CHAPTER X.

THE WINTER OF 1854-55 IN THE CRIMEA.

Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman—Sevastopol not to be taken in 1854—Tardy arrangements to enable the army to remain in the Crimea during the winter—Violent hurricane of the 14th of November; stores scattered and destroyed—The winter begins in earnest—How the Government at home attended to the wants of army at the seat of war—Absence of a road between the base at Balaklava and the front—Miserable plight to which the army was reduced—Indignation in England, and the measures taken to relieve the troops—Admirable manner in which the misfortunes were borne by the British soldiers—Operations on both sides during the winter—The Turks occupy Eupatoria; successful action fought there—The Guards Brigade sent to Balaklava.

The battle of Inkerman exhausted the energies of the combatants, and for a few days they recoiled from each other, stunned by its effects. The Allies had gained a Pyrrhic victory; another such victory, and their forces must be annihilated. The enemy also had received a crushing defeat, which shattered his military prestige and ruined the _morale_ of his army. Neither side was in a condition to operate against the other, and each faced his opponent listlessly, almost helplessly. But Menshikoff, though disgraced in the field, deserved the gratitude of his Imperial Master, and had every reason to be content with what he had achieved; for, he had gained an advantage of supreme importance. He had put it out of the power of the Anglo-French invaders to finish the war during the year 1854, and thus, while chaining them fast to the bleak and narrow upland of the Chersonese, he had the satisfaction of knowing that they would be exposed to the rigours of the approaching winter. This result was all the more disastrous to us, since, not having foreseen it, we were in no position to meet it, and were unprovided with the means of maintaining our troops in the inhospitable region to which we had become committed. In short, the Allies were about to be handed over to foes far more destructive and terrible than those they had hitherto met. Instead of contending against Russian weapons, they were now also to struggle with the forces of nature and the fury of the elements. On the 6th of November it was finally determined to put off the bombardment, and to winter in the Crimea. The Commissariat Department, informed of this decision, was then, and then only, ordered to make such preparations as would enable the army to remain on the upland. But the tardy order came too late, for in less than ten days the winter began in earnest, and nothing could then be got ready to save the troops from the cruel trials that awaited them.

On the day after the battle, the Allies were engaged in burying the dead, in removing the Russian wounded who still lay on the ground, and in clearing the field of the traces of the struggle. An invitation addressed to General Menshikoff to agree to a truce, and to send out his men to bury their own dead, was refused, for that prudent commander was naturally disinclined to give his troops so sombre and depressing an object-lesson of their utter inefficiency in the field. His army, however, met this invitation in another fashion, and, whether in error or by design, they answered it by firing upon our burying parties. As another attack was feared, the front was cleared of incumbrances as soon as possible, and the wounded were promptly taken to Balaklava. Their sufferings were considerable; there was a scarcity of hospital comforts and appliances at the seat of war, and the ambulances in use were unfitted for the purpose of conveying injured men.

Much affected by the heavy losses sustained by his “First Brigade,” the Duke of Cambridge came early into the Guards camp, where the few men present turned out to cheer him.

“Accompanied by his Aide-de-camp, the brave and popular Macdonald, the Royal General was assiduous in his attentions to the wounded Guardsmen, sympathizing in cheering tones with the livid wretches that still breathed, and shedding tears of manly sorrow upon the mangled clay of those who had completed their last tour of earthly duty.”[292]

Footnote 292:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 314.

The funeral of the numerous Coldstream Officers formed a most sad procession. Seven—Dawson, Cowell, MacKinnon, Eliot, Ramsden, Disbrowe, and Greville—were laid to rest in one grave, in a small rocky ravine near the Windmill. Bouverie’s body was only recovered late on the 6th, and he was buried by the side of Lieut.-Colonel Hunter-Blair of the Scots Fusilier Guards, who survived the action twenty-four hours.

“It was really enough to unman anybody; poor fellows! far away from all their friends and relations; poor Greville, whose death killed his mother, everybody loved him; we laid them side by side, and I remember the earth pattering on their poor bodies with dull hollow sound.”[293]

Footnote 293:

Tower, _Diary_ . All the Guards Officers were buried in this spot. During the winter of 1855, more than a year later, their bodies were exhumed, and were properly interred on Cathcart’s Hill, where they now lie.

Colonel Upton, though badly hurt, was able to remain at his post till the middle of November, and he assumed the command of the Brigade, _vice_ General Bentinck, wounded, and of the First Division from the 7th, when the Duke of Cambridge was sent to Balaklava, on the sick list. The command of the Battalion thus devolved upon Colonel Lord F. Paulet. The Coldstream was, in truth, a mere skeleton of the fine body which embarked at Portsmouth in the spring of 1854. It only mustered now 11 Officers and 307 men, while no draft,—except a small one of 58 men, which, having left London on the 26th of October, reached the Crimea on the 22nd of November,—was on the road to compensate for this serious deficiency of strength in the field. When news of the battle arrived in England, strenuous efforts were made to fill up the attenuated ranks of the army, by sending out fresh battalions and reinforcements to those already at the seat of hostilities. But the campaign, ever since July, when we were first encamped near the pestilential lake of Devna, had sadly drained our resources—far more rapidly, indeed, than the home authorities had anticipated,—and though recruiting had been actively going on, the large demands which this war created could not be satisfied. In this way, the next draft sent to the Coldstream only amounted to 153 men, and could do little to restore our depleted ranks to an efficient state. This draft started on the 24th of November, and arrived in the Crimea on the 18th of December.[294] In France, however, there was not such a dearth of fighting men as seems to have been the case in England, and considerable reinforcements were despatched to the east, so that somewhat later (in February) our allies were able to extend the siege-works that surrounded the south side of Sevastopol.

Footnote 294:

The average age of the small draft of 58 men reaching the seat of war in November, was twenty-one, and their service nearly two years. The averages of the next draft arriving in December, were twenty-one and a half years and eight months, respectively. Lieutenants Whitshed and Julian Hall accompanied the first; and Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett, Captains F. Burton and J. Le Couteur, and Lieutenants G. Wigram, A. Lambton, G. Rose, and G. Ives the second. Assistant-Surgeon C. V. Cay reached the Crimea on November 28th.

We have seen that the omission to strengthen the unguarded flank at Inkerman by earthworks had led to serious consequences. The critical nature of the battle made this so clear, that, when the fight was over, though we had fewer men to spare than were available before, this vital position was at once placed in a state of defence. English, French, and even Turks—held hitherto to be an incumbrance—were set to perform this duty, and Fore Ridge and Shell Hill were soon crowned with works, commanding the approaches to the scene of the recent struggle, and securing it at last, as far as possible, from further molestation.[295]

Footnote 295:

Recent events having opened the eyes of authority, the shoulder was put vigorously to the wheel. Hence the fortification of an all-important point which, previous to the battle, had either been considered unnecessary, or had been pronounced impossible of achievement with the means at disposal, was actually executed with sorely straitened means after the battle. In a word, few hands contrived to do what comparatively many hands had been judged incapable of doing. “Where there’s a will there’s a way” (_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 325).

The ordinary routine of siege life had hardly recommenced after the rude shock which interrupted it on the 5th, when the winter burst upon the Crimean peninsula with a suddenness and violence that marked a distinct feature in the story of the war, and brought innumerable troubles upon the Allies engaged in it. The weather lately had been cold and stormy, varied upon occasions by short gleams of sunshine and partial warmth. At daybreak on the 14th, however, a violent hurricane, accompanied by a deluge of rain, unexpectedly arose, and swept with terrific force over the country, and not only blew away every tent standing on the upland, scattered the stores upon which the army depended, and stopped all communications, but also dashed to pieces or disabled much of the shipping laden with supplies that were then very urgently needed.[296] The ground was speedily converted into a deep and impassable sea of sticky mud, which flew about in large quantities; the temperature fell, and snow came down. The men of the various regiments huddled together like sheep, behind bushes or rocks, or wherever they could find some protection against the violence of the elements. The condition of the houseless troops was miserable in the extreme, both during the day and long afterwards, for they had nothing wherewith to repair their losses; but it was worse with the sick and wounded, who were exposed to the full force of the cyclone, and to the cold and the rain. A considerable amount of shipping had been left outside the harbour of Balaklava, instead of being safely berthed inside the landlocked bay. Of the vessels anchored in this dangerous position, many went to pieces on the rocks forming the iron-bound coast; altogether twenty-one were sunk, and their valuable cargoes were all lost. H.M.S. _Retribution_, with the Duke of Cambridge on board, narrowly escaped destruction. On that fatal first day of a severe Crimean winter, the troops were deprived of vast quantities of ammunition, food, clothing, and forage, and there was no reserve at hand from whence they could be replaced.

Footnote 296:

It is said that only three tents remained upright in the English camps (Nolan, i., p. 650). But a fourth, belonging to Lieut.-Colonel Carleton, also survived, and it was the only one that did so in the Guards camp. The Turkish tents, placed in a sheltered position, made a better resistance than ours, and comparatively few were swept away.

The difficulties and sufferings that now overwhelmed the army began with this storm, but they are clearly to be traced to the aimless manner in which the campaign had been conducted. The original intention had been to surprise Sevastopol, but it soon disappeared out of sight, and no step was taken to capture the town in accordance with the conditions under which the expedition landed on Russian soil. On the contrary, a regular siege was gradually commenced, and a completely new plan was thereby adopted. But the change was never recognized, its bearing upon the fortunes of the war was not appreciated, and no stores were accumulated at the base of operations to meet the requirements of the lengthy proceedings into which the invaders had drifted. This was the more unfortunate, since, when the allied Commanders undertook the flank march, and shifted their ground from the north to the south side of Sevastopol, they found themselves obliged to operate upon a barren upland which afforded no supplies, and very soon they even lost the advantage of drawing forage from the valley of the Tchernaya. Thus, after the 25th of October, if not before, nothing whatsoever was to be obtained from the land in which the army was established, and every single article had to be transported by sea from a distance. The battle of Inkerman at last revealed the true position in which we stood; but it was then too late, and when the storm destroyed the vessels lying outside the harbour, which contained considerable addition to our scanty stores, it must be acknowledged that this position was indeed deplorable.

Nor should it be forgotten that requisitions put forward were imperfectly attended to by the authorities in England, and that there was often confusion at the base (Scutari and Balaklava), which appears to have been incompletely organized. Owing to these circumstances, many misfortunes overtook the British army, some of which may be cited. Though a request was made early in September for 2000 tons of hay, only 228 tons were received in the Crimea by the 1st of February, 1855.[297] In November an application was forwarded for 3000 tents, and for a steam mill and bakery, but more than six months elapsed before they arrived at the seat of war.[298] Again, we have seen that a substantial portion of the kits were left behind in the squad bags, at Scutari, at the end of May; also that, on landing at Old Fort, the packs were taken away from the men. The former seem to have been allowed to remain where they were stored. But an effort was made in the middle of October, just a month after they had been left on board ship, to recover the knapsacks, though apparently with very indifferent success; and the troops remained, exposed to the severe inclemency of the weather, without any change of clothing, in the worn-out and tattered garments that had uninterruptedly done duty day and night from the beginning of June, when they landed at Varna. Lastly, biscuit and salt pork formed the usual, indeed the never-varying ration served out to the British soldier. This diet was his only food, and it produced scurvy, as was only to be expected. To counteract this plague, limejuice and vegetables were thus urgently required, but neither was available. It is true that small quantities of vegetables were sometimes to be had, but then they were sold to the starving men at famine prices.[299] A tardy requisition was made in October for limejuice, and half the quantity demanded (20,000 lbs.) reached Balaklava on the 19th of December; but there it remained almost unnoticed, and this antidote against the scourge of scurvy was only unearthed on the 29th of January following; nor was it apparently ordered to be issued to the troops as a ration, until the middle of February.[300]

Footnote 297:

Kinglake, vi. 128, note.

Footnote 298:

_Ibid._ , pp. 98, 138.

Footnote 299:

_General Order, Memo._ , Nov. 1st: “Commanders of divisions will send to-morrow at 9 a.m. to the Quartermaster-General’s office, on the wharf at Balaklava, for potatoes.... They must be paid for at the spot at the price of £1 1_s._ per cwt.” _Ibid._ , Nov. 6th: “Those corps or divisions which desire potatoes should send to Balaklava for them; the price is £1 1_s._ per cwt.... The money required to pay for them must be sent at the same time.” It appears that later, after December 10th, whenever vegetables were available they were supplied to the men gratis; but as they had to fetch them from Balaklava under circumstances of extreme difficulty (as will presently appear), it is scarcely to be wondered that the wearied troops did not always avail themselves of the boon (see Kinglake, vi. 138, note). It should further be stated here, that Lord Raglan, “in consideration of the length of the siege operations, the constant labour the men have been called upon to perform, the inclemency of the weather, and the cheerfulness and good will they have manifested in discharge of their duty,” granted the unusual issue of working pay to the troops employed in digging, etc., in the trenches, at the rate of, for Non-commissioned officers as overseers, one for every twenty men, 1_s._ by day, 1_s._ by night; for rank and file, 8_d._ by day, 10_d._ by night (_General Order_ , Nov. 14, 1854).

Footnote 300:

Wyatt, pp. 41, 55. Limejuice, after February 16th, was issued three times during the month.

Arising directly out of the incomprehensible manner in which this extraordinary war was conceived and carried on, another circumstance, more powerful for evil than the apathy with which the necessities of the army were regarded by the Government, caused famine and distress to oppress our troops. We had no road between Balaklava and the front; and hence, when supplies reached the former place, we were without means of conveying them to the spot where they were to be consumed. And yet the distance to be traversed was under eight miles. It has been shown that, of the two roads connecting the English before Sevastopol and the base, one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled; the other, over the Col, was but a mere pathway or cart-track: also that on the 25th of October, we lost the use of the former, and were restricted to the latter. During the autumn this pathway was serviceable; indeed, so firm and open was the country, that waggons and guns could easily move across it anywhere. But when the torrents of rain flooded the ground on the 14th of November, the whole aspect of the upland became altered, and the track as well as the plain were converted into a deep morass, over which communications were rendered almost impossible. The French, with proper forethought, constructed a good road between Kamiesh Bay and their camps, directly they occupied the Chersonese; but as all the British troops were required to push forward vigorously the siege-works, and as we indulged in the misplaced confidence that Sevastopol would fall immediately after the bombardment of the 17th of October, we never even thought of securing our communications, until after the 5th of November, when it was decided to winter in the Crimea. The rejected Turks, offered by Omar Pasha, might certainly have performed this important service while the weather was clear and dry, but the prejudice against them has already been mentioned, and their assistance was refused. After the battle of Inkerman we took measures to construct the road, and we acted as we did with respect to the defences near Home Ridge; tools were hastily procured from Constantinople, and Turks were at last employed. But it was then too late. The unfortunate men were unprovided with food and shelter, and the weather was severe; they died so rapidly that the living were all required to bury the dead, and in a short time this ill-fated contingent disappeared altogether.

The scarcity of forage and the want of a road acted and reacted on each other, and formed the principal causes of the winter troubles. The horses and mules died of starvation, and it was useless to replace them, as there was not wherewithal to feed them. The transport, miserably insufficient as it always had been, dwindled into nothing, and all but disappeared; troop horses of the cavalry were impressed into this service, but they too perished. Carriage traffic soon ceased, and an attempt was then made to convey supplies on the backs of the wretched beasts that survived. This expedient also failed; the quagmire of tenacious clay intervening between the port and the front, the famine, and the exposure to cold and wet, all operated together, and the animals could work no more. Thenceforward there was nothing for it but to make the men themselves wade through the deep mud, and fetch up such things from the base as they required, to keep body and soul together. The duty was no inconsiderable addition to their ordinary toil, for while they were decreasing fast in numbers, the labour in the trenches did not abate. The journey also sometimes took twelve hours to accomplish, and during the time it lasted they were without food, shelter, or rest.[301] This miserable makeshift was, of course, entirely inadequate to supply the troops, and the more bulky or heavy articles, however necessary to the well-being of the army, could not be brought to camp at all. The serious error by which magazines had not been established in time at the seat of war, was repaired quickly by the great energy displayed at head-quarters, and in December considerable quantities of every kind of stores were available at Balaklava, but there most of them remained unused, because, as Government would not supply forage (and it seems it was not easily procured out of England), there was no transport, and as there was no road to span the morass, means did not exist of crossing it and of reaching the front.

Footnote 301:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 170.

The winter all through Europe was a peculiarly severe one, and there was no exception to its inclemency in the Crimea, where the season was specially cold. All the combatants suffered from its effects; even the Russians felt it acutely, though housed and provided with a tolerably fair transport service from their well-stored magazines on the Sea of Azof. Our French allies also underwent many privations, due to the general difficulties that affected the invaders established on the barren upland and exposed to the wind, the snow, and the rain; but more especially on account of the small _tente d’abri_ which sheltered them at night, and which was not so useful as our bell tent. But the British army suffered most. Like the French, our men were sent to trenches filled with water, where they remained wet to their knees for many hours during the day and night; but, unlike them, these hardships were of constant recurrence. Reinforcements were rapidly sent to General Canrobert, and his force was strong enough to enable him to give his soldiers rest when their tour of service in the siege-works was finished. But the British had no such exemption; their numbers were insufficient for the purposes of the campaign; and they practically were always at work. Lord Raglan computed that they were “on duty five nights out of six, a large proportion of them constantly under fire.”[302] If we add, that they were seldom dry; that they had little or no fuel except brushwood and roots; that they could not cook their food; that the coffee served out was in the form of the green unroasted berry;[303] that the ration of rice failed from the 15th of November to the end of December; that the boots were defective and bad; and that there was no warm clothing available until the beginning of the latter month;—it will be readily seen that the hardships undergone were of no trivial character.[304]

Footnote 302:

Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 26th.

Footnote 303:

Many of the men now existed almost entirely upon the biscuit and ration of spirit; the camp was often strewed with portions of uncooked salt meat, and partially roasted or green coffee (Wyatt, p. 40). The green coffee ceased on February 22nd, and compressed vegetables were supplied for the first time on the 26th (_ibid._, p. 56).

Footnote 304:

In the Coldstream some warm clothing and blankets were issued to the men early in December, more were obtained later, and in January a further supply was procured. Lord Raglan directed (January 6th) that each soldier should receive a pair of boots gratuitously (_General Order_ ). The following is the clothing served out to the Battalion (including the Regimental hospital) between the 6th of December and the 28th of February: Great coats, 392; trousers, 100 pairs; sheepskin coats, 459; tweed coats, 29; fur caps, 503; flannel shirts, 147; jersey frocks, 861; pairs of socks, 1527; flannel drawers, 994; mitts, 993; boots, long and short, 532; comforters, 446; gregos, 55 (Wyatt, pp. 41, 45, 57). The long boots appear to have given little satisfaction. On account of the cold—the thermometer sometimes ranging from eleven to fifteen degrees Fahrenheit,—it was not easy to make the men take off their boots at night; their wet feet often being swollen, were pressed by the leather, and thus frost-bite was induced (_ibid._, p. 42).

Nor did the men’s sufferings end here, for when exhausted by toil and privations there was no alleviation to those whose health and strength had given way. So badly organized were the hospital arrangements, that we are told the climax of misery was only reached in the places set apart for the sick. Circumstances necessarily made the field-hospitals in the front rude habitations for numerous patients seized and tormented by painful complaints.[305] The transport of invalids to Balaklava was, moreover, a difficult proceeding and an agonizing ordeal; but arrived at the port, their troubles should surely have come to an end. It was not so, however, for such was the confusion prevalent at the time, so great the number of the sick, that they were subjected, if possible, to worse treatment during the voyage across the Black Sea and in the great hospital established at Scutari. In short, this hospital was a loathsome lazarette, “crammed with misery, overflowing with despair,” until Miss Nightingale and a number of Nuns and Sisters, having arrived on the scene early in November, acquired such influence and acted with such admirable prudence and energy, that gradually—the evil was too great to be arrested at once—order was restored, sanitary conditions were introduced, and the sick were well tended and cared for by the gentle and able nursing of kindly ladies.[306]

Footnote 305:

The indefatigable Surgeon of the Coldstream in the Crimea, Dr. Wyatt, tells us that a marquee was applied for (November 17th) to replace the ill-ventilated bell tents used as a Regimental hospital. It arrived next day, but without ropes, and these, though repeatedly demanded, were only obtained a fortnight later, through Colonel Steele, Lord Raglan’s Military Secretary, who at last procured them from a man-of-war. On the 18th of December another marquee was required (the sick were becoming very numerous), and it arrived on the 29th, also without ropes and deficient of five pieces of canvas; in this case the error was only rectified on the 30th of January.

Footnote 306:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 172, 179, etc. After the battle of Inkerman, the depôt which had been established at Scutari early in June, was re-organized and placed under the able command of Colonel Lord William Paulet (November 23rd), through whose energy many improvements in the hospitals were effected (see Kinglake, vi. 437). An acting Sergeant-Major (Sergeant White of the Coldstream) was appointed there (November 19th).

The British forces before Sevastopol were rapidly melting away in consequence of the combination of misfortunes that overwhelmed them. Diseases of a violent type broke out, and cholera, typhus, diarrhœa, dysentery, scurvy swept away the ranks; frost-bites were common, and even men reported fit for duty, were so weakened as to be scarcely able to continue their labours under the hard circumstances that surrounded them. The drain was excessive upon our strength in the field, and the small army was in truth threatened with extinction. Between the 1st of November and the 28th of February we lost as many as 22,506 men, not including the killed in action; of whom 8898 had died in hospital, while the remainder, 13,608, were lying there sick on the latter date. In spite of fresh regiments and drafts which reached the Crimea after Inkerman, the total effectives all told at the seat of war, reckoning the troops at Balaklava, amounted then to only 17,311 men. In January there would have been about 3000 to 4000 men of the infantry available to repel another attack of the enemy, had he attempted to repeat the operation of the 5th of November.[307] The British would have had a smaller force at the end of February.

Footnote 307:

Kinglake, vi. 202, etc.

The Coldstream shared to the full the calamity which has just been so imperfectly described. Taking part in the constant duty which exhausted the army, exposed to the cruel suffering that the winter brought about, and conspicuously displaying the virtues of strict discipline and of uncomplaining fortitude which enabled our men to preserve a bold and defiant front against the Russians, the lot of the Battalion can scarcely be separated from that which afflicted and honoured its brethren in arms standing before Sevastopol. Its fate was the same as theirs, its sorrows were equally acute, its bearing likewise was proud and dauntless, its glory bright and lasting. But its losses were heavy, as the following table will show:—

┌────────────────┬────────────────────┬─────────────┬────────────────────────┐ │ │Regimental Hospital.│ Sick │ Remarks. │ │ ├───────────┬────────┤ Transferred │ │ │ │Admissions.│ Deaths.│ to Scutari. │ │ ├────────────────┼───────────┼────────┼─────────────┼────────────────────────┤ │Nov. (including │ 277 │ 22 │ 153 │ Eight died of cholera │ │ at Inkerman) │ │ │ │ and eleven of wounds. │ │December │ 221 │ 17 │ 99 │ —— │ │January │ 186 │ 37 │ 91 │The average daily │ │ │ │ │ │ sick was more than │ │ │ │ │ │ sixty-three per cent. │ │ │ │ │ │ of strength present. │ └────────────────┴───────────┴────────┴─────────────┴────────────────────────┘

On the 1st of November the effective strength of all ranks in the field was 600 Officers and men; 1st of December, 451; 1st of January, 353; 1st of February, 173; and at the end of February there were fewer than 100.[308]

Footnote 308:

Wyatt, p. 58. It should not be forgotten that the two drafts which reached the Battalion on November 22nd and December 18th, numbered together 211 men. It appears that there was considerable sickness and mortality among the young and unseasoned soldiers who composed the drafts. Of the Officers invalided during the winter (November to February), were Captain Wilson (November 22nd) and Captain Strong (January 1st); Captain Hardinge, moreover, had to leave the Crimea on account of his health (December 24th), and returned the following May.

But there was an end at last to these mournful circumstances that oppressed our forces fighting in the Crimea; and with the first peep of spring a new era of hope dawned upon the army. The news of the winter troubles roused a strong feeling in England, and the nation was stirred to its depths with sympathy for its brave and suffering soldiers, of whom no country had more reason to be proud, and with resentment against the supposed delinquents who were accused of bringing about the disaster. Greater activity and energy were displayed at home, and a railway was begun to connect Balaklava with the front, so that by the end of March it reached the Col on the edge of the upland, at a time when the road, constructed by ourselves and the French, was made to the same place. A Land transport service was also at length organized. Subscriptions were collected, and clothing, food, stores, and even luxuries poured into the Crimea, and into the hospitals established at and near Scutari. The Government was overturned, and a Commission of inquiry was instituted, both in England and at the seat of hostilities, to report upon every circumstance connected with the war. The result of these investigations, as well as the conclusions arrived at by another that sat later (in 1856), need not be alluded to in this volume. But one point cannot be omitted which deals with the conduct of the troops, who, in the dark hour of trial, did honour to their Queen, to their country, and to their noble profession.

“Great Britain,” says the report of the Commissioners sent to the Crimea, “has often had reasons to be proud of her army, but it is doubtful whether, the whole range of military history furnishes an example of an army exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities as high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan’s command. The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching, exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were reduced by disease and by casualties to a handful of men, compared with the great extent of the lines which they constructed and defended, yet the army never abated its confidence in itself, and never descended from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men and Officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that, perhaps, no other troops would even have made the attempt. Suffering and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other communities, but offences of a serious character have been unknown in the British army in the Crimea ... intemperance has been rare. Every one who knows anything of the constitution of an army must feel that, when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the Officers must have done their duty and set the example.”[309]

Footnote 309:

First Report, 1855, pp. 2 and 3.

The Russians, on the other hand, except for the great labour and care expended on the fortress, remained almost quiescent during the winter months. Restricting their energies to the defences of Sevastopol and to the annoyance of the besiegers, they made the fortress exceedingly strong, and pushed advanced works in front of the line they had already occupied. The greater portion of their field army was brought into the town to reinforce the garrison, the remainder being quartered in the neighbouring villages, or in the Tchernaya Valley. But no offensive operations were undertaken, notwithstanding their immensely superior numbers; and this was the more fortunate, since in the midwinter our forces were so weakened that the English trenches were guarded by only 350 men. This extraordinary inactivity on the part of the enemy has excited astonishment, and it may well be asked—

“how it was that an enemy who possessed such enormously superior forces in men and material, and who could, at any time during a period of months, have directed on some selected point of the siege-works thousands of troops that would have found only hundreds to meet them, did not muster the courage for such an enterprise, when it promised deliverance to the fortress and ruin to their foes.”[310]

Footnote 310:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 194. Whether the Russians were destitute of the necessary courage to take advantage of the obviously favourable chances that the winter offered them of sweeping away the feeble residue of frozen and plague-stricken Englishmen that still survived before Sevastopol, or whether their conduct was the result of a deliberate design, may perhaps be revealed at some future time, when eventual consequences of the Crimean war have been fully developed. It may easily be imagined that the Government of St. Petersburg shrank from converting the existing war of cabinets, hitherto purely local, into a general struggle of nations and principles (Klapka, _War in the East_ , p. 101). For had Great Britain been driven from the Crimea, she would surely have taken her revenge, and have removed the contest from a barren and useless fortress, where unhappily she became involved, to a vital point in the armour of her foe. If there were to be a war at all, it is obvious that the struggle for Sevastopol was the least expensive and the most advantageous form of hostilities that the Tsar could engage in; he lost comparatively little if the contest should prove adverse to his arms, more especially if he could prolong his resistance against the united efforts of the two great Powers of Europe. The more he succeeded in doing this, the more he gained a fictitious prestige, the more he exhausted our resources, by the dissolving process which the winter must surely effect, and the more he made the Western nations beware for the future how they again attempt to thwart his plans.

On the part of the Allies, the approaches to the fortress were pushed forward with considerable activity, both by ourselves and by the French, but there was little actual fighting except what was brought about by the siege operations. In the beginning of February, the French, who, thanks to the liberal supply of men sent to the seat of war, were growing in numbers, undertook to extend the siege-works on our right;[311] thus continuing the line of trenches towards the roadstead of Sevastopol. Bosquet’s Corps was employed for this purpose. Another element of strength was brought into the field during the winter, to which brief allusion must be made. It was at last determined that Omar Pasha’s army should be removed to the Crimea from Bulgaria, where it was unable to influence the course of hostilities; the concentration was effected at Eupatoria, and, on the 17th of February, before the movement was complete, the Turkish force there amounted to 23,000 men. The Russians, having reinforced the troops they had in this part of the peninsula to 20,000 men, attacked the place on that date, and were repulsed with a loss of some 800 men. This success seems to have been decisive, in so far that the Allies now held firmly a point within striking distance of the enemy’s communications through the isthmus of Perekop; but its value was considerably lessened by the following fact. In the autumn of 1854, General Menshikoff was dependent upon this line to draw reinforcements from Bessarabia, and, as he found it open, he advanced freely along it, and reached Sevastopol before the 5th of November, as has been already related. This advantage gained, the road through Perekop became of comparatively minor importance, and the enemy thenceforward relied upon the line from the Sea of Azof. His communications in this quarter could, of course, only be threatened by a force based somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kertch; but that place was avoided, and Eupatoria was selected. Hence the achievement of the 17th of February, while it might have been followed by satisfactory results had it taken place early in October, was, to a certain extent, a barren victory, and served only to show that our Turkish auxiliaries were capable of performing some service in the war.[312]

Footnote 311:

Our allies had 56,000 men in the Crimea in November, 65,000 in December, and 78,000 in January (Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 176).

Footnote 312:

Colonel (now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn) Simmons was present with Omar Pasha as British Commissioner with the Turkish army. He served in that capacity from the summer of 1853, until the end of the war.

The Guards Brigade, having suffered so severely at Inkerman, and being the only infantry force in the front composing the First Division (the Highlanders occupied Balaklava since the 25th of October), it was necessary to reinforce that division by adding thereto the 97th Regiment (November 23rd). This regiment was armed with the old smooth-bore musket, but as sickness diminished the ranks, the Minié rifles of non-effective Guardsmen were handed over to the survivors of the 97th and of other corps similarly situated. On the 22nd of November the position of the camps of the Grenadiers and Scots Fusiliers were moved to the spot where the Coldstream was established. Two days later, a new disposition of the piquets was ordered; of the eight furnished by the division, six were found by the Brigade and two by the 97th. The strength of these piquets, 50 men each, allowed a double sentry every fifty paces of the entire front; three piquets were placed in reserve, and all were “to be encouraged in making fires, as it is desirable that our full strength should be estimated.”[313] On the 25th of December the piquets were reduced to 30 rank and file each.

Footnote 313:

_Divisional Memo._ , Nov. 24, 1854.

During Colonel Upton’s absence at Balaklava on sick-leave, Colonel Lockyer commanded the Division until the 15th of January, when the former returned to the front; the senior Guards Officer present commanded the Brigade during this interval. Colonel Lord Frederick Paulet was also away on the sick-list until the 16th of January, and the Battalion during this time was under Lieut.-Colonel Newton; Captain Armytage was appointed acting Adjutant, vacant by the death of Captain Eliot. On the 17th of January the Brigade lost the services of their Paymaster, Captain South (late 20th Regiment), who, having been present with them ever since they left England, was obliged to leave the Crimea through ill-health. His duties were undertaken by a committee, composed of Colonel Hamilton (Grenadiers), president, and Lieut.-Colonel Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards), and Captain Sir J. Dunlop (Coldstream), members.

On the 26th of November the Household Brigade furnished a detachment of 200 men, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, to the neighbourhood of the monastery of St. George, on the coast west of Balaklava, for the purpose of making gabions, which were required for the siege-works. Of these, the Coldstream provided 70 men with Officers, and Non-commissioned officers in proportion. The detachment was relieved by a similar party on the 21st of December, and again on the 20th of January by 150 men, each Battalion finding a Subaltern Officer and 50 men, with the usual number of Non-commissioned officers.

Major-General Lord Rokeby arrived in the Crimea on the 2nd of February, and assumed the command of the First Division and of the Brigade, when Colonel Upton reverted to the Battalion. But not for long, for, owing to the promotion of the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment (Colonel Hon. A. Upton), he was gazetted to that command (February 20th), and left soon after to take up his duties in London.[314] By this change Lord Frederick Paulet

became Major of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Gordon Drummond obtained the command of the 1st; at the same time Lieut.-Colonels Daniell and Perceval were posted to the latter, and Newton to the former (Acting Majors, mounted).[315]

Footnote 314:

In parting from the Battalion when it was still before the enemy, and after having held the command during a very eventful period, Colonel Upton issued an order of which the following is an extract: “He has known their gallantry and firmness before the enemy, their endurance, and their discipline under every trial and pressure.... To the young soldiers one word at parting: let them ever hold in view the conduct and bearing which have characterized their older comrades, that they in their turn may pass them on to others, and so uphold and carry forward the name of the distinguished Regiment of which they now form a part.”

Footnote 315:

Lieut.-Colonel Stepney, Captains Markham, Blackett, and Caulfeild, and Lieutenant Lane-Fox, joined the Battalion in January, February, and March.

When the sick of the Battalion left the front for Scutari, no information regarding them was obtained by the Regimental authorities, and to correct this serious inconvenience, a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel from each Battalion of the Brigade was sent to inspect the hospitals where Guardsmen were treated, and to arrange a more proper system for future adoption (February 16th). Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton, who represented the Coldstream, reported that the admission of men into hospital, as well as the patients' death or discharge, were imperfectly registered:

“their kits were either stored or condemned without regular authority, or were left in the hold of transports, carried up and down during many voyages, and not unfrequently plundered. When a man died, no regular record was kept or transmitted to his regiment, although professedly done. No returns whatever had been sent to the Battalion of men dead, invalided home, or otherwise employed.”[316]

Footnote 316:

Wyatt, 53. The three Officers were, Lieut.-Colonels Hon. C. Lindsay, D. Carleton (now Lord Dorchester), and Hon. S. Jocelyn (now Earl of Roden).

Colonel Carleton remained absent six weeks, and during this time he established a system of fortnightly returns, which thenceforward were regularly despatched to the Crimea, and he placed a sergeant of the Coldstream on the staff of the hospital at Scutari to carry it out.

It has already been mentioned that the winter troubles added to the losses incurred at Inkerman, and, in the absence of sufficient reinforcements from home, had destroyed the efficiency of the Brigade at the seat of war. At the end of January the three Battalions could hardly muster a tenth of their proper strength, and numbered only some 312 men able to do duty.[317] Lord Rokeby seems to have been so struck with their exhausted appearance, that he endeavoured to obtain for them an exemption from trench duty for a time; but as the Order book shows them to be still continually at work, it is evident that it was not possible to comply with the proposal. Towards the end of February, however, it was found absolutely necessary to make a complete change, and to move them to Balaklava, there to rest and to recruit their strength after the very arduous labours in which for so long they had been engaged. Accordingly, on the 22nd, the Grenadiers marched there, followed by the Coldstream on the 24th, and by the Scotch Fusilier Guards about the same time. In the Regiment there were less than 100 men of all ranks on parade. For some time previously it had become manifest that, if the men continued to live under existing conditions, it was but a question of time how long the Battalion could survive except on paper. Of the sick left behind, 41 followed on the 27th, and 75 were conveyed next day by French mule transport (the usual conveyance lent us by our allies, and indeed the only transport procurable, since our own arrangements had broken down), but the last detachment was not removed to Balaklava until the 28th of March.[318] The Guards remained at the base till June, 1855, and though absent more than three months from the front, they missed little chance of performing any useful military service.

Footnote 317:

Kinglake, vi. 204, quoting from the _Report of the Sevastopol Commission_ .

Footnote 318:

Wyatt, pp. 54, 65.