CHAPTER VI.

BEGINNING OF THE WAR IN THE EAST.

Position of Russia in Europe—State of the Continent in 1853—British alliance with France—The Tsar’s quarrel with Turkey—Commencement of hostilities on the Danube—The affair of Sinope—How it drew England and France into the war—Three Battalions of the Brigade of Guards ordered on foreign service—Concentration of the Allies in the Mediterranean—Guards Brigade at Malta—Thence to Scutari—Want of transport—The Allies moved to Varna—Good feeling between the British and French troops—Course of the war on the Danube—Siege of Silistria—Retreat of the Russians into Bessarabia—Intervention of Austria—The Allies in Bulgaria—Sickness among the troops—Return to Varna—Preparations for the invasion of the Crimea—The organization and strength of the Allies.

The Empire of Russia—except for the great expansion in Central Asia which has taken place during the last forty years, and which has now brought its frontiers close to India—was scarcely less vast and formidable in 1853 than it is at present. Stretching from Germany on the west, to the Pacific Ocean on the east, bordering the Black Sea, and pressing on Turkey, Persia, and China, it occupies an immense and continuous territory, both in Europe and in Asia, and exercises many and important influences over the civilization of the world. Inhabited generally, by a docile agricultural population who live in the plains, and whose liberties and property are at the mercy of a strong executive power, it is ruled by an Autocrat both in name and in reality, and is governed by a trained army of ubiquitous administrators and officials, who enforce his decrees, and coerce the whole people to spend their existence in the service of the Tsar. The organization of Russia, less adapted, perhaps, to secure the welfare of her subjects than to accomplish the will of her rulers, is skilfully constructed; and the sagacity she displays in the conduct of her affairs, is as conspicuous in the manner she brings fresh conquests within her grasp, as in that by which she controls and assimilates the numerous and heterogeneous nationalities, that are to be found within her borders. But here her advantages end. Russia has no seaboard, and her foreign commerce, incommensurate to her size and importance, is not sufficient to enable her to develop her vast resources, or to consolidate the stupendous forces with which her disciplined intelligence, large possessions, and teeming population should endow her. A glance at the map reveals the disability under which she labours. Fettered in the north by an ice-bound ocean, she has but two outlets through which to reveal her strength, and these are blocked by the narrow channels of the Sound and the Bosphorus.

That Russia is ambitious and greedy of power, few will deny; but her encroachments are not altogether due to the mere love of extending her territories. Her existence, as a nation of the first rank, is menaced by her maritime weakness, and until she frees herself from the shackles that cripple her commercial activity on the sea, she is the ready and easy victim of the Power that holds, and has strength to use, the keys of her house. But, added to this, her statesmen have long perceived that, as soon as they shall have gained the Bosphorus, they will win a commanding supremacy over the destinies of the world. While, therefore, they are impelled to a system of aggrandisement, in order to force their way to the sea and to preserve the life of their Imperial structure, they by no means despise the glorious goal of wide dominion, to which the success of this policy must infallibly conduct them. This, then, is, and has been for many generations, ever since their genius conceived the design, the reason which has urged them relentlessly to enlarge their possessions in Poland, Persia, and in Central Asia, and to exhibit undying hostility towards the Turkish Empire.

The Western Powers have not failed to recognise the danger to which they are exposed by this active and aggressive policy, and Great Britain, having vital interests of her own in the far East, has never been able to view with unconcern the absorption of Turkey by her Northern rival. Hence, it has come about that, when the Sultan has been threatened, many nations of the West have endeavoured to go to his assistance, and to ward off the disaster that seemed to be imminent. But their efforts have been badly directed; for, divided among themselves, pursuing divergent interests, interfering without wisdom, or led away by false conceptions of the real situation, they too often manacled the defensive power of Turkey, and gave victory to the Russians, when the latter had not won it by their own strength. In this way Russia advanced and prospered,—by the ascendency that organized intelligence will ever command over a policy of mere sentimental or unreflective expediency,—until 1853, when another crisis was impending in the East, which produced a great European war, and terminated the long peace that had existed since 1815.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the origin of the war. It arose from a trivial incident—the possession of the keys of the Holy Places in Palestine. The Emperor Nicholas I. reigned at St. Petersburg at that time, and he claimed these emblems of superiority as head of the Greek Church; so also did the French, in virtue of an old Treaty made in the sixteenth century, which, they affirmed, constituted them protectors of the Latin Church in the East. The Sultan adjusted the petty cause of dispute, and thereupon the Tsar made fresh demands, which the Porte resisted. These will be adverted to presently, but a word will be necessary here to describe briefly the position of affairs, that existed on the continent of Europe.

France did not long maintain the Republic set up by the Revolution of 1848. Louis Napoleon, nephew and political heir of the first great Napoleon—in spite of the old decree banishing the family of the late Emperor,—was elected President for four years by a large majority (December 20th). Strengthening his position with the army, by appeals to past glory, and with the people generally, by the maintenance of order in troublous times, he resolved to revive the Empire, and succeeded in December, 1851, in constituting himself President for ten years, with largely increased powers, and with the title of Prince. Twelve months later (December 2, 1852), he was proclaimed Emperor under the name of Napoleon III., and was so acknowledged by Europe. The new Sovereign was not blind to the advantages which a friendship with England would confer upon him; he was even anxious to conciliate a people he had known and respected in the days of his exile. The defect in his title, moreover, was best obliterated by the adoption of a policy of adventure. The appearance of the Eastern cloud furnished him with an opportunity he was glad to seize; and, as it became darker, so did he, the more readily, co-operate with the British Cabinet, in their attempt to disperse it. When it was determined that peace could no longer be maintained, an alliance was cemented between the two countries, and England and France, so often in the past unhappily opposed in war, were at length found side by side in the strife, combating the same foe and loyally supporting each other in the field of battle—rivals only in the honour and glory to be derived therefrom. And yet this union was not without serious drawbacks. Seldom can a confederacy of independent States be satisfactory; for each has different interests to serve, and conflicting opinions too frequently weaken the efforts of those who have banded themselves together to accomplish an object avowedly dear to all. In 1854 the alliance was definitely established; it became _l’entente cordiale_, as it was felicitously termed, and, when the war was in progress, harmony and mutual respect and confidence reigned between the armies engaged. But, as a price, to please Napoleon, England gave up some of her most cherished customs of naval warfare—a sacrifice which the armed forces of Europe had in vain sought to wring from her,—and hostilities assumed a direction which, as will be seen, did the least damage to the enemy, and effected injury to the cause which the British nation had most at heart.

The popular explosion in France in 1848, affected not only that country, but produced widespread results, and its consequences were felt, like the Revolution of 1830, all over the continent of Europe. In Austria the crisis had been peculiarly acute, and the Hungarians and Italians rose in rebellion against the authority of their Sovereign. The latter was able to re-assert his power in Lombardy by his own resources; but in Hungary the resistance was so strong that, when the Tsar offered the assistance of his troops, the proposal was accepted, and Russian bayonets reduced the Magyars to obedience, and placed them once more under the Austrian Emperor (1849). In Prussia and in the petty States of Germany less difficulties had been experienced; but the temper of the people had been aroused, and they clamoured for reform and a greater control over their own affairs. The German Princes were alarmed; they distrusted their subjects, and relied for counsel and aid upon Russia—the only Power whose government, like theirs, was despotic, but who, unlike them, had no fear of a popular ebullition. In truth, the credit of the Tsar was in the ascendent in Central Europe: he ostensibly saved Austria from disaster, if not from dissolution; he intervened in the question of the Danish Duchies,[185] which then agitated the whole of Germany; and he mediated successfully between Austria and Prussia, when they became rivals and jealous of each other, on account of the efforts of the latter to restore in her own favour the Imperial Constitution of Germany, which had come to an end in 1806. In short, the Emperor Nicholas controlled the German nations; he arbitrated in their differences; and could involve them in serious trouble should they see fit to dispute his pleasure.

Footnote 185:

Schleswig and Holstein, torn from Denmark in 1864.

When Russia, therefore, not content with the settlement effected with respect to the Holy Places, determined still to provoke a quarrel with Turkey, the Western Powers were not united upon the problem that invited their attention. England and France alone resolved to resist her pretensions, while the others—Austria, Prussia, and the minor States of Germany—practically ranged themselves on her side. The demands made upon the Porte are of little importance; any pretext is good, where an object is to be gained. The Sultan was required to accept the protection of Russia over his Christian subjects, and he refused to submit (May 23, 1853). In this determination England agreed; indeed, it is clear that it would have been impossible for him to deliver over a very considerable section of his people into the hands of his hereditary enemy. Thereupon a Russian force, under Prince Michael Gortchakoff, crossed the Pruth (July 2nd), occupied the Principalities (now the kingdom of Roumania), and established itself upon the Danube. The Turks immediately made great efforts to meet the emergency, by collecting troops and despatching them both into Asia Minor, and into Bulgaria. But no declaration of war took place, for the Western Powers persuaded the aggrieved party to have patience, while they sent representatives to Vienna to try to avert hostilities by the arts of diplomacy.

These endeavours failed entirely, not to say ridiculously. An Instrument was drafted, called the Vienna Note, to which both the Tsar and the Sultan were to consent, as a basis for a future arrangement. The former did so readily, but the latter peremptorily refused his adhesion to it. That he was right, is shown by the fact that the Note was so loosely drawn, as to be capable of an interpretation, whereby the full demands of Russia would have been agreed to by Turkey; and in the negotiations which followed, it became apparent that this was the only interpretation which the Emperor Nicholas had adopted! So the intervention projected at this centre of Russian intrigue, came to an end with the full concurrence of the British and French Governments, who were obliged to recognize that they had been duped. In October, the Porte formally called upon General Gortchakoff to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, and ordered Omar Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-chief in Bulgaria, “to commence hostilities if, after fifteen days from the arrival of his despatch at the Russian head-quarters, an answer in the negative should be returned.” After the stated interval, towards the end of the month, the war commenced, not only on the Danube, but also on the Armenian frontier in Asia.

Interesting as is the campaign that now began, to the student of military history, it will be impossible to describe it at any length in these pages. It must suffice to say that, at the end of the year, the results in Asia were unimportant. There were victories on both sides, but no great progress was achieved by either of the combatants. It was different in Europe, for there, thanks to the skill and energy of Omar Pasha, and to the gallantry of his troops, the Turks gained many and considerable advantages. Crossing the Danube at Turtukai, they secured a position on the northern bank of the river at Oltenitza, in the face of superior forces, and repulsed every attempt to dislodge them. Again, having established themselves firmly at Kalafat, opposite Widin, they attacked and dealt a crushing defeat (early in January, 1854) on a strong corps, which had entrenched itself in their vicinity near Citate. The Ottoman troops were everywhere victorious in this theatre of operations; the Russians, on the other hand, were beaten and disorganized, their _morale_ shaken, and their losses, on their own admission, amounted to 35,000 men.

While these successes were being won, an incident occurred which caused the war to spread, and drew England and France into its meshes. A small Turkish squadron of a few frigates and smaller vessels lay at anchor at Sinope; whereupon, a far more powerful Russian fleet, consisting of heavily armed and large ships, approached under cover of a fog, surprised them, and completely destroyed them (November 30th). The attack was conducted under circumstances of considerable barbarity; no quarter was given, the ships were sunk, the wounded and the helpless were not spared, and 4000 men were slaughtered or drowned. When the news of this action reached Europe, indignation, already aroused by previous events, could not be restrained in England, and so strong was the feeling evoked in the country, that war could no longer be avoided. At first sight it may appear strange, that the story of useless butchery, perpetrated in war time, should produce so violent a resentment; but when events are reviewed, the reasons for it will be perceived. It is necessary to glance at these events, in order to understand some features connected with subsequent operations.

The guiding line of thought that influenced the statesmen of the two Powers, interested in curbing the aggression of St. Petersburg, was the conviction that Russia was at that time overwhelmingly powerful, and that the Ottoman Empire was in the last gasp of impotence and decrepitude. The Emperor Nicholas had for long fostered this idea, and had carefully instilled it into our Government. With this object, he made a journey to this country as early as 1844, and he pressed it upon our Ambassador at his Court, in secret communications held in the spring of 1853, before the actual crisis had taken place. We were then told that Turkey was “a sick man—a very sick man” who might at any moment “die upon our hands,” and that it was therefore advisable to divide his inheritance; and our cupidity was tempted by the offer of Egypt, and even of the island of Crete, if we would take these bribes, and give Russia a free hand. We believed these assertions of omnipotence on the one hand, and of prostration on the other, though needless to say we had no desire to share in the spoils. Our minds instantly recurred to the campaigns of 1828-29, when the Russians crossed the Balkans, and forced a disastrous treaty upon the Sultan at Adrianople. We dwelt upon these results, showing only Russian victories and Turkish defeat, and we drew our conclusions therefrom. But we forgot a few historical facts connected with that war.

We forgot that the Russians could only undertake a successful invasion of Turkey, when they had the command of the Black Sea, and that we ourselves had secured this for them, in 1828, by annihilating the Turkish fleet the year before (August, 1827), at the unfortunate victory of Navarino. We forgot, also, that the Balkans do not form the last line of defence, but that the difficulties of an invader increase materially as he approaches the Sea of Marmora. In 1829, the Russian army had achieved a great deal, but it had not attained to victory. It was exhausted, and unable to maintain itself at the end of a long line of communications; while Turkey, on the other hand, was gathering her forces together. We surely, then, failed to recollect, that we seized the opportunity at that very critical moment to force the Sultan to make a shameful peace; thereby saving the aggressor from disaster, and securing to him advantages which otherwise he could never have hoped to gain.

As a consequence of the exaggerated dread inspired by the great Northern Power, the Turks were not allowed to act in their own defence in 1853; they were obstructed by severe diplomatic pressure, and harassed by vexatious interference. At last, after the _fiasco_ at Vienna, they could no longer be restrained by their timid friends, and, in spite of them, they at length declared war, in the autumn of 1853. Now, when the Emperor Nicholas ordered an advance into the Ottoman Empire (viz. the Danubian Principalities), in July, and when the Porte, dissuaded from using force to repel the invasion, was obliged to allow her enemy quietly to consolidate himself therein, Russia, to appease Europe, made an announcement that she intended only to seize a material guarantee, and would engage in no further offensive operations. She would only meet any assault directed against her. England and France had sent their ships to a port near the Dardanelles (September 11th), and, as soon as the Sultan commenced hostilities, they ordered them up to Constantinople, to protect Turkey from Russian aggression (October 22nd). Conscious of the dangers surrounding the small Turkish squadron in the Black Sea, very urgent requests were made, that the friendly fleets should pass through the Bosphorus, to prevent its falling into the power of the enemy. But these applications were all peremptorily refused.[186] To make the matter very much worse, and, indeed, to render the whole course of action unintelligible, _the Turkish fleet itself_, by the strong representations of the Sultan’s Western advisers, was also kept back idly in the Bosphorus, and was prevented from sailing to the support of the exposed squadron![187] Hence the disaster at Sinope became inevitable. When this state of affairs was realized in England,—when it was seen that our diplomatic skill was again at fault, that the assurances of Russia were not to be relied upon, and that our naval demonstrations were held in contempt,—then the natural consequences followed, and the British people, their Government notwithstanding, determined that the disturber of the peace of Europe should be punished.

Footnote 186:

“Our last information from St. Petersburg, still represents Russia as desirous to treat, and as determined, above all, to assume the offensive in no quarter. This confidence explained why our fleets did not move” (_M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski_, Paris, Dec. 15, 1853).

Footnote 187:

See _Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey_ , part ii., pp. 248-258. Writing from Therapia, November 5, 1853, to Lord Clarendon, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, says, “I have succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships and sailing frigates into the Black Sea at this moment” (_ibid._, p. 250).

Early in 1854, the English, French, and Turkish fleets entered the Black Sea; but the Russian flag had everywhere disappeared. The victorious Admiral at Sinope,—never dreaming that our extreme caution and fear of giving offence to his Imperial Master would prevent us from taking some action, or from giving the Sultan leave to pursue and capture him,—had betaken himself back to Sevastopol with the utmost speed; he only waited to make the necessary repairs to secure a safe passage, for “the Russian squadron had suffered considerably.” Nor was the Emperor Nicholas cast down by recent events, except for the fact that Omar Pasha was steadily destroying his military prestige on the Danube, and was revealing to the world the real weakness of his supposed power in the field. He ordered his Ambassadors in London and Paris to demand their passports, and they left those capitals on the 6th of February. Meanwhile the tedious and fruitless negotiations continued at Vienna, and Russia, far from showing any conciliatory disposition, increased her demands. But these conferences came to nothing, and on the 13th the British Ambassador was invited to quit St. Petersburg.[188] An Ultimatum followed, calling upon the Tsar to evacuate the Principalities, and the formal declaration of war was issued on the 28th of March.

Footnote 188:

The French Ambassador in Russia thereupon applied for his passports.

Before this date, preparations for the coming strife had already been made. Treaties of alliance were concluded with France and Turkey, and the expeditionary force was sent to Malta. On the 10th of February a Brigade Order was issued, whereby a Brigade of Foot Guards, consisting of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalions Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards, were to be held in readiness to proceed on foreign service by the 18th, each Battalion to be completed to 40 sergeants, besides the usual Staff-sergeants, and 850 rank and file. The 1st Coldstream, then quartered at St. George’s barracks, were sent on the 14th of February to Chichester, where the 2nd Battalion were stationed,[189] there to be made up to field strength, and to transfer weakly or unfit men to the latter. This was the first movement of the troops in London, and the people, eager for war to commence, and ever ready to welcome their brave defenders, hailed the appearance of the men with unbounded enthusiasm. A contemporary writer thus describes the scene:—

“It was just noon when the Battalion left, ... the whole line of streets, from the barracks, along the Strand, over Waterloo Bridge, to the terminus of the South Western Railway, was literally blocked by multitudes, all eager to show some token of sympathy. Many a hand was stretched out to the brave fellows as they passed, which they had never clasped before—men of the humblest station grasped hands in which the best blood of England flowed. 'Fair women and brave men' waved their parting adieus. The windows and even the housetops were peopled with spectators, whose cheers, and waving of hats, and kerchiefs, testified their interest in the scene. Many of the Officers were young-looking men, and the rank and file seemed to be in the very bloom of youth and manhood, and to have attained that soldierly bearing which only a perfect discipline, united to professional pride, ever thoroughly forms.”[190]

Footnote 189:

The 2nd Battalion proceeded to Windsor, and on the 28th to Wellington barracks.

Footnote 190:

Nolan, _History of the War against Russia_ , i. 92.

The Battalion, having been inspected at Chichester on the 17th, proceeded to Southampton, and, amid the hearty cheers of a dense crowd, embarked on board the steamship _Orinoco_ (22nd) for Malta. Arriving there after a prosperous voyage, on the 4th of March, they were stationed at Fort Manoel (4 companies), Fort Tigne (1 company), and in the Lazarette (3 companies). The strength was 35 Officers, 919 men, and 32 women, the average age and service of the men being twenty-nine and seven years respectively.[191] The following Officers embarked:—

Colonel C. Hay (_Commanding Battalion_).

Colonels W. Codrington; and G. Drummond (_Mounted_).

Lieut.-Colonels W. S. Newton; Hon. V. Dawson; M. Tierney; T. Crombie; and H. Cumming.

Captains C. Cocks; J. Cowell; L. D. MacKinnon; W. Dawkins; H. Jolliffe; C. T. Wilson; Hon. A. Hardinge; Hon. Percy Feilding (Adjutant); Charles Baring; Hon. G. Eliot; H. Bouverie; H. Cust; H. Armytage; and Hon. H. Byng.

Lieutenants A. Thellusson; P. Crawley; Sir James Dunlop, Bart.; G. Goodlake; Lord Bingham; F. Ramsden; H. Tower; Hon. R. Drummond; and P. Wyndham.

Battalion Surgeon J. Skelton. Assistant Surgeons F. Wildbore; and J. Wyatt.

Quartermaster A. Falconer.

Footnote 191:

John Wyatt, Battalion-Surgeon, _History of the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards during the Eastern Campaign, from February, 1854, to June, 1856_ , p. 1 (1858).

The three Guards Battalions reached Malta about the same time, and were commanded by Colonel Bentinck (Coldstream Guards), who was appointed Brigadier-General, February 21st. There they remained for about seven weeks, awaiting events; while other troops, all infantry, poured into the island, without General Officers, Staffs, or Departments, wherewith to form an army. At first it seemed somewhat doubtful whether they would go further. Our Government at home still dreamt of peace, and could not make up their minds that war was upon them; they even seemed to have thought that, though a naval demonstration had signally failed at Constantinople, a military display in the Mediterranean might frighten the Russians! The interval, however, was not misspent; it was utilized in preparing the men for active service, principally in the exercise of musketry, which was practised without interruption. With reference to this important subject, the following, written by a Coldstream Officer (Colonel Wilson), who was present with the Battalion, will be of interest:—

“When the Household Brigade was ordered abroad, the military Court of Chancery had come to no decision relative to the suitableness of the Minié rifle for the general use of infantry. As yet that amazing tool was in the possession of only a few _select_ men in every regiment.[192] Hence, Lord Hardinge, who, it must be confessed, did much for the improvement of English small arms, judged it expedient that the Guards should take 'Brown Bess' to Malta; but, at the same time, he despatched thither cases of Miniés, under the charge of a competent instructor of musketry, Captain Lane-Fox [now General Pitt-Rivers, late Grenadier Guards].... Thanks to Captain Fox’s exertions in favour of modern betterment, and a few experiments, a right verdict was at length delivered. At Scutari, old Brown Bess was marched off ignominiously to the Ordnance stores, and the Minié maiden became the faithful consort of every foot soldier. How completely have subsequent events substantiated the truth of Fox’s arguments!”[193]

Footnote 192:

The Battalions of the Brigade proceeding on foreign service, started with 200 stand of Minié rifles and 650 percussion muskets (_Brigade Order_ , Feb. 21st). Even as late as February, 1854, the respective merits of these two firearms were so little determined, that we find parties from each Regiment of the Brigade, ordered to fire 100 rounds “of the common balls out of the old musket,” and to report upon the comparative accuracy of the fire (_ibid._, Feb. 8th).

Footnote 193:

“A Regimental Officer” (Colonel C. T. Wilson, late Coldstream Guards), _Our Veterans of 1854, in Camp and before the Enemy_ , p. 15 (London, 1859). The exchange of these firearms was not effected in the Battalion till the end of May, 1854.

Towards the end of March our French allies, already formed into fighting units, began to appear in Malta on their way to Gallipoli, when they fraternized freely and cordially with their British friends. A few days later, Lieut.-General Sir George Brown reached the island, and started for the same destination, where he was joined by five battalions of infantry. Shortly afterwards, Scutari, opposite Constantinople on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, was occupied by our troops, and the British forces in the East began to collect there. The Guards Brigade left Malta on the 21st of April, in three ships, seven companies of the Coldstream embarking on H.M.S. _Vulcan_, the eighth accompanying the Grenadier Guards on board the _Golden Fleece_; and, landing at Scutari on the 29th, they encamped there. Next day a General Order was issued, which announced to the troops the arrival and appointment of General Lord Raglan, G.C.B., to the command of the army in Turkey,[194] whose composition into divisions and brigades, “to replace the provisional arrangement hitherto made by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown,” was also notified. The organization and strength of the Allies will be given later, when they were more complete, but it may be stated here, that Captain F. Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards) was appointed Brigade-Major of the Guards Brigade, and that the following Officers belonging to the Coldstream were placed upon the Staff: Lieut.-Colonel T. M. Steele, Military Secretary, and Lieut.-Colonel P. Somerset, Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan; Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division; Captain Hon. H. Byng, Aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Bentinck; and Lieutenant Lord Bingham, extra Aide-de-camp to Major-General Earl of Lucan.[195]

Footnote 194:

See Appendix No. IX.

Footnote 195:

The following also eventually served upon the Staff as Coldstream Officers: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Burghersh, Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan; Lieut.-Colonel J. Airey, A.Q.M.G. Light Division; Captain Hon. H. Campbell, Aide-de-camp to Major-General Codrington.

“The army, or rather the infantry element of an army,” writes Colonel Wilson, “accumulated apace. Most mornings saw leviathian steamers letting go anchor in the Bosphorus; and an evening seldom passed without a fresh uprising of tents. But cavalry, artillery, military stores of all sorts, were yet afar off, tossing somewhere in sailing transports. In too many quarters, indeed, there were indications that the administration still clung to the fatal hallucination of peace, when there could be no peace,—still tried to believe that a demonstration within a mile of Constantinople, must be successful. 'Floriana and its parades failed,' some said, 'because Malta is so distant from the Pruth; but this concentration of ours at Scutari has a real business look, which _must_ tell!' Unluckily, the Tsar knew that the government of England was built up of incoherent materials. He had faith in his old familiar friend, '_ce cher_ Aberdeen.' His Greek spies informed him, how on the heights of Chalcedon stood no army ready to combat, only a stout corps of the unrivalled British Foot; therefore, he stayed not his hand. Old birds are not to be caught with chaff.”[196]

Footnote 196:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 20.

The six weeks spent at Scutari passed pleasantly enough. The scenes around them were new to the rank and file, and many, in the Household Brigade certainly, had never dreamt of the East and its marvels. There was much to excite the interest of the men, and little to mar their enjoyment. British sports and pastimes were freely indulged in; the food was good; stores of groceries and other material comforts were provided; no hardships were endured; the heat was not too oppressive; the military authorities even relaxed some of their old-fashioned and most cherished regulations, and the dog collar, called the stock, which then throttled our soldiers, was happily discarded. Cavalry and artillery began, moreover, to arrive in camp, and we seemed at length to be consolidating into a field army. The troops were turned out on the Queen’s birthday, and again on the 31st of May, for the inspection of the Sultan; and, as usual, they presented a splendid appearance, both in physique and discipline; moreover, they also began to look like an organized force. Still there was no transport, and the medical service left much to be desired. With no efficiency in these departments, how was war to be conducted? And as the deficiency was absolute, did our Government really mean that we should take the field? At last a makeshift was proposed, which is best described in Colonel Wilson’s words:—

“The utter insufficiency of means of land-transport greatly perplexed the authorities, and, judging from the ever-varying complexion of the memoranda, orders, and notifications on the subject, which issued continually from the bureaux of Selimnieh, it was unlikely a satisfactory solution of the problem would be promptly reached. At one moment, we were assured that the commissariat (hapless institution! doomed from the very beginning to be the scape-goat of every administrative failure or shortcoming) would provide for the conveyance of tents, sick, baggage, and the like; an hour afterwards, it was noised abroad that that department declined to engage in such duties, that the poor Treasury camel, starved and cuffed about as it was, had quite enough to do to provide the troops with daily bread, without undertaking any fresh burdens. Then did a public-spirited man in authority, hit upon the policy of making the Captains responsible for the carriage of the _impedimenta_ of their respective companies; naturally enough, this scheme was unfavourably received by those so seriously menaced in that delicate point—the pocket. The intended victims remonstrated, inquiring whence the purchase-money of so many horses and mules was to be derived? how losses were to be indemnified? meekly adding, that the project was unprecedented in military finance. These objections silenced the prescriber of the nostrum. The alarmed centurions heard no further about the matter.”[197]

Footnote 197:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 23.

After this, orders were issued to all Officers to provide themselves with bât-horses.[198] Twenty-one were allotted to each battalion, of which two belonged to every company for the transport of tents (_General Order_ , June 1, 1854). Baggage parades frequently took place, to instruct the men how to pack the loads, and to accustom the animals to carry them.

Footnote 198:

_Battalion Order_, May 25, 1854: “Officers are to provide themselves with animals for the conveyance of their baggage without delay.”

During the stay at Scutari, the question arose as to what further should be done, and, to resolve it, the British and French Commanders-in-chief proceeded to visit Omar Pasha in Bulgaria. The latter naturally desired to have the Allies at his back, and he urged that they should occupy Varna. This was agreed to, and the armies of England and France were at last to be transferred to the seat of war. On the 29th of May, Sir G. Brown’s division began to move, and a fortnight later (June 13th), the Guards and Highland Brigades, forming the First Division, steamed up the Bosphorus for their new destination. The Coldstream were conveyed there in the steam-transport _Andes_. The men started in light order; a reduced kit was carried in the knapsacks, the great coats, smock frocks, and blankets rolled on the top, but the rest of the clothing and necessaries were packed in the squad bags and left behind.[199]

Footnote 199:

_General Order_, May 25th. “There will be no store of any kind at Varna. Everything not intended for the field must be left here in store” (_Battalion Order_, 26th).

It may strike the modern reader as strange, that a proportion of women were allowed to accompany their husbands belonging to the force destined for the East. In Scutari they were lodged in huts in the camp, and though inadequately provided for, badly housed, and subject to inconveniences which could not be permitted in the present day, their existence still was tolerable. But seeing how incomplete were the transport arrangements, our astonishment must be extreme, when we learn that the British army, about to take the field in a quarter where no depôt or base of operations existed, was to be accompanied by these women, whose presence under such circumstances, could not fail to be a misery to themselves, as well as a serious burden to our defective military organization. Yet this was done, and we find two tents per battalion, making a total of ninety-six, allotted for their accommodation. In the subsequent operations these unfortunate women, as might have been easily anticipated, suffered considerably. They remained in camp until the embarkation for the Crimea took place. A few were even allowed to sail with the army to that coast, and during the passage the wife of a sergeant of the Coldstream gave birth to a daughter, who was appropriately christened “Euxina.” Fortunately they did not all land.[200] They were sent back to Scutari, where the main depôt and primary base of operations of the army in the East was formed, of which a Brevet Major of the 30th Regiment was appointed Commandant.[201]

Footnote 200:

At least some of the men’s wives (none belonging to the Brigade, as far as can be ascertained) accompanied their husbands into the Crimea, and remained there, during the course of the campaign. When we come to the winter of 1854-55 (Chapter X.), it will be seen what hardships they had to suffer. In mid-winter a letter, dated December 31st, was published in Orders, stating that some women’s clothing had arrived, and would be issued upon the production of a certificate that the women applying were fit persons to receive it.

Footnote 201:

_General Order_, June 8, 1854. Subsequently a smaller depôt was also formed at Varna, under command of a Captain of the 50th Regiment (_General Order_ , June 30, 1854).

Arriving at Varna (June 14th), the 1st Coldstream landed late in the evening, and had to pitch their camp in the dark. The site was unfortunately selected, both for the Brigade and for the rest of the British army, being situated on a slimy flat, close to a large lake of stagnant water, three-quarters of a mile from the town. Before a week elapsed, the intense heat, bad water, indifferent and insufficient food, and the monotony of inaction began to tell upon the men; they were afflicted with diarrhœa and other ailments, so that the health of the troops, hitherto entirely satisfactory, rapidly deteriorated. The French, on the other hand, had taken greater care of themselves; they occupied higher ground, and they suffered less. During the stay there—about a fortnight, for, on the 1st of July, an advance was made to Aladyn, some ten miles in the interior—the masses of the allied soldiery met each other for the first time, and the warmest good-fellowship existed between them. The French Chiefs, Marshal St. Arnaud and General Canrobert, often rode through our camps, and the men invariably turned out and cheered them with the utmost heartiness and good will—a welcome which was always much appreciated. In spite of the sickness that oppressed our troops, the Officers amused themselves, as they are always sure to do, in various ways, not least of which was a hunt, extemporized (but without hounds), after the wild mongrel dogs that were driven out of the town, and infested the district. In the month of June, the armies continued their concentration in Bulgaria; and by the 21st the bulk had arrived there, when, in addition to the detachments of Turkish and Egyptian troops that were stationed in the neighbourhood, they mustered some 60,000 men.[202]

Footnote 202:

Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 201.

Meanwhile the forces under Omar Pasha were seriously engaged with the enemy, and a few words will be necessary to explain briefly the military events that took place. After the victory at Citate, there was a pause in the operations till the middle of February, owing to the severity of the winter and to the temporary illness of the Turkish Commander. The Russians made strenuous efforts to repair their failures and their losses sustained in 1853, and they poured large reinforcements into the Principalities. In March, the Ottoman troops gained several successes. On the 4th, they crossed to the northern bank of the Danube and made a raid on Kalarashi; they repulsed an attack at Kalafat on the 11th, and on the 15th they prevented a passage at Turtukai, while a like attempt upon Rustchuk was also defeated. But the enemy, under General Luders, succeeded about the same time in crossing the river lower down, near its mouth, at Galatz, and invaded the Dobrudsha—an unhealthy district, full of swamps, and badly suited to military operations. Overjoyed with this advantage, Gortchakoff now reinforced Luders. After a series of well-contested engagements, at the price of great losses, the principal fortresses of the province, as far as Trajan’s wall (which extends from Rassova to Kustendji, on the Black Sea), were reduced; while Omar left them to their fate, and took no steps to retrieve the fortunes of the campaign in this quarter. These reverses, however, were partially compensated by another victory near Kalafat, and, as the Russians retired before the Turks in this direction, Krajova was occupied by the latter. This retreat was in reality a change of plan, for the enemy moved a portion of his forces to the east, and pressed on the right of Omar’s line, with the design of establishing himself between Varna and Silistria.[203] His design was now to lay siege to the latter place, which interposed, and which he had to take, if he meant to try and establish a footing in Eastern Bulgaria.

Footnote 203:

Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 127, etc.

The protracted siege of Silistria has become famous in the annals of the war, indeed in the history of military achievements. Space does not allow a proper description of the gallant and desperate resistance, which was then made by the Turks against overwhelming odds; but the principal points connected therewith may be glanced at in this work, if only because the British Officer, Major Butler, to whom, with Major Nasmyth, great glory is due for the defence, was transferred to the Coldstream Guards, as a reward for his brilliant services, though he never belonged to the Regiment, for his death occurred before he was actually gazetted.[204]

Footnote 204:

Captain J. A. Butler, from half-pay, Ceylon Rifles, was gazetted Lieutenant and Captain Coldstream Guards, July 15, 1854; he was promoted Brevet-Major; and, on the 28th following, Lieutenant Ramsden was appointed Lieutenant and Captain, _vice_ Brevet-Major Butler, “died of his wounds.” His death took place on June 22nd, but his appointment was never cancelled.

Silistria was attacked on the 14th of April, but it was three weeks later before a partial investment of the place was effected. The Russians were determined to take the place at any cost, and they made desperate efforts to accomplish their object; they brought up all their available forces, and placed their most renowned and capable Officers in command. During the siege, the war seemed almost everywhere else to stand still in Eastern Bulgaria, and all eyes were fixed on the memorable drama, that was being enacted in this part of the theatre of operations. The garrison was weak, and the indifferent works were only hastily repaired and strengthened; but the defenders were well led, while the matchless bravery and the military virtues of the Turk were fully displayed. Among the leaders, Mussa Pasha, the Commander, stood pre-eminent for intrepidity and firmness. He was admirably supported by the two British Officers, Captain Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, whose scientific knowledge, ardent valour, and cool judgment made their services of the utmost value, and gained for them undying renown. The enemy having drawn his lines as close as possible to the fortifications, resorted to every art to carry them. His principal efforts were directed towards an open work, called Arab Tabia, whose fall would have disconcerted the whole defence. Time after time, during the month of May, the besiegers bombarded the stronghold, sapped up to it, tried to mine it, and assaulted it both by day and by night. All to no purpose; every attempt was repulsed with slaughter and disgrace. The Turks held fast to their entrenchments, repaired them, met the enemy underground by countermines, and made continual sorties, which they always pressed home. Nowhere was a lodgment made; the troops of the Tsar gained no single advantage, but were harassed and beaten. During this time Omar Pasha was at Shumla, only some fifty miles distant, at the head of a formidable corps. Contrary to his well-known character and to his previous conduct in the war, he unaccountably remained inactive, and his subordinates near him followed his example. But in the beginning of June, he broke loose from the fetters that seemed to numb his faculties, and once more began to display something of his wonted energy. He ordered attacks to be made on various points of the Danube, which were successful; and he pushed a brigade to Silistria, which entered it and reinforced it. The Russians were now thoroughly disheartened, and, under cover of a final assault, they raised the siege on the 23rd of June, and fled in disorder from the scene of their disaster. In the siege alone they lost as many as 12,000 men, and all their principal leaders were severely wounded. Of the Turks, 4000 to 5000 men fell, but among them were counted the brave Mussa and the heroic Butler, who succumbed to his wounds on the 22nd, the day before victory crowned his noble deeds.[205]

Footnote 205:

Nolan, _History of the Russian War_, i. 214, etc.; Alexander W. Kinglake, _The Invasion of the Crimea_, ii. 48, etc.

Nor was this the only success gained by the Ottoman troops. During May, the Turkish army based on Western Bulgaria, and operating from Kalafat, was not idle, and defeated the enemy in several engagements, pushing him back towards the east. By the end of the month, this advance began to have some effect on the fortunes of the siege, and to be inconvenient to the communications of the Russians. When, therefore, the latter gave up all hope of taking Silistria, and left it in despair, they also soon after evacuated all the strong places they had taken in the Dobrudsha, and, re-crossing the river, they abandoned that province. This event was followed by an attack on Giurgevo, opposite Rustchuk, where the Russians still endeavoured to maintain a position; but the Turks drove them out, and forced them to fall back towards Bucharest, in the middle of July. Shortly afterwards, the enemy made a disorderly retreat towards the Pruth, pursued by the victorious Turks, who entered the Roumanian capital in triumph on August 8th.

“The retreat of Gortchakoff was neither dignified nor skilful; his whining appeals to the inhabitants for mercy, and his haste to get his troops beyond the reach of their enemies, contrasted ludicrously with the braggart bulletins and proclamations which were so profusely scattered, when there was no armed foe to dispute the seizure of the 'material guarantee.'”[206]

Footnote 206:

Nolan, i. 236.

N^o. 2.

About this time another element was introduced into the tangled web of Eastern affairs, which had great influence over the course of events, and over the future conduct of the Anglo-French Allies. Austria now intervened; and her action at this juncture led to important results. This action must be taken briefly into consideration before we can understand the causes that led to the invasion of the Crimea. The geographical position of this Empire necessarily exercises a deciding control over the communications of an army entering the Ottoman territory from the north. Austria, in short, commands the lid of the Turkish box; she can open it, and she can shut it, and prevent the hand of Russia from trying to snatch the prize—Constantinople—which lies at the bottom. In 1853, she held the lid wide open; but in 1854 another course was adopted, more pleasing to the Allies, though not less gratifying to the Tsar. It would not have suited the Government of Vienna to run directly counter to the two maritime Powers of Europe, and to declare themselves openly on the side of Russia; a diversion in Italy might have been serious to their prosperity. So the plain policy of opening the lid could no longer be maintained with safety. They therefore concentrated a force of observation on the south-eastern frontier early in spring, and, having prudently made an offensive and defensive treaty with Prussia, whom they did not trust, they calmly awaited events; and nothing was done till the summer. Austria then prepared for future contingencies, by inducing the Porte to sign a convention (June 14, 1854), by which she undertook to make Russia evacuate the Principalities, and to occupy them herself while hostilities lasted. Still she avoided any dispute with the Emperor Nicholas; she remained inactive, until the fortunes of the war should decide which of the belligerents was going to win in the field. On the 20th of August, however, when victory had declared itself entirely on the side of the Ottoman armies, then, and then only, her forces entered the Principalities, under the agreement that had been already signed, and thereby she rendered several important services to the Russians. She protected their retreat, saved them from disaster, and enabled them to proceed undisturbed into the Crimea, by preventing the Turks from pressing upon them, during their unfortunate march to the Pruth. She became a barrier in the way of the Allies should they deem it necessary to invade Bessarabia, and take a “material guarantee” for the repression of future encroachments in Turkey. And, lastly, she upheld the false prestige of the Tsar’s omnipotence, by making it appear that the Russians had evacuated the Danubian Principalities, not because they were forced to do so by the unaided valour of the Turks, but because the strategic position of the Austrian Empire had obliged them to retire.

Meanwhile, little or nothing had been done by the Allies. Their fleets, indeed, found no enemy to oppose them. Except, therefore, bombarding Odessa (April 22nd) to avenge an outrage on a flag of truce, and destroying batteries erected at the mouth of the Danube, there is nothing of interest to record. It is to be noted that we neither utilized, nor assisted the Turks to utilize, this great and important river—over which our naval superiority gave us considerable power—for the purpose of the war; but if our Ministry had the intention of remaining inactive in Bulgaria, the want of all enterprise is easily understood, and was the natural result of the policy pursued in London. In the military sphere, a few squadrons, under Lord Cardigan, were sent, in the end of June, when the fighting was all but over, to reconnoitre towards the Dobrudsha, and returned about the 10th of July. They acquired no information that could be of service, but, owing to the heat, exposure, and insufficiency of food, many of the horses perished or were disabled, and our small body of cavalry was uselessly weakened. After their return, a large French force was pushed forward from Varna as far as Kustendji. There was obviously nothing to be done in this quarter at this period, so no advantage was or could be gained; but cholera attacked the expedition, causing enormous loss, and they, too, were needlessly weakened.[207]

Footnote 207:

On August 8th it was computed that 10,000 lay dead or were stricken down by sickness (Kinglake, _Crimea_, ii. 133).

We left the Guards Brigade at Aladyn, close to Varna, which they reached on July 1st. Here a halt was called, and the humdrum of camp life was resumed. In the morning, the men were drilled, they practised musketry, made fascines and gabions, or threw up earthworks; in the heat of the day they lay about and slept; in the evening, the more energetic endeavoured to obtain some addition to the ordinary scanty and insipid supper. The peasants were conciliated, and a bazaar was established, under the auspices of Colonel Gordon Drummond of the Coldstream, which was fairly successful. It may be also noted that, after some discussion, the old-fashioned regulations were further relaxed at this time, and, shaving being dispensed with, beards were at length allowed to be worn in the field.[208]

Footnote 208:

This change had probably a wider bearing, if we may judge by the following Regimental Order (London, July 25, 1854): “The moustache will be taken into wear by the Coldstream, commencing to-morrow morning.”

The Brigade was inspected by Omar Pasha on the 6th of July, and his presence inspired the men with genuine admiration. Here at last, was a General who had really seen the Russians, who had fought against them, and who had beaten them. The sight of such a leader gladdened our gallant soldiers not a little; for they were sadly disappointed with their forced inaction in Bulgaria,—so close to scenes of martial glory. Now at last they buoyed themselves up with hope; they would move to the front and take the field in earnest against the enemy. But this, alas! was not yet to be, and before their warlike ardour was to be satisfied, many trials were still to be endured.

Next day, the Brevet, dated June 20th, arrived in camp, and made considerable changes in the Coldstream. By this gazette, Brigadier-General Bentinck and Colonels Hay and Codrington were promoted Major-Generals. The first of these Officers continued to command the Guards Brigade in Turkey; the second, appointed to the Mauritius, returned home; while General Codrington remained at the seat of war, and shortly afterwards obtained a brigade there;[209] and before the peace, he became Commander-in-chief of the British army in the Crimea. Owing to these changes, Colonel Hon. A. Upton became Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, while Colonel Hon. G. Upton was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel G. Drummond to the 2nd Battalion. The latter accordingly, as soon as he was relieved, was ordered to proceed to England, as also were the following Officers, who were transferred on promotion to the home Battalion: Lieut.-Colonel Newton, Captains Halkett, Cowell, and Lieutenant Thellusson. By Brigade Order (London, June 6th) a draft of 150 men for each Battalion in Turkey, was held in readiness to proceed to the East on the 1st of July. The Coldstream detachment, under the command of Colonel Hon. G. Upton and nine other Officers, including a Medical Officer, embarked in H.M.S. _Vulcan_ on the 27th, and reached Aladyn on the 20th of July. About the same time, on the promotion of Captain F. Stephenson, Captain Hon. P. Feilding temporarily took his place as Brigade Major, and Captain Hon. G. Eliot became Acting Adjutant of the Battalion.[210]

Footnote 209:

Vacant by the appointment of Major-General R. Airey as Quartermaster-General on Lord Raglan’s Staff, _vice_ Major-General Lord de Ros, invalided home.

Footnote 210:

The Officers of the Battalion were posted as follows: Commanding Officer, Colonel Hon. G. Upton; Acting Adjutant, Captain Hon. G. Eliot; Quartermaster, A. Falconer; Medical Officers—Battalion Surgeon, J. Skelton; Assistant Surgeons, F. Wildbore, J. Wyatt, J. Trotter.

Company. Lieutenants. Ensigns. No. 1. ... Capts. H. Jolliffe. Lts. F. Ramsden. C. Baring. No. 2. Colonel Lord F. Paulet. L. D. MacKinnon. Hon. R. Drummond. Hon. W. Wellesley. No. 3. Lt.-Col. T. Crombie. H. Armytage. H. Tower. No. 4. Lt.-Col. Hon. R. Boyle. Capts. W. Dawkins. Lts. Sir J. Dunlop, Bart. Percy Wyndham. No. 5. Lt.-Col. C. Cocks. H. Bouverie. P. Crawley. A. J. Fremantle. No. 6. Lt.-Col. M. Tierney. C. Strong. H. Cust. E. A. Disbrowe. No. 7. Colonel W. Trevelyan. Lord Dunkellin. G. Goodlake. No. 8. Lt.-Col. Hon. V. Dawson. C. T. Wilson. Hon. G. Eliot.

The camp at Aladyn was placed near the lake of Devna in a singularly beautiful spot, “the seventh heaven of the artist;” but it was terribly unhealthy, and entirely unsuited to a military station.[211] Sickness, in the shape of typhus, dysentery, and ague, was not long in appearing among the troops. It assumed increasing and alarming proportions, and it was found very difficult to restore the strength of those who were once attacked. During July, about a fifth of the Battalion were admitted into hospital; the men lost their elasticity, and their spirits drooped. On the 27th of the month, it was determined to move to a higher situation near Gevreklek, a village about three miles away. It was hoped that the change would produce an improvement, and everything was done to endeavour to stay the disorders that had broken out; but without avail, and cholera appearing, added its ghastly horrors to the general distress. In spite of the efforts of the military authorities, and the devotion of the doctors, the medical department was unable to bear the strain thus suddenly put upon it, and the sick, placed in small bell tents, and unprotected from the scorching heat, suffered terribly. The rest, weakened by disease, awed by the plague that burst upon them, and doomed to passive inactivity, were depressed and nerveless.

Footnote 211:

This remark does not apply only to this camp, but to every camp occupied by the British army in Bulgaria at this time. The evils that befell the Brigade of Guards were reproduced with greater or less intensity, at each of our military stations in this Turkish province.

“A heavy torpor hung about the camp, voices rarely to be heard, except when the sergeants warned the duties, or summoned a funeral party to turn out. The poor men lounged about pallid, gloomy, depressed, and, worst of signs, their appetites were remarkably affected; not half of their daily portion of pork or beef could they consume; and yet, with strange perversity, the authorities chose this moment as the apt time for superadding an extra half pound of meat to the rations—the original allowance being overmuch for our feeble digestions, we were to get still more!”[212]

Footnote 212:

_Our Veterans, etc._, 81.

At length the stricken troops were moved out of the pestilential place in which they were stationed; a new decision was made, and the British army was to be taken back to Varna. The Brigade left Gevreklek early on the 16th of August, and such was the condition to which they were reduced, that three days were required to accomplish a distance of less than fifteen miles; the health of the men was so entirely broken down, that they were unable to carry their packs during the short stages of five miles each.

“Seldom has there been a more dismal march. The men, very ghosts of the rosy giants who, but six short months before, had stepped so cheerily across Waterloo Bridge, now plodded along in gloomy silence. Not the most tremulous version of a song, not the feeblest effort at a joke proceeded from the haggard ranks; and, worst sign of all, even tobacco had fallen to a discount; ... and yet 'twas the flesh alone that ailed, the spirit was willing as ever; ay, that it was!”[213]

Footnote 213:

_Our Veterans, etc._, p. 91

During the period the Battalion was stationed in Bulgaria, 57 men died in the camp hospital, 28 of them from cholera and 25 from typhus fever. The chief mortality occurred among the men lately arrived from England, who appear to have been very young, with an average age and service of 21¾ and less than 2 years respectively. Many Officers were also affected by the pestilence, and the Regiment had to mourn the loss of two among them—Colonel Trevelyan, and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Boyle, M.P. Five others were invalided.[214]

Footnote 214:

Wyatt, p. 15. Lieut.-Colonels Tierney and Crombie, Lieutenants Wyndham and Fremantle, and Assistant-Surgeon Wildbore. Lieut.-Colonel Cumming had been invalided from Scutari in May, and Captain Hon. H. Byng, Aide-de-camp to General Bentinck, was sent home in July, on account of ill-health.

Arrived at Varna, the sea breezes, the prospects of at last getting a glimpse of the enemy, and possibly the new site selected for encampment—away from the influence of the plague-breeding lake, in the position which Omar Pasha had originally advised before the British army left Scutari—produced beneficial effects upon the men. Though they were still sickly and weak, and cholera lurked among them, their health improved, and their spirits revived.[215] On the 29th of August, the Brigade embarked for the much talked of invasion of the Crimea, but the start was not made till some days later. The Coldstream, 26 Officers and 737 men, were divided into two wings; the left wing and head-quarters on board the _Tonning_, the right in the _Simoon_ with the Grenadier Guards. From the latter, to prevent overcrowding, two companies, under Colonel Lord F. Paulet, were subsequently trans-shipped to the _Vengeance_, and, on the 4th of September, to H.M.S. _Bellerophon_. The sick of the Battalion, 89 in number, and 30 convalescents, were left behind in the camp hospital, in charge of Assistant-Surgeon Trotter; shortly afterwards they were sent to Scutari with the same Medical Officer, who rejoined the Battalion on the 9th of November. A Brigade detachment, moreover, consisting of three Officers (under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel), four sergeants, and 100 rank and file, selected from convalescents and those unfit for active service, were left behind at Varna; of these the Coldstream furnished a sergeant and 33 rank and file, under Captain MacKinnon, who rejoined the Battalion in the Crimea, on the 4th of October.

Footnote 215:

“At last the order to embark for the Crimea arrives. We are wild with delight at the prospect of being shot at instead of dying of cholera!” (Colonel Tower, late Coldstream Guards, _Diary_, Aug. 28, 1854).

The fleet weighed anchor on the 7th of September, and, getting into communication with our French and Turkish allies, the united armada started on its errand to the Crimea. The events that now took place will be described in the next and subsequent chapters, but, before concluding this one, it will be necessary to give some idea of the forces and organization of the Allied hosts that sailed on this memorable occasion to invade the Empire of the Tsar of All the Russias.

The British army, under the command of General Lord Raglan, consisted of five infantry divisions and of one cavalry division, each of two brigades. The First Division, under Lieut.-General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, consisted of the Guards (3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusilier Guards, Major-General Bentinck), and the Highland brigades (the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments, Major-General Sir Colin Campbell), and of two field batteries of artillery. The Second Division, under Lieut.-General Sir de Lacy Evans, consisted of Major-General Pennefather’s (30th, 55th, and 95th Regiments), and Brigadier-General Adams' brigades (41st, 47th, and 49th), and of two field batteries. The Third Division, under Lieut.-General Sir R. England, consisted of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Sir J. Campbell, Bart. (1st, 38th, and 50th), and Eyre (4th, 28th, and 44th), and of two field batteries. The Fourth Division, under Lieut.-General Hon. Sir G. Cathcart, was still incomplete, as two battalions had not yet arrived; the remainder was formed of the 20th, 21st, 63rd, 68th Regiments and the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, together with one field battery; the brigades being commanded by Major-Generals Arthur Torrens and Goldie. The Fifth or Light Division, commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown, was formed of the brigades of Major-General Codrington (7th, 23rd, and 33rd), and of Major-General Buller (19th, 77th, and 88th), also of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, and of one troop horse artillery, and one field battery. The Cavalry Division, under Lieut.-General Earl of Lucan, was formed of the Light (4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 8th and 11th Hussars, and the 17th Lancers, Major-General Earl of Cardigan), and of the Heavy brigades (4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, and 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, Major-General Hon. J. Scarlett), also of one troop of horse artillery. General Scarlett’s brigade left Varna later than the rest of the army, and reached the Crimea in October. A siege train had also been provided; but it was temporarily left behind. Each division was about 5000 men strong, and the English army numbered altogether some 26,000 infantry, nearly 2000 cavalry, and 60 guns.[216]

Footnote 216:

General Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B., _The War in the Crimea_ , pp. 31, 112 (London, 1892).

The French, under the command of Marshal St. Arnaud, were formed into four infantry divisions, each about 7000 strong, commanded by:—Generals Canrobert 1st Division; Bosquet, 2nd; Prince Napoleon, 3rd; and Forey, 4th Division. At first they brought no cavalry with them to the Crimea, but they had 68 guns. They were also accompanied by some 7000 Turks, who, commanded by Suleiman Pasha, were attached to the French Marshal’s army.