 9, p. 379, and No. 8, p. 360. Some future historian may perhaps consider what the result would have been if the fleet had been provided with a land force when the war was begun by the bombardment of the 11th, and whether the revolt against foreign interference could have been strangled in Alexandria, before it grew and required a regular invasion to suppress it. Into these matters we do not propose to enter; it is sufficient to say that no means were prepared to take military advantage of the peculiar nature of the communications which join Alexandria with the rest of the country, and that Arabi’s troops got away unhurt.

Preparations were now actively pushed forward to follow up the first blow struck by the British fleet for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Khedive. A vote of credit was agreed to in Parliament, troops were ordered to be got ready to proceed to the seat of war, and a portion of the reserves were called up to serve during the emergency (July 25th). The French also at last plainly expressed their intentions, by declining definitely to take part in the expedition which had now to be undertaken. The decision was made on the 29th of July in their Chambers, by a majority of 416 against 75 votes. Thus Great Britain was obliged to act alone, and if this was the result, it may seem to be a pity that she had not been allowed to have a free hand from the beginning. Be this as it may, she gained the advantage of being at least unfettered in the military operations that followed, and hence the dangers and inconvenience of a joint occupation were happily avoided.

As early as the 3rd of July, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B., appointed to take command of the expedition in case hostilities were undertaken, confidentially traced the plan of operations to be pursued. Soon the field army was organized, among which a Guards Brigade was included; and on the 30th of July, the first troops, the 1st Scots Guards (Colonel Knox), left England on board the _Orient_.[406] The other two Battalions of this Brigade, the 2nd Grenadiers (Colonel P. Smith), and the 2nd Coldstream (Colonel G. Wigram), being at Cork and Dublin respectively, left these stations for the seat of war as soon as they received drafts from London to fit them to take the field. For this purpose, the 2nd Battalion obtained from the 1st Coldstream, one Colour-sergeant, 9 sergeants, and 204 rank and file (28th); and on the 1st of August, having proceeded to Kingstown from Richmond Barracks, Dublin, they embarked, about 750 strong, on board the _Iberia_, and started for Alexandria. They reached their destination on the 13th, and moved immediately to Ramleh, where the Brigade was collecting under the orders of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G.[407]

The following Officers formed part of the Battalion:—

_Commanding the 2nd Battalion._—Colonel G. Wigram.

_Mounted Majors._—Colonels A. Lambton; F. C. Manningham-Buller.

_Dismounted Majors and Captains._—Lieut.-Colonels J. B. Sterling; Viscount de Vesci; R. S. Hall; W. F. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; R. W. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen.

_Lieutenants._—Captains R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; F. C. Manley; L. D. Mackinnon: Lieutenants Hon. E. Dawney; Hon. H. Monck; J. R. Gladstone; D. F. R. Dawson; G. V. Boyle; W. O. Corbet (in command of Regimental transport); G. P. Bouverie; Hon. A. Fortescue; P. A. Lovell (Signalling Officer); D. J. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris; and H. G. Shute; also H. Somers-Cocks (who left Portsmouth for Egypt, August 16).

_Adjutant._—Lieutenant Hon. A. Henniker-Major.

_Quartermaster._—W. Webster.

_Medical Officers._—Surgeon-Major G. Perry; Surgeon J. Whipple, M.D.

Footnote 406:

Lieut.-General Willis and Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, with their Staffs, were on board the _Orient_.

Footnote 407:

Captain Ivor Herbert, Grenadier Guards, was appointed Brigade Major; Major R. Lane, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-camp to His Royal Highness.

The following Officers, also belonging to the Regiment, served upon the Staff:—

Lieut.-Colonel Lord William Seymour, attached to the British Admiral.

Captain Pole-Carew, Orderly Officer to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.

Lieutenant A. Codrington, Aide-de-camp to Lieut.-General Willis, commanding the First Division.

Before this date, Sir A. Alison had been covering the concentration of the army at Alexandria, and, by means of strong reconnaissances, he endeavoured to make the enemy believe that the invaders meant to attack him from the north. But this was not the intention of Sir G. Wolseley, whose object was to seize the Maritime Canal, and, basing himself upon Ismailia, to advance thence to the capital of Egypt. In this manner, the main water-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would be secured from any attempt which Arabi might make upon it, and the invading army would obtain the best route into the interior. The route, it is true, was far from being a good one, for it lay in a desert of deep sand; but none of the communications of the country, other than by rail or canal, are good, and, in fact, roads, as we understand them, may be said to have no existence. The one selected, however, besides the strategical advantage it offered, of enabling an army to turn the Delta, and to proceed by the shortest way to Cairo, had along its course a fresh-water canal, where drinking water was to be obtained, and a railway; and both of these served as easy lines of supply. Arabi, indeed, had done his best to render these communications useless, but he could only obstruct them temporarily; and, though he thereby impeded our advance, he was not able to arrest it.

The British Commander had from the beginning believed that the enemy would make a stand at Tel el-Kebir, some thirty miles from Ismailia, on the road to Cairo; and if this were to prove to be correct, he determined to deliver a crushing and effective blow there, and so bring the campaign to a speedy and prompt conclusion. We shall see that he was entirely right in the opinion he had formed, and successful in carrying out his plan. To ensure this success, it was necessary to push advanced troops, of sufficient strength, from Ismailia to a point within striking distance of Arabi’s position, behind which the water and rail communications could be restored, and where the main army could be concentrated for the final battle.

The forces massing at Alexandria from the middle of July came, as we know, from the Mediterranean stations, and from the United Kingdom; but troops, native and British, also were despatched to the seat of war from India; and these, beginning to arrive on the 20th of August, landed at Suez, and, later, at Ismailia. The whole formed an Army-Corps, under the command of General Sir G. Wolseley (who landed in Egypt on August 15th), and was made up of a cavalry division, two infantry divisions, corps troops, and an Indian contingent. Each division was formed of two brigades and divisional troops.

The Cavalry Division, 23 squadrons, mounted infantry, and 6 guns, under Major-General Drury-Low: the 1st Brigade (Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell) contained, among others, three squadrons of Household cavalry, under Colonel Ewart, 2nd Life Guards;[408] the 2nd Brigade (Brigadier-General Wilkinson), Indian cavalry. The First Division, 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Willis: 1st Brigade (three Guards Battalions), Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught; 2nd Brigade (4 Battalions), Major-General Graham, V.C. The Second Division, 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Sir E. Hamley: 1st Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir A. Alison; 2nd Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir E. Wood, V.C. The Corps troops contained one battery of Royal Horse Artillery, and three batteries of Field Artillery, 24 guns. The Indian contingent, under Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., 4 battalions (of which 2 were native), 1 company Beluchis, 6 guns (mountain battery). Total force, including a reserve at Aden of 2 native battalions, not brought into the field, amounted to 23 battalions, 27 squadrons, and 60 guns, besides Engineers, Marines, Marine Artillery, siege trains, etc.; or to 1180 Officers, and 28,300 men.[409]

Footnote 408:

One squadron from each Regiment of Household Cavalry.

Footnote 409:

Appendix No. XIV. contains the order of battle.

Although all this army had not landed, yet a sufficient force had been collected to seize the Suez Canal, and to begin the real business of the campaign. Ample preparations had already been made by the Navy for this operation. The final details having been settled, a simultaneous landing was effected by blue-jackets and marines at all the important places from Port Said to Suez; and the water-way was cleared from end to end by 4 a.m. on the morning of the 20th of August.[410] Meanwhile, those portions of the Cavalry and First Divisions that were at Alexandria were embarked on board ship, while those of the Second Division were left behind to protect the town, and to keep up the delusion that Egypt was to be invaded from the north. In order to give the greater currency to this idea, it was further given out that the troops on board ship were destined to make an attack on Abukir. The 2nd Coldstream, which since their arrival at Ramleh had been facing south towards Kafr-ed-Dauer, re-embarked on the _Iberia_ on the 18th of August, and the whole fleet, consisting of 8 ironclads and 17 transports, left in the direction of Abukir at noon on the 19th, and approached Port Said next day, in the early morning. As soon as possible the ships entered the canal, and, piloted by Officers of the Royal Navy, were concentrated at Ismailia. They grounded occasionally as they steamed through the difficult passage, and delayed the procession; but these accidents did not materially check the movement, which was not confined merely to the fleet that sailed from Alexandria, but included also transports, conveying troops direct to the seat of war, from England by Port Said, and from India by Suez. General Graham, having landed with a small force of infantry on the evening of the 20th, pushed forward to Nefisha early next day; and the Guards Brigade, arriving at their destination late on the 21st, disembarked on the 22nd. For two days they were busily engaged in fatigue duties at Ismailia, during which time the concentration of troops continued with unabated energy, so that on the evening of the 23rd about 9000 men were on shore.[411]

Footnote 410:

Three ships, one French and two English, delayed the operation for a few hours.

Footnote 411:

Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 36. See Map No. 8, p. 360.

The invaders were dependent for drinking water upon the fresh-water canal previously mentioned, that runs from the Nile near Cairo to Ismailia; and now a fear seized the military authorities that Arabi might be able to destroy its banks, and stop the greater portion of our supply, not only at Nefisha and Ismailia, but also as far as Suez. It was therefore determined to send forward a small force on the 24th, under General Graham, to occupy El-Magfar, where the danger was most to be apprehended, and to prevent the occurrence of any such calamity. The force (1 battalion, 3 squadrons, and 2 guns) was not a large one; but it met with no resistance, and soon accomplished its object, not, however, without causing the enemy to show that he was concentrating a formidable body of men in a position further up the canal, at Tel el-Makhuta. It was evident that the British advanced detachment, if attacked with energy, might be unable to hold its own, and be obliged to fall back; but it was also clear that an initial advantage could be gained if we could bring up a sufficient force to cause the Egyptians to evacuate the ground they were engaged in taking up. Accordingly Sir G. Wolseley, who was present, sent back immediately to direct that the Guards Brigade at Ismailia and a battalion of infantry at Nefisha should move to the front without delay.

Meanwhile, the advanced troops became engaged, and a very unequal fight, as far as the numbers of the combatants were concerned, took place under the orders of General Willis. But the large Egyptian forces showed no disposition to close with the small body opposed to them, and the latter maintained their position until reinforcements, consisting of all the three arms, arrived to their support. Just before sundown the Guards Brigade appeared on the scene, the Coldstream leading; the Battalion then coming into the advanced line, under shell fire which happily was not effective, occupied an extended line of outposts during the night. The day had been exceedingly hot and oppressive, and the operations as well as the want of water had greatly exhausted the men, both those who fought and those who marched to their support under a scorching sun and through the burning sand.

“A scarcely less trying task had fallen to the lot of the Brigade of Guards. A march over the two miles of heavy road between Ismailia and Nefisha, difficult at any time, was, during the burning hours of the midday sun of an exceptionally hot day, a very serious task indeed. Throughout all the rest of the campaign, both before and after this, troops were ordered to march in the cool hours of the early morning, or of the late afternoon and evening. The sudden necessity for taking advantage of the enemy’s stand at Tel el-Makhuta alone made this severe task imperative. Even for troops in presence of the Egyptians, the direst enemies all that day were the sun and the parching glare of the desert sand. But at least they had the excitement of actual fighting, and were able at all times to take advantage of any shade that waggons and hillocks afforded, and they had not during those hours of fierce heat the additional labour of plodding over sand, burning to the feet and ankle deep. Man after man during the march was knocked down by the severity of the strain, and by stroke of the sun. All who were physically able pushed on with honest pride and steady discipline, but it was not until 6.20 p.m. that the march was over, and that H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught was able to bring up his Brigade to the support of the troops engaged.”[412]

Footnote 412:

Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 49. One man of the Coldstream, struck down by sun apoplexy, died at Nefisha next day (25th).

N^o. 8.

Mintern Bros. Photo lith. A.D. Innes & C^o. London.

At daybreak (25th), an advance was made by the First Division, General Graham in front, followed by the Guards Brigade in support, and, protecting the right flank, the King’s Royal Rifles and Marine Light Infantry, who had just come up, in second line; the Cavalry, under General Drury Low, on the extreme right front. Tel el-Makhuta was found to be abandoned by the enemy; but the Cavalry, still pushing on, found him at Mahsama, where, after a short struggle, they not only dislodged him but captured his camp, seven Krupp guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, stores, and provisions. Next day we took possession of Kassassin, and it was occupied by General Graham, the Guards being left at Tel el-Makhuta.

Meanwhile the disembarkation of men, horses, guns, and stores of all sorts still continued at Ismailia. As the English advanced troops had reached Kassassin,—within striking distance of Tel el-Kebir, where Arabi was known to be entrenching, with the object of making a definite stand against us,—it was now necessary to bring up all available forces for the assault of his lines. General Sir E. Hamley was therefore ordered round to Ismailia from Alexandria with the Second Division (except Sir E. Wood’s brigade, which was directed to remain there for the defence of the town and neighbourhood); so also was the Indian contingent moved up from Suez. While the concentration was in progress, communications were restored as rapidly as possible between the base and Kassassin. The line of railway was repaired where it was torn up, and where embankments of earth had been found to block it; and rolling stock brought out from England was landed and placed upon it. The fresh-water canal also was cleared by removing the dams, which had been constructed across it at Makhuta and Magfar. The Guards Brigade remained at Makhuta until the 9th of September, busily engaged in digging away the obstructions that impeded the traffic on the railway and on the canal at these two points, and partly in throwing up redoubts to strengthen the lines of communications. It was a laborious work;—

“for the skilful dam-makers ... had so wattled in reeds, telegraph wires, and other binding materials into the mass of the earthworks, that our men, standing in the muddy canal without any convenient foothold, had the greatest difficulty in removing the obstacles.”[413]

Footnote 413:

Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 55.

Supplies also ran short, on account of the impossibility of conveying them across the deep sand, through which lay the only road to the front, until the railway or canal could be used.

“But the most trying circumstance which the rapid movement had entailed was the absence of tents and camp equipage. These were pushed on by rail and canal as rapidly as the condition of both permitted, but for some days the necessity of depending for chance shade upon the shelter of the trees and villages under that glaring sun called for much endurance on the part of the troops so employed. It was the price paid for the rapid successes of the 24th and 25th. The tents reached the troops at Tel el-Makhuta on the 28th. The valises of the men reached them on the following day.”[414]

Footnote 414:

_Ibid._ , p. 57.

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties to be overcome, the scorching heat, and the shadeless glare, the work was well and expeditiously performed. The following communication from Colonel Drake, Commanding Royal Engineer of the First Division, refers to what the Brigade did at this period of the campaign:—[415]

_Tel el-Makhuta_, August 30, 1882. I wish to bring to the notice of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, the excellent work which has been done by the Brigade of Guards on the important work, of opening the communications on the railway and canal. Engineering work, always fatiguing to troops fully employed on military duties, has been especially harassing in this climate; but in consequence of the great interest shown in the work by the Guards Officers in charge of parties, it has been executed by the men cheerfully and well, and it is my opinion, that had this spirit not been shown by Officers and men, the progress of the army must have been for several days delayed.

Footnote 415:

An extract of a report upon the signalling performed in Egypt by the Coldstream is reproduced in Appendix No. XIV.

Once, on the 28th of August, this labour was interrupted for a brief space. On that day the enemy attempted to make an attack on Kassassin, which, owing to the fact that it was commanded by hills in his possession, was not a strong military position. Having made a demonstration in the morning, which resulted only in a distant artillery fire of little value, Arabi ordered a more vigorous attack upon General Graham in the afternoon, and this produced some fighting, and a charge conducted in moonlight by the three squadrons of the Household Cavalry. The Egyptians then retired, and the action came to an end; but as soon as it was perceived that the enemy was endeavouring to recapture Kassassin, the Guards Brigade were hurried forward from Makhuta to the threatened point, and were placed in reserve. The three Battalions did not return to their quarters until midnight.

On the 7th of September, communications were cleared, a railway service was established, the main bulk of the supplies and stores—of which large quantities had already been despatched to the front—were ready to be sent forward, and the remaining troops, hitherto kept back at Ismailia, were awaiting to be moved to Kassassin. Orders to concentrate the army there were given, when Arabi made one more attempt to defeat the advanced troops opposed to him at that place, before the rest came into position (September 9th). His previous efforts had failed; and it was scarcely likely that, having effected so little before—although in contact with a small portion of the British forces only—he would now be able to achieve a success at this late stage of the war. The attack was nevertheless a formidable one in point of numbers, and almost the whole of the hostile forces, supported by a powerful artillery, were employed in it. But it was easily repulsed, and the enemy was pursued towards Tel el-Kebir, where he ran for shelter.[416] During the action, the Guards Brigade were once more moved forward from Makhuta to remain in reserve should their services be required; but they were not brought into action. It seems probable that, had the advance of the First and Cavalry Divisions, who were then present, been continued, Arabi would then and there have been driven out of his entrenched position. The pursuit, however, was not pressed home. Instead of returning to their former camp, the Guards remained for the next few days on the ground they occupied on the evening of the 9th.

Footnote 416:

Our losses amounted to 3 killed and 77 wounded.

The Egyptian army could scarcely be considered a very formidable foe. The Generals had shown little military capacity, the native Officers no enterprise or power of leadership, and the men in consequence had displayed but a small amount of valour. Drawn principally from the fellaheen, or the peasantry of the country, the ranks of the forces opposed to us were filled with men who had no desire to excel in the profession of arms; and during the first combats of the campaign we gained ample proof of their inefficiency in the field.[417] As regards their numbers, we are informed that at the date of the bombardment (July 11th), the Egyptian army consisted in all of about 9000 men, 288 field guns, and only 750 horses. Of these, 5000 were in Alexandria, the rest being dispersed over the country. The reserves were called in afterwards, and the 9000 expanded to 60,000, by the 20th of August; when 15,000 were before Alexandria, 12,000 at Tel el-Kebir, 11,000 at Cairo, and 22,000 were distributed in remote garrisons unmolested by the invaders; besides this, there were 6000 Beduin Arabs, half at Tel el-Kebir and the remainder before Alexandria. Again, later, 40,000 raw recruits without training were enlisted, and the total of the army reached the high figure of 100,000 men, not counting the Beduins. For all these men, it appears, arms were available, and 11,000 untrained draft horses were procured.[418] These vast numbers of undisciplined and unorganized men could do little to serve Arabi’s cause, and they seem to have been rather a source of weakness to him. Unable to fight, they were liable to panic, and their presence was more calculated to unsteady the few soldiers who alone possessed some knowledge of their duties than to augment the strength of the army.

Footnote 417:

Arabi’s force contained a few battalions of Sudanese, or black troops; the latter were his best soldiers, and fought well.

Footnote 418:

Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 40, etc.

By the evening of the 12th of September, the whole available British forces were at Kassassin, some eight miles from Tel el-Kebir, and numbered 634 Officers, and 16,767 Non-commissioned officers and men, 61 guns, and 6 gatlings. Previous to this date, several reconnaissances had been undertaken towards the enemy’s entrenched position to examine his works, and to observe his strength, disposition, and habits. The knowledge so gained could only confirm the poor opinion in which the enemy deserved to be held. His lines were continuous, stretching from the canal for a distance of some 6000 yards; but they were not apparently protected by any advanced works, nor provided with efficient inner entrenchments. They seemed to present little difficulty to storming parties, nor were any formidable obstacles visible.[419] The left (north) flank, moreover, was entirely open and unguarded; and, lastly, no outposts secured the front during the night. Thus feebly did Arabi venture to oppose the army of one of the great Powers of Europe; and if he was unable to bring civilized science to his aid, so also were his troops incapable of displaying the wild heroism that belongs to the barbarian. In short, he invited a night attack either on his left flank or in front; with the certainty that, if the invaders could reach unseen the position he endeavoured to fortify, they could turn it or penetrate it, before he was ready to meet them; and the whole of his defences would be rendered useless. This would bring about his complete defeat, and the dispersal of his raw levies, who eagerly watched for an early opportunity to desert and fly to their homes.

Footnote 419:

The lines were afterwards found to consist of a parapet from 3 to 5½ feet high, with a ditch in front, about 4 feet deep; they were stronger in the south, near the canal, than on the north, where, in fact, they died away, as it were, into nothing in the desert.

It is, however, one thing to perceive after the event, what ought to be done, but quite another thing to determine beforehand, the best line of action, and to ensure a result as successful and decisive as the assault on Tel el-Kebir proved to be. The night march across the desert was by no means an easy operation. It entailed the bringing up the whole army in battle array, through the dark, close to a given position at a given time. Careful arrangements to prevent confusion had to be therefore made on the part of the leaders, from the Commander-in-chief downwards; and attention and rigid discipline were more than ever required on the part of the men who were thus led to the assault. It is needless to say that all ranks vied with one another in discharging correctly the important functions that every man had to perform during that night; and in this manner was the difficult operation carried through without hitch, and even without temporary delay. It should be added here, that fortune also favoured us in no small degree. Arabi had, in fact, constructed one, and only one, advanced work in front of his lines of defence; but it had not been discovered during our reconnaissances, and we were ignorant of its existence. By good luck that work was avoided by our columns, as they went forward in the dark to the attack. Thus we managed to cross the desert unperceived by so dangerous a tell-tale of our movement, and arrived at dawn before the hostile lines, close enough to storm them before the Egyptians even knew that we were in their vicinity.

A conspicuous point in the lines had been selected upon which to direct the march of the Second (Hamley’s) Division; Sir A. Alison’s Highlanders in front, followed by a brigade formed of the two Divisional battalions of the infantry divisions, under Lieut.-Colonel Ashburnham, C.B., King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The First Division was on Sir E. Hamley’s right, with an interval of 1200 yards; General Graham’s brigade in front, supported by the Guards 1000 yards in rear. Forty-two guns were placed between the two divisions, in line with the Guards Brigade. The Cavalry Division with 12 guns Royal Horse Artillery were on the extreme right. The Indian contingent and the Mountain battery, on the south of the canal, with orders to move off an hour after the rest of the army.

The troops began to strike their tents when dusk set in, and marched to their various rendezvous not without difficulty. It was, of course, imperative that every corps should reach its starting-point in proper order, and there was naturally some moving backwards and forwards in the dark before the masses were correctly formed and aligned. The Brigade took post in their usual formation, the Coldstream on the left, and each Battalion was in columns of half battalions. Everything was ready at 11 p.m.; the men then lay down till 1.30 a.m. of the 13th of September, when they arose in silence, and commenced the advance. We had the advantage of meeting no obstacles in the way; the trackless gravelly soil everywhere afforded an easy passage, and, guided by the stars alone, the army maintained the direction of their march.

At night, however, men are always somewhat under the influence of a vague and undefined feeling. The absence of sound, the inability to see for more than a few feet, the sense of isolation which every group experiences, the strange surroundings, the uncertainty of the future, the idea that some untoward event may happen,—all contribute to produce a suppressed excitement almost akin to nervousness.[420] The principal danger lay in the fact that should the centre halt, the wings would continue to move, and so wheel inwards, until one flank faced the other. This actually occurred in the Highland Brigade; but the mishap went no further, and was very speedily rectified by the vigilance, discipline, and intelligence of all ranks. The First Division moved more slowly than the Second, and its leading brigade appears to have executed some changes of formation during the night; the Guards, following in support, made no change in this respect, but marched in the order in which they had originally started. Just before reaching the enemy’s position, the British army was in an irregular _echelon_; the left was forward and nearest to the enemy, and the right was about 800 yards back.

Footnote 420:

“It is impossible adequately to convey an impression of the absolute silence which prevailed, and of the entire absence of any indication of the existence of a moving army at only a few yards from each of the columns” (Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 82).

The Egyptians say their forces at Tel el-Kebir amounted to 20,000 men and 75 guns; but there seems reason to believe that they have under-estimated their numerical strength, and that they had from 25,000 to 30,000 men present.[421]

Footnote 421:

Maurice, _Official Account_ , p. 92. If there is no exaggeration in the total numbers which, we are told, the rebel government collected after the bombardment of the 11th of July, and in the number of guns which were at their disposal at that date, it would appear likely that at least 30,000 men instead of 20,000 men must have been present at Tel el-Kebir; and it is somewhat a surprise to find that Arabi had only so small a force of artillery defending his lines, as 75 guns, when as many as 288 were apparently available at his orders.

As the enemy had no outposts to cover his front; and as we had been fortunate enough to pass by the only advanced work he had constructed, without coming in contact with it,—though our left was at one time unpleasantly close to it,—he had no sort of warning that our whole army was approaching his defensive position, and would assault it at daybreak. He was completely surprised. At 5 a.m., when the first gleam of light was beginning to appear, the Highlanders were close to Tel el-Kebir, and, dashing forward, they carried, after a brief but sharp struggle, the defensive lines in which Arabi apparently had placed so much confidence. While this fight was proceeding, General Graham’s brigade hurried up, and penetrated the Egyptian lines, where they presented a smaller obstacle than did those which faced the Second Division. The battle lasted scarcely half an hour. By the end of that time, the enemy was entirely overpowered, and his forces were annihilated and completely dispersed. The Guards followed, and got into the works as soon as possible, but the short action was then practically at an end.

“The first of the enemy’s shells landed in the middle of some vedettes, about eighty yards to our left front; nearly all the rest fell about one hundred yards in rear of us. As we advanced the Egyptians did not seem to alter their elevation. The bullets were falling all around us; but firing ceased at about 6 a.m., except our guns blazing at the flying Arabs.”[422]

Footnote 422:

Captain Shute (Coldstream Guards), _Diary_ .

The cavalry was ordered immediately to pursue the enemy to Cairo, the infantry advancing into and occupying the Egyptian camp and the bridge at Tel el-Kebir. The former pushed boldly on to a suburb of the capital, whence Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stewart went forward with a small force of fifty men, and secured the capitulation of the town and the surrender of Arabi (September 14th). Egypt now lay at the mercy of the British army.[423]

Footnote 423:

See Appendix No. XIV., giving Her Majesty’s message to the British army, and Sir G. Wolseley’s General Orders, issued after the battle of Tel el-Kebir.

The losses of Arabi’s forces at the battle of the 13th of September can scarcely be reckoned by the killed and wounded; for such was the extent of the disaster he experienced, that he had no further troops at the end of the action. Many fled to their homes, many rushed wildly onwards panic-stricken; all idea of further resistance had come to an end; every man only thought how he could best make his submission, and welcome the conquerors with demonstrations of joy. The Egyptian casualties are reckoned at 2500, and 58 of their guns were captured. The British lost 9 Officers and 48 men killed, 27 Officers and 355 men wounded, and 30 missing, total 469. Of these the Highlanders lost 45 killed, 180 wounded, and 6 missing; General Graham’s brigade 9 killed, 119 wounded, and 24 missing; the Guards Brigade 1 man killed, and 2 Officers and 20 men wounded; in the Coldstream, 1 Officer (Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Sterling), and 7 men were wounded,—of the latter, one man subsequently died of his wounds.[424]

Footnote 424:

Lieut.-Colonel Balfour, Grenadier Guards, reckoned among the wounded, died of his wounds; as did also two Officers of the Highland Brigade.

The victorious forces pushed on towards Cairo after the battle, and secured all the railway centres which communicated with the Egyptian garrisons, still held by the enemy. There was little trouble in causing these garrisons to submit, and by the 24th the whole country was pacified and disarmed. General Willis, with his 2nd Brigade and Divisional infantry, remained at Tel el-Kebir for a short time longer, while Sir G. Wolseley, with the Duke of Connaught, and a company of the Scots Guards as escort, went by train, on the afternoon of the 14th, to the capital, followed by the rest of the Scots Guards, by the Coldstream, and by the Grenadier Guards. Owing to obstructions on the line, the Commander-in-chief did not reach his destination until the morning of the 15th; and the Coldstream, starting the same day, reached Cairo that afternoon. The Battalion were then quartered in the Abdin barracks.

The rebellion had now been crushed, and the Khedive’s authority having been completely restored, Tewfik entered his capital in state on the 25th, and resumed his place in the government of the country. British troops, and among them the Guards, lined the streets, which were gaily decked with triumphal arches and inscriptions of welcome. If it is allowable to compare a small event with a great one, the scene was in a very minor degree (in principle, at least), not wholly unlike that which attended the return of the Bourbons to Paris in 1815. The “Usurper” in this case was not redoubtable, nor had he scourged Europe as had his proto-type; but he had interfered with the legal gains of European bondholders, and withstood the wishes and designs of the Western nations. The people, also, in the two cases, not having much will of their own, like many others in a similar position, were influenced by one very simple and burning desire—to give their hearty applause to the strongest party.

A draft from England left for the Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel F. Graves-Sawle and Lieutenant E. Wigram, September 11th; but they were too late to take part in any of the hostilities that marked the campaign, and they went no further than Malta.

There is little more to record. The six weeks spent in Cairo passed agreeably enough, and many eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity to see the sights and the remains of an ancient civilization that makes Egypt one of the most interesting countries in the world. Nor was a race-meeting forgotten, held on the 28th of September, even though other national sports and pastimes had to be discarded on account of the heat. A serious accident, that occurred the same day at the railway-station of Cairo, may also be mentioned. An accidental explosion took place in a waggon laden with ammunition, near the platform, and, as the flames could not be got under, the station buildings were soon destroyed, and much rolling stock and a considerable amount of stores were burnt. Troops were at once sent to the spot, and amongst them the 2nd Coldstream assisted to clear away the _débris_, and guard the place; several smaller explosions continued even during the night.

On the 30th of September a review was held before the Khedive, and the spectacle was made as imposing as possible to impress the natives, not only by the appearance of English troops, but also by the presence of the Indian contingent—Mussulmans like themselves—in the service of Her Majesty. Two days later, the Khedive gave a garden party at the Gezireh palace, to which all Officers were invited in “full dress,” the latter being defined for the occasion, “red serges, swords, and forage caps.” Lastly, there was the famous procession of the “Sacred Carpet,” carried through Cairo on its way to Mecca, and escorted by British troops—an incident which gave rise to some comment in England.

“I had a good deal of difficulty,” writes Captain Shute in his diary, “to find the camel with the carpet, as it had gone another way to the station so as to avoid the British escort. Tremendous procession of Arabs with banners; behind the camel with the carpet came several more camels bearing pilgrims to Mecca, and their baggage.”

The health of the troops gave some cause for anxiety on account of fever and other illnesses, which broke out among them; and, in consequence, several Officers and men of the Battalion had to be sent home invalided. But the sickness was not abnormally great, considering the fatigues and the privations to which the men were subjected during the campaign; the losses of the Battalion in this respect amounted to eighteen men, of whom twelve died of fever.

Soon after the Carpet incident the war organization of the invading army was broken up, and Sir A. Alison, being left in Cairo with a British force, while the re-settlement of Egypt was being accomplished, arrangements were made to send the remainder home to England, and the Indian contingent to India. The Coldstream, leaving their quarters in Cairo on the 31st of October by train for Alexandria, embarked there, the next day, on board the _Batavia_, and, reaching Portsmouth on the 16th, proceeded thence to Chelsea barracks.

It only remains to record that, in recognition of the services of the army in Egypt in 1882, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to augment the honourable distinctions upon the Colours of the regiments engaged in the campaign by the words “Egypt, 1882,” and “Tel el-Kebir.”

Thus was the war in Egypt conducted, and thus did the British army conquer Arabi Pasha, and subject the country once more to the rule of Tewfik. A new period now commenced, when Egypt was placed under the protection of England—a temporary protection only, as the Foreign Secretary of the day eagerly announced,—who assumed the responsibility of forming a pure administration out of discordant elements, and of educating the people to respect the system which was introduced for their benefit. The success that has attended our efforts, under difficult circumstances, is an interesting subject; so also is the resentment which the French pretend to feel—because we are obliged to stay in a land we conquered and saved from what might have been anarchy, when they would not move themselves to put an end to the trouble. But the consideration of these matters does not enter into the scope of this volume, as the Coldstream was not employed in the work of Egyptian reconstruction. A question, closely connected with our intervention, did, however, still remain to be settled, and it very speedily involved us in further military operations, in which the Regiment took its share. We must therefore devote the next two chapters to the causes and conduct of this war.