Part 49

The idea of invasion was a well-timed one; at no time in the war, either before or after, was England in so critical a condition or its existence so precarious. It had become plain by this time that the strength of England, at all events under the present management, lay in two directions--in its enormous resources and capacity for paying money, and in its fleet. Though such troops as had been employed had exhibited their usual bravery, though when well led, as in India, their efforts had met with great success, it was evident that the present ministry, hampered by their political relations and by the incessant interference of the King himself in the army, was unable to make any real show in the European war. But already in the last four years nearly eighty millions had been added to the National Debt, every variety of taxation almost had been tried both to cover the interest of the accumulating debt and to supply the yearly million to the sinking fund, and men began to think that the sources of money must shortly begin to fail. And yet the subsidized armies abroad had met with nothing but disaster. The North of Germany, including even the King's electorate of Hanover, had been driven to enter into a neutrality. Prussia had in the last year signed two conventions of the most amicable and friendly description with France; and the well-known selfishness of the Austrian Court did not allow it to be questioned that, if it saw its way to permanent advantage, it also would close its disastrous campaign by deserting the coalition. Worse even than that remained behind; it seemed as if the country was really upon the verge of a national bankruptcy, for the amount of specie was found insufficient to carry on the business of the country. At the same time that the financial strength of England seemed to have been fruitlessly exhausted, her permanent power upon the sea seemed on the point of disappearing also; for not only had the French been lately turning their attention to their own navy, but the successes of their arms had given them the command both of the fleets of Holland and Spain. Holland, formed into the Batavian Republic, had early purchased peace by promising thirty ships: in the July of the last year Spain had entered into a similar convention, and the whole of her naval resources, as many as forty line of battle-ships, were at the disposal of the French. It was with these combined armaments that the intended descent upon England was to take place. And just as the internal ruin had gone hand in hand with the failure of external financial influence, so it appeared that the new-born naval power of our enemies would go hand in hand with the total dissolution of our maritime force: for disaffection was widely spread among our sailors, and the year was marked by the mutinies of St. Helen's and the Nore.

[Sidenote: Monetary crisis.]

[Sidenote: Suspension of cash payments.]

In point of time it was the financial difficulty which first arose. The difficulty was not what is called a commercial but a monetary crisis. There was no want of credit, there was no want of solid wealth, but there was every chance of there being such a dearth of the circulating medium that the ordinary transactions of business would not be able to be carried on, that it would be impossible to meet engagements as they fell due, and that consequently many houses would be forced to stop payment, and a general bankruptcy be the result, more especially as it seemed probable that at the head of the banks that stopped payment would be the Bank of England itself. The causes of this state of things are not very difficult to understand. The same forces which had been at work to produce the necessary issue of Exchequer bills in 1793 had continued; the balance of trade had been constantly against the country. The position of Spain, Italy, France and Holland in the ranks of our enemies had of necessity curtailed the number of our purchasers. The necessity of war supplies and several poor harvests had rendered necessary the purchase of much food and of much raw material, consequently to restore the balance large payments in gold and silver had to be made. The great subsidies granted to foreign powers had necessarily been chiefly paid in specie. Large compensation had been given for the freights and cargoes of neutral ships which had been seized; and the Government for their special purposes had had to borrow upwards of ten millions in specie from the Bank. Threats of invasion had induced people throughout the country to realize their property as far as possible; this had produced a run upon the country banks, which had in turn demanded their deposits from the Bank of England. All these accumulated causes had so lowered the reserve, that on Saturday the 20th of February there was only £1,272,000 in the Bank cellars, and it was known that the demands of the next forty-eight hours would entirely empty them. In this crisis the Bank applied to the Government; a Council was immediately held, although it was Sunday, and a proclamation was issued forbidding payments in cash. A meeting of merchants next day sanctioned this step, promising to accept bank notes as legal tender. On examination the Bank was found solvent, but a Bill was passed prohibiting it to pay in cash more than twenty shillings, or to advance to Government more than £600,000. Though only intended as a temporary expedient, this Act continued in operation for twenty-two years, and during the whole of that time the depreciation of the paper money was comparatively slight.

[Sidenote: The threatened invasion checked by the victory of St. Vincent.]

The danger caused by the mutiny was still greater: it was the intention of the French Directory that the fleet of the Texel, composed entirely of the Dutch, the fleet at Brest which had been collected for the invasion of Ireland, and the great Spanish fleet, should combine. Thus, an armament of more than seventy ships of the line would sweep the English fleet from the Channel, and any operations against the island would be rendered safe. But the check sustained by the Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent ruined the well-conceived plan. A few days before Tate landed in England, the great Spanish fleet set sail from Carthagena, intending to join the French fleet off Brest and the Dutch fleet off the Texel, and thus secure the mastery of the Channel. Sir John Jervis was Admiral in the Mediterranean, and with him was Commodore Nelson, and though the Spanish fleet had twelve more ships than he had, and 1200 more guns, he determined to fight. He contrived to separate nine Spanish ships from the main body, and took four of the remainder, and though the separated ships joined the line in the evening, and Jervis was still outnumbered, the Spanish fleet retired into Cadiz.

But though the combined invasion was thus thwarted, the whole danger for England, or rather for Ireland, was by no means at an end. Hoche had been removed from the army of the Ocean to the army of the Sambre and Meuse. His mind was constantly bent upon the invasion of Ireland, and, acting under his influence, the Dutch Government, wishing to do something to show that they were not entirely effaced from the list of nations, with great efforts strengthened and equipped their fleet at the Texel till it numbered fourteen sail of the line, and embarked in it their whole army, 15,000 men, for an attack upon Ireland. The Directory, taking umbrage at this independent action, insisted upon Hoche, with 5000 men, accompanying them, and on their refusal began again to get ready their Brest squadron for a similar expedition. To watch the Dutch became the duty of Admiral Duncan, the care of Brest was intrusted to Admiral Bridport with the fleet at Portsmouth. Fortunately for England, the sailing of the fleets was delayed; had they sailed in the summer, as intended, they would have found England without fleets.

[Sidenote: Mutiny at Spithead.]

Early in the year a conspiracy was discovered among the crews of the fleet at Spithead, with a view to demanding redress of certain grievances. These grievances were shared in by all the seamen in the navy and were very real. The pay and pensions had never been altered since the time of Charles II., though every necessary of life had risen from thirty to forty per cent.; this neglect was rendered particularly objectionable as the pay and pensions of the army had been increased to suit the times. Many officers were appointed by interest alone, and a system of barefaced peculation was carried on by those who had the duty of provisioning the fleet, for the ships were furnished in a great degree by contract through the purser; moreover, all the nautical arrangements were at this time remarkable for extreme roughness, almost brutality, for unjust severity of discipline, for arbitrary power vested in the hands of the captain, and frequent misuse of that power. When Lord Bridport, Lord Howe's second in command, signalled to put to sea, every ship in the fleet refused to obey; and the next day delegates from every ship met in the 'Queen Charlotte,' and the mutiny was organized. The men behaved with perfect decorum, and drew up a petition, asking that their wages should be raised to suit the rise of prices in every direction, and that some improvement should be made in their system of pensions. To the Admiralty they sent a petition, exposing the peculations of the pursers and the unwarrantable hardships to which the sailor was exposed. The Admiralty acknowledged at once the justice of the claim for advanced wages, but were silent upon the other abuses. This did not satisfy the men: three admirals were sent to treat with them; and when an outburst of anger on the part of one of them broke off the conference, the red flag of mutiny was hoisted and the guns loaded. However, when their demands were granted in full, and a free pardon was sent them from London, they at once returned to their duty. During the whole of the outbreak perfect order had reigned. But the folly of the Admiralty, who, wishing to save their credit, sent down a perverse order that the marines should be kept constantly ready to suppress mutiny, led the sailors to believe that they were being deceived, and a second outbreak was the result. An attempt to suppress it by force on board the 'London' ended in a real mutiny among all the ships then lying at St. Helen's, outside Spithead. Lord Howe, the most popular of the admirals, known among the sailors as "Black Dick," was intrusted with the difficult task of recalling the fleet to its allegiance. With great skill he contrived that while their requests were granted, they should seem to be receiving rather than demanding a favour. He persuaded them to write a letter of contrition to himself, and apparently as the fruit of his good offices, announced to them that an Act of Parliament had been passed securing to them the redress of grievances they had demanded, and that considerable changes were to be made among the officers.

[Sidenote: Mutiny at the Nore. May 15.]

This wholly unpolitical mutiny was followed by a more formidable movement among the ships at the Nore. It began on board the 'Sandwich,' the flagship of Admiral Buckner. As in the former case, delegates from the seamen met on board the 'Sandwich,' but the chief management of the mutiny fell absolutely into the hands of a seaman called Parker, a man of good education, and at one time an officer in the navy, but whose abilities as a leader were spoiled by his arrogant assumption of dictatorial power. Under his influence the demands of the mutineers assumed a political character; they required a revision of the Articles of War, an increase of prize-money, and the dismissal of officers not agreeable to the ships' companies. All efforts to bring the men to reason were unavailing. Lord Spencer himself, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had an interview with Parker, but was met with nothing but insult. After this the mutineers fired upon some frigates who would not join them, and blockaded the Thames. It became necessary to take vigorous measures. Bills were passed without opposition strengthening the hands of Government, and making it felony to hold intercourse with the mutinous ships. Ships were got ready, the navigation of the Thames was rendered difficult by the removal of marks, and batteries were erected along the river. Cut off from the shore, and finding no sympathy among the fleets at Portsmouth and Plymouth, nor among even the most advanced radicals on shore, although they were joined by the fleets of Admiral Duncan, the mutineers began to give way. Ship after ship slipped her cable and escaped from the mutinous fleet, and on the 15th of June the 'Sandwich' herself was brought within range of the batteries. Parker was at once apprehended, sentenced to death, and hanged. But though the firmness of the Government had secured them complete victory, they were too conscious of the real abuses in the navy to be severe. Only four or five executions followed.

[Sidenote: Real loyalty of the sailors.]

The great peculiarity of the mutiny was the ease with which it was ultimately suppressed and the proofs of underlying loyalty which are visible throughout it. In the Channel fleet all the offers of the Admiralty, and even of Parliament, were regarded as delusive till the King's own sign manual was exhibited, upon which all signs of mistrust at once vanished. When one of the ships threatened to leave the fleet and join the French, the guns of the rest of the mutinous fleet were at once turned upon it, and it was carefully blockaded by guard-boats; and again, so far from sympathizing with the mutineers of the Nore, the sailors of the Channel fleet, after their return to allegiance, wrote to the delegates declaring that their conduct was a scandal to the British navy. Even at the Nore, where the mutiny had taken a more political form, every ship but one struck the red flag and hoisted the royal ensign on the King's birthday, and within a few weeks of the suppression of the disaffection, the battle of Camperdown, one of the severest engagements of the time, was chiefly won for England by the crews of the lately insurgent fleet.

[Sidenote: Disorganization of the French Government.]

It was well for England that the Government of France was at this time so disorganized that no vigorous effort could be made to take advantage of her deplorable condition. The place of the assignats had been taken by another form of paper money called "mandats," but these too had been rejected by the people, who could no longer be brought to believe in paper money of any description. Forced to have recourse to the use of specie, the Directory had also found itself compelled to have recourse to the old means of raising money; compulsory loans were established, the receipts of future years anticipated, the national goods sold for whatever they would fetch, and money raised at the most ridiculous interest. These financial arrangements gave rise to much nefarious speculation and stock-jobbing; the business of the army to still more; and the newly enriched speculators, emancipated from the pressure of the terror and devoid of all the nobler sentiments of republicanism, were a mere set of selfish voluptuaries. In such a dissolution of morality and public spirit it was plain that the royalists had their chance, and in the year 1797 sufficient members of their party were elected to change the majority of the two councils. The representative body immediately entered into a struggle with the executive Directory; and in that Directory were Barras, a revolutionary at heart though the leader of all the dissoluteness of the time, Barthélemy, the negotiator of Basle, who appears to have been royalist in his tendencies, and Carnot, an upright republican, but yet under the influence of the dread of the old terror. It was plain that if the Revolution was to be saved it must be done by violent means, and Rewbell and Laréveilière, the remaining directors, with the assistance of Barras, determined to save it at the cost of a _coup d'état_ carried out by the army. On the night of the 18th Fructidor (Sept. 4, 1797), Carnot and Barthélemy, with fifty of the obnoxious majority, were arrested, and all chance of a royalist reaction was for the time over. Bonaparte was now convinced that the ultimate fate of France must be with the army, in other words, that it must lie with himself, but with great wisdom he determined to wait the turn of events.

[Sidenote: Negotiations at Lisle.]

While the parties were thus struggling in France, and there seemed a chance of an entire change of feeling, the English ministry, very seriously anxious for peace, again opened negotiations. The Preliminaries of Léoben had in fact removed what should have been the sole difficulty; it was ridiculous that England should continue to hold out on the subject of the Low Countries when Austria had herself entered into a private treaty to abandon them. A passport was therefore demanded, and, somewhat unfortunately, Lord Malmesbury was again fixed upon as the negotiator. He went to Lisle, presented his plan of a treaty, and had every reason to believe that all was going well. England consented to restore all her conquests with the exception of the Isle of Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon. But this was at the very moment when the quarrel was at its height in Paris; intent upon its own affairs, the Directory suffered the negotiations to drag on, and when at length the republican party won their victory on the 18th Fructidor, the negotiations were suddenly broken off on the old ground that Malmesbury had not got full authority. The real reason is obvious,--the party in power, who relied on the army, knew that the power of the army was immensely increased by a state of war.

[Sidenote: Battle of Camperdown. Oct. 11, 1797.]

The termination of the negotiations was at once followed by a vigorous continuation of the war. Lord Malmesbury had been but a few weeks in England when the Dutch fleet found itself ready at length to sail from the Texel. But the delay--caused by the weather, the absence of Hoche, and the factions of Paris--had almost deprived it of its terrors. Even when the greater part of his fleet had been in mutiny in the Thames, Duncan had maintained the appearance of a blockade; keeping his two faithful ships within sight of the land, he had kept up so regular a succession of signals, as though sending his orders to a fleet outside, that the Dutch never found out that there were only two ships watching them. When at length they sailed Duncan's fleet outnumbered theirs by one ship. He had withdrawn for an instant to Yarmouth roads to refit, but apprised in time, he was enabled to fall upon the Dutch fleet before it had left the coast of Holland. He contrived, although the enemy was in close order, to come between them and the shore, and after a close combat, which recalled the old days of the rivalry between England and Holland, by four o'clock on the 11th of October he had succeeded in capturing the flagship of Admiral Winter, together with seven other ships of the line, two 56-gun ships, and two frigates. The bold manœuvre of passing between the enemy and the shore was a source of some danger, as the fleets drifted close inland during the action, but Duncan skilfully saved both his own fleet and his prizes. The action was watched by crowds from the Dutch shore. This battle put an end to the danger of immediate invasion, though it seems to have inspired the French with a determination to carry on that invasion on a larger scale in the following year, when great preparations were made under the personal superintendence of Bonaparte.

[Sidenote: Peace of Campo Formio. Oct. 17.]

The breach of negotiations at Lisle was followed on the 17th of October by the completion of the Peace of Campo Formio, which had been begun by the Preliminaries of Léoben. This peace secured to France the possession of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and the Ionian Isles, and acknowledged the establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, consisting of the provinces conquered in Italy from the Austrians, the Pope, and Venice; while Austria received in exchange Venice itself and its eastern provinces, Friuli, Istria, and Dalmatia. France thus lay not only triumphant in Europe, but with the Rhine for its frontier, and for outposts four republics pledged to uphold its revolutionary ideas. But in acquiring this position the rights of peoples had been trampled upon, Switzerland had been appended to France, the occupation of Rome had seemed to give colour to the assertion that the Revolution was atheistical, and the whole turn of events was such as to justify, even to necessitate, subsequent European interference.

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[Sidenote: Complications attending Irish difficulties.]

The peculiar manner in which Ireland has been conquered, peopled, and managed, renders questions regarding this country most intricate and difficult. There is seldom a single interest to be traced which is not crossed by numerous side winds, which render the development of political questions crooked and complicated. The Roman Catholic interest, the Protestant interest, the old Irish interest, the Anglo-Irish interest, the interest of the English ascendancy, the claims of the Presbyterians as contrasted with the National Church, are constantly crossing and recrossing. At no time was this complication so great or this difficulty so insoluble as in the years which followed the breaking out of the French Revolution.

[Sidenote: Necessity for the Union.]