CHAPTER IX.

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

Large Russian reinforcements reach the Crimea—Position and strength of the enemy; of the Allies—Description of the field of Inkerman—Commencement of the battle, 5th of November—The progress of the first part of the fight—The Guards Brigade advance to the scene of action—The struggle round the Sandbag battery—Arrival of the Fourth Division under General Cathcart—The manœuvre of the latter, and its failure—The arrival of the French—Successes of the British artillery—Repulse of the Russian attack; the retreat of the enemy; there is no pursuit—Operations of the garrison of Sevastopol and of the Russian force in the Tchernaya Valley during the day—Great losses incurred on both sides—Reaction among the soldiery after the battle.

The Russian reinforcements which, as we have seen, began to arrive in the month of October, continued their advance upon the Crimea, so that early in November the hostile forces at the seat of war amounted, all told, to more than 120,000 men capable of taking part in the operations of the campaign.[264] The moment had now come when the enemy determined to deliver his well-prepared attack upon the invaders, and hoped to rid the Crimea for ever of their presence. It must be confessed that he had a good opportunity of accomplishing his object, and that every advantage was on his side. He could choose his own time and place of attack; his forces were far more powerful than those of the invaders, both in numbers and in position; and, by the reconnaissance or sortie of October 26th, he found out (if he did not already know it) that our vulnerable right flank was unsecured by any fieldworks to make up for our other deficiencies. The onslaught, then, that was to drive us away from Sevastopol, and to sweep us into the sea, was to be directed upon this flank, upon ground which our soldiers called Mount Inkerman, and Sunday, the 5th of November, was chosen as the day upon which to put the design into execution.[265]

Footnote 264:

Sir E. Hamley, in his _War in the Crimea_ , p. 129, estimates these forces at 110,000 to 115,000, including the enemy’s sailors. He has, however, apparently omitted to include men whom he previously counted as part of the garrison at the end of September (see _ante_, p. 185).

Footnote 265:

See Map, No. 7, p. 216. Properly speaking, Inkerman was on the other side of the Tchernaya, called by us Old City Heights.

On the evening of the 4th, Prince Menshikoff established his head-quarters near the mouth of the Tchernaya, and his troops were posted as follows: The garrison was not increased beyond the numbers it contained towards the end of October. General Dannenberg, head-quarters on the Old City Heights, midway between Mackenzie Farm and the head of the roadstead, commanded a corps of 50 battalions, 1 squadron, and 134 guns (of which 54 were guns of position). This corps was divided into two columns, namely, General Soimonoff, 19,000 infantry and 38 guns (22 of position), whose troops were temporarily sheltered in the lines of the fortress in the Karabelnaya; and General Pavloff, 16,500 infantry and 96 guns (32 of position), concentrated on the Old City Heights. To the left of Pavloff, there was another force of 16 battalions, 62 squadrons, and 88 guns (15,000 infantry), composed mostly of Liprandi’s column, but now under Prince Gortchakoff, whose head-quarters were at Tchorgun. Lastly, there was a body of 4000 infantry and 36 guns guarding the road to Bakshiserai, somewhere near Mackenzie Farm. Thus, besides the garrison which amounted to nearly 60,000 men, placed in what was now a secure stronghold, amply covered and well armed, there was a force of 54,500 infantry, a powerful body of cavalry, and 258 guns available to operate against the undefended flank of the Allies.

The latter, on the other hand, had received a few reinforcements, but not sufficient to compensate for the immense losses to which they had been subjected. On the evening of the 4th, they numbered but 58,000 infantry,—16,000 British, 31,000 French, and 11,000 Turks; and this small force was further weakened by the fact that the allied Commanders, totally unacquainted with the warlike qualities of their Ottoman auxiliaries, would not allow them to develop their value, and left them no chance to assist in the approaching battle. So far did Lord Raglan’s prejudice go, that the 6000 attached to the British army, were not suffered to take part as combatants, and when Omar Pasha proposed to send him a further contingent he refused the offer.[266] Hence there were practically only 47,000 British and French infantry left to meet the grave crisis which now confronted us. These troops were disposed on an irregular curve which stretched from Streleska Bay (north of Kamiesh Bay) along the front of the enemy’s lines of Sevastopol to the heights of Inkerman, thence southwards on the Sapuné Ridge to the Col, where it ran more to the east, near Kadikeui, and covered Balaklava. This line measured twenty miles in length, it was unsupported by any central reserve, and was everywhere in contact with powerful masses of the enemy.

Footnote 266:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , 128; _Kinglake_ , v. 33, 34 note, 41 note. Sir Evelyn Wood says, in his recent publication, that he has “never understood why these Moslems, who came out so grandly at Silistria, were considered unfit to fight alongside the English and French troops” (Wood, _Crimea in 1854 and 1894_ , p. 199).

Menshikoff’s onslaught was to be delivered as the first gleam of light appeared at dawn on the 5th, when his forces were to be before our outposts, ready to press the advance home. The principal attack was confided to Dannenberg’s corps, whose two columns were to converge upon the British unguarded position at Inkerman,—that of Soimonoff, issuing from the Karabelnaya by the road that skirts the south bank of the roadstead, that of Pavloff marching down to the Tchernaya and crossing the river by the causeway and bridge near its mouth. Gortchakoff was to support this operation, and endeavour “to seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné Ridge;” and the garrison was to “cover by its fire the right flank of the assaulting columns, and, should there be confusion in the enemy’s batteries, to storm those batteries.” The Russians were elated by the bright prospects before them. “Future times, I am confident,” wrote their Chief, “will preserve the remembrance of the exemplary chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of the Allies.... Heaven visibly protects Holy Russia. Have the kindness to bring this to the knowledge of our august Sovereign for the great satisfaction of his magnanimous heart.” Two of the Grand-Dukes, sons of the Tsar, arrived in the Crimea, to encourage the Muscovite troops, and to bear witness to the “exemplary chastisement” about to be inflicted; but the “magnanimous heart” was not to be satisfied, for Menshikoff forgot to take into account, what a handful of British soldiers are capable of doing when sorely pressed, and when protecting the honour of their Queen and country, even against overwhelming odds.

A general description of the ground known as Inkerman (or Mount Inkerman) has already been given. The Lancaster battery, now nearly dismantled, and holding but one gun, had been planted on the Victoria Ridge between the Docks and Careenage ravines, and more than a mile in rear, stood the camp of General Codrington’s brigade of the Light Division. To the east, another main spur, jutting out from the upland, fills up the space between Careenage Ravine and the Tchernaya, broken by water-courses which descend into the ravine, the roadstead, and the river. Into the ravine, there is one water-course, the Wellway, which joins it 400 yards in rear of the Lancaster battery; and into the Tchernaya there is another, the Quarry Ravine, through which a post-road runs connecting the upland with the head of the roadstead. Between the Wellway and the Quarry Ravine, the main spur is some 1300 yards broad, and supports a rise, called Home Ridge, that bends to the north under the name of Fore Ridge, and thence slopes away towards the Tchernaya, in two spurs, which overlook the valley, and which are divided by St. Clement’s Gorge, viz. Inkerman Tusk and the Kitspur. On the Kitspur the Sandbag battery had been erected on commanding ground: it was a mere short wall of earth, only eighteen paces in length, too high to shoot over except where cut by two embrasures; it was unprovided with a banquette, and at this moment it was vacant and unarmed. Astride the post-road the Second Division was encamped, immediately behind Home Ridge, in front of which the main spur is contracted to 250 yards in breadth. But at a distance of 1400 yards from the ridge, the main spur again widens out considerably, and here there is another rise, called Shell Hill, flanked on each side by buttresses, West and East Jut, which the enemy had vainly tried to capture on October 26th. About a mile in rear of the Second Division, and always on the same main spur, near a ruined windmill, stood the camp of the Guards Brigade, the Coldstream being somewhat in rear, and separated from the rest by a narrow ravine. Thus, in the first instance, available to resist an attack on Inkerman, there was one division, viz. the Second, of 3000 men and 12 guns; supported in rear by the Household Brigade, 1300 men, and 12 guns of the First Division, and, on the left, though with a great obstacle intervening—the Careenage Ravine—Codrington’s brigade, 1200 men. To the rear, some two miles from the Guards, lay the northern portion of Bosquet’s Corps of observation, which at this time was in closer communication with the Highlanders and Marines, at Balaklava, than had been the case before October 25th. To the left, were Buller’s brigade of the Light, and the Fourth and the Third Divisions, distant respectively from Home Ridge, 1½, 2½, and 3 miles. These latter troops were covered by the defences which the trenches and batteries afforded, as was also Forey’s French siege corps, which, as already mentioned, took up the line from the British Left Attack to Streleska Bay. But no such protection was available for the division and the two brigades more immediately threatened in the vicinity of Inkerman.

Though both Commanders of the Allied armies felt anxiety on account of this exposed flank, nothing was done to make it secure. General Canrobert paid us the compliment of placing extraordinary reliance on our troops,—especially the _bonnets de poil_, as he called the Guards; on the other hand, Lord Raglan, weak in numbers, thought he could not spare any of his men from the trenches. Still, the omission to safeguard this vital position with earthworks has never been explained, for as Turks could have been obtained for this purpose, and as Engineer Officers were available, the excuse given, like many others put forward to cover our deficiencies in this extraordinary war, can hardly be deemed satisfactory. Of the value of works of defence to be occupied in case of attack, it is sufficient to point out that, if we were victorious without them, we should have been far stronger with them, and the battle (if it had taken place at all under these circumstances) could not have failed to result in greater disaster to the enemy, and in much less loss to ourselves.

The Guards furnished piquets to watch the flank and rear of the British army. On the 1st of November a stronger force was considered necessary to accomplish this object, and the Brigade supplied eight piquets daily. Six (numbered 1 to 6) mounted an hour before daybreak for twenty-four hours, under the Field-Officer of the day while the other two (Nos. 7 and 8) were posted as a reserve from sunset until an hour after sunrise, the whole during the night being placed under the command of a “full Colonel of the Brigade.”[267] Besides finding three working parties in the trenches, each 40 to 50 men strong under an Officer, the Coldstream furnished, on the 4th, piquets Nos. 5 and 8, and again on the 5th, Nos. 3, 5, and 6. Thus before dawn on the morning of the battle, the Battalion had two piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies) coming off, and three (Nos. 6 and 7 companies) going on duty; so that four companies were absorbed, and when the first alarm was given, only half the Battalion (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8 companies) were in camp. The Colonel on duty, during the night 4th-5th, should have been Lord F. Paulet, but as he was incapacitated by illness, Colonel Upton took his place; moreover, Lieut.-Colonel Newton, detailed Field Officer of the day for the 5th, had left long before daylight began to appear. The next senior Officer was Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, and, when the first alarm was given, he quickly formed up what remained of the Battalion, and immediately marched them to the front where the battle was heard, to the support of the Second Division, who were then seriously engaged with the enemy.

Footnote 267:

_Brigade Order_ , Nov. 1, 1854.

“MacKinnon, Ramsden, and I,” writes Colonel Tower, “were all three living in one tent, and were awakened at daybreak, or soon after, by firing in the direction of Inkerman; we thought little of it, as we were accustomed to alarms, and the piquets constantly fired; but presently a big gun or two told us it was more than piquets. The bugles sounded in the camp, and 'fall in directly' was echoed by the sergeants along the line of tents. We hurried on our arms, as we always slept in our clothes, and found the Battalion falling in. Vesey Dawson was in command, on a chestnut horse; Granville Eliot, Adjutant, on his old grey arab, Bashi-Bazouk. It rained a great deal during the night, and that memorable Sunday morning dawned a nasty damp foggy day; the mist was rising from the ground and the brushwood was quite wet; we could only see a few yards before us, but we could hear the pattering of musketry, and the firing had been going on fully half an hour before we came on the scene of action. We left camp in column of fours, but before we got to the Second Division tents one or two round shot came right through our ranks, and we began to have an idea how close the enemy was, and of the serious nature of the business. We formed line, and advanced through the Second Division tents, many of which were knocked down and shot through.... We were the battalion on the extreme right of the army, and my company (No. 1) was on the extreme right of the Battalion.”[268]

Footnote 268:

Tower, _Diary_ , Nov. 5th.

Meanwhile, what had happened was this. Although we knew that an attack was imminent, we were unable to tell the precise day on which it was to take place. The night 4th-5th passed quietly, there was no firing, no alarm, no spies came to warn us. The sentries on outpost, and the piquets, heard a rumbling noise in the valley, but the sounds were deadened by the heavy rain that fell during the 4th and throughout the night, and they were not sufficiently distinct to induce us to concert any definite arrangements to meet the emergency. In so far the enemy acted with caution and ability; the attack came upon us as a surprise, even though we expected it. He failed, however, to marshal his immense masses to the best advantage. The orders given to Dannenberg’s forces were vague, and there was a confusion as to whether both Soimonoff and Pavloff were to operate on the eastern side of the Careenage Ravine, or whether the former was to advance along the Victoria Ridge and the latter against Inkerman. Obviously, had this plan been adopted, Codrington’s brigade and Evans' division would both have been in imminent danger; and had either been driven in, the results must have been disastrous. Fortunately, the two unwieldy Russian columns jammed themselves together on the broken ground east of the ravine, and interfered by their numbers and proximity with each other’s movements.

Soimonoff, arriving on the ground a little before his colleague, commenced the attack with his powerful column. Advancing cautiously and silently in three lines covered by skirmishers, he had 6000 men in the first line, followed by 3300 and his heavy guns, and 9000 with the light artillery in reserve. The latter was the first hostile body perceived by the British advanced piquets; who, though they could then see nothing, heard their approach. On discovering them, they opened fire, and these volleys were heard by General Codrington, who, according to his usual practice, was near the Lancaster battery reconnoitring to the front with his relieved piquets, before the day broke. He at once got his brigade under arms, moved them to the edge of the ravine near the battery, and lost no time in conveying the alarm to head-quarters and to the left. Buller then moved out towards the threatened point, and the Fourth and Third Divisions were in readiness to march.

The enemy soon pressed back the outposts of the Second Division, and the camp being aroused, the troops formed on Home Ridge; while the 22 heavy Russian pieces establishing themselves on Shell Hill, opened on the ridge and on the ground in rear of it: by this means the Russians hoped to crush the British supports that were supposed to be in their ordinary place. But, as a matter of fact, we had none there, a single thin line held the crest, and the fire beyond it succeeded only in destroying the camp and the horses left behind. While this was going on, the twelve field guns of the division were neither silent nor inefficient, and General Pennefather (in command, Sir De Lacy Evans being at Balaklava, on the sick list[269]) now pushed forward bodies of 200 to 500 men to reinforce the piquets, who were slowly retiring before the advance of the masses opposed to them. One of these detachments, 500 strong, under General Adams, moved to the right, towards the Sandbag battery; and another, hurrying to the left, soon came in contact with a huge hostile column which bore down on them in the mist. The Officer in command had just time to sing out, “Fire and charge!” and the men obeying with loud cheers, the enemy was driven back, right through the line of his guns on Shell Hill, before the impetuous onset could be arrested. The result of this hand-to-hand encounter between a thin line of red-coats and a strong column of the Russians, was often repeated during the day. The battle, in short, resolved itself into a series of personal combats between small British detachments and dense masses of the enemy; the former, under the nearest Officers, dashing boldly, without supports, against the latter wherever opportunity offered or danger pressed. There was no central control, nor were manœuvres attempted; both were impossible. But the activity, intelligence, and courage of the few—to be counted by hundreds against thousands—never flagged for an instant, and the unwieldy forces opposed to us, though so much more powerful in point of numbers, were shattered and driven back in confusion.

Footnote 269:

He came up later, but refused to take the command out of Pennefather’s hands.

“No doubt the mist was favourable to the fewer numbers, hiding from the Russians the fact that there was nothing behind the English lines, which came on as boldly as if strong supports were close at hand. It needs some plausible supposition of this kind to account (however imperfectly) for the extraordinary combats which ensued, where the extravagant achievements of the romances of chivalry were almost outdone by the reality.”[270]

Footnote 270:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 141.

Soimonoff, leaving 10,000 men in rear of his guns on Shell Hill, made his first real assault with 9000 infantry, who, to avoid our artillery fire, moved along the eastern slope of the Careenage Ravine. Part of Pavloff’s corps, 6000 men, had by this time arrived on the scene, and they got into the Quarry Ravine, and, bearing across Inkerman Tusk, made for the Sandbag battery. Thus the narrow flat of the main spur, connecting Home Ridge with Shell Hill, was swept with fire from the enemy’s guns, and on one side of it (our left) were 9000 Russians advancing, while 6000 more were threatening our right front at the head of the Quarry Ravine and on the spurs in the vicinity overlooking the Tchernaya. General Buller reached the field at this juncture, with 600 men and a battery from the Fourth Division. To meet the onslaught of 15,000 men suitably supported by artillery, against both our flanks, Pennefather, therefore, had just 3600 men and 18 guns. Soimonoff’s advanced troops on our left met with a transient gleam of success; they captured three guns, which were hurrying into action, and they managed to push into the Wellway. Had they been able to emerge on the plateau near Home Ridge, they would have taken the British position in reverse.[271] But this column was quickly discomfited by a gallant charge of a few men of the 77th Regiment, and by a piquet of the Grenadier Guards under Lieut.-Colonel Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, posted close by. Nor did the remainder of Soimonoff’s corps hold their ground, for they also gave way when met by the steady line of British infantry, and the whole attack upon our left was soon repulsed; indeed, one of our groups, having driven in immensely superior forces, pursued them, and halted not until Shell Hill was reached. The three English guns taken by the enemy were speedily recaptured, and were found to be uninjured; the Russian General, Soimonoff, moreover, was killed at this period. Nor did Pavloff’s 6000 men fare any better, though they were confronted by only 700 to 800 Englishmen. At the head of the Quarry Ravine, the leading hostile battalions were charged by 200 men of the 30th Regiment, and were routed; while the rest, attacked by General Adams and the 41st Regiment near the Sandbag battery, were also driven back in confusion.

Footnote 271:

Apparently this advanced column was composed of sailors or marines, not reckoned in Soimonoff’s corps; they were, therefore, additional to it (Kinglake, v. 117).

It was now nearly 7.30 in the morning, and everywhere the struggle had resulted in our favour. But the battle was only in its infancy. Soimonoff’s reserve, 10,000 strong, was intact, and the remainder of Pauloff’s corps, 10,000 men, had arrived, together with his long train of artillery, which, placed on commanding ground, prolonged the line of guns from Shell Hill to the end of East Jut. Dannenberg now assumed command of these 20,000 infantry, and of the columns whose first attack had failed. He determined to employ his masses against our right, and so co-operate more closely with Gortchakoff, who, as we have seen, was manœuvring in the valley, with orders to seize the Sapuné Ridge. This latter corps had very early assumed a threatening attitude as far north as the heights for which the Guards Brigade were responsible, and this fact somewhat delayed their advance to the front;[272] but it was soon perceived that the enemy in this quarter was making a mere empty demonstration, that the real crisis was round Home Ridge, and that the piquets were sufficient in the present emergency to guard the hills overlooking the Tchernaya. The Grenadier and Scots Fusilier Guards, encamped closer to the scene of action, were therefore moved forward to take their share in it, followed soon after by the Coldstream (four companies strong, under Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, as we have seen), and the whole came into action about 7.30, when the introductory phase of the fight was over, and just as the new attack was developing itself. Shortly after the departure of the Regiment, the two relieved Coldstream piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies), having been kept out somewhat longer than usual, on account of Gortchakoff’s movements, came into camp, and, finding it empty, advanced to the front, as did also Colonel Upton. The strength of the Brigade was as follows:—

Officers. Sergeants. Drummers. Rank & Total. File.

Grenadier Guards 22 24 17 438 501

Coldstream (6 companies) 17[273] 34 14 373 438

Scots Fusilier Guards 20 23 17 332 392

Brigade Staff 3 (Major-Gen. Bentinck; Capt. 3 Ellison, Bde. Maj.; & Capt. Visct. Balgonie, A.D.C.)

Total 62 81 48 1143 1334

Footnote 272:

See Kinglake, v. 70.

Footnote 273:

The names of these Officers are: Colonel Hon. G. Upton, commanding Battalion; Captain Hon. G. Eliot, Acting Adjutant; Lieut.-Colonels Hon. V. Dawson (commanding the four companies that first left camp, viz. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 8), Lord C. FitzRoy, J. Cowell, and J. Halkett; Captains L. MacKinnon, C. Strong, C. Wilson, H. Bouverie, P. Crawley, F. Ramsden, and H. Tower; Lieutenants E. Disbrowe, Hon. W. Amherst, and C. Greville; lastly, Captain Hon. P. Feilding (Acting D.A.A.G. First Division) is here reckoned as a Regimental Officer, since early in the day his horse was shot, and he then joined and fought with the Battalion.

Belonging to the Regiment, and also actively engaged with the enemy, were Lieut.-Colonels T. Steele and P. Somerset on the head-quarter Staff; and Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, D.A.A.G. First Division.

On piquet, and holding the heights over the valley against Gortchakoff’s demonstrations, were Lieut.-Colonels Newton in command, Wood, and Carleton; Captains H. Armytage, and Sir J. Dunlop; and Lieutenant Heneage; with Nos. 6 and 7 companies.

Of the Medical Officers, the Battalion Surgeon, J. Skelton, had been invalided home, November 1st; Assistant-Surgeon Wyatt was present, also Quartermaster Falconer.

Dannenberg’s advance was directed against the Sandbag battery, a work, although quite unfit for defence, and worthless when gained, yet served as a rallying-point, which the enemy endeavoured to capture, and which we determined to defend. Round it and near it, therefore, there surged the bloody and lengthened contest in which the Brigade was about to take a leading and conspicuous part. The attack was of a far more fierce and formidable nature than those which preceded it, and which were almost as child’s play compared with what followed. Instead of yielding to an impulse to fly when the heads of their columns recoiled before our impetuous charges, as had invariably been the case in the early morning, the Russians, still assailed by the same dauntless and romantic British courage, now fought with greater determination; they worked round our flanks and rear, and refused to be carried back by the retreating bodies which our men repulsed. The advance, in short, was better regulated, better fed, and better covered by artillery.

Adams was still holding the Sandbag battery, and had received reinforcements after his first success; our troops were also at the head of the Quarry Ravine, where a short wall of loose stones, called “the Barrier,” blocked the post-road. Little breathing-time was allowed them after the repulse they had just inflicted on the enemy, and a desperate struggle recommenced at these points. The small British detachments, overpowered by numbers and threatened in flank, were forced back; they retired fighting, and in good order, losing many men, among them General Adams. Three guns, under Captain Hamley (the late Sir Edward Hamley, whose book has been so frequently referred to), effectually checked any desire the Russians might have indulged in to harass our retreat. At this juncture the Guards Brigade arrived on Home Ridge; and it will be useful to take a rapid glance at the position as it was at that moment.

On the left, General Codrington was chained to the slopes near the Lancaster battery, and could not move therefrom without endangering the whole line. He received, though unwillingly, slight reinforcements, and his force then amounted to 1400. Later, additional troops reached him from the Third Division, and some artillery, but the latter were overpowered by heavier fire, and the one gun in the Lancaster battery could not be used till near the conclusion of the battle. During the day he held the ridge, maintained a heavy fire upon the enemy in Careenage Ravine, and stood ready to oppose any hostile advance that might have been contemplated up its course. His casualties amounted to about 180 men. Next, in and near the Wellway and in front of it, were the various groups who had repulsed Soimonoff’s first attack, including the company of Grenadier Guards previously mentioned; in all, about 1000 men—that is, allowing for losses, less than a third of the whole force that held Inkerman during the preliminary stage of the battle. It was not known that the enemy meant to concentrate all his efforts on our right, and to leave the other flank practically unmolested, so these men were also chained to the places where they stood, expecting fresh adventure, and, if any of them had to be moved to meet an emergency elsewhere, others replaced them in the position they held. Of the rest, a proportion were men exhausted or unrallied after their previous exertions, and it is calculated that some 1400 men only remained to defend Home Ridge and the Kitspur, 700 on each. As we have seen, those holding the latter were slowly retiring. Of reinforcements arriving, the Guards, 1300, had just reached the ridge, as well as 12 guns of the First and 6 of the Light Divisions. The Fourth Division, 2000, under Sir G. Cathcart, was approaching, so that some 4700 men and 36 guns might be reckoned upon for immediate purposes, while 1600 French and other of Canrobert’s troops were moving forward. On the other hand, the enemy was still very strong, though he had lost part of the 15,000 troops that first attacked, some of whom, indeed, were streaming away from the field panic-stricken, down the Careenage Ravine into Sevastopol, and over the Tchernaya bridge. But he had his powerful and numerous artillery securely posted on West Jut, Shell Hill, and East Jut, and, besides the greater portion of the 15,000 men, there were 20,000 fresh troops. Of these latter, 10,000 were in reserve, and the other 10,000 in the Quarry Ravine, in the neighbouring glens, on the post-road, and in the Sandbag battery which they had just captured.[274]

Footnote 274:

According to the theory of Mr. Kinglake (whose excellent work on the Crimean War has been largely drawn upon, in preparing this part of the present volume), the 15,000 men who attacked in the early morning in two columns, one 9000 strong on our left and the other 6000 on our right, were so completely shattered by their first encounter with the detachments of the Second Division, that they _all_ fled away, and not a man of them took any further part in the battle. Also that, of the 20,000 infantry remaining to the Russians, practically only 10,000 were engaged, the reserve of 10,000 being most of it kept back. Thus, while 15,000 were dispersed into space with the utmost ease, in an hour, by very few opponents, almost as if by magic, the 10,000 made so good a resistance that they were with difficulty vanquished, in three hours and a half, by the 4700 Englishmen who were on the scene at this moment, aided by 1600 French, who appeared soon after, and by the Algerines, Zouaves, and other troops of the same nation, 4000 strong, who reached the ground between ten and eleven o’clock. Nor is it alleged that the early attacks of the enemy were delivered by worse troops than those who came into action at 7.30 a.m. This theory was evidently not believed by some who fought at Inkerman, and Colonel Tower is of opinion that when the Guards first entered into the struggle, they met the Tarutin and Borodino regiments; that is, the eight Russian battalions which formed the main portion of the first attack made by the enemy with 6000 men on the Kitspur, and which, by Kinglake’s account, were not only repulsed, but clean driven from the field never to appear there again, by the bold onset of 700 to 800 Englishmen.

The losses during the day of the two Russian columns, that took part in the first attack, before 7.30, amounted to some 5000 men; and this fact seems to show conclusively that the 15,000 men continued the fight, as stated in the text, long after the hour when Mr. Kinglake says they disappeared from the battle-field. The casualties of the 10,000 men under Pavloff, who came into action at 7.30, were somewhat greater, proportionately, than those of the first two columns. The losses of the reserve (10,000 men), which to a great extent was kept back out of the struggle, were proportionately much less. (P. Alabine, _Notes of the Expedition in 1853-5_ , published in the Russian language, at Viatka, 1861, gives the losses by Russian regiments.)

The enemy had secured a footing on the plateau of the Inkerman main spur, and the Guards Brigade, coming up at that instant, were launched against him, the Grenadiers in front, then the Scots Fusiliers, the Coldstream following a short distance in rear. The leading Battalion charged, and drove the Russians back to the crest; the next formed on its left, and Dawson prolonged the line to the right.

“Thus the narrow strip of height on the beak of which arose the two-gun work [the Sandbag battery] was thinly edged by the _Tria juncta in uno_, ranged two deep: the Duke of Cambridge and General Bentinck in command.”[275]

Footnote 275:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 287.

Many of the rifles at first missed fire, for the incessant rain had saturated everything; but by snapping off caps to dry the channel and by other means the arms were got to work.[276] The failure to use their weapons at this crisis caused great confusion, as may well be imagined, for there was a dense mass of Muscovite grey coats and flat caps in front, advancing against the Brigade.

Footnote 276:

Some of the nipples had even to be unscrewed (Tower, _Diary_).

N^o 7.

“We were almost among them _at once_, we were certainly not twenty-five yards from them.... They yielded ground and we advanced a little, showing a most decided front, but they kept pouring a most deadly fire into our ranks, which began to tell fearfully. The enemy’s artillery were posted on Cossack and Shell hills, and they had seventy or eighty guns at least, but the mist prevented their laying their guns properly for our lines, and they worked the Second Division heights whilst we were far in advance of that; the road was also a point on which they concentrated their fire. Big gaps began to be visible in our line, our dark great coats and bearskin caps towering above the bushes made our men conspicuous in the grey mist.... Several times I saw heads of Russian columns coming swarming through the bushes, the Officers in front waving their swords and shouting to the men; but directly they saw us there was a hesitation, a huddling together, an indecision, and a decided tendency _not_ to come on. They fired quickly and nervously, and generally over our heads; they were so close to us before they saw us, and they were on lower ground than we were; if they had advanced in anything like a decided manner, we _must_ have been entirely swamped and annihilated. But our fellows stood their ground manfully, and the more the Ruskis came up, the quicker our fellows rammed down their cartridges and blazed into them.... Our men were getting very few and far between; our poor company, No. 1, suffered terribly, but we yelled and screamed and fired at the columns we saw in our front; they were immensely superior to us in numbers, ten to one at least, and seemed now to stand their ground very well; they pressed us _hard_. But determination and dogged courage kept them back, and not a yard would we yield. The numbers in front of us increased every second, and we were really hand to hand with them; the bushes were full of English and Russians mixed up together. The groans of the wounded, Officers yelling and screaming at their men, the soldiers shouting at one another, and (I have no doubt) using their favourite expressions, and the firing almost deafened one.

“The Brigade was getting very much mixed up now.... Several other regiments and men of the Second Division piquets furnished us with stragglers who were of the right sort. Our Brigade line, or remnant of our line, was the rallying-point of everybody who was animated with a right spirit. Oh, for breechloaders at this moment, how we could have swept them off as they came up the hill!... I kept taking ammunition out of dead men’s pouches to feed the pouches of the living, screaming if I saw any fanatic Ruski that required shooting.... Some one behind or in the ranks hallooed out, Charge! Granville Eliot galloped forward right at the mass in front of him, Cowell, Bob Lindsay (Fusilier), young Greville, and myself were all close together, and we ran forward with all the men that were near us. It really was a critical moment in the battle, at least in our _local_ part of the battle. Eliot fell from his horse, shot through the head; Cowell staggered and fell by the same bush; young Greville was shot through the body. The enemy was frantic at this moment; the few men who charged with us were all shot, and I found myself entirely surrounded by flat caps.... I could see no one but Russians anywhere near; one fired at me, the powder almost singed my cap. I could see some bearskins on my right through the bushes, and accordingly made for them as hard as I could lay legs to the ground, and I suppose Bob Lindsay and the men who were with us did the same.

“There was a small two-gun sandbag battery on the crest of the hill, into which the remnants of the Brigade were retiring; the Grenadier Colours were already there: the Russians had been driven out of it just before.[277] There were perhaps a hundred men of the three Regiments in the little battery, and crowds of Russians hemmed us nearly all round; we extended men on the left and rear to prevent their cutting off our retreat and getting in behind us. Column after column kept pouring up the hill, and every moment our chances of retreat looked worse and worse. The parapet in front of us was too high to fire over, and the enemy kept climbing into the embrasures and up the exterior slope of the parapet; but one after another they fell, shot by our men as they showed.... We could see lines of bayonets outside the parapet, and could hear them howling and cheering one another on; it was now _fearfully_ exciting.... We kept them at a respectable distance; our line extended some way in the rear and left: but they kept getting nearer, and our men fell very thick.... Vesey Dawson I saw shot by a Russian creeping into the embrasure; Sir R. Newman of the Grenadiers was also killed, and some other Grenadier Officer fell wounded. Our ammunition was beginning to fail, some of the men had not had a round of their own for a long time: the dead furnished the living; but now even that began to fail, and the men in their excitement threw stones, lumps of earth, anything they could see, over the parapet among the Russians, and they came back again amongst us with interest. One of the most remarkable things about Russian troops is the noise they make in action, and I think it is catching, as I never heard our men make such a yelling as they did all this day; I know I was as bad as the rest, because I could not speak for hoarseness that evening and the next day. How long the game of throwing stones lasted I cannot say, but it seemed a long time. There was a visible diminution of bayonets outside the battery, and we had really driven the enemy back a great deal on our left; it was more that they ceased coming on than that we were driving them back. We were still surrounded by them, and they were firing into us as hard as they could.

Footnote 277:

For their gallantry upon this occasion, Colonels Lord Henry Percy and Sir Charles Russell, Grenadier Guards, got the Victoria Cross.

“Of course we could do nothing but retire; this we accordingly did, the Grenadier Colours being our rallying point: but in our weak state, with only a handful of men, _very_ few Officers, and very little ammunition, retiring in the face of a body of the enemy was no easy matter, although the enemy were not in the same strength they were, nor did they seem to be animated with the same spirit they had shown previously. They retired from outside the Sandbag battery certainly; because I remember going outside the battery with several men and pursuing, or rather firing into the enemy, as there were large bodies of them below the battery amongst the bushes; I very nearly got killed for my pains, as I got too far down the hill, and found the top above me lined with Ruskis, and had to run the gauntlet through the bushes along the side of the hill to rejoin the remnants of our Brigade with the Grenadier Colours.... At this moment the _Indigènes_ [the Algerines] came into action; they were the first individuals that appeared on the stage, and well do I remember their black faces and blue uniform coming tearing through the bushes.... When we got to the Second Division heights we were given ammunition.... As to what occurred in the front after this I cannot pretend to say, I only know firing went on with considerable vigour for some time; but the battle _had_ turned in our favour.

“The French troops advanced in masses down the road and over the Second Division heights [Home Ridge], but the _real_ fighting all along the line was over when we retired and when the _Indigènes_ advanced. Some heavy guns on the Second Division hills had cut up their artillery on Cossack and Shell hills very much; the distant rumbling of musketry was going on and some heavy firing still, but it got further off.... I am _perfectly certain_ the brunt of the battle was over when we were retiring out of Sandbag battery: the sun then came out, and it was perfectly clear; our heavy guns began to tell upon the enemy’s artillery on Cossack Hill. The fog having lifted, I saw the whole battle for the first time when we retired out of the Sandbag battery; before then, we had been entirely enveloped in mist and fog. I put this period at about 8.30 or 9, perhaps a little later, but no Frenchman appeared on the right of the battle till after this time, 9.30.... I am perfectly confident the Russians were in retreat when Bosquet’s _Indigènes_ came into the action.... When the _Indigènes_ came through the bushes, some of our men joined them to have a last shot at the Ruski, and they probably formed along the hill in our old position, and peppered into the retreating columns as they went down the hill.”[278]

Footnote 278:

Tower, _Diary_ , Nov. 5, 1854.

This account of the fierce struggle between the Brigade and overwhelming masses of the Russians, written in the private diary of an Officer of the Regiment, gives a few of the confused events that took place immediately near him. Colonel Tower belonged to No. 1 company, and as Colonel Wilson was with No. 8 company, a few words describing what occurred about him may be also reproduced.

“Amid a dense fog raged wholesale murder; the mortal strife was hand to hand, foot to foot, muzzle to muzzle, butt-end to butt-end. It must not be supposed that we always stood rooted on our ground, that we never budged. No, the fight rested not steadfast for an instant. It was now backward, now forward, now sideways. Here, a Grenadier party, after a frantic tussle, would be forced by overwhelming swarms out of the battery; there, a knot of Coldstreamers would arrest the advance of an entire Russian battalion; in another place, a cluster of Fusiliers, rallying after a repulse, would fling themselves upon a column, and with the sheer might of strong hearts, arms, and steel, send it slap-dash over the height’s crest. This ceaseless wrestling to and fro accounts for the Sandbag battery being occupied alternately by men of the different Guards Regiments (or, more properly speaking, by mixed parties of the three Regiments larded with brave Liners). Whenever Pavloff succeeded in ousting one band of defenders from the work, a comrade batch would rush in, and, by a combination of bullet, bayonet, and gun-stock, thrust forth the intruders....

“Time marches so marvellously fast in battle, that it is utterly impossible for men, plunged in the _mêlée_, to form an idea of how they stand with the clock. I have therefore no notion at what period reinforcements reached us. All I know is, that towards the end of the fight I saw many Linesmen fighting intermixed with Guardsmen.... Despite melting ranks, despite fresh regiments which continued to stream up the hillside, despite the growing scarcity of ammunition, the English clung to their battery with the grip of despair. If, by chance, the bull-dog’s hold was for an instant shaken off, the next moment his teeth closed tighter than ever on the sandbags....

“The Russian Officers behaved like true soldiers. They ever were in front of their less adventurous rank and file, urging them on with voice and uplifted sword; nay, they rushed freely on certain death, with the view of inflaming the sluggish spirit of their followers.... And now half the Brigade—a grandiose title for 1300 men—strewed the ground; some slain outright, others bleeding to death, others vainly imploring to be carried off the field. Oh! that I must write 'vainly,' but in the devilish turmoil not a man whom God had shielded could be spared to carry away the wounded. The honour of England, nay, the very safety of the army, demanded that all living should be breast to breast with the Russians.... Meanwhile the Guards seemed at their last gasp, every minute found them less able—not a jot less willing—to repel the enemy. Hardly a man tasted food that morning, hence individual strength began to flag; where companies contended now only subdivisions struggled, hence collective power was ebbing fast. Nor was this all, ammunition had become frightfully scarce; in many cases, indeed, the soldiers had none left, so they were reduced to rifling the pouches of their fallen messmates; and when that resource failed, to pounding away at the ugly Calmuck visages with stocks and stones.”[279]

Footnote 279:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 290, etc.

It is unnecessary to proceed further with this account, for the writer now gives his experiences, when his excited men, having forced a superior number of Russians into hurried flight down the hillside into the valley, rushed after them in pursuit, in spite of their Officer’s efforts to call them back. It is sufficient to say that any description of the struggle between the Guards and the masses which Dannenberg brought against them is impossible. The combatants were in close proximity, the contest was fought out in a thick fog, and on broken ground covered with tough hornbeam bushes and oak scrub, so that our men were speedily dispersed into groups, and few could really say what their neighbours were doing.[280]

Footnote 280:

The following extract, from an account furnished by a Coldstreamer present at the battle, will be read with interest: _Sergeant W. Wilden, No. 1 Company_ , writes:—“Suddenly the alarm came, 'fall in,' every man rushed for his rifle and ammunition; the order was so sudden many had not turned out, and several took their places in the ranks only partly dressed; poor Captain Ramsden was killed in his brown shooting-suit.... During the early part of the day, I should think about 8 or 8.30, the atmosphere became so thick with fog, rain, or mist, and the smoke from firing on both sides, I was not able to see more than eight or ten of my comrades, and scarcely able to distinguish the enemy, although within a few yards of him. At this juncture an alarm ran through our shattered ranks that the enemy was surrounding us. This turned out to be true, for he was working round our right flank to obtain possession of the small Sandbag battery.... A terrible struggle took place for possession of this battery; the enemy pushed his columns to the front in great numbers, and at the same time his left flank was gradually working round and attacking our right. At this time I should think about two companies of our Battalion held the battery. Here our losses were very heavy. We held it apparently for some time, and kept the Russian massive columns in check, until an unfortunate crisis happened; our ammunition was exhausted, and, as our ranks were so terribly shattered, we were compelled by superior numbers to retire from the battery, or, in other words, we were driven out, and left it in the hands of the enemy; but only for a short time, for we rallied and charged the enemy at the point of the bayonet and recaptured the battery. Here a dreadful struggle ensued, a hand-to-hand fight took place, in which bayonets were freely used on both sides, and at one period stones were resorted to to beat the enemy back from the north-western embrasure.... Although several bayonet charges were made upon the enemy, we were unable any longer to hold our ground against overwhelming numbers, and greatly exhausted, we were compelled gradually to retire, at the same time disputing every inch of ground. Here the enemy gradually advanced, and many of our wounded comrades were bayoneted or killed by the enemy. At this moment, the welcome sound of the bugles of the gallant Bosquet’s division of Zouaves reached our ears; their numbers enabled them to force the enemy back and regain the position we were gradually losing. We then retired.... Two long 18-pounder guns were about this time drawn by hand to replace those dismantled, and were used until the close of the battle.”

But the main features of the contest are fairly clear. The Russians, securely posted in the Quarry Ravine, St. Clement’s Gorge, and on the eastern slopes of the Kitspur, made their main attack against the latter, and as their assaulting columns were driven from the crest, they rallied again in the hollows beneath, and kept surging upwards, and renewing the strife. For some time the Brigade drove back the successive waves of the advancing enemy unassisted, except by the broken fragments of Adams' men; but a little later, when Cathcart’s division approached, some 500 of his troops were pushed forward, and joined in the fray, while another portion moved to the head of the Quarry Ravine, and regained the Barrier. The latter, reinforced from time to time, remained there during the rest of the battle, and though the enemy passed them by, now as he advanced and again as he retired, it seems he never closed in on their rear or reconquered the post. Colonel Upton, reaching the ground some time about 8 a.m., with No. 5 company and a company of the Scots Fusilier Guards, also coming off piquet,[281] endeavoured to close an undefended gap which existed between the Sandbag battery and the Barrier, and he prevented the enemy from seizing its advantages at that moment. But his force was insufficient to hold it for more than a brief space, and his men were most of them drawn into the vortex of the principal fight. Hence, it was not difficult for the Russians, pressing through the gap, to work round the left flank of the Brigade, and to penetrate to their rear. Most of the Fourth Division, having been split up into fractions, were sent wherever the pressure of the battle required their presence; but a residue of 400 men under General Torrens remained, and with this force Cathcart hoped to relieve the Brigade in their arduous struggle, and assail the enemy in flank by descending the slopes on our right. The attempt, though successful at first, was not fortunate, and it failed to accomplish the results that were expected from it. The men soon dispersed in groups, were almost surrounded, and had to fight their way upwards with the Russians above them. It was here, moreover, that the valuable life of Cathcart was lost, and that Torrens (some time in the Grenadier Guards) was severely wounded.

Footnote 281:

It appears that No. 4 company moved forward separately, and joined the main body of the Battalion.

This manœuvre appears to have changed the principle on which the Brigade had been resisting the hostile columns, and many who hitherto never pursued the beaten bodies of the enemy beyond the crest, now rushed after them down the slopes into the hollows beneath. In this way the group near Captain Wilson got out of hand, and pursued far down into the valley of the Tchernaya, where they were met by shots from Gortchakoff’s riflemen, “who sprang up among the bushes, and blazed full in our faces.” Meeting some stray groups of Cathcart’s submerged detachment, the whole party reascended the heights, and lost heavily as they climbed up. Here they found themselves between two fires, and ascertained that the enemy was really above them, for at first they thought they were mistaken for Russians, and were being shot at by English soldiers. Avoiding this danger, by taking an upwards direction to the left, they stumbled upon a dead ammunition mule, and eagerly replenished their pouches, as for some time they had not had a round among them. Having at last reached the top, they found that the fog had lifted, that the Brigade was not where they had left it, and that Zouaves and Algerines (the _Indigènes_) were approaching the ground, and were driving the enemy back, as Colonel Tower has already told us. Wilson and the last of his men joined this attack, and many fell; he finally attached himself to the French 50th of the Line as they advanced, and then finding he could do nothing more, he sought the Coldstream, eventually falling in with them near Home Ridge, which he reached before the shattered remains of the Battalion got there.

From the moment our men began to descend the slopes their means of maintaining their post on the Kitspur seemed to diminish. Under any circumstances, the struggle of the few against the many was gradually exhausting the power of the former, and reinforcements were urgently required. It was fortunate, therefore, that our allies now appeared upon the scene. Bosquet, who for some time in the early morning had been observing Gortchakoff, came speedily to the conclusion that that General meant to remain quiescent; he therefore sent forward some of his troops without delay, to Home Ridge, where the danger was most pressing. Two Battalions, 1600 strong, arrived first; and one, the French 6th of the Line, pushing towards the Kitspur, struck in flank the Russians, who, advancing through the gap, which was ever getting wider, were endeavouring to operate against our rear. This French battalion, however, soon got into difficulties, and the other, the 7me Léger, was sent to its support. But before this was effected another crisis occurred; for, the enemy, urging forward his numerous forces up the ravines which he occupied, brushed past the Anglo-French then on the Kitspur, and made a very determined onslaught on Home Ridge itself. This serious manœuvre was repulsed by the gallantry of a few British detachments present on the spot, and of the 7me Léger; the defeated column was driven back, so that the two French battalions were brought together. It was now 10 a.m., and another French force, a brigade with some artillery, led by Bosquet in person, reached the battle in two columns: in the first, some rifles, a battalion of Algerines, and one of Zouaves (1900); in the other, more Zouaves, and the French 50th of the Line (2200). There was still a good deal of difficulty in forcing the enemy to recede; for as the first column pursued him, they advanced too far, and fresh hostile forces were able to move up the ravines leading to the main spur, thereby threatening our allies in rear. But on the arrival of the second column, the Russians, now thoroughly broken by their losses and by the stubborn resistance which held them in check, gave up the contest. They were finally driven off the Kitspur and out of the ravines which had been so useful to them during the struggle, by enabling them to re-organize after so many repulses inflicted by our slender forces. Kinglake thus speaks of a band of the Coldstream during this phase of the fight:—

“The Zouave battalion was advancing ... when the bearskin all at once reappeared. It was from the wooded steeps of the hillsides that the spectre uprose. Since the time when last we observed it, the small band of Coldstream men collected by Wilson had remained in the brushwood below, watching always for some such occasion as the one that now offered. Amid a roar of joy and welcome—for the Zouaves and the Guards were close friends—these Coldstream men joined the advance, aligning on the right of the French.... What followed was slaughter.”[282]

Footnote 282:

Kinglake, v. 402.

Meanwhile we had already gained an immense superiority over the enemy’s artillery. As early as about 9.30, two 18-pounder guns of position had been brought on Home Ridge, and after a short space of time the power of the hostile batteries began to wane. The French guns, coming up, posted themselves on our right, and the bombardment continued with increasing advantage on our side, though the number of our pieces was not half that of our opponents. Some of our men on the left and centre of our line also advanced, and added to the misfortune of the gunners on Shell Hill. The battle was really decided at eleven, though the artillery continued to fire till much later. As soon as the bulk of the Household Brigade returned to Home Ridge, and after ammunition had been served out, the men were reformed, and were moved up to protect the guns against any sudden assault. This duty was “worse than fighting the infantry, for we got no revenge for the men we lost,” and we incurred casualties not a few.[283]

Footnote 283:

Letter of Mr. Taylor, late Quartermaster Somersetshire Militia, then in the Coldstream; one shell killed and wounded eight men. Colonel Upton was wounded at this period. See, also, _Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 299.

The action of the Guards at Inkerman seems to be imperfectly described in Kinglake. According to that writer, the bulk of the Brigade came out of action at 8.30; though he notes that the force under Wilson joined the last attack undertaken by the French about 11 o’clock, and allows that the companies which followed Upton were in the field as late as 10. Giving Bosquet’s impressions of the scene presented to his observation at that hour, he says, “High above on the right, where there sauntered a red-coated Officer with the _bonnet de poil_ and a singularly unconcerned air (Colonel Upton), some men of the Guards could be seen lying down among the brushwood” (Kinglake, v. 382). Yet Tower and Wilden, whose accounts have been given, state that they were relieved on the Kitspur by the Algerines and Zouaves—that is, after 10 o’clock; and Wilson who, according to Mr. Kinglake, was on that portion of the battle-field later than any other Guardsman, tells us himself that he got back to Home Ridge _before_ the bulk of the Brigade reached it. Some isolated groups, separated during the fierce struggle in the fog and brushwood from the main body, possibly found themselves on Home Ridge before; Taylor says he helped to pull up the two 18-pounders, which, as we know, took place about 9.30.

The retreat of the Russians commenced about one o’clock, and was covered by a column of their reserve; which, attempting to advance, was quickly dispersed by a few rounds of the 18-pounders. There was no pursuit. The enemy slipped away, and “seemed to melt from the lost field; the English were too few and too exhausted, and the French too little confident in the advantage gained, to convert the repulse into a rout.” Our allies, deducting losses, numbered at the end of the engagement some 7000 infantry, for, besides the troops already mentioned, three battalions (2400) arrived on the ground at eleven; they also had 700 cavalry and 24 guns present. Lord Raglan was anxious to complete the victory by falling on the rear of the flying Russians, but his cautious colleague would not consent; for he still feared an attack from Gortchakoff’s untouched forces, and was unwilling to expose his men to the fire of the ships that were moored in the roadstead.[284]

Footnote 284:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 157.

While the battle was going on, the garrison of Sevastopol kept up so poor a demonstration, that we were able to denude our camps of men, and push them to Inkerman. Besides the men on duty in the trenches, the greater part of the Third Division watched the fortress, and they were subjected to no further inconvenience than that which the fire from the place, intensified on this day, entailed. About 9.30, however, the enemy made a sortie against Forey’s siege corps, under General Timofeyeff, with 5000 men and 12 guns. The blow, though it met with some success at first, failed, and the Russians were pursued by our gallant allies back under the shelter of the fortress. Thus little was done by the garrison to assist Dannenberg, and that little was of trifling value. Gortchakoff’s operations during the day were still less effective. He made a few feints, fired upon the Sapuné Ridge, and, it is said, did lose 15 men. He thereby gave the companies on piquet (among them, Nos. 6 and 7 companies of the Coldstream) the opportunity of engaging him with distant volleys, without apparently causing much, if any, loss to our side. In short, he did nothing, when by attacking Bosquet, he would have prevented that General from advancing to our assistance at Inkerman. His orders were “to support the general attack, to draw the Allied forces upon himself, and to try and seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné Ridge.” Mr. Kinglake, however, tells us that these written orders were explained away by “oral communications” into something different,[285] and makes us believe that there is a mystery which has never been explained, hanging over the operations of this Russian Commander, who held so much power in his hands on that day. What we do know is that Dannenberg, in spite of his overwhelming numbers, was unable to secure a footing on the Kitspur, that this was due to the manner in which it was defended by our scanty forces, and that in this defence the Household Brigade played a glorious part, and suffered much in consequence.

Footnote 285:

Kinglake, v. 59 (note), 69.

The losses were very great on both sides: those of the enemy, who moved in heavy columns, being more than those of the Allies, though relatively, in proportion to numbers at the seat of war, he suffered less than we did. The Russians had 10,729 killed, wounded, and prisoners, including 256 Officers. The English 2357 of all ranks, of whom 130 were Officers (or 39 Officers, and 558 men killed, and 91 Officers and 1669 men wounded). The French 929, among them 49 Officers (or 13 Officers and 130 men killed, and 36 Officers and 750 men wounded).[286] The Brigade lost nearly half its effective strength, viz., out of a total of 1334:—

Killed 12 Officers, 9 Sergts., 1 Drumrs., 177 Rank & file, Total 199 Wounded 20[287] ” 20 ” 4 ” 357 ” ” 401 Missing — ” — ” — ” 4 ” ” 4 Total 32 ” 29 ” 5 ” 538 ” ” 604

Footnote 286:

The above were the losses on the field of Inkerman. The total casualties on the 5th of November amounted to: Russians, 11,959; English, 2573; and French 1800 of all ranks (Kinglake, v. 443, 457).

Footnote 287:

Counting Major-General Bentinck, who was severely wounded. Of the Coldstream Officers serving on the Staff on that day, none were wounded; Colonel Somerset, however, had a horse shot under him.

The Coldstream suffered in like proportion, but the casualties among the Officers far exceeded those that occurred in the other Regiments. In fact, almost all the Officers were swept away. Out of seventeen present, four only escaped uninjured, viz. Captains Strong, Wilson, Crawley, and Tower. Of the rest, eight were killed or died soon after of their wounds, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Dawson, and Cowell, Captains MacKinnon, Bouverie, Eliot, and Ramsden, and Lieutenants Greville, and Disbrowe. The remainder were wounded; viz. Colonel Upton (slightly), Lieut.-Colonels Halkett, and Lord C. FitzRoy, Captain P. Feilding, and Lieutenant Amherst (all severely). The losses of the Battalion amounted to—

Killed 8 Officers, 3 Sergeants, 73 Rank & Total 84 File,

Wounded 5 ” 11 ” 107 ” ” 123

Total 13 ” 14 ” 180 ” ” 207

The principal casualties were in the flank companies. No. 1 entered the action with 50 to 60 men, and No. 8 was slightly stronger. The former lost one sergeant and 43 rank and file, and the latter two sergeants and 41 men. No. 2 came next, losing 37 men. Where a Battalion has so freely shed its life-blood in the stubborn defence of the position assigned to it, it may seem strange that no official notice should be taken of the death of the Officer who led it into action, and who directed its movements until he fell, and more especially when in the Brigade to which the Battalion belonged, no other Commanding Officer lost his life. Yet this is what occurred with respect to the memory of the gallant Colonel Dawson, and the feelings of his brothers in arms were not inadequately expressed in the following lines, written by Colonel Wilson:—

“The despatch which informed England of this dearly bought victory, commended the services of many of the living and blazoned the merits of many of the dead; but from that encomiastic scroll there was at least one remarkable omission. To the memory of Colonel Vesey Dawson, shot through the heart while in command of the Coldstream Guards, was conceded not a passing word of eulogy or of regret. It is melancholy to reflect that on this humble page should stand the only record of how as brave a soldier as ever drew a sword, as noble a gentleman as ever earned the respect of his fellow-men, fought and died.”[288]

Footnote 288:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 306.

We are told that this great victory caused no outward elation among our troops. A reaction succeeded the excitement of the struggle; the danger now past began to be realized for the first time; and the men, though hardened to the miserable scenes which war creates, were almost awed by the terrible carnage and devastation that met their eyes on the hard-fought field. The Second Division camp was laid flat, the tents uprooted and scattered, canvas saturated with blood carpeted the ground. Our own camp swarmed with the wounded and the dying, and the sight sent a chill of depression through the few survivors as they returned to their bivouacs. Everywhere on the narrow space of the battleground the victims lay thick, some killed, others groaning in agony, and nowhere thicker than in and around the Sandbag battery, where the contest raged the fiercest. Here the dead were literally piled up on one another as they fell.

“The whole battle-field, which could all be seen at a glance, except where concealed by brushwood, looked perfectly _covered_ with bodies; between the Second Division hills and the crest of the Inkerman hill is a very short distance, and the entire action having been fought on that limited space, there was an awful scene of carnage upon it.... Before evening we got all our wounded off the field; the dead, of course, remained there, and the poor wounded Ruskis who were a great deal too numerous to take off.... From the heights I could see the Russian army winding up the road; the whole country was covered with troops straggling over the causeway over the Tchernaya marsh; they were a long time crossing. Arabas full of wounded, guns, etc., lumbering up the way, but they had quite enough of it.... Our hospital was a most piteous sight.... Our poor fellows were all dying or dead.... The camp was miserable, and I could only thank God I was not lying in the hospital tent with half my limbs smashed to pieces, or lying on a stretcher ready to be buried.”[289]

Footnote 289:

Tower, _Diary_ .

Saddest of all, was the cruel thought surging in every mind that many of our brave wounded had been basely bayoneted as they lay helpless on the ground, by an uncivilized enemy, who, unable to drive off the few that held the plateau against him, wreaked his vengeance on the defenceless, as soon as they fell into his hands. We had ample evidence of this savagery—established, moreover, by a special inquiry—that cast so black a stain on the Russian army, for, when our men hurled the foe from a corner from which he had driven us, we found our wounded stabbed to death.

Thus was the battle of Inkerman fought and won by small bodies of the British and French armies, over an overpowering hostile force of more than 35,000 infantry, amply supported by artillery; who, having stolen in during the night up to our outposts, endeavoured to break through the Allied line round Sevastopol, at a point where we were weakest, and where we had absolutely no defences.[290] The result proved the immense superiority of our arms over those of Russia; so also does it give us some indication of what would have happened if we had boldly attacked Sevastopol at the end of September, before, or immediately after, the flank march, or even during the bombardment in October. The British fought with a valour and constancy that surpassed even the glorious traditions of the past. Led by Officers who hurled themselves like the old Knight Errants into the thick of every danger, they nobly followed on with that unflinching steadiness produced by constitutional bravery, by devotion to their leaders, and by the splendid discipline that was the predominant characteristic of our Crimean troops. Their bold extension and their courage in maintaining it, even without supports and when opposed to heavy columns, made the Russians think that the line of red-coats was but a fringe of our strength, and they hesitated when they ought to have acted boldly. We were, moreover, provided with a superior rifle, and so when the enemy, emerging from the ravines, found himself met by a heavy and shattering fire, his columns were brought to a standstill, and he lost the advantage which his solid formation might have given him. He was far from being imbued with the spirit that animated our men, and he lacked the determination to close with them.

Footnote 290:

It cannot be insisted too often that the Sandbag battery was a battery only in name; and that its importance consisted in the fact that it served as a rallying-point, on account of its being a conspicuous object, round which the main struggle on the Kitspur raged. Russian exaggerations have given it a wholly fictitious value; even Todleben, describing the fight a little after eight o’clock, says that the Okhotsk regiment (3000 strong) attacked the Sandbag battery held by their “worthy rivals—the intrepid Coldstream,” that they expelled the latter, and that nine guns were the reward of this brilliant feat of arms! (see Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 160).

“Had he, at the commencement of the battle, pushed these columns resolutely forward, it follows nearly as a matter of course that, by sheer momentum of his heavy masses, the British lines would have been broken through and trampled down utterly. It would have been a question of weight alone. As it was, no devotion, no exertions on the part of the Russian Officers, could at the outset spur their battalions to one grand combined rush. Time was frittered away in a series of persevering but desultory attacks, which were invariably repulsed, thanks to English valour and English firearms.”[291]

Footnote 291:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 309. It is proper to add that the Russian Rifle corps, 1800 strong, were armed with as good a weapon as our Minié, also that some of the British battalions (the 20th Regiment, for instance, who distinguished themselves greatly in the battle) carried the old smooth-bore musket, known as “Brown Bess” (see Kinglake, v. 475).