A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy
Part 14
The consequences of this victory were unexpectedly great. Brussels opened its gates to the advancing conquerors; King Charles was proclaimed King in the capital of the Spanish Netherlands; even the line of the Scheldt was deserted, and Ghent, Bruges, and Oudenarde, fell into the hands of the allies; the great naval strongholds, Antwerp and Ostend, which had before now sustained memorable sieges, surrendered, the one on account of some quarrel within its walls, the other because of its inability to withstand the advancing allies. The list of conquests is concluded by the strongholds of Menin and Ath. In fact the effect of the battle was to drive the French entirely out of the Netherlands; Mons and Namur being the only towns of importance still remaining in their hands.
[Sidenote: Saves Eugene in Italy.]
The battle even influenced affairs in Italy. The complete disorganization of the French army in Flanders made a change of commanders imperatively necessary. Vendome, regarded in some ways as the ablest French general, was summoned from Italy, where he had been acting successfully against Eugene. He had driven the Imperial army to retreat behind the Adige; the Milanese had thus been cleared, and Piedmont conquered with the exception of Turin. Into that last fortress the unfortunate Duke had withdrawn. For the purpose of taking it, a well-appointed army, under the Duke de la Feuillade, son-in-law of Chamillart the war minister, but without other claims to the command, crossed the Alps and invested the town. It was of the last importance that it should be relieved, and Eugene determined upon a march, bold even to rashness, for the purpose. Crossing the Po not far from its mouth, he followed the river upwards upon its south bank. The obstacles he encountered were many; but Vendome at this critical moment was recalled to Flanders, and Marsin and the Duke of Orleans, who took the command, allowed Eugene to cross river after river without opposition, contenting themselves with following his movements upon the opposite bank of the river. At length Eugene approached Turin, formed a junction with the Duke of Savoy, whom the laxity of the siege had allowed to leave the city with 10,000 men, and passing beyond Turin, turned his back upon France, and marched against the investing army. The siege had been carried on without skill, the lines were of immense length, and severed into various sections by the numerous rivers which join the Po in the neighbourhood of Turin. Orleans was eager to lead the troops out of the trenches and risk a pitched battle, which, as the French had a considerable advantage in numbers, might easily have resulted in Eugene's defeat. He was overruled by Marsin, who unexpectedly produced a commission as commander-in-chief, and the army awaited the assault in their trenches. Even in this position they were badly commanded. Three generals, issuing sometimes contradictory orders, prevented the proper concentration of troops, and when Eugene marched against that section of the works which lay between the Doria and the Stura, not more than a third of the French army is said to have been ready to oppose him. The route of the French was complete, 200 guns, and much stores and money, fell a prey to the victors (Sept. 7). The effect of the victory was greater than the victory itself. It was found impossible to lead the broken troops into the Milanese; they fell back in confusion behind the Alps, thus leaving the force on the Adige to be surrounded by enemies. Piedmont returned to its allegiance, and in fact the whole of Italy was irretrievably lost to France, and compelled to join the Grand Alliance.
[Sidenote: The disasters of the French in 1706]
[Sidenote: make Louis desire peace.]
[Sidenote: Marlborough rejects his terms.]
The disasters of France had been continuous. Blenheim had secured Germany, and in this year of 1706, Ramillies had been followed by the conquest of the whole of the Netherlands, Turin by the conquest of the whole of Italy, the relief of Barcelona by the occupation of Madrid by the allied forces, although they had subsequently been compelled to fall back towards Valencia. So great were the French disasters that Louis began to think of treating, and suggested as terms on which peace might be made a new Partition Treaty, by which he would consent to acknowledge Queen Anne in England, to give the Dutch the barrier they demanded, to grant great commercial advantages to the maritime powers, and to surrender Spain and the Indies to the Archduke Charles, if only he could preserve for his grandson Philip a kingdom in Italy consisting of Milan, Naples, and Sicily. These terms were very attractive to the Dutch, who thought they had already secured all they required, but were by no means satisfactory to the Emperor, who saw that the barrier given to the Dutch must of necessity be taken from the Spanish dominions in the Netherlands, and therefore from his brother:[3] nor to Marlborough, who, though he confessed he did not believe that the King of France would ever make peace without securing some kingdom for his grandson, was desirous for his own sake to continue the war, and thought the French demand for the Milanese after the great victories which had been won unreasonable. With some difficulty he persuaded Heinsius to reject the terms, and the war proceeded on its course. It might have been better to have accepted Louis' terms. Never again were the affairs of the allies in so prosperous a condition, although the continuation of the war undoubtedly told in their favour by the gradual exhaustion it produced in France.
[Sidenote: The tide of victory turns.]
[Sidenote: Almanza. April 25, 1707.]
[Sidenote: Stolhofen. May 22.]
[Sidenote: Toulon. Aug. 20.]
It seemed indeed in the course of the next year as if the tide of victory had wholly turned. Peterborough had returned to Spain, and viewing the altered state of affairs, was now as eager to act on the defensive as he had been before to urge an advance upon Madrid. His advice was again disregarded. The introduction of Sunderland into the ministry at home was unfavourable to him, and he was recalled, leaving the command of Spain in the somewhat incompetent hands of Das Minas and Galway. These generals, determining to act on the offensive, marched out of Valencia towards Madrid, but were met near Almanza by the lately reinforced army of Berwick, and suffered a complete defeat. The consequence was the loss of Valencia and Saragossa, so that Charles was only able to maintain himself in the province of Catalonia. The battle of Almanza was fought on the 25th of April. On the 22nd of the following month, Marshal Villars completely surprised the Margrave of Bareuth, who had succeeded the late Margrave Louis of Baden in command of the Imperial troops on the Rhine. The lines of Stolhofen, which had been so long held against the French, were taken and destroyed. Nor was the advance of the allied army of Italy into the south of France more successful. Eugene and the Duke of Savoy reached Toulon and besieged it. But sickness had much decreased the number of the allies; a considerable detachment had been sent to complete the conquest of Naples, and the appearance of Marshal Tessé with a large army, and the threat of an assault upon their rear, induced them to raise the siege and retire beyond the Alps. Nor was there anything done in Flanders to redeem the ill-success which had met the allied arms elsewhere. Marlborough in vain attempted to bring the French to a pitched battle. The Dutch had lost confidence after receiving the news of Almanza and Stolhofen, and renewed their old dilatory policy; the rains also somewhat impeded the campaign, which was closed without any important event.
[Sidenote: Marlborough diverts Charles XII.]
One valuable diplomatic service, however, Marlborough had performed. Charles XII. of Sweden was in the midst of his victorious career. Having defeated the Russians at Narva, he had succeeded in driving Augustus, Elector of Saxony, from the throne of Poland, and entering Saxony itself, was now in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. Sweden was the old ally of France, and Louis did not let Charles forget it. For a moment there seemed a chance that Charles would follow in the footsteps of Gustavus Adolphus, throw himself and his victorious army into Germany, and ruin the cause of the allies. To deter him from this step Marlborough visited him at his camp, and successfully directed his ambition towards his old enemies the Russians, against whom he shortly marched to meet his ruin at the battle of Pultowa.
[Sidenote: Threatened invasion of Scotland. 1708.]
The beginning of the ensuing year was marked by a new incident in the war. The hopes of Louis were raised by the reports of the general discontent prevalent in Scotland; a large portion of that nation had seen with dislike the late completion of the Union, and assurances were brought to France of the readiness of the Jacobite party to rise in arms. An invasion was determined on and actually set on foot. The fleet was all ready to sail, when Prince James Edward, afterwards called the Old Pretender, but now known by the name of the Chevalier de St. George, who was to accompany it, was taken ill of the measles. The expedition was postponed for some weeks, and these weeks were enough to destroy its chance of success. Byng with a powerful fleet appeared in the Channel, troops were brought over from the Continent and others collected in England, and though the little squadron succeeded in eluding the fleet and reached the Firth of Forth, there was no sign of a general rising of the Jacobites, and it had to return from its fruitless expedition, glad to escape with safety.
[Sidenote: Campaign of 1708.]
[Sidenote: Marlborough's plan.]
This threatened invasion had of course retained Marlborough in England. It was not till somewhat late that he could join the army. With a slight change of generals the war continued its old course. Villars was employed to reduce Piedmont, Berwick and the Elector of Bavaria were on the Rhine, Spain had been intrusted to the Duke of Orleans, while in Flanders, which was this year selected as the great battlefield, Vendome was to oppose Marlborough, having with him as nominal commander-in-chief the Duke of Burgundy, the heir to the French throne. Marlborough had again formed a great scheme for the campaign. His intention was that the Elector of Hanover, who after the defeat of Stolhofen had taken command of the Imperial troops, should remain on the Rhine, and that Eugene, with whom he again longed to act in co-operation, should form a new army and assist him on the Moselle. The two generals met in April at the Hague, and there agreed that they would make an ostensible plan for the invasion of Lorraine, but that they should in fact join their two armies, and act rapidly and decisively to complete the conquest of the Netherlands. Eugene met with infinite difficulties in forming his new army, and Marlborough was still singlehanded when Vendome began an offensive movement.
The French army had been concentrated at Mons, on the south-west of the Netherlands. It thence advanced northward towards Brussels. Fearing for the capital, Marlborough took up a position to cover it, but suddenly the French marched off eastward, and threatened Louvain. This was, however, but a feint. The real intention of the French was to act upon the western frontier, upon the river Scheldt. The Dutch had made themselves highly unpopular in the Netherlands since they had had possession of that province; the disaffected inhabitants of the great towns on the Scheldt had opened correspondence with Vendome, and were prepared to surrender their cities to him. Having therefore drawn Marlborough towards Louvain, he suddenly marched westward to Alost, across the front of the English army, sending forward on his march detachments, to which Ghent and Bruges surrendered without a struggle. As the town of Oudenarde, somewhat higher up the river, would complete the security of these new acquisitions, it was determined to besiege it. Marlborough had followed close upon the heels of the French, circling round Brussels so as to defend the capital. He had not ceased to urge Eugene to join him with his troops, which, according to agreement, should have been with him many weeks before. The delay was no fault of the Prince's; he was already hurrying to join Marlborough, when, hearing that it was his intention to fight a battle in defence of Oudenarde, and unable to bring up his troops, he hastened forward alone and joined the English army. Between Marlborough's army and Oudenarde ran the river Dender, which the French determined to hold to cover the siege. Alost, which lies a little to the north of Oudenarde, they already possessed; at about an equal distance to the south, also on the river Dender, was the entrenched camp of Lessines. Could they occupy this they would be in a good position to cover the siege. Marlborough foresaw their intention, and determined to forestall them. Although the river between Lessines and Alost makes a considerable curve, and Marlborough, on the convex side of it, had almost twice the distance to traverse that the French had, he pushed on with such rapidity that he secured Lessines and the passage of the river before the French columns appeared in sight. It was now evident to the French generals that Marlborough intended to fight. They drew in their detachments, and marched rapidly to cross the Scheldt at Gavre, to the north of Oudenarde. Marlborough marched direct upon that city, so that the converging lines of march would speedily meet. It was known that there was much disputing and ill-feeling between Vendome and the Duke of Burgundy, and that the latter Prince intended, if possible, to avoid an engagement. With all speed Marlborough sent forward General Cadogan to secure the passage of the river, and prepare bridges for his army. After he had performed this duty, Cadogan rode forward to reconnoitre, and saw the French troops crossing at Gavre, and, in ignorance of the immediate vicinity of the English, quietly sending out foragers. With such troops as he had he drove in the outlying posts of the enemy, who now, apprised of the approach of Marlborough, found a battle inevitable.
[Sidenote: Battle of Oudenarde. July 11, 1708.]
A little to the north of Oudenarde the river Norken joins the Scheldt, after a course almost parallel to that river. Between the Norken and the Scheldt an irregular semicircle of hills sweeps with the convex side of one of its arms at Oudenarde, while the other, surmounted by the village Oycke, overhangs the Norken; it contains in its hollow two little brooks which fall into the Scheldt just north of Oudenarde. On the other side of these brooks, closing the opening of the semicircle, is an irregular mass of rising ground sloping away northward towards the junction of the Scheldt and Norken. Vendome gave orders to occupy this irregular mass and the valleys of the brooks, the arm of the semicircle between Oudenarde and the course of the brooks being occupied by Cadogan. But the Duke of Burgundy counter-ordered his commands, and arranged his troops upon what was doubtless a stronger position, the range of hills beyond the Norken. But though stronger for defence, it was much less favourable for an offensive battle. These contradictory commands cost the French their first loss. Seven battalions of their troops having pushed forward towards Oudenarde as far as Eyne, were fallen upon and destroyed by Cadogan, who thus crossed the brook and ascended the irregular high land beyond it. Had Vendome's order been carried out the position of Cadogan would have been very precarious. He was almost unsupported, although Marlborough was coming to his assistance with some cavalry, which he led forward for several miles at a gallop. As it was, however, the English army came up by degrees, and took position with their left on the semicircle of hills, and their right supporting Cadogan beyond the brook. Thwarted in his first schemes, Vendome now wished to remain beyond the Norken, knowing that the enemy were wearied with a long march (it was already four in the afternoon), and that he would have an opportunity of withdrawing quietly in the night towards France. The Duke of Burgundy again thwarted him. He commanded the right wing, and insisted upon sending his troops forward across the Norken into the valleys where the brooks ran. The country was there broken up with enclosures, and a fierce hand-to-hand battle was fought with the English right, which Marlborough had intrusted to Eugene. The exhibition of all the English cavalry upon the high lands beyond the brooks held the French left entirely in check; and while Eugene and the English were disputing the hedges and enclosures in the valley, Marlborough, passing to the left, observed that the extremity of the semicircle, which overhung the Norken and was occupied by the village of Oycke, was unguarded by the French. He caused Overkirk with the Dutch reserve to march round the hills to occupy this point, and thus completely envelop the French right. The effect was the total annihilation of that part of the French army, and it was owing to an accident alone that any part of it escaped. The two extremes of the enveloping English line came so close together, that in the darkness they fired upon each other. The mistake was happily soon discovered, but fearing a repetition of the accident, the general gave orders rather to let the French escape than to run the risk of renewing such a disaster. Some 9000 men thus broke through at a gap in the semicircle of hills near the Castle of Bevere, and made their escape to France. The rest of the beaten army retired toward Ghent.
[Sidenote: Siege of Lille. Dec. 9, 1708.]
Both armies were speedily reinforced. Eugene's troops arrived from the Moselle, and joined the English; Berwick, with part of the army of the Rhine, which had been observing them, reinforced the French, but the relative numbers of the troops were not much changed. Marlborough and Eugene had now to settle upon a further plan of action. Before them lay the great city of Lille, one of the earliest conquests of Louis XIV., newly fortified with all the skill of Vauban. That the allies should cross the frontier and enter France was speedily determined. But while Marlborough suggested the bold plan of leaving troops to mask Lille, while the main army marched direct to Paris, Eugene, though by no means a timid general, urged the more regular course of besieging and capturing the great fortress which lay in their way before proceeding further. The arguments in favour of this plan were too plausible to be disregarded. It was decided that while Eugene in person undertook the siege, Marlborough should command the covering army. Even to bring the siege material to the spot was a matter of no small difficulty; the artillery alone required 16,000 horses, and the progress of the siege was watched by a French army of 100,000. When these preliminary difficulties were triumphantly overcome, there still remained the great fortress itself, occupied by 15,000 men, under the able command of Boufflers. At one time the Dutch deputies were so alarmed at the slowness of the progress made that they urged the renunciation of the project. One of the greatest difficulties experienced by the allied commanders was the provisioning of the army; the land communication with Brussels was entirely cut off, all provisions had to be brought from Ostend, whither they had been conveyed by sea. The French determined to interrupt this line of communication also, and to destroy one of the convoys which had been intrusted to General Webb, with a most insufficient detachment of troops. It has been suggested that Marlborough was here playing one of his old tricks, that, in his jealousy of Webb, he wished for his destruction, and had intentionally exposed him to this danger. If such was the case he was thoroughly disappointed. When the French troops fell upon the convoy at Wynendale, Webb made a most gallant defence and beat them off. The very slight notice taken by Marlborough in his despatches of this gallant action gives some colour to the rumour. The victory of Wynendale was at all events the turning-point of the siege; from this time rapid progress was made. On the 22nd of October Boufflers found it necessary to capitulate for the town, while retaining the citadel, and on the 9th of December he marched out of his last stronghold with all the honours of war. The reconquest of Ghent and Bruges followed upon the fall of Lille.
[Sidenote: Capture of Port Mahon.]
In other directions the war had been languid. In Spain only had anything been done. There Stanhope had taken the command in conjunction with Staremberg, the Imperial general, and had succeeded without much difficulty in capturing Port Mahon in Minorca, a place then regarded as more valuable than Gibraltar, and of the highest importance as affording a safe winter harbour for the English fleet in the Mediterranean.
[Sidenote: Exhaustion of France. 1709.]
[Sidenote: Louis offers to treat.]
[Sidenote: High demands of the allies.]
[Sidenote: Rejected by Louis.]