Chapter 18

JOSEPH ALBO (1380-1444)

Of the post-Maimonidean philosophers Crescas is the last who contributes original views of philosophical value. Joseph Albo, of Monreal in Aragon, is of little importance as a philosopher. He rehashes the problems which occupied a Maimonides, a Gersonides and a Crescas, and sides now with one, now with the other. He benefited by the writings of his predecessors, particularly Maimonides, Crescas, and Simon Duran;[403a] and the philosophical discussions in the last three sections of his "Book of Roots" ("Sefer Ikkarim") give the impression of an eclectic compilation in the interest of a moderate conservatism. The style is that of the popularizer and the homilist; and to this he owes his popularity, which was denied his more original teacher, Crescas.

But philosophy as such was not Albo's forte, nor was it his chief interest. While it is true that all the Jewish thinkers of the middle ages were for a great part apologetes, this did not prevent a Maimonides or a Gersonides from making a really thorough and disinterested study of science and philosophy; and often their scientific and philosophic conviction was so strong that the _apologia_ was _pro philosophia sua_ rather than _pro Judaismo_. The central theme therefore in the majority of Albo's philosophical predecessors was the equally metaphysical and theological, of God and his attributes. These were proved by reason and confirmed by Scripture and tradition. Judaism had to be formulated and defended with a view not so much to the dangers threatening from Christianity and Mohammedanism as to those endangering all religions alike, namely, the opinions of science and philosophy as taught especially by the Aristotelians. Hence Maimonides treated for the most part of the same problems as the Mohammedan Mutakallimun before him, and Thomas Aquinas the Christian had no scruple in making the Jewish philosopher's method his own when he undertook to defend the Catholic faith "contra Gentiles."

Different were the circumstances as well as the attitude of Joseph Albo. The purely philosophic interest was not strong in his day. He was not confronted by the necessity of proving the existence and incorporeality of God by reason. No one doubted these things and they had been abundantly written about in times gone by. In the interest of completeness and for the benefit of those who were not trained in technical philosophy, Albo found it desirable to restate the results of previous discussions of these topics in a style more accessible to the readers of his day. But the central interest in his age was shifted. It was a time of religious disputations and forced conversions. Albo himself had taken part in such a disputation held at Tortosa in 1413-14, and he had to defend Judaism against Christianity. He had to show his own people that Judaism was the true religion and Christianity spurious. Hence it was religion as such he had to investigate, in order to find what marks distinguished a divine law from a human, and a genuine divine law from one that pretended to be such. To make this investigation logically complete he had to show that there must be such a thing as a divine law, and that no such law can be conceived without assuming certain basal beliefs or dogmas. A discussion of religious dogma was essential, for upon the nature of these fundamental beliefs depended one's judgment of a given law and its character as divine or human, genuine or spurious. Hence the title of Albo's treatise, "Book of [religious] Roots [dogmas]." And while it is true that Maimonides, the systematizer and codifier, could not fail to put down in his commentary on the Mishna a list of articles of the Jewish creed, nothing is said of this in his philosophical work, the "Guide of the Perplexed." With Albo the establishment of the fundamental dogmas is the central theme.

At the same time Albo was anticipated even in this, his more original contribution. Crescas, his teacher, had written, beside the "Or Adonai," a work against Christianity.[404] And in the "Or Adonai" itself he devotes considerable space to the question of the fundamental dogmas of Judaism, and takes occasion to criticize Maimonides for his faulty method in the selection of the thirteen articles, on the ground that he did not distinguish between what was fundamental and what was derivative. This suggestion gave Albo his cue, which he developed in his own way.[404a]

Human happiness, Albo tells us, depends upon theory and practice, as Aristotle says. But the human mind is inadequate to know by itself the truth touching these two. Hence there is need of something superior to the human mind which will define right practice and the true ideas. This can be only by divine guidance. Hence everyone must be able to tell the divine legislation from those which are not divine. For this it is necessary to know what are the principles without which a divine law cannot exist. This is the purpose of the book, to explain the essential principles of a divine law.[405]

A knowledge of the principles of religion would seem easy, for all people profess some religion or other, and hence are presumed to know upon what their religions are based. But this question has not been treated adequately before, and there is no agreement among previous writers about the number of the principles or their identity. Some say there are thirteen (Maimonides), some say twenty-six, some six (Crescas), without investigating what are the principles of divine religion generally. For we must distinguish between the general principles which pertain to divine legislation as such and hence are common to all religions, and special principles which are peculiar to a particular religion.

Seeing the importance of this subject, Albo continues, I undertook this investigation. I came to the conclusion that there are three general principles of divine religion, existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment after death. Then there are special principles peculiar to a particular religion. From the general principles ("Ikkarim") follow particular or derivative principles ("Shorashim.")[406]

The investigation of the principles of religion is a delicate matter because one is in danger of being reckoned an infidel if he denies what is considered by others a fundamental dogma. Thus according to Maimonides the belief in the Messiah is fundamental, and he who denies it is a heretic and has no share in the world to come. And yet Rabbi Hillel in the Talmud (Sanhedrin, 99a) said, "Israel need expect no Messiah, for they had the benefit of one in the days of Hezekiah, King of Judah." On the other hand, Maimonides does not regard creation _ex nihilo_ as fundamental, whereas others do; and to their mind Maimonides is open to the charge of unbelief.

The truth is that only he is an unbeliever who deliberately and knowingly contradicts the Bible. A person who believes in the Bible but is led mistakenly to misinterpret it, and denies real principles because he thinks the Bible does not require us to believe them as principles, or does not require us to believe them at all, is guilty of error and in need of forgiveness, but is not a heretic.[407]

Having thus defined his attitude and purpose, Albo proceeds to criticize the list of dogmas laid down by Maimonides and modified by Crescas, and then defends his own view. A fundamental principle ("Ikkar," lit. root) is one upon which something else depends and without which this latter cannot exist. Maimonides counts thirteen principles of Judaism as follows: (1) Existence of God, (2) Unity, (3) Incorporeality, (4) Eternity, (5) He alone must be worshipped, (6) Prophecy, (7) Superiority of the prophecy of Moses, (8) Revelation, (9) Immutability of the Law, (10) God's Omniscience, (11) Reward and Punishment, (12) Messiah, (13) Resurrection.[408] This list is open to criticism. If Maimonides intended to admit strict principles only without which Judaism cannot exist, we understand why he named (1), (6), (8), (10), (11), which are general principles of any divine religion, and (7) and (9) as special principles of Judaism. But we cannot see why he included (2) and (3). For while they are true, and every Jew should believe them, Judaism can be conceived as existing without them. It is still more strange that (5) should be counted as a principle. To be sure, it is one of the ten commandments, "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.... Thou shalt not bow thyself down to them, nor serve them" ... (Exod. 20, 35), but Judaism can be conceived to exist even with the belief in a mediator. Similarly it is not clear why (13) should be considered as a fundamental dogma. On the other hand, he omitted Tradition and Free Will as beliefs essential to any divine religion.

If, in defence of Maimonides, we say that he intended to name not only fundamental principles, but also true beliefs, whether fundamental or derivative, then there are many others he might have mentioned, such as creation _ex nihilo_, belief in miracles, that God rests in Israel through the Torah, and so on.

Another writer counts twenty-six principles, including everything that occurred to his mind, such as the attributes of eternity, wisdom, life, power, will and others, counting paradise and hell as two, and other absurd ideas. Others again,[409] criticizing Maimonides's principles, reduce them to six, viz. (1) God's knowledge, (2) Providence, (3) Power, (4) Prophecy, (5) Free Will, (6) Purpose, adding thereto the three proved by Maimonides, God's existence, unity and incorporeality. The objection to this list is that it does not contain the special dogmas of Judaism, and does not give us a principle by which we can distinguish between the genuine and spurious divine religion. For the dogmas named in the above list give us the _necessary_ requirements for a divine law, but not the _sufficient_. We may have all these principles and yet not have a divine religion. As to Free Will and Purpose, they are essential to divine legislation to be sure, but not _qua_ divine; they are also essential to a conventional human law. Divine religion has a special purpose peculiar to it.[410]

Having laid bare the defects in the attempts at a list of fundamental dogmas of Judaism made by his predecessors, Albo categorically lays down the following three principles as fundamental to divine religion: (1) Existence of God, (2) Providence, and reward and punishment, (3) Revelation.

To justify this statement Albo finds it necessary to make clear what is meant by divine law or religion, and what relation it bears to other laws, not divine. This necessitates an explanation of existing laws and their motives and causes.

Animal life, we are told, may be divided into three classes according to the mode of living adopted by each. Beasts of prey live separately and not in groups. Mankind must live in communities, as one individual is dependent upon the work of another, and social life is essential to their existence. Intermediate between beast of prey and man are the gregarious animals, which keep together not as a matter of necessity, as is the case in man, but for convenience, for the sake of being together. Man is social by nature; and in order to make communal life possible, there must be some order in the community which prohibits violence, robbery, and so on. This is known as "natural law." In addition to this there are in many places "conventional laws," made by kings and emperors, regulating more carefully and with greater detail than the natural law the affairs of the members of the community.

But this is not all. There is still another kind of law due directly to God's providence. The providence of God is seen even in the lower animals, in the constitution of their bodies, not merely in matters essential to the preservation of the animal, but also in the interest of comfort and convenience, as for example the duplication of the sense organs. It stands to reason therefore that there is a divine influence which provides for man even to a greater degree. This providence may extend only to one individual, but this person brings about the perfection of the race; just as in the individual man the heart is instrumental in giving life to all the other limbs. The law which is promulgated through this person is a "divine law."

The term "law" ("Dat") applies to any system of directions embracing a large aggregate of men, whether it contains many commands or one. There are thus three kinds of law, natural, conventional and divine. Natural law is the same for all persons, times and places. Conventional law is ordered by a wise man or men in conformity with the necessity of the persons, times and places, as the reason dictates, without special divine suggestion. Divine law is ordered by God through a prophet. The purpose of natural law is to remove wrong and promote right, keeping men from robbery and theft so that society may be able to exist. Conventional law goes further and tends to remove the unseemly and to promote the becoming. Divine law has for its purpose to guide men to true happiness, which is the happiness of the soul and its eternal life. It points out the way to follow to reach this end, showing what is the true good for man to pursue, and what is the real evil which one must shun; though it also lays down the law of right and wrong like the other two.[411]

The conventional law is inferior to the divine in a number of ways.

The conventional law only orders human conduct for the purpose of improving social life, but does not concern itself with perfection in theoretical speculation and knowledge, which leads the soul to eternal life. The divine law embraces both the parts upon which human perfection depends, conduct and theory. It embraces the becoming and unbecoming (practice), and the true and untrue (theory). As the Psalmist has it, "The Law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul" (Psal. 19, 8).

The conventional law, being human, cannot always decide with certainty what is becoming and what unbecoming. It is liable to error. This is particularly the case in matters of theory, such as the creation or eternity of the world. The divine law gives us certainty in all things, "The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple" (_ib._).

The person guided by the conventional law is not sure that he is always guided aright; hence he cannot feel the satisfaction and the joy of the man whose guide is the divine law, making him certain of being right--"The precepts of the Lord are upright, rejoicing the heart" (_ib._ 9).

The conventional law can give general rules only, but is unable to advise in a particular case. So Aristotle in the Ethics points out that virtue is a mean, but he cannot determine exactly the proper measure at a given time. This is the function of the divine law--"The commandment of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes" (_ib._).

The conventional law is subject to change in the course of time. Witness the marriage of sisters in the early period of Adam and Abel. The divine law alone does not change--"The fear of the Lord is pure, enduring for ever" (_ib._ 10).

The conventional law cannot estimate exactly the merited amount and kind of reward and punishment; whereas, "The ordinances of the Lord are the truth; they are just altogether" (_ib._).[412]

Freedom and Purpose are principles of conventional law. Without freedom there is no sense in giving orders. For this reason Freedom and Purpose are not correctly given as fundamental dogmas of divine law, for while the latter cannot get along without them, they are not peculiar to divine law as such, but are common also to conventional law. This is why Maimonides omitted Freedom in his creed. The same is true of Purpose in general. The divine law, however, has a special purpose, perfection and eternal life, hence Maimonides did include it in his list.[413]

The fundamental dogmas of divine law are, as we said before, Existence of God, Revelation, Reward and Punishment. It is evident that there cannot be a divine law without the first two. The third is also necessary; for the purpose of divine law must be a perfection greater than the conventional law can accomplish. This is eternal life, and is signified by Reward and Punishment.

As all agree that the Law of Moses is divine, it is proper to use it as a standard in order to discover what a divine law must have. Accordingly if we examine the first four chapters of Genesis, we find the principle of the existence of God in chapter one, describing creation. The second and third chapters give evidence of revelation, or communication of God with man for the purpose of directing his conduct. Finally in the Cain incident in chapter four is illustrated the third dogma of Reward and Punishment.[414]

Creation _ex nihilo_ is a true belief but not a fundamental principle. For though the Aristotelian view of eternity is heretical, as it takes away the possibility of miracles, nay even the possibility of Moses and the Messiah (for these could exist only after the lapse of an infinite number of individuals), one who believes like Plato in a primitive matter is not necessarily in contradiction with the Biblical miracles, for they were not _ex nihilo_[415] (_cf._ above, p. 358).

It is not sufficient to believe in the three principles mentioned to be considered a believer and to be entitled to a share in the world to come. One must believe also in the derivative principles following from them. Thus from the existence of God follow his unity and incorporeality. And if a man does not believe in incorporeality, he disbelieves in the real nature of God, and it is as if he denied the original principle.

The derivative principles ("Shorashim" = roots) are as follows. From existence of God are derived four: (1) Unity, (2) Incorporeality, (3) Independence of time, (4) Freedom from defects. From Revelation are derived three: (1) God's knowledge, (2) Prophecy, (3) Authenticity of God's messenger. From Reward and Punishment is derived one--Providence in the sense of special Providence. In all there are eleven dogmas.[416]

A particular commandment of the Law is not reckoned either as a fundamental principle or as a derivative. He who trangresses it is a sinner and is punished for his misdeed, but is not a heretic who loses his share in the world to come, unless he denies that the commandment in question is from God. In that case he comes in the category of those who deny revelation. Similarly the belief in tradition is not a principle because it is a particular commandment. Unity of God is a principle though it is apparently a special commandment, because the term unity contains two concepts; first, that God is one and there is not another like him; second, that being one and free from any multiplicity or composition, he is the cause of all the multiplicity in the world. The latter is not a particular commandment, but a principle derived from the existence of God. The former is a particular commandment. If particular commandments were regarded as principles, we should have as many principles as there are commandments in the Bible.[417]

The above distinction between the two senses of the term unity, one of which is rationally derived from the existence of God, whereas the other not being so derivable is not a principle, and is given in the Bible as a special commandment, is clearly due to Crescas, who after a few attempts at proving the unity of God in the sense of excluding dualism, gives it up as incapable of proof logically, and falls back upon the testimony of Scripture, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One." The other sense of the word unity Crescas proves by reason. Hence Albo counts it among the derivative principles (_cf._ above, p. 392).

If a particular commandment is not a principle, which means that a fundamental or derivative dogma cannot itself be a commandment, but must lie at the basis of all commandments, the question arises whence come these principles, and who is to warrant their truth. In the sciences we know that the basal principles of a given science are not proved in that science itself, but are borrowed from another science in which they are proved. Thus physics takes the concepts of substance and accident from metaphysics. In turn the latter takes the idea of a first mover from physics. Among the laws, too, the conventional law takes its principles, freedom and purpose, from political philosophy. Whence does divine law take its principles? The existence of God can be demonstrated philosophically from premises going back to axioms and first principles. But this is not true of Prophecy and Providence.

The answer Albo gives to this question is that of Judah Halevi and Crescas. The principles of the divine law are known empirically, _i. e._, by experience. Adam knew of the existence of God, of prophecy and reward and punishment from personal experience. Similarly Noah and Abraham. Nowadays we know the law by tradition, but the majority of the principles thus known are so certain that there is neither difference of opinion nor doubt entertained by anyone concerning them. Such is the status for example of the principle of Revelation. Other principles again, like the existence of God, are, as was said before, known by theoretical speculation.[418]

To find out whether a religion professing to be of divine origin is really so or not, it must be examined first with reference to the three fundamental, and the other derivative principles. If it opposes them, it is spurious and not genuine. If it is not opposed to the principles in question, it must be further examined with a view to determining whether the promulgator is a genuine messenger of God or not. And the test here must be a direct one. Miracles and signs are no conclusive proof of prophecy, and still less do they prove that the person performing them is a messenger sent by God to announce a law. They merely show that the person is considered worthy of having miracles performed through him, provided the miracles are genuine and not performed through magic. The test of the prophet and the messenger of God must be as direct as it was in the case of Moses, where the people actually saw that he was addressed by God and commissioned with a message for them.[419]

This opinion of Albo is clearly intended as a defence of Judaism against Christianity's claim that Jesus performed miracles, a claim which the Rabbis of the middle ages were inclined to recognize.

In addition to the three fundamental and eight derivative principles of divine legislation, there are six dogmas, which every follower of the Mosaic law must believe. They are (1) Creation _ex nihilo_, (2) Superiority of Moses to other prophets, (3) Immutability of the Law, (4) That human perfection can be attained by any one of the commandments of the Law, (5) Resurrection, (6) Messiah.

Creation _ex nihilo_ is neither a fundamental nor a derivative principle of religion generally or of Judaism specially because, as we saw before (p. 413), they can exist without this dogma. At the same time it is a truth which it behooves every religionist and particularly every Jew to believe. It follows from the principle of the existence of God. If God cannot create _ex nihilo_, there is a defect in him. For creation _ex nihilo_ is admitted in a certain sense even by those who hold that the world is eternal. They admit that God is the cause of everything else; hence matter is his effect through the mediation of the separate Intellect. But how can a separate Intellect be the cause of matter if there is no creation _ex nihilo_. This is _ex nihilo_ as much as anything can be. To say that we can find no reason why he should create at a particular time rather than at another, and hence the world must be eternal, is no argument; for this reasoning can apply only to action from necessity. Voluntary action is just of this kind, that it takes place at a particular time.

In the above argument for creation the reader will not fail to see reminiscences of Maimonides as well as Crescas (_cf._ pp. 271 and 403).

The superiority of Moses to other prophets is not essential to Judaism, nevertheless it behooves every Jew to believe it, as it is included in the principle of Revelation, and the Bible tells us, "And there arose not a prophet since then in Israel like unto Moses" (Deut. 34, 10).

The Immutability of the Law will be treated in detail later. Here it will suffice to say that while it is not a _sine qua non_ of Judaism, every Jew should believe it, as it is included in the derivative principle of the Authenticity of God's messenger.

It stands to reason that human perfection can be attained by the performance of any one of the commandments of the Law. For if it requires the performance of all the commandments for this purpose, then the Law of Moses makes it more difficult to reach perfection than the previous laws, which is not in consonance with the statement of the Rabbis that "God gave Israel so many laws and commandments because he wished to make them meritorious" (Tal. Bab. Makkot, 23 b).

Resurrection will be treated more at length later. It must be believed because it has been accepted by Israel and has come down to us by tradition. The same thing applies to the belief in the Messiah. This is also a traditional belief and is related to the principle of Reward and Punishment, though it is not like the latter indispensable either to religion in general or to Judaism in particular.[420]

The difference, it will be seen, between Albo and Maimonides in the question of Jewish dogmas is simply one of classification and grading. Albo includes in his enumeration all the thirteen dogmas of Maimonides with the exception of the fifth, namely, that God alone be worshipped, but instead of placing them all on the same level of importance as equally essential to the structure of Judaism, as Maimonides apparently intended, Albo divides them into three categories of descending rank as follows: fundamental principles, derived principles, true beliefs. Of Maimonides's list the last two, Messiah and Resurrection, belong to the last category. None the less Albo believed strictly in both and held it incumbent upon every Jew to believe in them. It was only a question of the status of a person who mistakenly denies these true beliefs. According to Maimonides, it would seem, he would be called a heretic and be excluded from a share in the world to come equally with one who denied the existence of God; whereas according to Albo a person so guilty is a sinner and needs forgiveness, but is not a heretic. Of the other eleven dogmas of Maimonides, (1), (8) and (11) are placed by Albo in his first class, (2), (3), (4), (6) and (10) belong to the second class, while (7) and (9) come under true beliefs along with Messiah and Resurrection. The difference between the first and the second class is purely logical and not practical. As we saw before (p. 413), one who denies incorporeality (a principle of the second class) disbelieves in the true nature of God, which is tantamount to denying the principle of the existence of God.

Before concluding this general discussion of the fundamental dogmas of religion and Judaism, Albo undertakes to answer two questions which must have been near his heart, and which were on the tongues no doubt of a great many honest people in those days of religious challenge and debate. The first question is, Is it proper, or perhaps obligatory, to analyze the fundamental principles of one's religion, to see if they are true; and if one finds another religion which seems to him better, is one permitted to adopt it in place of his own? Albo sees arguments against both sides of the dilemma. If a man is allowed to analyze his religion and to choose the one that seems best to him, it will follow that a person is never stable in his belief, since he is doubting it, as is shown by his examination. And if so, he does not deserve reward for belief, since belief, as Albo defines it elsewhere (Pt. I, ch. 19), means that one cannot conceive of the opposite being true. Again, if he finds another religion which he thinks better and is allowed to exchange his own religion for the new one, he will never be sure of any religion; for he may find a third still better, and a fourth, and so on, and as he cannot examine all the possible religions, he will remain without any religious convictions.

On the other hand, if he is not allowed to investigate the foundations of his belief, it follows either that all religions alike bring their believer happiness, no matter how contradictory they are, which is absurd; or God would seem unfair if only one religion leads its devotees to happiness and no one is allowed to change his religion for one that seems to him the true one.

The answer of Albo to this interesting question is characteristic. It shows that he armored himself in advance, before he risked such a delicate question. He makes it clear that it really does not expose to any danger the religion of Judaism, the mother of the other two, which they came to supersede. If all religions in the world, Albo tells us, were opposed to one another, and regarded each other as untrue, the above difficulty would be real. But it is not so. All religions agree in respect to one of them that it is divine; but they say that it is superseded. Hence every religionist who is not a Jew must investigate his religion to see if it is justified in opposing the religion which is acknowledged to be divine. Similarly the professor of the admittedly divine religion should investigate to see if his religion is temporary or eternal. In this investigation he must first see if the religion conforms to the principles of divine religion above mentioned. If it does this and in addition endeavors to order human affairs in accordance with justice, and leads its devotees to human perfection, it is divine. It is still, however, possible that it is the work of a wise man of good character. It is therefore necessary to investigate the character of the promulgator, to find out whether he is a genuine divine messenger or not. This test, as was said above (p. 415), must be a direct test and not an indirect.[421]

The other question is whether there can be more than one divine religion. Apparently there can be only one, since the giver is one, and the recipients are of one species. But in reality the receivers vary in temperament according to difference in inheritance and environment. Hence there may be a difference in the law according to the character of the people for whom it is intended. Since, however, the difference is due to the receiver and not to the giver, it must reside in those elements which are dependent upon the receiver, _i. e._, in particulars and details, not in the principles, fundamental or derived. So the Noachite and the Mosaic laws differ only in details, not in fundamental principles.[422]

We have now completed the exposition of the part of Albo's teaching that may be called distinctly his own. And it seems he was aware that he had nothing further to teach that was new, and would have been content to end his book with the first part, of which we have just given an account. But his friends, he tells us in the concluding remarks to the first part of the "Ikkarim,"[423] urged him to proceed further and discuss in detail the principles, fundamental and derived, the true beliefs and the so-called "branches," which he barely enumerated in the first part. He was persuaded by their advice and added the other three sections, each devoted to one of the three fundamental dogmas and the corollaries following from it. Here Albo has nothing new to teach. He follows the beaten track, reviews the classic views of Maimonides, takes advantage of the criticisms of Gersonides and Crescas, and settles the problems sometimes one way sometimes another, without ever suggesting anything new. Accordingly it will not be worth our while to reproduce his discussions here. It will suffice briefly to indicate his position on the more important problems.

The second section deals with the existence of God and the derived principles and branches growing out from this root. In proving the existence of God he refers to Maimonides's four proofs (_cf._ p. 257 ff.), and selects the third and fourth as really valid and beyond dispute. The first and second are not conclusive; the one because it is based upon the eternity of motion, which no Jew accepts; the other because the major premise is not true. It does not follow if one of the two elements _a_, _b_, of a composite _a + b_ is found separately, that the other must be found existing separately likewise.[424]

We have seen that from the principle of the existence of God follow four derivative dogmas, unity, incorporeality, independence of time, freedom from defects. We are now told that from these secondary roots issue a number of branches. From Unity it follows that no attributes either essential or accidental can be applied to God, such as wisdom, strength, generosity, and so on, for they would cause multiplicity. From incorporeality we infer that God is not subject to corporeal affections like fear, sorrow, joy, grudge, and so on. Independence of time implies infinite power and want of resemblance to other things. Freedom from defect implies absence of such qualities as ignorance, weakness, and so on.[425]

In the discussion of the divine attributes Albo has nothing new to offer, but instead he argues forward and backward, now with Maimonides, now against him, reproducing a good deal of Maimonides's classification, embodying some material of Bahya on unity, and after this rambling and not very consistent discussion, he comes to the conclusion that none but active and negative attributes are applicable to God; and yet some essential attributes too must be his, but these must be understood as implying only the aspect of perfection, and not that other aspect of attribute which is responsible for multiplicity.[426]

He asks the question so often asked before, How can multiplicity come from unity? And after giving Ibn Sina's scheme of the emanation of the Intelligences one after the other, and criticizing it in the manner of Gazali and Maimonides, he gives his own solution that the variety and multiplicity of the world tends to one end, which is the order of the world. And thus are reconciled plurality and unity. (_cf._ Gersonides above, p. 351).[427]

He discusses the question of angels or Intellects, gives the views of the philosophers concerning their nature and number, each being the effect of the superior and the cause of the inferior, and objects to their idea on the ground that these cannot be the same as the Biblical angels, who are messengers of God to mankind. He then gives his own view that the number of angels is infinite, not as the philosophers say ten or fifty, and that they are not related to each other as cause and effect, but that though they are immaterial Intellects they are individuated and differentiated according to the degree of understanding they have of God.[428]

In discussing the second fundamental principle, Revelation, Albo argues in the good old fashion that man is the noblest creature of the sublunar world, and the most distinctive and noblest part of man--his form and essence--is the theoretical reason. Hence the purpose of man must be the realization of the theoretical intellect. At the same time, and with little consistency, Albo takes the part of Judah Halevi and Crescas, employing their arguments, without naming them, that the philosophers and the philosophizing theologians are wrong who make human immortality, perfection and happiness depend solely upon intellectual activity. He comes to the conclusion, therefore, that spiritual understanding, which gives perfection of soul when in combination with practice, is not acquisition of ideas but the intention of doing the will of God in the performance of good deeds, and not that of pleasure or reward.[429]

This being so, it becomes an important question what are the practices which tend to human perfection, and what are those which tend the other way. In general we may conclude, as like desires and rejoices in like, that those deeds which give the soul pleasure before and after performance are good and helpful, while those which cause subsequent pain, regret and sorrow are bad, and tend away from the soul's perfection.

But the criterion of pleasure and pain just suggested is not sufficient as a guide in conduct, for a great deal depends upon a man's temperament. What a hot-blooded man may commend and find pleasure in, the phlegmatic temperament will object to, and will feel discomfort in doing. Besides, as the good deed is always a mean between two extremes, which it is hard to measure precisely; and as the good deed is that which pleases God, and beyond generalities we cannot tell what does, and what does not please God, since we do not know his essence, it was necessary for man's sake that God should reveal his will to mankind through a prophet. Thus Revelation is proved by reason.[430]

This leads to the problem of prophecy, one of the derivative principles of Revelation. The divine influence from which man gets a knowledge of the things pleasing and displeasing to God, he cannot obtain without the divine will. Instead of magic, divination, and communication with evil spirits and the dead, which the ancient heathen employed in order to learn the future, God sent prophets to Israel, to tell the people of the will of God. Foretelling the future was only secondary with them. Prophecy is a supernatural gift, whether it takes place with the help of the imagination or not. If it were a natural phenomenon dependent upon the intellectual power of the individual and his faculty of imagination, as the philosophers and some Jewish theologians think, there should have been prophets among the philosophers.

Here again we see Albo adopt the view of Halevi and Crescas against the intellectualism of Maimonides and Gersonides. His further classification of the grades of prophecy is based upon Maimonides, though Albo simplifies it. Instead of eleven Albo recognizes four grades in all, including that of Moses. The great majority of mankind, he says, stop with the ability to analyze, such as is exhibited in the analysis of things into matter and form, and so on, though not all of them go so far. But there are some few who go farther and are enabled to speak words of wisdom and to sing praises to God without being able to account for the power. This is the holy spirit ("Ruah ha-Kodesh"). Some go still farther, and through the strength of their reason and imagination they dream true dreams and receive prophecies; though, the imagination having the upper hand, they struggle very hard and tremble and faint, almost losing their soul. This is the first stage of prophecy. The second stage is when the imagination and reason are equal. In that case there is no struggle or fainting. Visions come to the prophet at night in dreams, or in a revery at daytime. The forms that appear are not real, but the meanings they convey are. Such are the figures of women, horses, basket of summer fruit, and so on, in the visions of Zechariah and Amos. The third stage is when the reason gets the better of the imagination and there are no forms or images, but real essences and ideas, like the visions of Ezekiel, which represent real things in the secrets of nature and divinity. The prophet in this stage also hears an angel speaking to him and giving him information of importance to himself or others. In all these cases the will of God is essential. No preparation can replace it. Finally the fourth stage is reached when the imagination does not come into play at all. In this stage there is no angel or form, and the message comes to the prophet at daytime while he is awake. He hears a voice telling him what he desires to know; and whenever he chooses he can summon this power. Moses alone attained to this final stage. Outside of the prophets, the righteous and the pious have various degrees of power according to the degree of their union with God. Some can in this way influence the powers of nature to obey them, as a person can, by thinking of food, make his mouth water. So they can by taking thought cause rain and storm. Others can bring down fire from above and revive the dead.

Through the influence of a prophet the gift of prophecy may sometimes rest upon individuals who are themselves unprepared and unworthy. Witness the revelation on Sinai where the entire people, six hundred thousand in number, were endowed with the spirit of prophecy, and that too of the highest degree, like Moses himself. The prophetic medium reflects the spirit of prophecy on others as a smooth surface reflects the light of the sun upon dark bodies. This is why prophecy is found only in Israel and in Palestine, because the ark and the Tables of Stone, upon which the Shekinah rests, reflect the divine spirit upon those who are worthy and have in them something resembling the contents of the ark, namely, the Torah and the commandments.[431]

Among the true beliefs we have seen (p. 416) that Immutability of the Law is related to the principle of Revelation. Hence this is the place to discuss this question. Can a divine religion change with time or not? It would seem at first sight that it cannot. For the giver expresses his will in the Law, and his will never changes. The receivers are the same, _i. e._, the same nation, and a nation does not change. Finally the purpose of the Law or religion is to give people true opinions, and these never change.

And yet on further reflection there seems no reason why religion should not change with the change of the recipient, as the physician changes his prescription with the progress of the patient, and as a matter of fact we find that the commandments given to Adam were different from those given to Noah and to Abraham and to Moses. Adam was not allowed to eat meat, Noah was. Abraham was commanded circumcision. High places were at first permitted and later forbidden. Maimonides makes the immutability of the Law a fundamental dogma, relying upon the commandment, "Thou shalt not add thereto, and thou shalt not diminish therefrom" (Deut. 13, 1). But in the first place the verse refers to changes in the mode of observing the laws; and besides, it says nothing about God himself changing the Law.

The phrases "an eternal statute," "throughout your generations," "it is a sign for ever," are no proof of the eternity of the Law; for not all commandments have these expressions attached, and this shows rather that the others are subject to change. Besides, the expressions, "for eternity," and so on, are not to be taken absolutely. They are often used to express finite periods of time.

After the Babylonian Exile two changes were made. They changed the characters in which the Bible was written, and the order and names of the months, beginning with Tishri instead of Nisan. There is no reason, therefore, why other laws might not change, too. We need not, then, regard Immutability of the Law as a fundamental dogma with Maimonides. Hasdai Crescas also classes it with true beliefs and not with fundamental principles.

Albo resolves the problem as follows: A matter that is revealed by God himself cannot be changed by a prophet unless it is changed by God himself. The first two commandments, "I am the Lord thy God, &c.," and "Thou shalt not have other gods, &c.," were heard by the people directly from God without the intervention of Moses, hence they cannot be changed by any prophet. It follows therefore that the three fundamental dogmas, existence of God, Revelation and Reward and Punishment can never be changed by a prophet, for they are implied in the first two commandments, which were heard from God himself. The rest of the commandments, as they were heard from God through the interpretation of Moses, can be changed by a prophet as a temporary measure. The other laws which were given by Moses may be changed by a later prophet even permanently. But the prophet must be greater than Moses, and he must show this by the greatness, number, publicity and permanence of his miracles, which must excel those of Moses. He must likewise show that he was sent by God to change the Law, as clearly as Moses proved that he was sent to give it. But it is unlikely that any such prophet will come, for the Torah says that there never was or will be any prophet like Moses.[432]

Before discussing the third fundamental dogma, Albo finds it desirable to dispose first of a few other problems implied by this dogma, one of which, God's knowledge, was postponed to this place, though it is connected with Revelation, because it cannot well be separated in discussion from the problem of Freedom. Providence is the other related problem, which is derived from the dogma of Reward and Punishment.

There is nothing that is new in Albo's treatment of knowledge and Freedom. He insists like Maimonides that God must be omniscient, and on the other hand the contingent cannot be denied, and neither can freedom. He gives the stock arguments, which it is not necessary to reproduce at this late hour. And his solution is that of Maimonides that in God human freedom and divine Omniscience are reconcilable because God's knowledge is not our knowledge.[433]

Nor is there anything original in Albo's discussion of the problem of Providence. He recognizes with Maimonides and others that a strong argument against special Providence is the observed inequality between the destinies of men and their apparent merits. And he endeavors in the well worn method to give reasons and explanations for this inequality which will not touch unfavorably God's justice or his special Providence. The reasons are such as we met before and we shall not repeat them. Albo also gives a few positive arguments to prove the reality of special Providence for man. He sees in various natural and human phenomena evidence of deviation from the merely "natural" as demanded by the principles of Aristotle's Physics or the laws of uniformity. This shows special Providence. Thus the existence of dry earth, the heaviest element, above water, cannot be accounted for by the laws of Physics. The phenomenon of rain cannot be reduced to law, hence it argues will and purpose and Providence. Admonition in dreams is direct evidence of special Providence, and it is scarcely likely that man, who has special equipment above the other animals in his reason, should not also receive special care above that which the lower animals have. Now they are protected in the species, hence man is provided for as an individual.[434]

Having disposed of the auxiliary dogmas, Albo takes up the fundamental principle of Reward and Punishment. He cites various opinions on the subject, which are dependent upon the idea one entertains concerning the nature of the soul. Thus if one holds that the human soul is not different in kind from the animal soul, it follows that as there is no reward and punishment for the animal, there is none for man. And if one regards the human soul as merely a capacity or possibility of intelligence he must necessarily conclude that the soul perishes with the body and there is no spiritual reward and punishment after death. The only reward there is must therefore be corporeal, during life. On the other hand, our general experience, which brings before us many cases of good men suffering and bad men enjoying prosperity, would seem to argue against corporeal reward and punishment in this world. This taken together with the philosophical opinion that the soul is an immaterial and indestructible substance gives rise to the third view that the only recompense is spiritual after death. None of these views is satisfactory to Albo. The first two because they are based upon an erroneous notion of the soul. All agree, philosophers as well as theologians, that the human soul is different in kind from the soul of the animal; and it is likewise admitted that the human soul is immortal. His criticism of the third view so far as it is based upon the intellectualist idea that the thing of highest value is intellectual effort, and the only reward is immortality which intellectual activity engenders, is similar to that of Halevi and Crescas in its endeavor to refute this notion and to substitute for it the religious view that the soul is an independent substance having a capacity for intelligence _in God's service_. The degree in which a person realizes this service determines his reward and punishment. The argument from experience Albo does not answer here, but we may suppose he regards it as answered by what he said in his discussion of Providence, where he tries to account for the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous.

Albo's own view accordingly is that which he also attributes to the Bible that there is a twofold reward, in this world and in the next. There is still a difference of opinion concerning the nature of the true and ultimate reward, whether it is given to the soul alone, or to body and soul combined in resurrection. He quotes Maimonides's opinion, with whom he agrees, that the real reward is purely spiritual enjoyed by the soul alone. To be sure, after the coming of the Messiah the bodies of the righteous will be resurrected to make known abroad God's wonders, or to give these people bodily pleasure for the pain they suffered during life, or to give them additional opportunity to acquire perfection so that they may have a greater reward later. But this state of resurrected life will last only for a time, and then all will die again, and the souls will enjoy spiritual life forever.

The other opinion, held by Nachmanides, is that the real and ultimate reward is that of body and soul united to everlasting life. Albo is not satisfied with this view, his objections being among others that if only the perfect are resurrected, the rest will remain without any reward at all, not to mention the difficulty that it is not likely that the human body--a perishable thing--will change into a matter that will last forever.

As to the nature of reward and punishment after death, Albo tells us that reward will consist in the soul's realization that its endeavors in this world were correct, and in the next world it will be prepared to join the spiritual beings, which will give it great joy. The erring soul will find itself in a position where it will still desire the corporeal pleasures of this world, but will not be able to have them for want of corporeal organs. At the same time it will also entertain the other more natural desire of a spiritual substance to join the other spiritual beings in the other world. This feeling too it will not be able to satisfy because of its want of perfection. This division of desires unsatisfied will cause the soul excruciating torture, and this is its punishment.[435]

CONCLUSION

Our task is done. We have now reached the limit we have assigned ourselves. We have traced objectively and with greater or less detail the rationalistic movement in mediæval Jewry from its beginnings in the ninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and Rabbanites to its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth century. We have followed its ascending curve from Saadia through Gabirol, Bahya and Ibn Daud to its highest point in Maimonides, and we likewise traced its descent through Gersonides, Crescas and Albo. We took account of its essential nature as being a serious and conscientious attempt to define a Jewish _Weltanschauung_ in the midst of conflicting claims of religions and philosophies. The Jewish sacred writings had to be studied and made consistent with themselves in regard to certain ethical and metaphysical questions which forced themselves upon the minds of thinking men. In this endeavor it was necessary to have regard to the system of doctrine that was growing up among their Mohammedan neighbors and masters--itself inherited from Greece--and adjust its teachings to those of Judaism. The adjustment took various forms according to the temperament of the adjuster. It embraced the extremes of all but sacrificing one of the two systems of doctrine to the other, and it counted among its votaries those who honestly endeavored to give each claim its due. The system of Judaism was the same for all throughout the period of our investigation, excepting only the difference between Karaites and Rabbanites. This was not the case with the system of philosophic doctrine. There we can see a development from Kalam through Neo-Platonism to Aristotelianism, and we accordingly classified the Jewish thinkers as Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists or Aristotelians, or combinations in varying proportions of any two of the three systems mentioned.

It was not our province to treat of the mystic movement in mediæval Jewry as it developed in the Kabbalistic works and gained the ground yielded in the course of time by the healthier rationalism. To complete the picture it will suffice to say that as the political and economic conditions of the Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries deteriorated, and freedom and toleration were succeeded by persecution and expulsion, the Jews became more zealous for their own spiritual heritage as distinguished from foreign importations; philosophy and rationalism began to be regarded askance, particularly as experience showed that scientific training was not favorable to Jewish steadfastness and loyalty. In suffering and persecution those who stuck to their posts were as a rule not the so-called enlightened who played with foreign learning, but the simple folk who believed in Torah and tradition in the good old style. The philosophical and the scientific devotees were the first to yield, and many of them abandoned Judaism.[436] Thus it was that mysticism and obscurantism took the place of enlightenment as a measure of self-defence. The material walls of the Ghetto and the spiritual walls of the Talmud and the Kabbala kept the remnant from being overwhelmed and absorbed by the hostile environment of Christian and Mohammedan. The second half of the fourteenth, and the fifteenth century were not favorable to philosophical studies among the Jews, and the few here and there who still show an interest in science and philosophy combine with it a belief in Kabbala and are not of any great influence on the development of Judaism.

Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob (ab. 1440) author of a work entitled "Emunot,"[437] is a strong opponent of Greek science and philosophy. He is not content with attacking the lesser lights and extremists like Albalag or Gersonides or Abraham ibn Ezra. He goes to the very fountain-head of Jewish Aristotelianism and holds Maimonides responsible for the heresies which invaded the Jewish camp. He takes up one doctrine after another of the great Jewish philosopher and points out how dangerous it is to the true Jewish faith. Judah Halevi and Nachmanides represent to him the true Jewish attitude. The mysteries of the Jewish faith are revealed not in philosophy but in the Kabbala, which Maimonides did not study, and which he would not have understood if he had studied it, for he had no Kabbalistic tradition.

Unlike Shemtob, his son Joseph ben Shemtob (d. 1480)[438] shows great admiration for Aristotle and Maimonides. But he is enabled to do so by lending credence to a legend that Aristotle in his old age recanted his heretical doctrines, in particular that of the eternity of the world. Joseph ben Shemtob made a special study of Aristotle's Ethics, to which he wrote a commentary, and endeavored to show that the Stagirite's ethical doctrines had been misunderstood; that the highest good of man and his ultimate happiness are to be sought according to Aristotle not in this world but in the next. It was likewise a misunderstanding, he thinks, when Maimonides and others make Aristotle deny special Providence. True science is not really opposed to Judaism. At the same time he too like his father realizes the danger of too much scientific study, and hence agrees with Solomon ben Adret that the study of philosophy should be postponed to the age of maturity when the student is already imbued with Jewish learning and religious faith.

The son of Joseph, bearing the name of his grandfather, Shemtob ben Joseph (fl. ab. 1461-89), followed in his father's footsteps,[439] and wrote a commentary on the "Guide of the Perplexed" of Maimonides, whom he defends against the attacks of Crescas.

Isaac ben Moses Arama (1420-1494)[440] is the author of a philosophico-homiletical commentary on the Pentateuch entitled, "Akedat Yizhak," and a small treatise on the relations of philosophy and theology. He was also interested in Kabbala and placed Jewish revelation above philosophy.

Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1508),[441] the distinguished Jewish statesman who went with his brethren into exile at the time of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, was a prolific writer on Biblical exegesis and religious philosophy. Though a great admirer of Maimonides, on whose "Guide" he wrote a commentary, and whose thirteen articles of the creed he defended against the strictures of Crescas and Albo, he was nevertheless an outspoken opponent of the rationalistic attitude and has no phrases strong enough for such men as Albalag, Gersonides, Moses of Narbonne and others, whom he denounces as heretics and teachers of dangerous doctrines. He does not even spare Maimonides himself when the latter attempts to identify the traditional "Maase Bereshit" and "Maase Merkaba" with the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics (_cf._ above, p. 303 f.), and adopts Kabbalistic views along with philosophic doctrines. He is neither original nor thoroughly consistent.

His son Judah Leo Abarbanel (1470-1530)[442] is the author of a philosophical work in Italian, "Dialoghi di Amore," (Dialogues of Love), which breathes the spirit of the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Italy. It is under the influence of Plato and Plotinus and identifies God with love, which is regarded as the essential principle of all life and activity in the world, including even the inorganic natural processes. There is no attempt made to construct a Jewish philosophy, and though all evidence is against it, some have made it out that Judah Abarbanel was a convert to Christianity.

In the same country, in Italy, Judah ben Yechiel Messer Leon of Mantua[443] (1450-1490) made a name for himself as a student of Cicero and of mediæval Latin scholasticism. He wrote a rhetoric in Hebrew based upon Cicero and Lactantius, and composed logical works based upon Aristotle's Latin text and Averroes. As an original student of philosophy he is of no importance.

Two members of the Delmedigo family of Crete, Elijah (1460-1498) and Joseph Solomon,[444] are well known as students of philosophy and writers on philosophical and scientific subjects.

Thus the stream of philosophical thought which rose among the Jews in Babylonia and flowed on through the ages, ever widening and deepening its channel, passing into Spain and reaching its high water mark in the latter half of the twelfth century in Maimonides, began to narrow and thin out while spreading into France and Italy, until at last it dried up entirely in that very land which opened up a new world of thought, beauty and feeling in the fifteenth century, the land of the Renaissance. Jewish philosophy never passed beyond the scholastic stage, and the freedom and light which came to the rest of the world in the revival of ancient learning and the inventions and discoveries of the modern era found the Jews incapable of benefiting by the blessings they afforded. Oppression and gloom caused the Jews to retire within their shell and they sought consolation for the freedom denied them without in concentrating their interests, ideals and hopes upon the Rabbinic writings, legal as well as mystical. There have appeared philosophers among the Jews in succeeding centuries, but they either philosophized without regard to Judaism and in opposition to its fundamental dogmas, thus incurring the wrath and exclusion of the synagogue, or they sought to dissociate Judaism from theoretical speculation on the ground that the Jewish religion is not a philosophy but a rule of conduct. In more recent times Jewry has divided itself into sects and under the influence of modern individualism has lost its central authority making every group the arbiter of its own belief and practice and narrowing the religious influence to matters of ceremony and communal activity of a practical character. There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but there are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY[D]

GENERAL WORKS

SOLOMON MUNK, Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris 1859, pp. 461-511. A brief historical résumé of philosophical authors and books. German translation by Beer, Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden, Leipzig, 1852. English translation by Isidor Kalisch, Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews, Cincinnati, 1881.

A. SCHMIEDL, Studien über jüdische, insonders jüdisch-arabische Religionsphilosophie, Wien, 1869.

MORITZ EISLER, Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters (3 parts), Wien, 1870-84.

DAVID KAUFMANN, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadia bis Maimuni, Gotha, 1877.

SIMEON BERNFELD, [Hebrew: Da'at Elohim, Toldot Hafilosofiya Hadatit B'yisrael], Warsaw, 1897.

S. HOROVITZ, Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religions-Philosophen des Mittelalters, von Saadia bis Maimuni, Breslau, 1898-1912 (includes so far Saadia, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik, Abraham ibn Daud).

J. POLLAK, "Entwicklung der arabischen und jüdischen Philosophie im Mittelalter" in _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. XVII (1904), pp. 196-236, 433-459.

UEBERWEG-BAUMGARTNER, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. II, 10th ed., Berlin, 1915, pp. 385-403.

DAVID NEUMARK, Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, nach Problemen dargestellt, vol. I, Berlin, 1907, vol. II, part I, Berlin, 1910.

IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, Die jüdische Philosophie in _Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie_, von W. Wundt, etc. (Die Kultur der Gegenwart I, 5), pp. 70-77 (2nd ed., pp. 301-337).

KALAM IN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

MARTIN SCHREINER, Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur, Berlin, 1895.

ISAAC ISRAELI

JACOB GUTTMANN, Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, Münster i. W. 1911.

AL MUKAMMAS

ABRAHAM HARKAVY, in Russian periodical _Woskhod_, Sept. 1898.

SAADIA

JACOB GUTTMANN, Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, Göttingen, 1882.

D.J. ENGELKEMPER, Saadja Gaon's religionsphilosophische Lehre über die heilige Schrift, übersetzt und erklärt, Münster, 1903.

JOSEPH AL BASIR

P. F. FRANKL, Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10. Jahrhundert, Wien, 1872.

MIKSA KLEIN, Júszuf Al-Baszîr, Al-Kitâb Al-Mu[h.]tavî, Budapest, 1913.

ERNÖ MORGENSTERN, Júszuf Al-Baszîr, Al Kitâb Al Mu[h.]tavî, Budapest, 1913.

JESHUA BEN JUDAH

MARTIN SCHREINER, Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900.

SOLOMON IBN GABIROL

S. MUNK, Mélanges, etc., Paris, 1859, pp. 151-306.

SEYERLEN, in Zeller's Theologische Jahrbücher, vols. XV and XVI.

JACOB GUTTMANN, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn Gabirol, Göttingen, 1889.

DAVID KAUFMANN, Studien über Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899.

BAHYA IBN PAKUDA

DAVID KAUFMANN, "Die Theologie des Bachja Ibn Pakuda," in "Gesammelte Schriften von David Kaufmann" (ed. Brann), vol. II, Frankfurt a. M., 1910, pp. 1-98.

J. H. HERTZ, Bachya, The Jewish Thomas à Kempis, New York, 1898 (in Sixth Biennial Report of the Jewish Theological Seminary Association).

PSEUDO-BAHYA

JACOB GUTTMANN, "Eine bisher unbekannte, dem Bachja ibn Pakuda zugeignete Schrift," _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._, vol. XLI (1897), p. 241 ff.

ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA

JACOB GUTTMANN, in _Monatschrift f. G. u, W. d. J_., 1900.

JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK

MAX DOCTOR, Die Philosophie des Joseph Ibn Zaddik, nach ihren Quellen, insbesondere nach ihren Beziehungen zu den Lauteren Brüdern und zu Gabirol untersucht, Münster, 1895.

LEOPOLD WEINSBERG, Der Mikrokosmos, ein angeblich im 12. Jahrhundert von dem Cordubenser Joseph ibn Zaddik verfasstes philosophisches System, nach seiner Echtheit untersucht, Breslau, 1888.

JUDAH HALEVI

AD. FRANKL-GRÜN, Die Ethik des Juda Halevi, Bilin, s. a.

DAVID KAUFMANN, Jehuda Halewi, Versuch einer Charakteristik, Breslau, 1877; reprinted in "Gesammelte Schriften" (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. II, pp. 99-151.

DAVID NEUMARK, Jehuda Hallevi's Philosophy in its Principles, Cincinnati, 1908.

JULIUS GUTTMANN, Das Verhältniss von Religion und Philosophie bei Jehuda Halewi, in Israel Lewy's Festschrift (ed. Brann and Elbogen), Breslau, 1911, pp. 327-358.

ABRAHAM IBN EZRA

NACHMAN KROCHMAL, [Hebrew: More Nevochey Hazman], Warsaw, 1894, p. 266 ff.

DAVID ROSIN, Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham ibn Esras, in _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._ vols. XLII (1898) and XLIII (1899).

G. ORSCHANSKY, Abraham ibn Esra als Philosoph, Breslau, 1900.

ABRAHAM IBN DAUD

GUGENHEIMER, Die Religionsphilosophie des R. Abraham ben David ha-Levi nach dessen noch ungedruckter Schrift Emuna Rama in ihrem inneren und historischen Zusammenhange entwickelt, Augsburg, 1850.

JACOB GUTTMANN, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud aus Toledo, Göttingen, 1879.

MAIMONIDES

M. JOEL, Die Religionsphilosophie des Mose ben Maimon, Breslau, 1876.

SIMON B. SCHEYER, Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, Frankfurt a. M., 1845.

DAVID ROSIN, Die Ethik des Maimonides, Breslau, 1876.

MOSES BEN MAIMON, sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss, heraus-gegeben von der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judenthums, Band I, Leipzig, 1908.

LOUIS-GERMAIN LEVY, Maïmonide, Paris, 1911 (Les Grands Philosophes).

J. MÜNZ, Moses ben Maimon, sein Leben und seine Werke, Frankfurt a. M., 1912.

M. JOEL, Verhältniss Albert des Grossen zu Moses Maimonides, Breslau, 1876.

JACOB GUTTMANN, Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philosophie auf das christliche Abendland, in _Moses ben Maimon_ (see above), pp. 135-230.

DAVID KAUFMANN, Der "Führer" Maimûni's in der Weltliteratur, _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. XI (1898), pp. 335-376; reprinted in "Gesammelte Schriften" (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. II, pp. 152-189.

J. P. WICKERSHAM CRAWFORD, The _Vision Delectable_ of Alfonso de la Torre and Maimonides' _Guide of the Perplexed_, Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, XXVIII, 2 (1913), pp. 188-212.

ISAAC HUSIK, An Anonymous Medieval Christian Critic of Maimonides, Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, vol. II, 1911, pp. 159-190.

GERSONIDES

M. JOEL, Lewi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862.

_Isidore Weil_, Philosophie Religieuse de Levi ben Gerson, Paris, 1868.

BENZION KELLERMANN, Die Kämpfe Gottes von Lewi ben Gerson, Uebersetzung und Erklärung des handschriftlich revidierten Textes, Erster Teil, Berlin, 1914. Contains the German translation of the first book of the "Milhamot Adonai." The translation is faulty in many places, as the present writer has shown in an article entitled, "Studies in Gersonides," which will appear in the _Jewish Quarterly Review_, New Series, in the course of the year 1917.

HASDAI CRESCAS

_M. Joel_, Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren in ihrem geschichtlichen Einflusse dargestellt, Breslau, 1866.

PHILIPP BLOCH, Die Willensfreiheit von Chasdai Kreskas, München, 1879.

JULIUS WOLFSOHN, Der Einfluss Gazâlî's auf Chisdai Crescas, Frankfurt a. M., 1905.

DAVID NEUMARK, "Crescas and Spinoza," in Commemoration of the Fifth Centenary of the Publication of the "Or Adonai"; in Year Book of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, XVIII, 1908, pp. 277-318.

JOSEPH ALBO

SAMUEL BACK, Joseph Albo's Bedeutung in der Geschichte der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie, Breslau, 1869.

JAULUS, in _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._, 1874, p. 462 ff.

A. TÄNZER, Die Religionsphilosophie Joseph Albo's nach seinem Werke "Ikkarim" systematisch dargestellt und erläutert, Frankfurt a. M., 1896.

BIBLICAL EXEGESIS

W. BACKER, Die Bibelexegese der jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalters vor Maimûni, Budapest, 1892.

ID., Die Jüdische Bibelexegese vom Anfange des zehnten his zum Ende des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts, Treves, 1892, reprinted from Winter und Wünsche, Die Jüdische Literatur seit Abschluss des Kanons, II, 239-339, where a full bibliography is given.

ID., Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Bible Exegesis, §§ 14-16.

INFLUENCE OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY ON SCHOLASTICISM

The works of Joel, Guttmann, Kaufmann, Crawford and Husik mentioned above under Maimonides; and besides

JACOB GUTTMANN, Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Litteratur, Göttingen, 1891.

ID., Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902.

For further references see the notes.

[D] This bibliography contains a selection of the more important works of exposition. For original sources see the notes.

NOTES

[Black figures denote the page, the light figures the notes]

=xv=, 1. See below, p. 395 ff.

=xvi=, 2. Talm. Bab. Hagiga 11b.

3. Ibid.

4. See Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, III, 2, 3d ed. p. 347; Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 71, beginning.

=xvii=, 5. See Wenrich, De Auctorum Graecorum Versionibus et Commentariis Syriacis, Arabicis, Armeniacis Persicisque, Leipzig, 1842, p. 4 ff; De Boer, Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam, Stuttgart, 1901, p. 17 ff (English translation by Jones, London, 1903, pp. 11-30). Duval, La Littérature Syriaque 2nd ed., Paris, 1900, ch. XIV, § 2, p. 253 ff.

=xx=, 6. See Dieterici, Die Theologie des Aristotles (Arabic text), Leipzig, 1882; German translation by the same, Leipzig, 1883.

7. See Bardenhewer, Die Pseudoaristotelische Schrift über das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis, Freiburg i. Br., 1882.

8. See Valentinus Rose, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 1883, p. 843.

9. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary upon the "Vetus Logica," Leyden, 1906, p. 11, 97 note.

=xxi=, 10. For the following sketch of the Kalam see Goldziher, Vorlesungen über den Islam, Heidelberg, 1910, 100 ff, 127 f.

=xxiv=, 11. See below, p. 247.

=xxv=, 12. See Schreiner, Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur, Berlin, 1895, p. 3; ibid., Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900, p. 12 ff.

=xxvi=, 13. See L. Ginzberg, in Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. "Anthropomorphism."

14. See Talm. Bab. Berakot, 33b. [Hebrew: Modim Modim Mashtikin Oto]

15. See Talm. Bab. Megillah, 25b. [Hebrew: Hakol Beyidei Shamayim Chutz Meyeriat Shamaim]

16. Schreiner, Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehudah, p. 15 note 2.

17. See Bab. Talm. Pesakim, 54a, [Hebrew: Shiv'a Dvarim Nivreu Kodem Shenivra Ha'olam Ve'eylu Hen Torah.... Torah Dechtiv (Mishley Khet) Hashem Kanani Reyshit Darko.]

18. Schreiner 1. c. p. 12.

19. Ibid.

20. Schreiner, Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur, p. 3, 4.

=xxvii=, 21. Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 71.

22. See below, p. 246 ff.

23. See Goldziher, Vorlesungen über den Islam, p. 155 ff.

=xxviii=, 24. See Yahuda, Al-Hid[=a]ja `Il[=a] Far[=a]`id Al-Qul[=u]b des Bachja ibn Joseph Ibn Paquda, Leyden, 1912, p. 53 ff.

=xxxvii=, 25. Cf. above, note 6.

=1=, 26. See Steinschneider, Die Hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher, Berlin, 1893, § 479 and notes.

=1=, 27. See Guttmann, Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902, P. 55 ff.

28. Omnia Opera Ysaac, Lugduni, (Lyons), 1515.

=2=, 29. See [Hebrew: Igrot Harambam], ed. Amsterdam, p. 14b.

30. S. Fried, Das Buch über die Elemente ([Hebrew: Sefer Hayesodot]), Drohobycz, 1900.

31. Published by Hirschfeld in "Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstag Moritz Steinschneiders," Leipzig, 1896, PP. 131-141; cf. also pp. 233-4.

32. See note 28 and the two preceding notes.

=5=, 33. [Hebrew: Sefer Haruach V'hanefesh] published by Steinschneider in the Hebrew periodical [Hebrew: Hakarmel] I, pp. 401-405. cf. Guttmann, Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, Münster i. W., 1911, p. 31, note 1.

=10=, 34. Fried, [Hebrew: Sefer Hayesodot], p. 12f.

=17=, 35. Berlin, 1885, pp. 65, 77-83, 151-154.

36. See the Russian paper Woskhod, September, 1898.

=24=, 37. Arabic text edited by S. Landauer, Kit[=a]b al-Am[=a]n[=a]t wa`l-I`tiq[=a]d[=a]t, Leyden 1880. The Hebrew translation of Judah ibn Tibbon has been published in many editions. The references in the following notes are to the Yozefov edition.

=25=, 38. Cf. below, p. 249 ff.

39. Pt. I, ch. 1, third argument, p. 58 of Yozefov edition.

40. Ibid., fourth argument, p. 59.

=26=, 41. Ibid., ch. 3, p. 63 ff.; cf. Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, Göttingen, 1882, p. 45 f.

42. Pt. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-101.

43. Pt. VI, ch. 1, p. 149.

44. Pt. II, ch. 2, pp. 88-9.

=27=, 45. Introduction, pp. 38-39.

46. Ibid., p. 40.

=28=, 47. Ibid., pp. 43-48.

48. Ibid., p. 48.

49. p. 49

50. p. 51.

=29=, 51. Pt. I. Introduction, p. 54 f.

52. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 56.

=30=, 53. Ibid., p. 57.

54. Ibid., p. 58.

55. Ibid., p. 59.

=31=, 56. Ch. 2, p. 60 ff.

57. Ch. 3, third opinion, p. 66 ff.

=32=, 58. Ch. 4, pp. 80-82.

59. Pt. II, Introduction, p. 86.

60. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 88.

=33=, 61. Pt. I, ch. 3, fifth opinion, p. 68.

62. Pt. II, ch. 2, p. 89.

=34=, 63. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 91-93.

64. See Graf, Die Philosophie und Gotteslehre des Jahj[=a] ibn `Ad[=i] und späteren Autoren, Münster, 1910, p. 32, note, p. 52.

=35=, 65. III, ch. 10, p. 122; V, ch. 8, p. 147; VII, ch. 2, p. 165.

66. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-102.

=37=, 67. VI, chs. 1-4, pp. 148-156.

=38=, 68. III chs. 1-3, pp. 104-110.

=40=, 69. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 110-113.

70. Ch. 6, pp. 113-114.

71. Chs. 7-9, pp. 114-121.

=41=, 72. IV, pp. 124-136.

=42=, 73. V, chs. 1-3, pp. 136-140.

=43=, 74. IX, chs. 1-4, pp. 185-190.

=44=, 75. VI, ch. 8, pp. 160-162.

=45=, 76. VII, chs. 1-9, pp. 162-174.

77. VIII, pp. 175-185.

78. IX, chs. 5-11, pp. 190-197.

=46=, 79. X, pp. 197-215.

=48=, 80. The following sketch is based upon Frankl, Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10ten Jahrhundert, Wien, 1872.

=55=, 81. The following sketch is based upon Schreiner, Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900.

=60=, 82. [Hebrew: Igrot Harambam] (Letters of Maimonides), ed. Amsterdam, p. 14b.

=61=, 83. See Munk, Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris, 1859, p. 291 ff; Guttmann, Die Scholastik des Dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, Breslau, 1902, pp. 60-85. _Id._, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn Gabirol, Göttingen, 1889, p. 54 ff. This last work and that of Munk represent the best exposition and criticism of Gabirol's philosophy and of his sources and influences.

=62=, 84. Cf. Baeumker, Avencebrolis Fons Vitæ, Münister, 1892-95, Prolegomena.

=63=, 85. Jourdain, A., Recherches Critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions Latines d' Aristote, 2 ed. Paris, 1843, p. 197 note.

86. Munk, Mélanges, etc. (see note 83), contains the Hebrew extracts of Falaquera. The Latin translation was published by Clemens Baeumker in the Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. I, pts. 2-4 (cf. above note 84). See also Seyerlen in Theologische Jahrbücher, edited by Zeller, XV and XVI.

=64=, 87. Cf. Munk, Le Guide des Égarés, II, p. 25, note 1, end.

88. See Kaufmann, Studien über Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899.

89. Baeumker, Fons Vitæ, V, p. 313, 6.

=65=, 90. F. V. V, 333-335, Falaquera in Munk's Mélanges, V, §§ 67-69.

91. F. V. IV, 8 ff., Falaquera IV, § 1.

92. F. V. V, 296, 10.

93. F. V. IV, 243, 10.

94. F. V. III, p. 196, 5 ff., Falaq. III, § 10.

95. F. V. III, 208, 15; Falaq. III, § 44.

=67=, 96. F. V. III, 175, 10 ff.; Falaq. III § 27 ff.

97. F. V. IV, 211, 9 ff., 213, 17 ff., 217, II ff., 218, 18; Falaq. IV, §§ 1-4 and ff.

98. F. V. V, 258, 19; 259, 1; 268, 8, 14, 15; 322, 12; Falaq. V, § 55.

=68=, 99. F. V. V, 306, 7 ff.; Falaq. V, § 34 ff.

100. F. V. V, 330, 15 ff.; Falaq. V, § 64 ff.

101. F. V. V, 326, 3 ff.; Falaq. V, § 60 ff.

=70=, 102. F. V. III, 204, 13 ff.; Falaq. III, § 37.

=71=, 103. S. Wise, "Improvement of the Moral Qualities," New York, 1901. (Columbia University Oriental Studies, vol. 1.)

=72=, 104. F. V. I, 4, 24 ff.; Falaq. I, § 2.

=78=, 105. See Munk, Mélanges, 166 ff.

=80=, 106. Yahuda, Prolegomena zu einer erstmaligen Herausgabe des Kit[=a]b Al-Hid[=a]ja `Il[=a] Far[=a]`id Al-Qul[=u]b, Frankfurt a. M., 1904, 12 ff.; _id._, Al-Hidaja `Il[=a] Faraid Al-Qul[=u]b des Bachja ibn Joseph ibn Paq[=u]da, Leyden, 1912, 63 f.

107. Neumark, Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, I, Berlin, 1907, 485-493.

=81=, 108. In his commentary on Deut. 32, 39. Cf. Yahuda, Prolegomena, p. 12, note 2, where 35 should be corrected to 39.

109. Yahuda, Al-Hidaja, etc., p. 97.

=85=, 110. [Hebrew: Chovat Halevavot] (Duties of the Hearts) ed. Warsaw, 1875, Introduction, pp. 9-28.

=86=, 111. Ibid., Introduction, 28-37.

112. Yahuda, Al-Hid[=a]ja, pp. 53-112.

=88=, 113. Duties of the Hearts, I, chs. 1-6, pp. 41-58.

=89=, 114. Duties, I, ch. 6, pp. 57-8.

=92=, 115. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 58-69.

=93=, 116. Ch. 8, pp. 69-72.

117. Ch. 9, pp. 72-76.

=95=, 118. Ch. 10, pp. 76-84.

=96=, 119. Guide of the Perplexed I, ch. 53.

120. Duties, ch. 1, p. 44.

121. Ibid., ch. 10, end, p. 92 f.

=97=, 122. Duties, II, pp. 95-137.

=99=, 123. III, pp. 138-197.

=101=, 124. IV, pp. 198-256.

125. Duties, 2nd volume, part V, pp. 3-35.

=102=, 126. VI, pp. 36-58.

=103=, 127. VII, pp. 58-82.

=104=, 128. VIII, pp. 82-126.

=105=, 129. IX, pp. 126-150.

130. X, pp. 151-168.

=106=, 131. Broydé, Les Reflexions sur l'âme par Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakouda, Paris, 1896; Hebrew title, [Hebrew: Sefer Torot Hanefesh].

132. Goldziher, Kit[=a]b Ma`[=a]n[=i] al-Nafs, Berlin, 1907.

133. See Guttmann in "Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums," XLI (1897), 241 ff.

=107=, 134. Arabic text, p. 41, 12 and 46, 2; Hebrew, p. 55, 1 and 61, 5.

135. Ch. 2, p. 4, 29 (Heb. p. 5, last line).

136. Ibid., p. 6, 1 (Heb. p. 7, 3).

137. Ibid., p. 5, 16 f. (Heb. 6, 16 f.).

138. Ibid., ch. 9, p. 34, 13 ff. (Heb. p. 44, 10).

139. Ch. 2, p. 6, 6 ff. (Heb. p. 7, 8 f.).

140. Ch. 12, p. 42, 23 (Heb. p. 56, 23).

=108=, 141. Chs. 1-2.

=111=, 142. Chs. 16-17.

143. Chs. 6 and 11-12.

=112=, 144. Ch. 2.

145. Ch. 9.

=113=, 146. Ch. 7.

147. Chs. 19 and 21.

=114=, 148. [Hebrew: Sefer Higayon Hanefesh], edited by Freimann, Leipzig, 1860. German title, Sefer Hegjon ha-Nefesch.

=115=, 149. p. 2a.

150. Ibid., also 4b.

151. See, however, below, p. 119.

152. p. 2b.

=116=, 153. p. 1.

=117=, 154. pp. 1-2.

=118=, 155. pp. 4b-5a.

156. pp. 2b-4a.

=122=, 157. pp. 5b-8a.

158. p. 8b ff.

=123= 159. p. 11a.

160. pp. 10-12.

=124=, 161. p. 30b ff.

=125=,162. See Doctor, Die Philosophie des Joseph ibn Zaddik, Münster, 1895, pp. 1-3; Horovitz, Der Mikrokosmos des Joseph Ibn Saddik, Breslau, 1903, I-II.

163. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, XIII, ff.

164. Letters of Maimonides, ed. Amsterdam, 14b.

=126=, 165. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, 7, 24-8, 2.

=127=, 166. Ibid., 44-46; 53-54; cf. below, p. 145.

167. Ibid., p. 37, 2 ff.; cf. below, p. 138.

=129=, 168. pp. 1-2.

=130=, 169. pp. 3-6.

=133=, 170. pp. 7-19.

=134=, 171. pp. 19-25.

=137=, 172. pp. 25-33.

=141=, 173. pp. 33-43.

=142=, 174. pp. 43-47.

=145=, 175. pp. 47-57

=146=, 176. pp. 57-58.

=149=, 177. pp. 59-79.

=150=, 178. Al-Chazari, I, 67, ed. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1887, p. 29, 24.

179. Ibid., p. 29, 19-20.

180. I, 63; II, 66; pp. 29 and 125.

=151=, 181. See Kaufmann, Jehuda Halewi in "Gesammelte Schriften," Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. 2, pp. 99-151.

=152=, 182. Al-Chazari IV, 13, 15; p. 253, 18 ff., 257, 6 ff.

=153=, 183. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters, Gotha, 1877, pp. 119-140.

=157=, 184. Al-Chazari I, 1-67, pp. 1-29.

=158=, 185. Ibid., 70 ff., p. 31 ff.

=159=, 186. II, 6; p. 75, 22 ff.

187. IX, 13; p. 253, 18 ff.

=160=, 188. IV, 3; p. 229, 10 ff.

189, Ibid., 15 ff.; p. 257, 6 ff.

=161=, 190. II, 2-4; pp. 71-75.

=163=, 191. I, 87 ff.; p. 39 ff.

=164=, 192. I, 99 ff.; p. 53 ff.

193. II, 10 ff.; p. 77 ff.

194. Ibid., 36 ff.; p. 103 ff.

=165=, 195. Ibid., 68 f.; p. 125 f.

=167=, 196. IV, 3 ff.; p. 237, 9 ff.

=168=, 197. II, 26, p. 95; 48, p. 107 f.

=169=, 198. Ibid., 50, p. 109, 24 f.; III, 1 ff., p. 141 ff.

=170=, 199. I, 109 ff.; p. 59 ff.

=173=, 200. V, 20 ff., p. 337 ff.

201. IV, 25, p. 267 ff.

202. Ibid., 27, p. 283 f.

=174=, 203. Ibid., 29 ff., p. 285 ff.

=175=, 204. See above, p. 8.

205. Zeitschrift der ~deutschen~ morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XXIX (1875), pp. 335-418.

=177=, 206. V, 1 ff., p. 295 ff.

=179=, 207. IV, 25, p. 281, 24 ff.

=181=, 208. V, 12, p. 311 ff.

=182=, 209. Ibid., 14, p. 323 ff.

=183=, 210. Ibid., 16 ff., p. 331 ff.

211. Ibid., 22 ff., p. 357 ff.

=184=, 212. Quoted by Bacher in Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Ibn Ezra, Abraham.

213. Published by Dukes in "Zion," II, Frankfurt a. M., 1842, pp. 117-123, 134-137, 157-159, 175. Cf. also Literaturblatt des Orients, X, 748, where Dukes publishes a brief passage from the "Arugat Habosem," not found in "Zion." He derived it from a different manuscript.

=187=, 214. Jesod Mora, published with German translation by M. Creizenach, Frankfurt a. M., and Leipzig, 1840. Hebrew title [Hebrew: Yisod Mora]. Sefer Ha-Schem, ed. Lippmann, 1834. Cf., Bacher, Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v.

=189=, 215. [Hebrew: More Nevochey Hazman], Warsaw, 1894, ch. 17 ([Hebrew: Chochmat Hamisken]), pp. 266 ff.

216. Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Esra's, in "Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums," 42 and 43 (1898 and 1899).

=192=, 217. Ibid., 42 (1898), pp. 454-455.

=193=, 218. Commentary on Exod. 33, 21, towards the end of the long excursus.

=195=, 219. Commentary on Exod. 20, 2.

220. Introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes.

=197=, 221. Emunah Ramah (Heb. title [Hebrew: Emunah Ramah]), published with German translation by Simson Weil, Frankfurt a. M., 1852, p. 2 (Heb.).

222. Em. Ram., p. 83.

=198=, 223. See note 221.

224. Em. Ram., 2-3.

225. See note 221.

=199=, 226. See Horovitz, Ueber den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam, Breslau, 1909.

=200=, 227. But see below, p. 354, l. 31.

=202=, 228. Em. Ram., p. 1 ff.

=203=, 229. Ibid., 4.

=204=, 230. Al Gazali. Cf. Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud aus Toledo, Göttingen, 1879, p. 117, note.

=205=, 231. Em. Ram., 44-46.

232. Ibid., 4-8.

=207=, 233. Ibid., 9-13.

=208=, 234. Ibid., 13-15.

=209=, 235. Ibid., 15-20.

=216=, 236. Em. Ram., 20-41.

237. Ibid., 41-43.

=220=, 238. Em. Ram., 44-51.

=221=, 239. Ibid., 51-57.

=223=, 240. Ibid., 57-69.

=224=, 241. Ibid., 69-70.

=226=, 242. Ibid., 70-75.

=228=, 243. Ibid., 75-81.

=230=, 244. Ibid., 93-98.

=232=, 245. See Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham Ibn Daud, p. 220, note 2.

=235=, 246. Ibid., 98-104.

=236=, 247. [Hebrew: Be'oor Milot Ha'higayon], Breslau, 1828. For other editions and interesting information concerning this treatise see Steinschneider, Die Hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters, Berlin, 1893, § 251, and Die Arabische Literatur der Juden, Frankfurt a. M., 1902, p. 208, 5.

248. Introduction to the eleventh chapter (ch. Helek) of the treatise Sanhedrin.

=239=, 249. Letters of Maimonides, ed. Amsterdam, pp. 13b-14.

250. The Arabic text was published with a French translation and extremely valuable notes by Solomon Munk, under the title, Le Guide des Égarés, 3 volumes, Paris, 1856-66. English translation by M. Friedländer in 3 vols., London, 1881-1885, re-issued in one volume, with omission of notes, London, 1910. For other translations, editions and commentaries see Kaufmann, "Der 'Führer' Maimûnis in der Weltliteratur," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XI (1898), pp. 335-376, republished in Kaufmann's Gesammelte Schriften ed. Brann, vol. 2, Frankfurt a. M., 1910, pp. 152-189. See also Friedländer's translation, London, 1910, p. XXVII ff.

251. The Arabic text was published with a German translation by M. Wolff under the title, Mûsâ Maimûni's Acht Kapitel, 2nd edition, Leyden, 1903. Hebrew text with English translation by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics, New York, 1912 (Columbia University Oriental Studies, vol. VII).

=240=, 252. Emunah Ramah, p. 81 ff.

=241=, 253. Guide, I, chs. 1, 3-16, 18-30, 37-45, 64-67, 70.

=243=, 254. Ibid., ch. 54.

255. III, 28.

256. I, 55.

=244=, 257. I, 32.

258. Ibid., ch. 33.

=245=, 259. Ch. 34.

260. Ch. 71.

=246=, 261. Ibid.

=247=, 262. Cf., however, above, p. xxv f. (the view that Kalam originated in Judaism).

=248=, 263. Ch. 71.

=249=, 264. The following numbers do not correspond to those of Maimonides.

=252=, 265. Guide, I, 73.

266. Ibid., 74.

=253=, 267. Ibid., 75.

268. Ibid., 76.

269. See below, p. 257.

270. Below, p. 259.

271. Above, p. 218.

272. Below, p. 258, last line, and 260.

=257=, 273. Guide II, Introduction.

=260=, 274. Ibid., ch. 1.

=261=, 275. Ch. 36.

=262=, 276. Ch. 46.

=264=, 277. Ibid., chs. 51-53.

=265=, 278. Chs. 55-58.

279. Ch. 61.

=268=, 280. See Munk, Guide des Égarés II, p. 69, note 1.

281. Guide II, chs. 3-6.

=271=, 282. Chs. 13-18.

=272=, 283. Munk understands the preceding sentence differently. See his edition, vol. II, p. 157, note 2.

=274=, 284. Guide II, chs. 19-25.

=281=, 285. Ibid., chs. 32-48.

286. III, ch. 8.

=282=, 287. "Eight Chapters," ch. 1.

=285=, 288. Ibid., chs. 2-5.

289. Ch. 7.

=288=, 290. Ch. 8.

=289=, 291. Guide III, chs. 10-12.

=290=, 292. Ibid., ch. 16.

=292=, 293. Ibid., chs. 17-18.

=294=, 294. Ibid., chs. 19-21.

295. Ibid., chs. 26 and 31.

=295=, 296. Ibid., ch. 27.

297, Ibid., ch. 50.

=298=, 298. Ibid., chs. 29-50.

=299=, 299. Ibid., ch. 54.

=304=, 300. Ibid., II, ch. 30.

301. Ibid., III, chs. 1-7.

302. See Munk, Le Guide des Égarés, III, p. 8, note.

303. Ibid.

304. Guide III, chs. 22-23.

=305=, 305. See Kaufmann, Der Führer Maimûnis in der Weltliteratur in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie XI (1898) p. 314 f.; reprinted in Kaufmann's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Brann, Frankfurt a. M., 1910, p. 158 f.

306. See Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions Latines d'Aristote, 2nd ed., Paris, 1843. German transl. by Stahr, Halle, 1831.

=305=, 307. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Book VIII, ch. 5, "Nulli nobis quam isti [sc., Platonici] propius accesserunt"; ch. 9, "Platonem de Deo ista sensisse, quae multum congruere veritati nostrae religionis agnoscunt."

=306=, 308. See Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIII^me Siècle, Louvain, 1911, chs. 1-2; Isaac Husik, An Anonymous Medieval Christian Critic of Maimonides, Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, vol. II, Phila. 1911, p. 159 ff.

309. See J. Perles, "Die in einer Münchener Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung des Maimonidischen Führers", in Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, XXIV (1875), p. 9 ff.

=307=, 310. See M. Joel, Verhältniss Albert des Grossen zu Moses Maimonides, Breslau, 1876, in M. Joel, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Breslau, 1876. J. Guttmann, Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Literatur, Göttingen, 1891; id., Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902; id., Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philosophie auf das christliche Abendland, in "Moses ben Maimon," vol. I, Leipzig, 1908.

=308=, 311. See Graetz, History of the Jews, index volume, s. v., "Maimunist Controversy."

=309=, 312. Published by M. L. Bisliches, Pressburg, 1837.

312a. Edited by W. Bacher under the title "Sefer Musar," Berlin, 1910.

313. Published by the "Mekize Nirdamim" Society, Lyck, 1866.

=310=, 314. Published by Munk in Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris, 1859.

315. Published by Bisliches, Pressburg, 1837.

316. See Munk, Mélanges, p. 494, note 1; H. Malter, Shem Tob Palquera, in Jewish Quarterly Review, new series, vol. I, pp. 151-181, 451-501.

317. Published by Werbluner, Josephi Kaspi ... Commentaria hebraica in R. Mosis Maimonides Tractatum Dalalat al Haiirin, Frankfurt a. M., 1848.

318. Edited by Goldenthal, Wien, 1852.

=311=, 319. The English reader will also find a good deal of material in the pages of the Jewish Encyclopedia under the names of the translators and writers above mentioned.

=313=, 320. Guide I, ch. 74, 7th proof, end.

=314=, 321. Published by the "Mekize Nirdamim," Lyck, 1874.

=315=, 322. Tagm. Hanef. 1.

=317=, 323. Ibid., 1b-7b. The definition occurs, p. 7b, ll. 28 ff.

=318=, 324. Ibid., 8a.

=319=, 325. Ibid., 8a-10a.

=322=, 326. Ibid., 10a-13b.

=323=, 327. Ibid., 13b-19b.

=324=, 328. Ibid., 20a-21b.

=326=, 329. Ibid., 21b-24b.

330. Ibid., 24.

=327=, 331. Ibid., 25a-32.

=328=, 331a. See Heimann Auerbach, Albalag und seine Uebersetzung des Makâsid al-Gazzalis, Breslau, 1906, p. vii f.; Guttmann, Die Stellung des Simon ben Zemach Duran in der Geschichte der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie in Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, vol. LVII (1913), p. 184 f.

=328=, 332. See Maywald, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit, Berlin, 1871; Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIII^me Siècle, Louvain, 1911, vol. 1, p. 148 ff.

=329=, 333. First edition, Riva di Trento, 1560; modern edition, Leipzig, 1866. The references in the sequel are to the Leipzig edition.

334. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the "Vetus Logica," Leyden, 1906, p. 11.

335. See Joel, Lewi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862, p. 9f. (in M. Joel, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Breslau, 1876).

=330=, 336. Introduction to Gersonides' commentary on the Pentateuch.

337. Introduction to "Milhamot Adonai," pp. 6-7.

=331=, 338. Milhamot I, ch. 14, p. 91.

339. Ibid., Introduction, p. 8.

=336=, 340. I, chs. 1-4, pp. 12-35.

=337=, 341. Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 35-36.

=339=, 342. Ch. 6, pp. 36-48.

=340=, 343. Ibid., chs. 10-12, pp. 61-88.

=342=, 344. Milhamot II, chs. 1-2, pp. 92-98.

345. Ibid., chs. 3, 5 and 6, pp. 98 f., 104, 111 f.

=344=, 346. Milhamot III, ch. 3, p. 132.

=345=, 347. III, chs. 1-6, pp. 120-150.

=349=, 348. IV, chs. 1-7, pp. 151-187.

=350=, 349. V, 3, ch. 6, p. 264 f.

=351=, 350. Ibid., chs. 4-6, pp. 247-264.

=352=, 351. Ch. 12, pp. 278-285.

=354=, 352. VI, 1, chs. 1-9, pp. 293-328.

353, Ibid., chs. 10-13, pp. 328-353; ch. 15, p. 356 f.

=355=, 354. Ch. 16, pp. 359-361.

=357=, 355. Chs. 17-28, pp. 362-416.

356, VI, 2, ch. 1, p. 419.

=358=, 357. VI, 2, chs. 1-8, pp. 418-441.

=360=, 358. Ibid., chs. 9-12, pp. 441-460.

359. Chs. 13-14, pp. 460-463.

=363=, 360. Published by Delitzsch and Steinschneider, Leipzig, 1841.

=364=, 361. Ez Hayim, p. 4.

=366=, 362. E. H., pp. 3-5.

=367=, 363. p. 15, l. 6 f., also p. 18, l. 10 f.

364. Ch. 4, pp. 12-13, l. 24.

=368=, 365. Ch. 9, pp. 26-27.

=369=, 366. p. 17, l. 16.

367. p. 33.

=372=, 368. Chs. 66-72, pp. 80-89.

369. Ch. 75, pp. 93-96.

=373=, 370. Chs. 76-78, pp. 96-99.

=375=, 371. Chs. 79-81, pp. 100-107.

=376=, 372. Chs. 82-89, pp 107-133.

=377=, 373. Ch. 89, pp. 133-136.

=378=, 374. "Guide" III, 24.

=379=, 375. Ez Hayim, ch. 90, pp. 136-144.

376. "Guide" III, chs. 12, 13, 25 end.

=380=, 377. Ez Hayim, ch. 94, pp. 149-154.

=382=, 378. Chs. 96-100, pp. 160-176.

379. Chs. 101-102, pp. 177-181.

380. Ez Hayim, pp. 116-117.

=383=, 381. Ch. 103, pp. 181-185.

=384=, 382. Chs. 104-105, pp. 185-187.

=385=, 383. Ch. 106, p. 187 ff.; ch. 109, p. 194 ff.

384. Chs. 107-108.

=387=, 385. Chs. 110-112.

=389=, 386. Ed. Ferara, 1556 (no pagination).

=390=, 387. "Or Adonai," Introduction, pp. 6-7 (not numbered).

=391=, 388. Book I, sections 1-2.

389. Ibid., section 3, ch. 2.

390. Ibid., ch. 3.

=392=, 391. Ibid.

392. Ibid., ch. 4.

=393=, 393. Book II, section I.

=395=, 394. Ibid., section 2.

395. Section 3.

396. Section 4.

=398=, 397. Section 5.

398. See M. Joel, "Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren," Breslau, 1866 (in M. Joel, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Breslau, 1876), p. 54 f.

=402=, 399. Or Adonai, II, section 6.

400. Ibid., III, introduction.

=403=, 401. Ibid., section 1.

=404=, 402. Section 3.

=405=, 403. Section 4.

=406=, 403a. Simon ben Zemach Duran (1361-1444). He was a relative of Gersonides, a Rabbinical authority, and the author of a scientific and philosophical work, entitled "Magen Abot." Unlike his more distinguished relative, Simon Duran was opposed to the extreme views adopted by such men as Albalag, Moses of Narbonne or Gersonides himself, and favored a return to the more moderate standpoint of Maimonides. Without laying any claim to originality his work shows wide reading and familiarity with the scientific and philosophic literature of the time. See Guttmann, "Die Stellung des Simon ben Zemach Duran in der Geschichte der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie," in Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, vol. 52 (1908), pp. 641-672, vol. 53 (1909), pp. 46-97, 199-228. From Guttmann's investigations it appears that Albo cannot claim any originality even for the reduction of the fundamental dogmas of Judaism to three. The first part of the "Ikkarim" turns out to be a compilation from Crescas and Duran, and is no more original than the rest of the book. When we consider that though he owes the central point of his contribution to Duran, Albo never mentions him, the charge of plagiarism brought against him is not far from justified. See below, p. 407.

=407=, 404. [Hebrew: Bitul Ikarei Hanotzrim], published by Ephraim Deinard, Carney, N. J., 1904. The work was originally composed in Spanish, and was translated into Hebrew by Joseph Ibn Shemtob.

404a. See also note 403a.

=408=, 405. [Hebrew: Sefer Ha'ikarim], ed. Warsaw, 1877, pp. 13-14.

406. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

=409=, 407. pp. 21-25.

408. In the introduction to his commentary on the eleventh chapter of the Mishnic treatise Sanhedrin (chapter Helek).

=410=, 409. Crescas; cf. above, p. 392.

410. Ikkarim, I, ch. 3, pp. 25-31.

=411=, 411. Chs. 4-7, pp. 31-39.

=412=, 412. Ch. 8, pp. 39-46.

413. Ch. 9, pp. 46-48.

=413=, 414. Chs. 10-11, pp. 48-58.

415. Ch. 12, pp. 58-60.

416. Chs. 13 and 15, pp. 60-61 and 64-68.

=414=, 417. Ch. 14, pp. 61-64.

=415=, 418. Ch. 17, pp. 7-76.

419. Ch. 18, pp. 76-78.

=416=, 420. Ch. 23, pp. 84-86.

=418=, 421. Ch. 24, pp. 87-90.

422, Ch. 25, pp. 90-92.

=419=, 423. Ch. 26, p. 93.

424. Book II, chs. 4-5, pp. 107-114.

425. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 117-118.

=420=, 426. Chs. 8-10, pp. 118-125.

427. Chs. 11-13, pp. 125-140.

428. Ch. 12, pp. 129-133.

=421=, 429. Book III, chs. 1-5, pp. 197-214.

430. Chs. 6-7, pp. 214-218.

=423=, 431. Chs. 8-11, pp. 218-228.

=424=, 432. Chs. 13-20, pp. 229-246.

433. Book IV, chs. 1-6, pp. 279-294.

=425=, 434. Chs. 7-15, pp. 294-313.

=427=, 435. Chs. 29-35, pp. 338-356.

=429=, 436. See Guttmann "Die Familie Schemtob in ihren Beziehungen zur Philosophie," Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, vol. 57 (1913), p. 177 ff.

437. See Guttmann as in preceding note.

438. See preceding note.

=430=, 439. See note 436.

440. See Jewish Encyclopedia s. v.

441. J. E. s. v.

=431=, 442. See Zimmels, "Leo Hebraeus, ein jüdischer Philosoph der Renaissance," Leipzig, 1886; Appel, "Leone Medigos Lehre vom Weltall und ihr Verhältniss zu griechischen und zeitgenössischen Anschauungen," in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. XX, pp. 387-400, 496-520; Munk, Mélanges, pp. 522-528.

443. Husik, "Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the Vetus Logica," Leyden, 1906.

444. Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v.

LIST OF BIBLICAL AND RABBINIC QUOTATIONS

BIBLE

GENESIS: 1, 1, p. 110; 1, 2, p. 118; 1, 3, p. 120; 1, 6, p. 118; 1, 9, p. 121; 1, 11, p. 121; 1, 21, p. 121; 1, 25, p. 121; 1, 26, pp. 121, 268; 1, 27, pp. 94, 121; 1, 28, p. 121; 2, 7, p. 121, 214; 2, 19, p. 121; 6, 6, p. 227; 8, 21, p. 102; 11, 7, p. 268; 14, 22, p. 369; ch. 15, p. 280; 15, 4, p. 280; 15, 12 ff., p. 225; 18, 10, p. 340; 27, 34-41, p. 74; 28, 13, p. 94; 28, 20, p. 105; 36, 31, p. 295.

EXODUS: 2, 13, p. 232; 2, 17, p. 232; 3, 14, p. 95; 5, 2, p. 160; 7, 3, pp. xiv, 42; 9, 12, p. 74; 15, 26, p. 403; 20, 2, pp. 194, 233; 20, 11-12, p. 233; 20, 17, p. 83; 20, 35, p. 409; 22, 26, p. 74; 23, 21, p. 109; 24, 10, p. 167; 33, 11, p. 381; 33, 13, p. 243; 33, 23, p. 37; 34, 6, p. 233.

LEVITICUS: 19, 17, p. 83; 19, 18, p. 83.

NUMBERS: 10, 8, p. 227; 12, 8, p. 167; 15, 39, p. 83; 23, 10, p. 170.

DEUTERONOMY: 2, 30, p. xiv; 4, 15, pp. 35, 95; 4, 39, pp. 84, 115, 220; 6, 4, p. 74; 13, 1, pp. 382, 423; 15, 7, p. 83; 17, 15, p. 295; 30, 15, p. 286; 30, 19, pp. xiv, 41, 286; 31, 17, p. 348; 33, 4, p. 41; 34, 10, p. 416.

JOSHUA: ch. 10, p. 360.

I. SAMUEL: 2, 6, p. 386; 19, 20, p. 226.

II. SAMUEL: 23, 2, p. 34.

I. KINGS: 22, 20, p. xiv.

ISAIAH: 1, 14, p. 227; 1, 11-17, p. 82; 5, 20, p. 374; 6, 1, 8, p. 280; 11, 1-4, p. 112; 26, 19, p. 386; 40, 12, p. 208; 40, 26, p. 369; 43, 1, p. 122; 43, 7, p. 121; 45, 18, p. 104; 59, 19, p. 109.

JEREMIAH: 7, 22, p. 234; 9, 22-23, pp. 124, 148, 205, 299; 18, 1 ff., p. 207; 31, 33, p. 141.

EZEKIEL: 8, 9, p. 109.

HOSEA: 4, 6, p. 348; 6, 3, p. 141.

AMOS: 3, 2, p. 164; 5, 6, p. 141.

MICAH: 6, 8, p. 168.

ZEPHANIAH: 2, 3, p. 148.

MALACHI: 1, 9, p. 41.

PSALMS: 19, p. 216; 19, 2, p. 193; 19, 7, p. 193; 19, 8, p. 411; 19, 9-10, p. 412; 73, 11-13, p. 293; 94, 9, p. 293; 136, 6, p. 176; 139, p. 205; 145, 9, p. 376.

PROVERBS: 8, 22, p. 109; 25, 16, p. 244; 30, 4, p. 208.

JOB: 10, 10, p. 378; 19, 26, p. 116; 23, 13, p. xxvi; ch. 32, p. 349; 38, 36-37, p. 208.

ECCLESIASTES: 1, 14, p. 47; 2, 3, p. 47.

DANIEL: 7, 1, p. 225; 10, 8, p. 278; 10, 17, p. 381; 12, 2, p. 404.

NEHEMIAH: 9, 5, p. 95.

MISHNA AND TALMUD

BERAKOT (Bab. Tal.): 17 a, p. 44; 33 b, p. xxvi, note 14, p. 41.

BERAKOT (Jer. Tal.): I, p. 83.

PESAKIM: 54 a, p. xxvi, note 17.

MEGILLAH: 25 b, p. xxvi, note 15.

HAGIGAH: ch. 2, p. 244; 11 b, p. xvi, notes 2 and 3.

SANHEDRIN: 38 b, p. 268; 99 a, p. 408; 106 b, p. 83.

MAKKOT: 23 b, p. 416.

ABOT: ch. 4, p. 44.

INDEX

Aaron ben Elijah, xli, 362-387; relation to Maimonides, 363 f.; to the Mu`tazila, 364; reason and faith, 364 f.; physics, 366 ff.; defends atomic theory, 367 f.; creation, ibid.; existence of God, 368 f.; unity, ibid.; incorporeality, ibid.; attributes, 369 f.; will of God, 372; problem of evil, 373 f., 376 f.; Providence, 375 f.; reward and punishment, 379, 383; purpose of the world and of man, 379 f.; prophecy, 380 f.; immutability of the Law, 382; reason of the commandments, ibid.; immortality, 384; resurrection, 385 f.

Aaron ben Joseph, 363

Abarbanel, Don Isaac, 304, 312, 328, 430

Abarbanel, Judah Leo, 431

Abd Al Rahman III, 59

Abélard, 305

Abraham bar Hiyya, xlvi, 114-124; standpoint, 115; physics, 116 f.; matter, ibid.; form, 117 ff.; intellect, soul and nature, 119; ethics, 119, 122 f.; reward and punishment, 119, 122 ff.; immortality, 120 f.; problem of evil, 123 f., 128, 139, 175, 309, 435

Æsculapius, 155

Afer, Constantinus, 1

Aher, 197

Akiba, Rabbi, xxvi

Al-Ashari, xxiii

Albalag, Isaac, 328, 429, 430, 447, note 403a

Albalia, Baruh, 151

Al Basir, Joseph, xxv, xlvii, 48-55; priority of reason, 48; atomic theory, 49; existence of God, 49 f.; creation, ibid.; attributes, 50; divine will, ibid.; eternity, 51; incorporeality, unity, simplicity, ibid, f.; God's word, 52; ethics, ibid, f.; problem of evil, 54; freedom, 54 f.; and foreknowledge, ibid.; reward and punishment, 55, 56, 57, 81, 126, 127, 128, 141, 146, 200, 246, 363, 434

Albertus Magnus, 1, 200, 306, 312, 313, 323

Albo, Joseph, I, 406-427; standpoint, 406 ff.; purpose of his work, 408; principles of religion, ibid.; criticism of Maimonides's 13 articles, 409 ff.; Albo's own view, 410 f.; divine law distinguished from natural and conventional, 408 ff.; freedom, a principle, 412; creation, 413, 415; existence of God, 419 f.; attributes, 420; angels, ibid.; revelation, 420 f.; prophecy, 421; immutability of the Law, 423; God's knowledge, 424; and human freedom, ibid.; Providence, 425; reward and punishment, 425 f.; 428, 430, 436, 447, note 403a

Alexander of Aphrodisias, xviii, 7, 60, 290, 313, 321, 332, 334, 335, 336

Alexander the Great, xvii

Alexander of Hales, 306

Alfadhil, 239

Alfarabi, xx, xxi, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 26, 60, 177, 178, 198, 199, 218, 223, 252, 253, 276, 281, 302, 312, 313, 362, 391, 392

Alfasi, 151

Algazali, xxxix, 80, 152, 153, 389, 392, 420, 443, note 230

Ali, 86

Al-Kirkisani, Joseph Ha-Maor, 363

Almohades, 238

Alphonso VI, 151

Al-Mansur, 1

Almoravid, 151

Anatoli, Jacob, 302, 309

Angels, xlvi; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190 f.; in Ibn Daud, 221 f.; in Maimonides, 266 f.; in Albo, 420

Anthropomorphism, xxii, xxvi, xlv, 35, 95, 186, 260 f.

Appel, 448, note 442

Aquinas, Thomas, 1, 61, 63, 200, 207, 306, 307, 312, 313, 323, 331, 332, 406

Arama, Isaac, 430

Archimedes, xviii

Aristotelians, xl, 150, 165, 246, 364, 365, 366, 368, 428

Aristotle, xvi, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxix ff., xxxvii, xxxix, xl, xli, xlii, xlv, xlvi, 7, 8, 9, 13, 20, 26, 60, 62, 64, 72, 89, 92, 107, 111, 126, 132, 138, 139, 155, 157, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 199, 200, 206, 207, 210, 213, 216, 217, 218, 236, 240, 247, 252, 253, 254, 256, 258, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 290, 291, 299, 300, 303, 305, 306, 307, 309, 312, 313, 315, 316, 321, 329, 331, 332, 333, 334, 338, 346, 347, 350, 352, 353, 354, 366, 367, 375, 378, 388, 389, 390, 395, 402, 408, 412, 425, 429, 430, 431

"Arugat Habosem," 184

Ashariya, xxiii, xxvii, xlvii, 23, 246, 251, 291, 362, 365, 372, 378, 379

Atomic theory, in the Kalam, xxii, 249 f.; in Saadia, 25; in Al Basir, 49; in Jeshua ben Judah, 56; in Aaron ben Elijah, 367 f.

Attributes, doctrine of, in the Kalam, xxiii, xxvii, xl, xliv; in Saadia, xliv, 33 f.; in Mukammas, 18 ff.; in Al Basir, 50; in Bahya, 93 f.; in Ibn Zaddik, 145 f.; in Judah Halevi, 161 ff.; in Ibn Daud, 220 f.; in Maimonides, xlv, 262 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, xlv, 344 f., 351 f.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 369 f.; in Crescas, 391 f.; in Albo, 420

Auerbach, Heimann, 445, note 331a

Augustine, xli, 51, 305, 445, note 307

Averroes (Ibn Roshd), xx, xxi, xxxix, xli, xlvi, xlvii, 7, 60, 62, 125, 177, 199, 306, 309, 310, 312, 313, 318, 321, 322, 323, 329, 332, 334, 335, 336, 362, 392, 431

Avicebron, see Gabirol, Solomon Ibn

Avicenna (Ibn Sina), xx, xxi, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 26, 60, 62, 107, 108, 175, 177, 178, 179, 198, 199, 207, 210, 211, 213, 218, 223, 224, 253, 276, 281, 302, 312, 313, 362, 391, 392, 420

Bacher, W., 437, 443, notes 212 and 214; 445, note 312a

Back, Samuel, 436

Baeumker, Clemens, 440, note 84; 441, notes 86 and 89

Bahya, Ibn Pakuda, xix, xxviii, xxxix, xlii, 1, 80-105; duties of the limbs and duties of the heart, 82 f.; sources of knowledge, 83; creation, 86 ff.; unity, 89 f.; attributes, 93 f.; study of nature, 96 f.; gratitude to God, 97 f.; submission to God, 98; freedom, ibid.; the laws, 98 f.; trust in God, 99 f.; "unity of conduct," 101 f.; humility, ibid.; repentance, 102; self-examination, 103; temperance, 104; asceticism, ibid.; love of God, 105; 106, 126, 128, 146, 147, 162, 167, 168, 195, 200, 201, 217, 241, 246, 252, 309, 362, 428, 434

Baradæus, Jacob, 34

Bardenhewer, 439, note 7

Bardesanes, 375

Becker, C. H., xxvi, xxvii

Beer, 433

Bernfeld, Simon, viii, 433

Bisliches, M. L., 445, notes 312 and 315

Bloch, Philipp, 436

Brahmins, 380

Brethren of Purity, xxxix, 60, 107, 125, 126, 128, 139, 187, 199

Broydé, Isaac, 106, 441, note 131

Cicero, 431

Clement VI, Pope, 329

Clement of Alexandria, 302

Chazars, 153

Crawford, J. P. W., 436

Creation, in Kalam, xxii, xlii, 24, 247, 252; in Saadia, xlii, 24; in Israeli, 5 ff.; in Al Basir, 49 f.; in Jeshua ben Judah, 56; in Gabirol, 68; in Bahya, xlii, 86 ff.; in Pseudo Bahya, 110; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 116 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, xlii, 143; in Judah Halevi, 157; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190; in Maimonides, 269 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 352 f.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 367 f.; in Albo, 413, 415

Creed, articles of, l; in Maimonides, 409 f.; in Crescas, 392 ff.; in Albo, 410 f.

Creizenach, M., 443, note 214

Crescas, Hasdai, xv, xix, xxvii, xxxix, xl, xlii, xlix, l, 173, 200, 312, 388-405; standpoint, 389; existence of God, 389 f.; unity, 391 f.; attributes, ibid.; fundamental dogmas of Judaism, 392 ff.; God's knowledge, 392 f.; Providence, 393 f.; problem of evil, 394; prophecy, 395; freedom, 396 f.; influence on Spinoza, 398 f.; purpose of the Law, 399 f.; immortality, 400; creation, 402; criticism of Maimonides's 13 articles of the creed, 402, 404; reward and punishment, 403 f.; resurrection, 404 f., 406, 407, 408, 409, 414, 416, 419, 420, 421, 424, 426, 428, 430, 436, 447, notes 403a and 409

"Cusari," see "Kusari"

Daud, Abraham Ibn, xix, xx, xxvii, xxxix, xlii, xliii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, xlix, 61, 62, 63, 71, 79, 125, 166, 197-235; standpoint, 197 f.; Ibn Daud neglected, 201; purpose of his book, 201 f.; duty to study philosophy, 202; relative value of the sciences, 203 f.; categories, 205; physics, 205 ff.; matter and form, ibid.; motion, 207; infinity, 208; psychology, 209 ff.; rational soul, 212 ff.; the three kinds of intellect, 214; immortality, 215; metempsychosis, 215 f.; the heavenly spheres, 216; existence of God, 217 ff.; incorporeality, 217; unity, 219 f.; attributes, 220 f.; angels, 221 f.; active intellect, 222; emanation of Intelligences, 223; tradition, 223 f.; prophecy, 224 f.; abrogation of the Law, 226 f.; freedom, 201 f., 229 ff.; problem of evil, 228 f.; and foreknowledge, 229 f.; ethics, 231 ff.; virtues, 232; reason of commandments, 233 f., 237, 240, 241, 246, 248, 253, 254, 257, 266, 267, 276, 281, 302, 307, 309, 317, 332, 350, 362, 366, 388, 428, 435

De Boer, 439, note 5

"Definitions, Book of," 2, 4, 60

Deinard, E., 447, note 404

Delitzsch, 446, note 360

Delmedigo, Elijah, 431

Delmedigo, Joseph Solomon, 431

Democritus, xxii, 3

Dieterici, 439, note 6

Doctor, Max, 435, 442, note 162

Dominicus Gundissalinus, 61, 63

Dukes, 443, note 213

Dunash ben Labrat, 59

Duns Scotus, 61, 63, 200, 307

Duran, Simon, 406, 447, note 403a

"Duties of the Hearts," 80, 81

Duval, 439, note 5

"Eight Chapters," 239

Eisler, Moritz, 433

"Elements, Book of," 2, 3, 4, 10, 60

Elias of Nisibis, 34

Elisha ben Abuya, 197

Empedocles, 60, 61, 64, 126, 127, 145, 179, 184

"Emunah Ramah," 198

"Emunot ve-Deot," 24

Engelkemper, D. J., 434

Entelechy, xxxv, 209

Ephodi, 328

Epicurus, 290, 367

Eriugena, 200

Ethics, in Jewish Philosophy, xlvii f.; in Saadia, 46 f.; in Al Basir, 52 f.; in Jeshua ben Judah, 57; in Gabirol, 71 ff.; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, 148; in Judah Halevi, 168; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 195; in Ibn Daud, 228 ff., 231 ff.; in Maimonides, 281 ff.; in Hillel ben Samuel, 325. See also "Virtue."

Euclid, xviii, 90

Evil, Problem of, in Al Basir, 54; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 123 f.; in Ibn Zaddik, 148; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 195; in Ibn Daud, 228 f.; in Maimonides, 288 f.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 373 f.; in Crescas, 394

Exegesis, Biblical, xvi, xxxvii; in Saadia, 35; in Gabirol, 78 f.; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 187 f.; in Maimonides, 302 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 357 f., 437

"Ez Hayim," 363

Ezekiel, Vision of divine chariot, xvii, 303

Falaquera, Shem Tob, 61, 63, 64, 309, 328, 441, note 86

"Fons Vitæ," 60, 61, 72, 80, etc.

"Fountain of Life," see "Fons Vitæ"

Frankl, P. F., 434, 440, note 80

Frankl-Grün, Ad., 435

Freedom of the Will, xiv, xlvii; in Saadia, 41 f.; in Al Basir, 54 f.; in Bahya, 98; in Judah Halevi, xlviii, 171 ff.; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 193; in Ibn Daud, xlviii, 229 f.; in Maimonides, xlviii, 285 ff.; in Crescas, xlviii, 396 ff.; in Albo, 412, 424

Freimann, 442, note 148

Fried, S., 439, note 30; 440, note 34

Friedländer, M., 444, note 250

Gabirol, Solomon Ibn, xix, xxxix, xlvi, 59-79; fate of G. in Jewish Literature, 60 f.; tendency of his work, 63 f.; G. a Neo-Platonist, 64; his doctrine, 64 ff.; emanation, 65; matter in spiritual substances, 65, 67; man typical of the universe, 65; Intelligence, Soul, Nature, 66; matter, 66 f.; creation, 68; will, 68 f., 70; mystic knowledge, 69 f.; ethics, 71 ff.; the virtues, 72 f.; the "Royal Crown" (Keter Malkut), 75 f.; Biblical exegesis, 78 f.; influence on Jewish Philosophy, 79; on Kabbala, ibid., 80, 81, 89, 91, 107, 126, 127, 131, 151, 184, 185, 187, 188, 198, 200, 206, 237, 246, 307, 309, 328, 428, 434

Galen, xviii, 2, 3, 72, 209, 252

Genesis, creation story, xvii, xxix, 303

Gersonides, see Levi ben Gerson

Ginzberg, L., 439, note 13

God, in Aristotle, xxxiii; existence of G. in Kalam, xlii, 24, 247; in Saadia, xlii, 28 ff.; in Al Basir, 49 f.; in Jeshua ben Judah, 57; in Bahya, xlii, 86 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, xlii, 143; in Ibn Daud, xlii f., 217 ff.; in Maimonides, xliii, 248, 257 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 350 f.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.; in Crescas, 389 ff.; in Albo, 419 f.

Goldenthal, 445, note 318

Goldziher, Ignaz, 106, 433, 439, notes 10 and 23; 442, note 132

Gorfinkle, Joseph I., 444, note 251

Graetz, H., 445, note 311

Graf, 440, note 64

Gugenheimer, 435

"Guide of the Perplexed," 239

Guttmann, Jacob, 434, 435, 436, 439, note 27; 440, notes 33, 41 and 83; 442, note 133; 443, notes 230 and 245; 445, notes 310 and 331a; 447, notes 403a, 436 and 437

Guttmann, Julius, 435

Halevi, Judah, xix, xxxix, xl, xlv, xlvi, xlviii, xlix, 125, 150-183; his standpoint, 150, 152, 157 f.; his life, 151 f.; philosophy and religion, 152; influence of Algazali, 152 f.; the "Kusari," 153 ff.; the "philosopher's" creed, 154 f.; the Christian's, 155 f.; the Mohammedan's, 156; the Jew's, 156 ff.; creation, 157; existence of God, 158; will, 159; motives of philosopher and believer, 159 f.; meaning of the name of "Jhvh," 159 f., 165; of "Elohim," 160, 165; mysticism in H., 160; attributes, 161 ff.; incorporeality, 162; superiority of Israel, 162 f.; need of revelation, 163; superiority of Palestine, 164; Israel the heart among the nations, 164; superiority of the Hebrew language, 164 f.; prophecy, 165 f.; the active Intellect, 165 f.; the ceremonial law, 167 f.; ethics, 168 f.; immortality, 169 f., 181 f.; future world and reward and punishment, 170; freedom, 171 ff.; and foreknowledge, 172 f.; interpretation of "Sefer Yezirah," 173 f.; the Rabbis knew the sciences, 174; exposition of the current philosophy, 174 ff.; H. understands Aristotle's definition of the soul, 175; physics, 175 ff.; matter, 175; criticism, 176 f.; emanation of Intelligences, 178; criticism, 178 f.; psychology, 179 f.; criticism, 181 f., 197, 198, 200, 201, 210, 211, 216, 223, 224, 226, 230, 231, 246, 248, 281, 309, 332, 362, 389, 392, 396, 414, 420, 421, 426, 429, 435

Harizi, Judah, 125, 184

Harkavy, Abraham, 17, 433

Hasdai Ibn Shaprut, 59, 153, 308

Hayyuj, 187, 309

Hefez ben Yazliah, 84

"Hegyon ha-Nefesh," 114

Hermes, 60, 155, 184

Hertz, J. H., 434

Hillel ben Samuel, xlvi, 312-327; standpoint, 314; the soul, 314 ff.; definition of soul, 317; active intellect, 317 ff.; reward and punishment, 323 ff.; prophecy, 325; ethics, ibid.; resurrection, 326; interpretation of Rabbinic writings, 326 f., 332

Hippocrates, xviii, 2, 3, 72, 209

Hirschfeld, 440, note 31; 442, note 178

"Hobot ha-Lebabot," see "Duties of the Hearts"

Homonym, 240, 351, 371

Horovitz, S., 433, 442, notes 162, 163 and 165; 443, note 226

Husik, Isaac, 436, 439, note 9; 445, note 308; 446, note 334; 448, note 443

Hypostasis, xxxviii, 6, 91, 115

Ibn Aknin, Joseph, 302

Ibn Badja, 60

Ibn Caspi, Joseph, 302, 310, 329

Ibn Daud (Aven Death), 61

Ibn Daud, Abraham, see Daud, Abraham Ibn

Ibn Ezra, Abraham, xxxix, 79, 80, 81, 114, 184, 187-196; Biblical exegesis, 187 f.; unity of God, 189; incorporeality, ibid.; creation, 190; matter, ibid.; the universe, 190 f.; Intelligences, ibid.; angels, ibid.; soul, 191 f.; reward and punishment, 192; transmigration, 192; freedom, 193; and foreknowledge, ibid.; knowledge of God, 193 f.; prophecy, 194; classification of the laws, 194; problem of evil, 195; ethics, ibid., 200, 246, 309, 310, 429, 435

Ibn Ezra, Moses, xxxix, xlvi, 79, 125, 184-187; man a microcosm, 185; definition of philosophy, 185; unity of God, ibid.; active intellect, 186, 200, 246

Ibn Migash, Joseph, 151

Ibn Janah, 84, 309

Ibn Roshd, see Averroes

Ibn Sina, see Avicenna

Ibn Zaddik, Joseph, xix, xxxix, xlii, xlv, xlvi, xlix, 60, 79, 125-149; standpoint, 125 f.; division of his book, 128; purpose, 129; definition of philosophy, 129; process and sources of knowledge, 129 f.; physics, 130 ff.; matter and form, ibid.; substance, 131; the sphere, 131 f.; the four elements, 132 f.; the human body, 133 f.; the soul, 134 f.; the three souls, ibid.; the emotions, ibid.; life, 136; death, ibid.; sleep and waking, ibid.; the rational soul, 137; definition of soul, 138; intellect, 139; world soul, 140; duty to use the reason, ibid.; criticism of the Kalam, 141 f.; creation, 143; existence of God, ibid.; unity, ibid.; self-sufficiency, 144; will of God, ibid.; attributes, 145 f.; commandments, 147; rational and traditional, ibid.; the virtues, 148; reward and punishment, 148; evil, 148 f.; Messiah, 149, 162, 175, 184, 200, 206, 209; 211, 237, 246, 309, 317, 362, 435

"Ikkarim," 406

Immortality, in Pseudo-Bahya, 112 f.; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 120 f.; in Judah Halevi, 169 f., 181 f,; in Ibn Daud, 215; in Levi ben Gerson, 339 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 384; in Crescas, 400

Incorporeality, in Kalam, xliv, 253; in Saadia, 32; in Al Basir, 51; in Jeshua ben Judah, 57; in Judah Halevi, 162; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 189 f.; in Ibn Daud, 217; in Maimonides, xliv, 257 ff., 260 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.

Infinity, in Kalam, 251 f.; in Saadia, 25, 30; in Bahya, 86, 87; in Ibn Daud, 208; in Maimonides, 251 f., 254, 256 f.; in Crescas, 390

Intellect, active, xli; in Jewish Philosophy, xlvi f.; acquired i., xlvii; active i. in prophecy, xlix, 109; in Ibn Zaddik, 139; in Judah Halevi, 155, 162, 165, 181; in Moses ibn Ezra, 186; in Ibn Daud, 222; in Maimonides, 268, 277; in Hillel ben Samuel, 317 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 337 ff. See also "Intelligence," "Soul"

Intelligence, xlvi; in Israeli, 6 f.; in Gabirol, 65, 66; in Pseudo-Bahya, 109; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190 f.; in Maimonides, 266 f.

Israeli, Isaac, xix, xlvi, xlix, 1-16; Maimonides on I., 1 f.; his works, 2; his sources, ibid.; theory of the elements, 3, 12; definition of philosophy, 4; creation, 5 ff.; Intelligence, 6 f.; Soul, 8 ff.; three kinds of soul, 10 ff.; element and principle, 12 f.; prophecy, 15, 17, 24, 31, 60, 72, 91, 127, 175, 224, 434

Jabariya, xxi, xlvii

Jacob ben Machir, 309, 310

Jacobites, xviii, 34

Jaulus, 437

Jeshua ben Judah, xxv, xlvii, 55-58; priority of reason, 56; atomic theory, ibid.; creation, ibid.; existence of God, 57; incorporeality, ibid.; good and evil, ibid.; 200, 246, 363, 434

Jesus, xxvii, 86, 91

Job, xv, xxvi, 304, 346, 377 f.

Joel, M., 398, 435, 436, 445, note 310; 446, notes 335 and 398; 447, note 398 end

Johannes Hispanus, 61

Joseph ben Shemtob, 429, 430, 447, note 404

Joseph ibn Zaddik, see Ibn Zaddik, Joseph

Jourdain, A., 63, 441, note 85; 445, note 306

Judah ben Barzilai, 17

Judah Hadassi, 363

Judah Halevi, see Halevi, Judah

Judah Messer Leon, 431

Justinian, xvii

Kabbala, 79, 429, 430

Kadariya, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 23

Kalam, xxiv, xxvii, 16, 17, 48, 50, 52, 55, 86, 106, 125, 128, 141 f., 146, 154, 171, 183, 200, 245, 246 ff., 362, 366, 428, 433, 439, note 10

Kalisch, Isidor, 433

Karaites, xiii, xxiv, xxv, xli, xlvii, 23, 24, 48, 55, 59, 108, 125, 126, 146, 154, 174, 183, 200, 245, 246, 362, 363, 364, 365, 370, 373, 377, 378, 428

Kaufmann, David, 152, 153, 433, 434, 435, 436, 441, note 88; 442, note 181; 444, notes 250 and 305

Kellermann, Benzion, 436

"Keter Malkut," see "Royal Crown"

Kindi, Al, xxxix

Klein, Miksa, 434

Knowledge, sources of, xl; in Saadia, 27 f.; in Bahya, 83; in Ibn Zaddik, 129 f.

Koran, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, xxvii, xxix, xliv, 34, 156

Krochmal, Nahman, 189, 435

"Kusari," 153

Lactantius, 431

Landauer, S., 175, 440, note 37

Laws, rational and traditional, 1; in Saadia, 38 f.; in Ibn Zaddik, 147; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 194; in Ibn Daud, 233 f.; in Maimonides, 294 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 382

Lebid-ibn Al-A`sam, xxvi

Leibnitz, 307

Leverrier, 275

Levi ben Gerson, xix, xx, xxxix, xli, xliii, xlvii, xlix, 7, 16, 166, 217, 235, 302, 312, 313, 328-361; standpoint, 329 f.; reason and authority, 330 f.; his style and method, 331; the passive intellect, 332 ff.; active intellect, 337 ff.; problem of knowledge, 338; of definition, 339; immortality, 339 f.; prognostication and prophecy, 340 ff.; and the contingent, ibid.; God's knowledge, 342 ff.; attributes, 344 f., 351 f.; Providence, 346 ff.; existence of God, 350 f.; origin of the world, 352 f.; eternal matter, 355 f.; interpretation of creation story in Genesis, 357; miracles, 358 f., 362, 363, 369, 384, 388, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398, 399, 401, 402, 406, 419, 420, 421, 428, 429, 430, 436, 447, note 403a

Levy, Louis-Germain, 436

"Liber de Causis," xx, 2, 64, 317

Lippmann, 443, note 214

Logos, xxvii, xli, 52, 71, 91

"Ma`amar Yikkawu ha-Mayim," 309

"Maase Bereshit," xvi, 242, 303, 430

"Maase Merkaba," xvi, 242, 303, 430

Maimonides, Moses, xvi, xix, xx, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, xxxix, xli, xlii, xliii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlix, l, 1, 2, 16, 25, 60, 62, 63, 79, 88, 95, 96, 114, 125, 126, 146, 153, 158, 166, 167, 198, 199, 200, 201, 207, 218, 221, 235, 236-311; his life, 238 f.; his _chef d'oeuvre_, 239 f.; his method, 240; his standpoint, 240 ff.; importance of science, 243 f.; difficulty of metaphysics, 244 f.; sketch of Jewish Philosophy, 245 f.; exposition of the Kalam, 246 ff.; propositions of the "philosophers," 254 ff.; existence of God, 257 ff.; unity, ibid.; incorporeality, ibid., 260 ff.; attributes, 262 ff.; meaning of "Jhvh," 265; angels, 266 f.; origin of the world, 269 ff.; emanation of Intelligences, 272 f.; criticism of Aristotle, 271 ff.; psychology, 281 ff.; virtue, 282 ff.; freedom, 285 ff.; and foreknowledge, 287 f.; problem of evil, 288 ff.; God's knowledge, 289 ff.; reason of the commandments, 294 ff.; Bible exegesis, 302 ff.; influence of M., 305 ff.; on Scholasticism, 305-307; on Judaism, 307-311, 312, 313, 314, 317, 323, 325, 329, 332, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 350, 352, 353, 357, 358, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398, 399, 400, 402, 403, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421, 423, 424, 425, 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 435, 447, note 403a

"Malmad Hatalmidim," 309

Malter, H., vii, 445, note 316

Mandonnet, P., 445, note 308; 446, note 332

Manicheans, 375

Matter, rejected by Mutakallimun, xxii; doctrine of, in Aristotle, xxix ff.; in Plotinus, xxxviii; as source of evil, 38; in Gabirol, 66 f.; in Pseudo-Bahya, 109; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 117; in Ibn Zaddik, 130 ff.; in Judah Halevi, 175; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190; in Ibn Daud, 205 f.; in Maimonides, 256, 270; in Levi ben Gerson, 355 f.

Maywald, 446, note 332

"Mekize Nirdamim," 445, notes 313 and 321

"Mekor Hayim," see "Fons Vitæ"

Menahem ben Saruk, 59

Messiah, in Saadia, 45; in Ibn Zaddik, 149; in Crescas, 402, 404; in Albo, 408

Metempsychosis, see Transmigration

"Microcosmus," 60, 125

"Milhamot Adonai," 329

Miracles, in Levi ben Gerson, 358 f.

Mohammed, xxv, 86

Monophysites, xviii, 34

"More Ha-moreh," 310

"More Nebukim," 238

Morgenstern, Ernö, 434

Moses ben Enoch, 59

Moses ben Maimon, see Maimonides

Moses of Narbonne, 309, 310, 328, 430, 447, note 403a

Motion, in Aristotle, xxvi; in Ibn Daud, 207; in Maimonides, 254, 269

Mukammas, David Al, 2, 17-22; definition of science and philosophy, 17 f.; attributes, 18 ff.; unity, 18; reward and punishment, 21 f., 34, 52, 81, 84, 95, 200, 246, 434

Munk, Solomon, 63, 304, 328, 433, 434, 440, note 83; 441, notes 86, 87 and 105; 444, notes 250, 280 and 302; 445, notes 314 and 316; 448, note 442

Münz, J., 436

Mutakallimun, xxi f., xl, xli, xlvii, 9, 11, 24, 25, 26, 48, 81, 88, 96, 106, 125, 126, 127, 128, 139, 142, 145, 149, 158, 182, 183, 199, 240, 246-253, 256, 275, 352, 353, 362, 366 f., 369, 372, 382, 406, 428

Mu`tazila, xxii ff., xxvii, xlvii, 3, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26, 48, 108, 171, 246, 251, 291, 292, 362, 365, 366, 375, 377

Nachmanides, 426, 429

Nature, in Plotinus, xxxviii; in Gabirol, 65, 66; in Pseudo-Bahya, 109; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119

Neo-Platonic, xx, xxviii, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 6, 13, 24, 38, 64, 79, 81, 86, 89, 90, 92, 106, 107, 114, 115, 125, 126, 127, 129, 138, 139, 177, 178, 199, 200, 266, 305, 317, 319

Neo-Platonism, xxix, 17, 64, 70, 79, 91, 114, 150, 187, 200, 266, 288, 317, 428

Neo-Platonists, xl, 31, 64, 91, 106, 184, 199

Neo-Pythagoreans, 188

Nestorians, xviii, 34

Neumark, David, viii, 433, 435, 436, 441, note 107

"Nous," xxxviii, 7, 91

"Olam Katon," see "Microcosmus"

"Or Adonai," 389

Origen, 288, 302

Orschansky, G., 435

Perles, J., 445, note 309

Philo, xvi, xxvii, xxxviii, xli, 23, 91, 95, 188, 240, 266, 268, 288, 302

Philoponus, 247, 353

Philosophy, and religion, xiii; content of Jewish P., xl-l; defined by Israeli, 4; by Ibn Zaddik, 129; by Moses Ibn Ezra, 185

Physics, in Kalam, xxii, xli; in Aristotle, xxx; in Israeli, 3, 5, 12; in Saadia, xli; in Ibn Zaddik, xlii, 130 ff.; in Judah Halevi, 175 ff.; in Ibn Daud, xlii, 205 ff.; in Maimonides, xlii, 254 ff., 269 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 352 f., 355 f.; in Aaron ben Elijah, xli, 366 ff.; in Crescas, xlii, 389

Plato, xxix, xli, xlv, 5, 7, 8, 37, 47, 90, 91, 122, 138, 155, 179, 181, 182, 184, 195, 231, 268, 269, 288, 304, 305, 353, 413, 431

Plato of Tivoli, 114

Plotinus, xx, xxxvii f., xxxix, 6, 64, 65, 91, 107, 115, 126, 139, 178, 431

Pollak, J., 433

Porphyry, 60

Proclus, xx, 3

Prophecy, xlvi, xlix f.; in Israeli, xlix, 15; in Saadia, 40; in Judah Halevi, xlix, 165; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 194; in Ibn Daud, xlix, 224 ff.; in Maimonides, xlix, 276 ff.; in Hillel ben Samuel, 325; in Levi ben Gerson, xlix, 340 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 380 f.; in Crescas, 395; in Albo, 421

Providence, xl; in Maimonides, 290 ff.; in Levi ben Gerson, 346 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 375 f.; in Crescas, 393 f.; in Albo, 425

Pseudo-Bahya, xlvi, xlix, 106-113; standpoint, 106 f.; the soul, 108 ff., 111 ff.; Intelligence, Soul, Nature, 108 f., 110; matter, 109; creation, 110; virtue, 112; immortality, 112 f.; reward and punishment, 113, 122, 126, 139, 148, 317, 434

Ptolemy, xviii, 273, 309

Pythagoras, 60, 179, 184, 185

Pythagoreans, 9

Rashi, 187

Raymond, Bishop of Toledo, 61

Reason, and authority, xiii; r. in Aristotle, xxxvi; active and passive, xxxvi f.; in Plotinus, xxxviii; r. as a source of knowledge, xl; r. and authority in Levi ben Gerson, 330 f. See also "Intellect," "Soul"

Resurrection, l; in Saadia, 44 f.; in Hillel ben Samuel, 326; in Aaron ben Elijah, 385 f.; in Crescas, 404

Reward and Punishment, xlvii, xlviii, l; in Mukammas, 21 f.; in Saadia, 42 f.; in Al Basir, 55; in Pseudo-Bahya, 113; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119 ff.; in Ibn Zaddik, 148; in Judah Halevi, 170; in Abraham Ibn Ezra, 192; in Hillel ben Samuel, 323 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 379, 383; in Crescas, 403 f.; in Albo, 425 f.

Roscellinus of Compiègne, 305

Rose, Valentinus, 439, note 8

Rosin, David, 189, 192, 435

"Royal Crown," the, 75 f.

Saadia, xix, xxv, xli, xlii, xlv, xlvi, xlix, 1, 17, 23-47; his "Emunot ve-Deot," 24 f.; modelled on the Kalam, ibid.; atomic theory, 25; reason for writing, 26 f.; sources of truth, 27 f.; speculation not forbidden, 28; necessity of revelation, ibid.; existence of God, 28 ff.; incorporeality, 32; unity, 32 f.; attributes, 33 f.; categories inapplicable to God, 35 f.; theophanies, 36; soul, 37 f.; laws and commandments, 38 f.; rational and traditional, ibid.; prophecy, 40; written and oral law, 40; abrogation of Law, 40 f.; freedom, 41 f.; and foreknowledge, ibid.; reward and punishment, 42 f., 46; future world, 43 f.; resurrection, 44 f.; ethics, 46 f., 48, 50, 52, 59, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 96, 126, 127, 128, 146, 147, 167, 175, 186, 195, 200, 237, 241, 246, 252, 253, 302, 309, 362, 363, 388, 428, 434

Sabeans, 296

Saladin, 239

Samuel, 197

Scaliger, 307

Scheyer, Simon B., 435

Schmiedl, A., 433

Schreiner, M., xxv, xxvii, 433, 434, 439, notes 12, 16, 18 and 20; 440, note 81

"Sefer Ha-Kabbala," 198

Seyerlen, 63, 434, 441, note 86

Shemtob ben Joseph, 430

Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob, 429

Socrates, xxix, 155, 184, 185

Solomon ben Adret, 430

Solomon ben Yeroham, 363

Sophists, xxix

Soul, in Aristotle, xxxv; world soul in Plotinus, xxxviii; s. in Jewish philosophy, xlv f.; world-soul in Jewish Neo-Platonists, xlvi; s. in Israeli, 5, 8 ff.; in Saadia, 37 f.; in Gabirol, 65, 66; in Pseudo-Bahya, 108 ff.; in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119; in Ibn Zaddik, 134 f., 137 f.; world-soul in Ibn Zaddik, 140; s. in Judah Halevi, 179 ff.; in Abraham Ibn Ezra, 191 f.; in Ibn Daud, 209 ff.; in Maimonides, 281 ff.; in Hillel ben Samuel, 314 ff.; in Crescas, 400. See also "Intellect," "Reason"

Spinoza, 398 f.

"Spirit and Soul, Book of," 5

Steinschneider, Moritz, 311, 439, note 26; 440, notes 31 and 33; 443, note 247; 446, note 360

St. Ephrem of Nisibis, xviii

Sufis, xxvii f., 86, 153

Syrians, xvii ff., 199, 246

"Tagmule ha-Nefesh," 314

Tänzer, A., 437

Themistius, 7, 60, 313, 321, 332, 333, 334, 335

"Theology of Aristotle," xx, xxxix, 64, 266

Theophrastus, xviii

Tibbon, Judah Ibn, 71, 309, 310

Tibbon, Moses Ibn, 309, 440, note 37

Tibbon, Samuel Ibn, 2, 60, 125, 239, 302, 309

"Tikkun Midot ha-Nefesh," 71

"Torot ha-Nefesh," 106

Tradition, xiii, xli, 28, 223 f.

Transmigration, in Saadia, 44; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 192; in Ibn Daud, 215 f.

Trinity, xliv, 33, 34, 71, 91

Truth, twofold, 328

"Twenty Chapters," 17

Ueberweg-Baumgartner, 433

Unity of God, in Kalam, xxii, xliii f., 252; in Mukammas, 18; in Saadia, 32 f.; in Al Basir, 51; in Bahya, 89 f.; in Ibn Zaddik, 143; in Moses ibn Ezra, 185; in Abraham ibn Ezra, 189; in Ibn Daud, 219 f.; in Maimonides, xliv, 257 ff.; in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.; in Crescas, 391 f.

Vincent of Beauvais, 1

Virtue, xlix; in Gabirol, 72 f.; in Pseudo-Bahya, 112; in Ibn Zaddik, 148; in Ibn Daud, 232; in Maimonides, 282 ff.

Weil, Isidore, 436

Weil, Simson, 198, 443, note 221

Weinsberg, Leopold, 435

Wenrich, 439, note 5

Werbluner, 445, note 317

Will of God, in Al Basir, 50; in Gabirol, 68 f.; in Bahya, 90; in Ibn Zaddik, 144; in Aaron ben Elijah, 372

William of Auvergne, 71, 306

William of Occam, 200

Wise, Stephen S., 71, 441, note 103

Wolff, M., 444, note 251

Wolfsohn, Julius, 436

Yahuda, 80, 86, 439, note 24; 441, notes 106, 108, 109 and 112

Yahya ben Adi, 247

Yefet Ha-Levi, 363

"Yezirah, Sefer" 17, 94, 173, 179

Yohanan ben Zakkai, 197

Zeller, 439, note 4; 441, note 86

Zeno, 25

Zimmels, 448, note 442

Zunz, Leopold, 184

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