CHAPTER XI.

THE FALL OF SEVASTOPOL.

Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava—Improvement in the condition of the men—Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th—Changed aspect of affairs before Sevastopol—Review of events during the time spent at Balaklava—Second bombardment—Interference by Napoleon III. in the course of the war; operations paralysed—General Canrobert resigns, and is succeeded by General Pélissier—Energy displayed by the latter—Third bombardment—Fourth bombardment; assault on Sevastopol—Its failure—Death of Lord Raglan; succeeded by General Simpson—Siege operations continued—Battle of the Tchernaya—Fifth bombardment—Sixth bombardment; second assault—The Malakoff is captured—Fall of the south side of Sevastopol—The Russians evacuate the town, and retreat to the north side—State in which the Allies found Sevastopol.

There are few incidents of Regimental interest to record during the stay at Balaklava. The men were lodged in huts, but as these were situated near a burial ground and close to the stables of the Land Transport Corps, the advantages gained by a change from the fatigues and hardships of the siege to the base of operations were sadly diminished, and several cases of maculated fever for the first time appeared. In March, another site having been selected on the west side of the harbour, in a more favourable and sanitary position, and huts having been constructed, the Battalion moved there towards the end of the month. The better food, the shelter, the increased comfort, and the rest now enjoyed by the men, produced a satisfactory effect upon their health, to which the improvement in the weather also contributed; for, the short, though terribly severe winter had passed away, and with the spring the temperature became warm and pleasant. During March, 101 men were admitted into hospital, of whom 24 were suffering from typhus, and the mortality amounted to 10; while next month, 53 men only were admitted, and but 5 deaths occurred.[319]

Footnote 319:

Wyatt, p. 65.

The Battalion were employed principally in the ordinary duties performed at the base of operations, guarding the stores and buildings or other places set apart for the use of the army, and unloading the ships that arrived in Balaklava. Drills were carried out, and the troops practised, in occupying the trenches at night, to meet any sudden attack which the enemy might contemplate. The danger of such an attack was lessened by the fact that the enemy had relaxed his hold, as far back as the end of December, upon the heights on the left bank of the Tchernaya, captured by him on the 25th of October, though he continued to occupy the line of the river. It was still necessary to restrain his activity in this quarter, and several reconnaissances took place to prevent his advance. As was only natural, the Officers at Balaklava, when off duty, rode frequently to points where operations of interest were being undertaken, but the Brigade itself was not engaged at this period.

The gabion-making detachment was continued near Balaklava, to supply the siege-works before Sevastopol.

Early in March, convalescents from Scutari, wounded at the Alma and at the Inkerman, returned to the Battalion, but the next draft did not arrive until the 1st of May, when 7 Officers and 307 men, whose average age and service were 22-1/12 years and 7 months respectively, landed in the Crimea.[320] Owing to the Regimental promotion which had taken place, Colonels Lord F. Paulet (commanding the 2nd Battalion) and Newton, and Lieut.-Colonel Wood were now ordered home to the 2nd Battalion; while Colonel Gordon Drummond assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, Colonels Daniell and Perceval being Acting Majors (mounted), as has already been stated. About this time, also,[321] Officers were posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Captains F. Burton, H. Tower, and C. Blackett. (Subsequently Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy.)

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain M. Heneage; Lieutenant St. V. Whitshed.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stepney; Captain Le Couteur; Lieutenant Rose.

No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel W. Dawkins; Captain Hon. R. Drummond; Lieutenant H. Lane.

No. 5 Company: Major P. Crawley; Lieutenants A. Lambton, Lane-Fox.

No. 6 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop; Lieutenant A. Adair. (Subsequently Major C. Baring.)

No. 7 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Cocks; Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenant G. Ives.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton; Captains A. Thellusson, Gerald Goodlake; Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.

Footnote 320:

The Officers were: Colonels Gordon Drummond, Daniell, and Perceval; Lieut.-Colonel Cocks; Captain Thellusson; and Lieutenants Adair, and Lane. Shortly afterwards Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy (wounded at Inkerman) and Major C. Baring (wounded at the Alma) reached the seat of war; Assist.-Surgeon T. Rogers arrived on June 15th.

Footnote 321:

_Battalion Order_ , May 4, 1855.

As the summer approached, the weather became extremely hot, and towards the middle of May, 90 degrees were registered in the shade. Cholera again broke out among the troops, but, warned by the visitation of this plague in the previous year, every precaution then known to medical science was taken to avert it. The number of sick increased during May and June, the admissions into hospital being in the first month 134, and the deaths 5, and in the second month 267 and 36 respectively; of the latter, 24 men died of cholera.

On the 16th of June, the Brigade returned to the front to join in the operations which were intended to be undertaken by the Allies on the 18th, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.[322] The Battalion was 488 strong (excluding Officers). Three Officers and 61 men were left behind sick, as well as 15 convalescents; altogether 111 men were abstracted from the effective strength. On reaching the upland the old positions were scarcely to be recognised by the rank and file who had remained more than three months at Balaklava. The French having already extended the British Right Attack, occupied the ground in front of the Karabelnaya from the Dockyard Ravine, past the Careenage Ravine, and along Mount Inkerman to the heights overlooking the roadstead. Innumerable siege-works cut up the plateau, the lines were pushed further forward, a large force was concentrated on the spot, and the face of the country—so bleak and barren in February—was now covered with the green carpet of a luxuriant vegetation.

Footnote 322:

The Highland Brigade marched up with the Guards, and thus the First Division, under Lieut.-General Sir Colin Campbell, was once more complete before Sevastopol. Shortly afterwards the following changes were made in the British army. The Highlanders were separated from the Guards, and having several battalions added to them, formed the “Highland Division,” commanded by Sir Colin Campbell. Lord Rokeby, promoted locally Lieut.-General, commanded the First Division, formed of the Guards Brigade, under Brigadier-General Craufurd; and of the 2nd Brigade, viz. a battalion of the 9th, 13th, 31st Regiments, and of the Rifle Brigade, under Colonel Ridley. About the same time, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Light Divisions were commanded by Major-Generals Markham, Eyre, H. Bentinck, and Lieut.-General Sir W. Codrington respectively. The Cavalry, under Lieut.-General Sir J. Scarlett, was divided into three brigades: the Heavy, Light, and Hussar brigades.

We must now take a hasty glance at the state of affairs prevailing before Sevastopol and elsewhere, which controlled the war, while the Guards were at Balaklava. In spite of the united efforts of the British and French occupying the ground before the Malakoff, the enemy succeeded in extending his works to his front, and in materially strengthening the lines that covered the Karabelnaya. The fact was becoming more apparent that General Canrobert, gallant soldier though he was, was not disposed to risk the chances of making a bold move against the Russians; and that the latter, under the distinguished leadership of Colonel Todleben, were enabled thereby to prolong the struggle.

But Canrobert was not entirely his own master in this matter, for towards the beginning of the year 1855 the Emperor Napoleon interfered with the conduct of the operations in the Crimea, in a manner to impede seriously the progress of hostilities. Declaring himself to be dissatisfied with the course pursued, the Emperor conceived the idea of delaying the siege until he could isolate Sevastopol from the rest of the peninsula; and he even proposed to go himself to the Crimea to carry out his design. He was happily dissuaded from undertaking this latter part of the project—dangerous both on account of his inexperience in war, and because of the instability of his authority in Paris,—and it was finally abandoned, after he had been received as a guest at Windsor (April 25th); but he still adhered to his determination to enforce some hazy plan which his vanity had formed, and thereby he increased considerably the difficulties of the Allies.

Added to this, there was a renewal of negotiations at Vienna. The Tsar Nicholas died early in March, and though his successor Alexander II. was clearly in the hands of the war faction, some feeble attempt was made to patch up a peace. The negotiations failed; but the events alluded to could not but exercise some influence over the fortunes of the war, by fettering the action of the French army engaged in it.

This appears to be shown by the results that followed the second bombardment of Sevastopol, which commenced on the 8th of April. Immense preparations had been made to ensure its success, and it was confidently expected by the Allied hosts that this bombardment would at last lead to an immediate and triumphal assault of the fortress.

“Ten days did the terrific storm of iron hail endure; ten days did the Russian reliefs, holding themselves ready to repel attack, meet wounds and death with a constancy which was of necessity altogether passive. On the 19th they saw the fire of the Allies decline, and settle into its more ordinary rate; they saw too, that the sappers were again at work with their approaches, and reading in this the signs of a resumption of the siege, and the abandonment of the policy of assault, they once more withdrew their sorely harassed infantry to places of shelter and repose. Then they began to reckon their losses, which amounted for the ten days, in killed and wounded, to more than 6,000 men. The French lost in killed and disabled, 1,585 men; the English, 265.”[323]

Footnote 323:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 212.

All this expenditure of lives and of war _matériel_ effected just nothing, nor was anything even attempted against the enemy; for the French, though having an opportunity to assault, not possessed at that time by their British allies, were “kept waiting for Louis Napoleon, and were restrained from engaging in any determined attack.”[324]

Footnote 324:

Kinglake, vii. 195; compare Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 225.

In order to accomplish the views of the Emperor Napoleon, a French army of reserve was being collected near Constantinople, and as it was expected soon to reach the Crimea—to undertake the plans which had been sketched out in Paris,—two important operations against the enemy were delayed. First, a further bombardment, arranged to take place at the end of April, and to be followed by an assault, was put off; and secondly, an expedition, at last agreed to, against the Russian communications in the Sea of Azof, and which had actually started to Kertch (May 3rd), was recalled.[325] Both these events caused much embarrassment to Lord Raglan, who, understanding imperfectly even then the Emperor’s proposals, found his own plans thwarted by the supine and unintelligible conduct of his colleague. The confidence reposed in the latter was naturally shaken; and when, a few days later, Napoleon’s scheme was fully revealed to the allied Commanders, was discussed, and was found to be impossible of execution, General Canrobert felt his position to be intolerable, and he resigned the chief command of the French army. It is right to add that, though Canrobert’s character unfitted him to direct the difficult operations which lay before him, he was well suited to assume the lower functions of a commander of a division or army-corps. Being of a loyal and soldierlike disposition, and unwilling to leave the seat of war, he begged that he might revert to the position he originally occupied in the French army when the war broke out, and recommended that General Pélissier (who had reached the Crimea in January) should be appointed the new Commander-in-chief. These proposals were sanctioned in Paris by telegram, and were immediately carried into execution (May 19th).

Footnote 325:

“I merely record that both armies were certainly, if not discontented, amazed, when an expedition which started on the 3rd of May to Kertch, to destroy Russian magazines and stores, was recalled three days later, on the receipt of a telegram from Paris” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , p. 264).

The change in the French command completely altered the state of affairs in the Crimea. The vacillating weakness of Canrobert and his subserviency to the foibles of his Imperial Master, were at last replaced by the hardy daring of Pélissier and by his manly disregard of an ill-timed interference in the conduct of the war, which could only end in disaster. The forces fighting against Russia, moreover, were increasing; while the strength of that Empire was ebbing fast. In April nearly half of Omar Pasha’s Turks, about 45,000 strong, were taken from Eupatoria to the Chersonese, and next month a compact division of 15,000 Sardinians—who had joined the confederacy against Russia—landed in the Crimea, under the command of General La Marmora. The enemy about this time, by reason of his immense losses, had little more than 100,000 men in the peninsula; the Allies were more numerous, and could dispose of about 180,000 men.[326] Thus, it was becoming apparent, that by vigorously pushing on the siege, Sevastopol must fall, and that the resources of Russia—so fatally allowed to accumulate in the early stages of the war—were beginning to fail.

Footnote 326:

English, 28,000; French, 100,000; Turks, 45,000; Sardinians, 15,000 (Kinglake, viii. 7).

Immediate arrangements were made to storm the advanced works which Todleben had constructed, to occupy the Tchernaya and the plain of Baidar that lay beyond it, and to attack Kertch and the Russian base of supplies formed on the coast of the Sea of Azof. On the 23rd of May, after severe fighting, the French gained an important advantage over the enemy near Quarantine Bay; and, two days later, he was also attacked on the Tchernaya and driven out of Tchorgun. About the same time, the expedition to Kertch, composed of 15,000 English, French, and Turks, started for its destination. Operations in this quarter were entirely successful, and by the middle of June the Allies, having struck deep into the resources of the Russians, cut their chief line of supply, and in no small degree carried out practically the policy of investment which the Emperor professed to desire.[327]

Footnote 327:

Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 242. Established now at last on the shores of the Sea of Azof, the Allies might even at this late period have inflicted a crushing blow on the enemy in the direction of Circassia, and so have brought about the end of the war, and a severe check to Russia’s advance through Central Asia and towards India—the objects that Great Britain had in view when she undertook to curb the Tsar’s pretensions in the East. It appears that the attention of the Foreign Secretary (Lord Clarendon) was directed at that time to this most important point; but there was a difficulty with the French, who, conceiving that they would be giving assistance to a purely English policy, would not concur in any such scheme (see Rawlinson, _England and Russia in the East_ , 272 note). It must not be forgotten that Louis Napoleon disapproved of the expedition to Kertch—the one operation in the war which was crowned with complete and immediate success, and which cost the Allies nothing,—and that he peremptorily ordered Pélissier to take no part in the attack on Anapa on the Circassian coast (Kinglake, viii. 79).

The allied Commanders now directed their efforts to the Russian advanced works covering the Karabelnaya, and, determining to attack them, they prepared for the assault by a fierce cannonade (the third bombardment), which opened on the 6th of June with tremendous violence and effect, and lasted until the 10th. On the evening of the 7th, the French advanced against the White works (situated on Mount Inkerman, to the east of Careenage Ravine), and the Kamskatka Lunette (on the Mamelon, covering the Malakoff and some 500 yards in front of it); and the English moved against the Quarries (covering the Redan and about 400 yards from it). These attacks were successful, and the enemy, driven from all these outworks, was restricted to his main line of defence. The captured positions were occupied and held by the Allies. Between the 6th and the 10th the Russians lost altogether, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 8500 men and 73 guns; the Allies nearly 7000 men.

These advantages were now to be pressed home, and a great effort made to assault the main line round the Karabelnaya; the Malakoff and the Redan were to be attacked, and the fortress so long besieged was at last to fall. The final act of the long drama was fixed for the 18th of June, when the Anglo-French allies, having shared so many dangers and hardships in common, might reap the reward of their arduous labours, and obliterate the memories of the day of Waterloo.

The fourth bombardment opened on the 17th, and the fleets once more joined their fire to the numerous great siege guns planted before Sevastopol. The devastating force of the artillery soon obtained a mastery over that of the fortress, and the usual results followed: the enemy’s works were knocked to pieces, his defences ruined, and he lost 4000 men. Now, therefore, was the time for the assault to take place, and, as we have seen, the Guards Brigade were brought up to the front from Balaklava to participate in the operations about to ensue. But the ardent expectations of the besiegers were not yet to be realized, and the attack ended unfortunately. Neither in the Malakoff nor in the Redan, were the French or ourselves able to effect a lodgment; the only consolation was the capture of a position in front of our Left Attack. Among the blunders that occurred to account for the failure, perhaps the most unfortunate was that of Pélissier himself. It had been settled that the bombardment was to continue for two hours after dawn on the 18th, so as to shatter the repairs which the Russians invariably made to their works during the night, and that then the assault was to commence at about 5.30 in the morning. But this plan was altered at the last moment, by Pélissier, who wished the advance to begin at dawn, without any previous preparation by artillery fire. Lord Raglan was not consulted, and, when he heard of it, he submitted to the change most reluctantly. The enemy, therefore, was ready, behind parapets hastily renewed and armed with field guns during the night, and thereby he was enabled to repel the attack. That this was probably the main cause of the failure, may perhaps be inferred from the fact that when, after the assault, the bombardment recommenced, the soldierlike spirit of the Russians gave way, and many of them, unable to stand against the terrific fire poured upon them, fled to the harbour, and endeavoured to escape to the north side of Sevastopol.[328] The Guards Brigade were not engaged upon this occasion; they remained in reserve, and were not brought forward. In fact, the attack had failed, and further expenditure of lives had to be avoided. The losses were great on that fatal day; that of the English amounted to 1500, of the French to 3500, and of the enemy only to 1500.

Footnote 328:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 261.

Two Officers occupying very conspicuous positions in their respective armies disappeared from the scene of their labours about this time. General Todleben was slightly wounded on the 18th, and more gravely hurt a few days later, so that he had to leave Sevastopol, and the Russians lost the services of that master mind to whose conspicuous ability, energy, and courage the prolonged and successful defence of the fortress was primarily due. The Allied armies also were plunged into mourning by the unexpected death of Lord Raglan, who never recovered from the grief and disappointment which oppressed his mind after the events of the 18th. This reverse, added to the labours and anxieties of the previous fifteen months, during which time he discharged his high but onerous duties without intermission, undermined his constitution, and he died on the 28th, surrounded by his personal friends and his military staff. He was succeeded by General Simpson.[329] His body was removed to England, and was taken to the Bay of Kazatch with full military honours, on the 3rd of July; and, in accordance with General Orders, the troops not engaged in the funeral or on duty in the field, remained in their tents during the afternoon. While the ceremony lasted, the Allied forces before Sevastopol were passive in the trenches, and, whether owing to chance or to a graceful act of courtesy on the part of the Russian Commander, the guns of the garrison also kept silence.[330]

Footnote 329:

See Appendix No. X., containing General Orders on Lord Raglan’s death.

Footnote 330:

Kinglake, viii. 299.

The siege was pushed forward with great activity after the 18th, and in this portion of the weary operations the Guards Brigade took their full share. Seeing the mistake committed by advancing over open ground for a distance of 400 to 500 yards, against the _enceinte_ covering the Karabelnaya, General Pélissier now proposed to sap up close to the fortress. The soil near his own siege-works favoured such an undertaking; but not so, that which lay in front of our positions, where a thin layer of earth only covered the solid rock. Thus, while the French were able to get close to the ramparts of the Malakoff, the British were prevented from pushing through the ground much beyond the Quarries, or from lessening to any considerable extent the distance that separated them from their objective—the Redan.

These siege operations lasted without intermission until early in September. On the night of June 18th, the Brigade found 30 Officers and 1000 men for the trenches, of which the Coldstream, furnished 8 Officers and 263 men; and so on, from day to day, in varying numbers, according to the requirements of the moment. It was ordered on the 21st, that “in future the proportion of Officers and men in the trenches will be one Captain and one Subaltern to every 100 men;” and also “should any part of the guard of the trenches be called upon to work, they are positively forbidden to take off their accoutrements or to go far from their arms.”[331] Commencing July 10th, the duties were found by divisions—the First, Second, and Light in the Right, the Third and the Fourth in the Left Attack,—and during that night the Battalion furnished 7 Officers and 312 men, also 21 men more as a special working party.[332]

Footnote 331:

_First Divisional Morning Order_ , June 21st.

Footnote 332:

Special and other working parties and shot-loading fatigues in the trenches were frequently ordered at this time. The following, relating to the duties in the trenches, may be of interest:—

_Head-quarter Memo._ , July 10th: “General Officers of divisions will be so good as to detail not less than a Brigadier-General, three Field Officers, and two Adjutants for duty in the trenches on the days that their divisions furnish the guard, Right Attack.”

_Divisional Order_ , July 12th: “The troops will be told off to their places in the trenches before they leave their camp, and they will move off from the parade in front of the camp, after being so told off, at 6.15, so that they may all be in their places in the trenches and the relief completed by 8 o’clock, according to the General Order on the subject.”

_Head-quarter Memo._ , July 24th: “Until further orders the guard in the trenches by night, will be 2400 men, under a General of the day with three Field Officers; of this number 600 men will work if required by the Royal Engineers, from 4 to 8 a.m., and return to their camp at 8 a.m. if it should seem prudent to the senior Officer in the trenches to dispense with them.... The remainder of the guard will furnish working parties as usual during the day, when required by the Royal Engineers.... There will be a special working party, consisting of 400 men under a Field Officer, independent of the guard of the trenches, except in case of an attack, when they will be available to be called upon by the Officer commanding in the trenches.... General Officers of divisions furnishing the guards in the trenches are to consider the remainder of their division as a support ready to reinforce the guard, with which they will proceed in case of alarm, and resume the command of the whole force in the trenches.”

Later, in the middle of August, a reserve of 600 men was ordered “to remain in the trenches the twenty-four hours, and will be planted during the day in such spots in the 1st parallel or other places of security as may be pointed out by the Generals of the Attacks. Troops not on duty are to remain in camp till further orders” (_Head-quarter Memo._ , Aug. 16th).

_Head-quarter Memo._ , Aug. 17th: “A steady fire of musketry, by riflemen and good shots, must be kept up during the night, from the advanced trenches of both Attacks on the Redan and works in rear and flank. The object being to prevent the enemy from repairing the damage done to their works. The artillery should assist this as much as possible by throwing light balls.”

Colonel Tower says that, on August 21st, he was in the 5th parallel, and that he was ordered to keep up a heavy fire all night on the embrasures. 75,000 rounds were fired from the trench in which he was stationed. He also says that the custom in the middle of August, was to withdraw the guards of the trenches to a position in rear, and to leave an Officer and small party in the advanced line to watch the enemy’s works, and to fire at the embrasures when any one showed himself (Tower, _Diary_ ).

Towards the end of August, and during the beginning of September, more men were employed. There was a party for the trenches 2800 strong, the guard as before 2400, and the special working party, 400 men. During this period, more than one division furnished the necessary daily number required.

It should be noticed here, that the Guards Brigade, on August 31st, exchanged the whole of their arms and ammunition for the new Enfield rifle then introduced, and that, at this time, there were two patterns in use by the troops of the British army standing before Sevastopol.[333]

Footnote 333:

“After 5 p.m. on the 28th inst. the small-arm ammunition magazine on the right of the eight-gun battery in the Right Attack will contain only Enfield rifle ammunition, pattern 1853, bore ·577; the three other magazines will still be supplied with Minié rifle ammunition, pattern 1851, bore ·᛫702.”

Notwithstanding the interest which the operations undertaken between June and September excited, and the high hopes generally entertained that the fortress would soon fall, the little-varying duty in the trenches became monotonous in the extreme, and all wished earnestly that this phase of the war might quickly pass away. Some cricket matches served to while away a few of the weary hours; but the weather was extremely hot and oppressive, and the season was sickly. There was, of course, much to distract the minds of men who, for the first time, found themselves in the presence of an enemy; but it was different for those who had been almost constantly at work for many months on the same spot and at the same object, and thus even these distractions lost much of their novelty and interest.

“The siege was really getting too fearfully tedious now,” writes Colonel Tower, about August 28th. “The weather was hot and sultry; our camp was a long way from the works. We used to parade about 5 p.m., having crammed in all the victuals we could get. We toiled down three miles in the sun, carrying great coat, haversack, revolver, and defiled into the zigzags before sundown; all night (if in the advance) we were straining our eyes over the parapet, momentarily expecting a sortie, being graped and shelled the whole time, and losing a good many of our party. The sun got up very early, and often a breeze with it, and from sunrise to sunset we had to sit in a dusty ditch, being shelled, our food—salt pork and biscuit—covered with dust and sand. The men could not show their noses over the parapet.... The deep blue sea stretching away, dotted with ships coming in and going out, looked so cool and nice in the distance, I used to think of home far away, and long for the siege to be over. It really seemed now as if it were drawing to a close. The bridge across the harbour had been constructed some time, and could be for no other purpose than as a means for the enemy to retire. The French pressed the enemy at the bastion Du Mât [the Flagstaff Battery] and the Malakoff; I used to spend a good deal of time in the French trenches, and knew the whole position as well as any one in the army.”

The casualties in the Battalion were not very severe during these three months, and amounted to 47 wounded, of whom 6 died of their injuries. Besides this number, an Officer of the Regiment, Captain Hon. R. Drummond, was wounded, on August 25th, in the trenches, having been shot through the chest; he left the Crimea on September 6th, but died before he reached England, unfortunately, indeed, just before the steamer anchored at Spithead. The general health of the Battalion may be seen from the following table:—

+————-+——————————————-+————————+ | |Admissions into Hospital from| Deaths from | | |———————+———————+————————+ | | Disease. | Wounds. |Disease.|Wounds.| +————-+———————+———————+————+———-+ |July | 138 | 20 | 8 | 1 | |August | 132 | 15 | 5 | 3 | |September| 65 | 12 | 2 | 2 | +————-+———————+———————+————+———-+

Between June 20th and September 21st, 78 men returned to duty from the hospital at Balaklava; but, _per contra_, 95 men were sent down from the front for treatment during the same period.[334]

Footnote 334:

Wyatt, p. 86.

The Russians could do little to resist the formidable preparations made by the Allies to bring about the capture of Sevastopol. They lost heavily every day, even under the ordinary fire which the besiegers poured upon them, and, perceiving that the end of the long struggle was imminent, they resolved to make one final effort to free themselves from the forces that were closing nearer and nearer to their defences. After much consideration, General Michael Gortchakoff[335] determined to bring down the field army, which was established on the Mackenzie heights and on the Belbek, into the valley of the Tchernaya, and to attack the French, Sardinians, and Turks holding that portion of the field. On August 15th, accordingly, a general action took place in that quarter, known as the battle of the Tchernaya, between a Russian army of 48,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 272 guns, and a somewhat smaller force of the Allies, who, though they massed as many as 60,000 men, did not deploy their whole strength upon that occasion. The enemy displayed much bravery, but showed little skill; he was routed, and fell back slowly towards Mackenzie Farm, losing 69 Officers and 2300 men killed, 160 Officers and 4000 men wounded, and 31 Officers and 1700 men missing—total 8260. The French had 1500 killed and wounded, and the Sardinians 200.[336] The besieging armies expected that this battle would be accompanied by a general sortie from Sevastopol; but it did not take place, for, the Russians were getting exhausted, and their resources were almost entirely at an end. In order to prevent any such attempt, and also to enable the French to sap up quite close to the defences of the Karabelnaya opposite to them, the Allies opened another, though only a partial, bombardment (the fifth) on August 16th, and continued their fire for some days with great violence; but no assault followed, for they were not yet ready to enact the final scene that was soon to begin.

Footnote 335:

General Menshikoff had been replaced in his command in the Crimea by General Gortchakoff in the spring of 1855; the same who fought on the Danube, and whose curious movements, on the day of Inkerman, have already been adverted to.

Footnote 336:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 271.

General Gortchakoff might now have yielded the fortress which had been held so tenaciously and gloriously by the armies of the Tsar; but, after a full inspection of the town, of its ruins, and of the miseries and horrors it contained, he came to the resolution that it was to be held to the last extremity, and that the honour of his Sovereign prevented him from either evacuating it or capitulating. He determined, therefore, to bring into Sevastopol all he could spare of his field army, and to resist to the end. Hopeless as the outlook was at this moment, he still professed to believe that he could hold out for another month.

The last and sixth bombardment commenced on September 5th, and continued, if possible, with even greater fierceness and intensity than before, till the 8th, the day set apart for the grand assault. Pélissier guarded himself this time against advancing at dawn; and, having observed that at noon the Malakoff was usually more weakly occupied than at any other hour of the day or night, he resolved to take advantage of this circumstance, and to deliver the attack then. At noon therefore, the French, under Bosquet, were to storm the Malakoff, the Curtain near, and the little Redan; while the English, under General Codrington, were to attack the Redan. The town defences, moreover, were to be assailed by the French opposite to them, aided by a Sardinian brigade under General Cialdini; but this movement was subject to further orders.

A very fierce fight took place at all these places, of which one alone was successful; for the French, having entered the Malakoff, secured a firm footing there, and gained that important position in the enemy’s main line. Their losses were immense, not less than 3087 in killed and wounded out of 7446 men engaged in this portion of the battle-field. Everywhere else the assaults were beaten back, and the Allies could only believe at first that they had but gained an indecisive victory.

The attack on the Redan was made, as has been seen, under very difficult—almost impossible—circumstances; but, if it was only undertaken to relieve the pressure which the enemy brought to bear upon our allies near the Malakoff, our purpose was fulfilled. It is, however, difficult to believe that a diversion was all we intended to effect, since this assault was to be the final act of the great military drama which had been going on for a whole year in the Crimea, and which riveted the eyes of Europe upon Sevastopol. The troops engaged comprised the Second and Light Divisions, 6200 strong—1700 in the first line, 1500 in support, and 3000 in reserve in the 3rd parallel; the Third and Fourth Divisions formed a main reserve; but neither the Highland nor the First Division, to which the Guards Brigade belonged, was called up to share in the action. The Brigade was posted in rear, about half a mile from the Malakoff, where a splendid view of the fighting was obtained. There was much regret among all ranks composing it that they were not allowed to advance and take part in the attack; more especially since, when the French (according to Colonel Tower) asked General Simpson to send some of his troops to help them to hold the Malakoff, the request was refused, and the First Division, or, at least, the Guards, who were close by, were not told off to perform this duty. If this is more than camp gossip, it is, indeed, to be regretted that no British troops were enabled to participate in the glory of inflicting a final reverse upon the enemy’s position in the Karabelnaya.

General Simpson explains that he determined to give the honour of leading the assault to the Second and Light Divisions, because they had defended the trenches and approaches to the Redan for many months, and because of the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground. Military critics believe that this was a “cruel kindness to the army.” The two divisions were exhausted by the siege, and the knowledge of the ground is considered upon this occasion to have been a positive disadvantage, “for, in acquiring it, the troops generally lost the dash which is essential to success.” Moreover, these divisions were now filled with young and only partially trained soldiers, “who paid no attention to the orders that were given;” “the companies lost all formation and cohesion from the irregular manner in which they ran forward, and they stood in confused groups behind the parapets;” “the battalions got mixed up;” in fact, “the young, raw recruits failed to follow their leaders in the way in which the soldiers had done at the Alma and Inkerman.”[337] On the other hand, there were fresh troops available; the Guards had only shortly before come up to the front from Balaklava, where they passed three and a half months, and the Highlanders had been there between October and June. Neither, as we know, were employed in the assault, much to their disappointment and chagrin.

Footnote 337:

Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , pp. 370-378.

But all this is only one side of the story. The task before the British was, under any circumstances, most difficult to fulfil. They had to advance over the open for a considerable distance, against a strong work, covered in front by obstacles, whose rear was unenclosed, and whose fire was unsubdued. It had been impossible to construct _places d’armes_ in our trenches, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, and hence the reserves could not be concentrated in suitable positions whence to push forward at the proper moment and feed the attack. Nevertheless, the leading British troops advanced with the utmost gallantry and spirit, notwithstanding the furious fire to which they were exposed; they penetrated into the Redan, and clung to the position they had gained. But they could not maintain themselves there; for, the Russians, hurrying up in immense numbers, forced them to retire before the reserves—hampered in the narrow trenches—were able to advance to their support. The French, moreover, having spiked the guns they found in the Malakoff, had none to turn

upon the enemy as he entered the Redan in force to drive out our storming parties. After this failure, the attack was put off to the following day; our losses amounted to 2271 Officers and men, those of the French to 7567, and of the Russians to 12,913.[338]

Footnote 338:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , pp. 278-285. The 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, in support, lost, in killed and wounded, 15 Officers out of 18, and 197 men out of five companies (Wood, _Crimea_ , loc. cit.).

But there was no necessity to renew the combat; for the enemy, aware of the strength of the Malakoff position, which commanded the whole of the defences of Sevastopol, evacuated the south side during the night of the 8th-9th, and withdrew to the northern bank of the roadstead, blowing up their magazines, and firing the town in several places. The Allies had thus early intimation of the impending fall of the fortress which for so long had withstood their valour; but the full extent of the victory was scarcely appreciated before the morning of the 9th, when the enemy’s retreat became known to the armies engaged. The evacuation of the Redan was first ascertained by some Highlanders in the trenches in the night, who, stalking up to the ditch and abatis that was near it, found the work tenanted only by spiked guns and by dead men.

“N——, who knew my wandering tendencies, came to me in the middle of the night before daybreak, and told me to get up at once, that some one had come out of the trenches, and that the Redan was evacuated. I got on Bono Johnnie and galloped off about daylight. I arrived at our trenches, which I found occupied by the Highland Division; they were fast putting out a line of sentries to prevent any one going over to the Russian works.... I went across the hill towards the Malakoff, the ground literally paved with iron; the great high parapet was already broken down, and in the afternoon the ditch was filled in with gabions and a regular road made into the work. Dead and dying inside the work; such a scene of devastation and confusion impossible to conceive: guns broken and upset; powder in the embrasures, two or three inches deep, all loose on the ground; wounded men, French and Russians, still crawling about, and the trenches full of Russians who had crept in.... From the top of the parapet our trenches were spread out like a map. I was wild with delight at thinking the siege was over, and all the country opened to us. I posted off to the White barracks, and ransacked the whole place, coming back through the Redan.”[339]

Footnote 339:

Tower, _Diary_ , Sept. 9, 1855.

The Allies did not enter the town on the 9th, for Sevastopol was a blazing mass of ruins, and the frequent explosions showed the place to be undermined: the garrison having escaped under cover of the night, when we were unaware of their intention, could not be further pressed at that moment, so there was no object to serve by sending the troops into a fire-trap. A terrible conflagration raged, and to this was added the burning and the final destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The minds of our men could be well filled with awe and joy at the wonderful sights that met their gaze—awe at the fiery furnace the enemy kindled to mark his departure from the stronghold he had held so audaciously and bravely, and joy that the protracted siege was at last concluded.[340] Early on the 10th, the fires had ceased, and the conquerors, advancing to secure their prize, found one great building intact. Having penetrated into it, they were amazed to discover that it was a hospital containing no less than 2000 dead and dying men, who had been left to their fate without food or treatment for two days and nights, in the midst of the dire confusion and chaos that prevailed in the town; among them were three English Officers.[341] At midday on the 13th, a fatigue party of 500 men of the First Division, under Major Ponsonby, Grenadier Guards, were ordered into the town to help to cleanse it, and to bury the numerous dead. The duty was a disagreeable one, as may well be imagined; it was well performed, as can be seen from the following Divisional Memorandum, dated September 15th:—

The General Commanding the Forces expresses, through Lieut.-General Lord Rokeby, his regret at being obliged to employ the Brigade on the disagreeable fatigue duty of Thursday last, but which, for the health of the army, was absolutely necessary; and he was fully satisfied with the manner in which that duty was performed.

Footnote 340:

The Battalion Order dated the 9th, “The Battalion will parade for inspection of necessaries at 9 a.m. to-morrow, Officers in blue coats, etc.,” shows that the ordinary routine of military duty was never relaxed.

Footnote 341:

Hamley, _Crimea_ , p. 286; Nolan, ii. 473.

The French now occupied Sevastopol, and the English the Karabelnaya, where regular guards were established. The British troops (500 each day from the Brigade) were employed, with a working pay of 1_s._ 6_d._ a day, in making a main road from Balaklava to the front, and others in the neighbourhood, under the superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. A. Hardinge, Coldstream Guards.

It should be stated here, that, on the 27th of August, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Ambassador at Constantinople, reached the Crimea for the purpose of investing several Officers with the Order of the Bath. The ceremony took place at the British head-quarters, in the presence of General Pélissier and his Staff. The Guards Brigade furnished a Guard of Honour; the Coldstream, the Queen’s Colour, the Ensign and Lieutenant (Lieutenant Whitshed), and 50 men; and the Scots Fusilier Guards, the Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, the Lieutenant and Captain, and 50 men. Among those on whom the honour was conferred, connected with the Regiment or to be connected with it, were Lieut.-Generals Sir Colin Campbell, Sir H. Bentinck, and Sir W. Codrington.

The Brigade paraded in review order on the 20th of September, for the purpose of receiving medals and clasps, which were distributed to the Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men who had landed in the Crimea before the 1st of October, 1854.

Early in October, 1855, new reinforcements reached the Battalion. On the 2nd, 24 convalescents arrived for duty from Balaklava, as against 7 invalids sent to England next day. On the 4th, the fifth draft landed from home, consisting of 8 Officers and 207 men, whose average age was 24 years, and service 15 months. “They were principally volunteers from the Militia, and a remarkably fine body of men, not so tall as the original Guardsmen, but in every way better adapted for the exigencies of active service.”[342] Officers were posted to companies as follows, October 7th:—

No. 1 Company: Major C. Baring, Captain H. Tower, Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett, Major Lord Bingham, Lieutenant Julian Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert-Stepney, Captain C. Blackett, Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Le Couteur, Captain Lord E. Cecil, Lieutenant Whitshed.

No. 5 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop, Lieutenant A. Lambton.

No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate, Captain W. Reeve, Lieutenant H. Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major H. Armytage, Captain Hon. W. Feilding, Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, Captain Heneage, Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.[343]

Footnote 342:

Wyatt, 86.

Footnote 343:

A few days later, Majors Baring and Armytage were invalided to England, and Captains Hon. H. Byng and Jervoise joined the Battalion—the former from home, the latter by transfer from the 42nd Highlanders.