Part 3

We may look at this subject in whatever way we choose we shall find that in no way whatever can we form any idea of a First Cause, an infinite and absolute Creator. Let us see. "The First Cause cannot be absolute, that is, it cannot exist out of all relation to the universe. Whereas a cause not only sustains some relation to its effect, but exists as a cause only by virtue of such relations. Suppress the effect and the cause has ceased to be a cause. Absolute cause, therefore, is like the phrase, circular triangle. The two words stand for conceptions which cannot be made to unite. We attempt, says Mr. Mansel, to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing the succession of time. The absolute exists first by itself and afterward becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception of the infinite. How can the infinite become that which it has not from the first." ("Fisk's Cosmic Philos.")

Look at it whatever way we may the finite mind cannot grasp the conception of the infinite. Nay, cannot know of the existence of the infinite. Hence all efforts to explain the First Cause, the absolute, and the infinite, are more artificial and unreal than painted ships upon a painted sea.

We may view the subject in still another light. If God reasons, his knowledge is limited and he is finite. Man reasons because his knowledge is circumscribed. If he knew everything he would have no doubts, and hence would not need to investigate, experiment, recollect, and compare. He would not be compelled to lay down certain definite data, and follow their implications through rules of logic, and through scientific experiment in order to reach conclusions. The end would be as clearly before his mind as the beginning; in fact there would be to such a mind no beginning and no end. But we cannot imagine an infinite being who needs to recollect past events. But if we deny that in the mind of God there is the faculty of memory, we thereby deny that he reasons. The same may be said of doubt, for if the mind of God is never troubled with doubts, it is simply because he does not reason. Much of the mind's activity is employed in doubts. Doubt and inquiry are necessary elements of thought. Does God doubt? Does he investigate, compare, and test matters by experiment? If he does then he is not infinite, and if he does not, then he does not reason. Has he imagination? If he exercises this important function of the mind then he deals in unrealities, idealizes, has dreams, cherishes visions, builds air castles. If he does not thus exercise imagination he cannot be said to reason.

It is an old argument that design implies a designer. The essential weakness of this argument lies in what is called "proofs of design." And in support of this idea it is commonly urged that there are everywhere apparent in nature evidences of order, harmony, and adaptation. But to put this argument into a sentence, the maggot in the cheese could offer the same arguments to show there was a design in his position in the cheese. He could argue that everything about him showed order, harmony, and adaptation. It was just the cheese for him.

But even if we should admit this statement, it would not prove the existence of God, for if an intelligent mind had created the universe, it is certain that that mind itself must have been governed by law which yields to order, harmony, and adaptation, and if these imply a designer in one case they must also in the other, and therefore every designer must have had a designer.

The Difference Between the Two Cosmogonies as Given in the First Two Chapters of Genesis.

In the first, the earth emerges from the waters and is therefore saturated with moisture. (Gen. 1 : 9, 10.) In the second, the whole face of the ground requires to be moistened. (Gen. 2 : 6.)

In the first, the birds and beasts are created before man. (Gen. 1 : 20, 24, 26.) In the second, man is created before the birds and beasts. (Gen. 2 : 7, 9.)

In the first, all the "fowls that fly" are made out of the waters. (Gen. 1 : 20.) In the second, the "fowls of the air" are made out of the ground. (Gen. 2 : 19.)

In the first, man is made lord of the whole earth. (Gen. 1 : 28.) In the second, he is merely placed in the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. (Gen. 2 : 8, 15.)

In the first, man and woman are created together. (Gen. 1 : 28.) In the second, the beasts and birds are created between the man and woman. (Gen. 2 : 7, 8, 15, 22.)--Bishop Colenso.

Evidence of the Vast Age of the Universe.

"I have looked further into space than ever human being did before me. I have observed stars, of which the light, it can be proved, must take two millions of years to reach this earth. Nay more, if those distant bodies had ceased to exist two million of years ago, we should still see them, as the light would travel after the body was gone. * * *

"The light from the nearest star requires some three years to reach the earth. From a star one thousand three hundred and forty-four times farther it would require about four thousand years, and for such a cluster as we have imagined, no less than six thousand years are needed." (Sir Wm. Herschell, "Life and Works of Sir Wm. Herschell" by Edward S. Holden.)

Sir Wm. Thomson, in Encyclopedia Britannica, article, Geology, showed from data available at the time, "that the superficial consolidation of the globe (this earth) could not have occurred less than twenty millions of years ago."

"And as any table of the earth's crust will show you there are rocks above and below the chalk, for the production of which millions heaped upon millions of years were required." (Clodd's "Childhood of Religions.")

Such eminent scientists as Sir Wm. Thomson, Helmholtz, Newcomb, Croll, Bishop, Reade, Lyell, Darwin, and others think it would have taken many millions of years for the original nebulæ to condense to the present dimensions of the sun.

PROPHECY.

"A prophecy, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, signifies a prediction of future events, which could not have been foreseen by human sagacity, and the knowledge of which was supernaturally communicated to the prophet. It is clear, therefore, that in order to establish the claim of anticipatory statement, promise, or denunciation, to the rank of a prophecy, four points must be ascertained with precision; namely, (1.) what the event was to which the alleged prediction was intended to refer; (2.) that the prediction was uttered in specific, not vague, language before the event; (3.) that the event took place specifically, not loosely, as predicted; (4.) and that it could not have been foreseen by human sagacity. * * *

"It is probably not too much to affirm that we have no instance in the prophetical books of the Old Testament of a prediction, in the case of which we possess, at once and combined, clear and unsuspicious proof of the date, the precise event predicted, the exact circumstances of the event, and the inability of human sagacity to foresee it.

"The state of the case appears to be this: That all the Old Testament prophesies have been assumed to be genuine inspired predictions; and, when falsified in their obvious meaning and received interpretation, by the event, have received immediately a new interpretation, and been supposed to refer to some other event. When the result has disappointed expectation, the conclusion has been, not that the prophecy was false, but the interpretation was erroneous. It is obvious that a mode of reasoning like this is peculiar to theological inquirers. * * *

"In justification of this idea of a double sense, he (Dr. Arnold) continues: 'The notion of a double sense in prophecy has been treated by some persons with contempt. Yet it may be said that it is almost necessarily involved in the idea of prophecy. Every prophecy has according to the very definition of the word, a double source; it has, if I may venture so to speak, two authors, the one human, the other divine.... If uttered by the tongue of man, it must also, unless we suppose him to be a mere instrument (in the same sense as a flute or a harp), be colored by his own mind. The prophet expresses in words certain truths conveyed to his mind; but his mind does not fully embrace them, nor can it; for how can man fully comprehend the mind of God? Every man lives in time, and belongs to time; the present must be to him clearer than the future.... But with God there is no past, nor future; every truth is present to him in all its extent, so that his expression, if I may so speak, differs essentially from that which can be comprehended by the mind, or uttered by the tongue of man. Thus every prophecy as uttered by man (that is, by an intelligent and not a mere mechanical instrument), and at the same time as inspired by God, must, so far as appears, have a double sense; one, the sense entertained by the human mind of the writer; the other, the sense infused into it by God.' We must confess our amazement at the obvious and extreme unsoundness of this whole passage. Not only does it painfully remind us of the double meaning so often and so justly charged upon the Pagan oracles--but it assumes the strange and contradictory improbabilities: first, that God was unable to convey his meaning to the mind of the prophet; secondly, that he infused this meaning into the words which were uttered, although he could not infuse it into the mind of the man who uttered them; and thirdly, that we can see further into the mind and meaning of God than those to whom he spoke; that they in expressing the ideas which he had put into their minds, mistook or imperfectly conceived those ideas,--but that to us is given to discover a thought which those words contained, but did not express, or which, if they did express it, they were not understood by the writer to express. Now, either the ideas which God wished to communicate were conveyed to the mind of the prophet, or they were not; if they were so conveyed, then the prophet must have comprehended them, and intended to express them correctly--for it is monstrous to suppose that God would infuse ideas into a man's mind for the purpose of being communicated to the public; which ideas he yet did not enable him to communicate; and then all the above confused subtleties fall to the ground. If, on the other hand, these ideas were not so conveyed to the prophet's mind, then it must have been the words and not the ideas which were inspired, and God used the prophet simply as a flute (a supposition scouted by Dr. Arnold) and we are thus driven to the equally monstrous supposition that God used words which did not convey his meaning, even to the very favored individual to whom and through whom he spoke." (Greg's "Creed of Christendom," pp. 76, 92.)

"We have already had ample proof that the Jewish writers not only did not scruple to narrate past events as if predicting future ones--to present history in the form of prophecy, but that they habitually did so. The original documents from which the books of Moses were compiled, must have been written, as we have seen in the time of the earliest kings, while the book of Deuteronomy was not composed, and the whole Pentateuch did not assume its present form till, probably, the reign of Josiah; yet they abound in such anticipatory narrative--in predictions of events long past. The instances are far too numerous to quote." (Greg's "Creed of Christendom," p. 86.)

"There is not throughout the whole Bible any word that describes to us what we call a poet, nor any word that describes what we call poetry. The case is, that the word prophet, to which latter times have affixed new ideas, was the Bible word for poet, and the word prophesying meant the art of making poetry. It also meant the art of playing poetry to a tune upon any instrument of music.

"We read of prophesying with pipes, tabrets, and horns--of prophesying with harps, with psalteries, with cymbols, and with every other instrument of music then in fashion. Were we now to speak of prophesying with a fiddle, or with a pipe and tabor, the expression would have no meaning, or would appear ridiculous, and to some people contemptuous, because we have changed the meaning of the word.

"We are told of Saul being among the prophets, and also that he prophesied, but we are not told what they prophesied, nor what he prophesied. The case is, there was nothing to tell; for these prophets were a company of musicians and poets, and Saul joined in the concert, and this was called prophesying."--Thomas Paine on the Prophecies.

"There is no reason to think that a prophet ever received a revelation which was not spoken directly and pointedly to his own time. (Ency. Brit. "Bible.")

"It is plain, however, that the whole work (the Pentateuch) is not the uniform production of one pen, but that in some way a variety of records of different ages, and styles have been combined to form a single narrative. Accordingly, Jewish tradition bears evidence that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, Joshua the book named after him, Samuel the book of Judges, and so forth. As all Hebrew history is anonymous, a sure sign that people had not yet learned to lay weight on questions of authorship, it is not probable that this tradition rests on any surer ground than conjecture." (Ency. Brit., "Bible.")

"I have now fully and fairly analyzed and exposed many of the most important prophecies or pretended prophecies of the whole Bible, I have shown that very few of them are real prophecies at all; that those which are real prophecies, very few ever have been, or ever can be fulfilled; that the very few which seem to have been fulfilled were written after the occurrence of the events claimed to be their fulfilments, and that, whether fulfilled or unfulfilled, none of these prophecies ever have been, or ever can be, of any service to the world. And thus fall all the prophetic props of priestcraft. Not one of them can bear the test of fair examination." (Kelso's "Bible Analayzed.")

MIRACLES.

"At the very outset of inquiry into the origin and true character of Christianity we are brought face to face with the supernatural. Christianity professes to be a Divine Revelation of truths which the human intellect could not otherwise have discovered. It is not a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man and appealing to his reason, but a system miraculously communicated to the human race, the central doctrines of which are either supernatural or untenable. If the truths said to be revealed were either of an ordinary character, or naturally attainable they would at once discredit the claim to divine origin. No one could maintain that a system discoverable by reason would be supernaturally communicated. The whole argument for Christianity turns upon the necessity of such a revelation, and the consequent probability that it would be made. * * *

"The spontaneous offer of miraculous evidence, indeed, has always been advanced as a special characteristic of Christianity logically entitling it to acceptance in contradistinction to all other religions. 'It is an acknowledged historical fact,' says Bishop Butler, 'that Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation, that is, as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it in such an age; ... and Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions.'

"Having then ascertained that miracles are absolutely necessary to attest the reliability of a Divine Revelation we may proceed to examine them more closely, and for the present we shall confine ourselves to the representation of these phenomena which are in the Bible. Throughout the Old Testament the doctrine is inculcated that supernatural communications must have supernatural attestation. God is described as arming his servants with power to perform wonders, in order that they may thus be accredited as his special messengers. The Patriarchs and the people of Israel generally are represented as demanding 'a sign' of the reality of the communications said to come from God, without which, we are led to suppose, they not only would not have believed, but would have been justified in disbelieving, that the messengers actually came from him. Thus Gideon asks for a sign that the Lord talked with him.

'And the Lord said unto him, Surely I will be with thee, and thou shalt smite the Midianites as one man.'

'And he (Gideon) said unto him, If now I have found grace in thy sight, then show me a sign that thou talkest with me.' (Judges 6 : 16, 17.)

"And Hezekiah demands proof of the truth of Isaiah's prophecy that he should be restored to health.

'And Hezekiah said unto Isaiah, What shall be the sign that the Lord will heal me, and that I shall go up unto the house of the Lord the third day?' (2 Kings 20 : 8.)

"It is, however, unnecessary to refer to instances, for it may be affirmed that upon all occasions, miraculous evidence of an alleged divine mission is stated to have been required and accorded.

"The startling information is at the same time given, however, that miracles may be wrought to attest what is false as well as to accredit what is true. In one place, it is declared that if a prophet actually gives a sign or wonder and it comes to pass, but teaches the people on the strength of it, to follow other gods, they are not to hearken to him, and the prophet is to be put to death.

'If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams.' (Deut. 13 : 1, 2, 3.)

"The false miracle is here attributed to God himself.

'For the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul.' (Deut. 13 : 3.)

"In the book of the prophet Ezekiel the case is stated in a still stronger way, and God is represented as directly deceiving the prophet.

'And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel.' (Ezek. 14 : 9.)

"The narrative of God's hardening Pharaoh's heart in order to bring more plagues upon the land of Egypt is in this vein. God, in fact, is represented as exerting his almighty power to deceive a man and then destroying him for being deceived. In the same spirit is the passage in which Micaiah describes the Lord as putting a lying spirit into the mouths of the prophets who incited Ahab to go to Ramoth-gilead. (1 Kings 22 : 14-23.)

"The miracles wrought by the Egyptian sorcerers in competing with Moses were done by another power than God. We have notable instances of the belief in signs and wonders wrought by this other power. Jesus is represented as warning his disciples against false prophets, who work signs and wonders.

'Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? of whom he should say, I never knew you, depart from me, ye that work iniquity.' (Mat. 7 : 22, 23.)

And again in another place:

'For false prophets shall arise, and shall work signs and wonders, to seduce, if it were possible, the elect.' (Mark 13: 22.)

Also, when the Pharisees accuse him of casting out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils, Jesus asks: 'By whom do your children cast them out?' a reply which would lose all its point if they were not admitted to be able to cast out devils. In another passage John is described as saying: 'Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, who followeth not us, and we forbade him.' Without multiplying instances, however, there can be no doubt of the fact that the reality of false miracles and lying wonders is admitted in the Bible. The obvious deduction from this representation of miracles is that the source and purpose of such supernatural phenomena must always be exceedingly uncertain. Their evidential value is, therefore, profoundly affected, 'it being,' as Dr. Newman has said of ambiguous miracles, 'antecedently improbable that the Almighty should rest the credit of his Revelation upon events which but obscurely implied his immediate presence.' As it is affirmed that other supernatural beings exist, as well as an assumed personal God, by whose agency miracles are performed, it is impossible to argue with reason that such phenomena are at any time especially due to the intervention of the Deity. Dr. Newman recognizes this, but passes over the difficulty with masterly lightness of touch. After advancing the singular argument that our knowledge of spirits is only derived from scripture, and that their existence cannot be deduced from nature, whilst he asserts that the being of a God--a personal God be it remembered--can be so discovered, and that, therefore, miracles can only properly be attributed to him, he proceeds: 'Still it may be necessary to show that on our own principles we are not open to inconsistency. That is, it has been questioned whether, in admitting the existence and power of the spirits on the authority of Revelation, we are not in danger of invalidating the evidence upon which that authority rests. For the cogency of the argument for miracles depends on the assumption, that interruptions in the course of nature must ultimately proceed from God; which is not true, if they may be effected by other beings without his sanction. And it must be conceded, that, explicit as scripture is in considering miracles as signs of divine agency, it still does seem to give created spirits some power of working them; and even, in its most literal sense, intimates the possibility of their working them in opposition to the true doctrine (Deut. 13 : 1-3; Mat. 24 : 24; 2 Thes. 2 : 9-11).' (Dr. Newman's Two Essays on Miracles, p. 31.)

"Dr. Newman repudiates the attempts of various writers to overcome this difficulty by making a distinction between great miracles and small, many miracles and few, or by referring to the nature of the doctrine attested in order to determine the author of the miracles, or by denying the power of spirits altogether, and explaining away scripture statements of demoniacal possession and the narrative of the Lord's temptation. 'Without having recourse to any of these dangerous modes of answering the objection,' he says, 'it may be sufficient to reply, that, since, agreeably to the antecedent sentiment of reason, God has adopted miracles as the seal of a divine message, we believe he will never suffer them to be so counterfeited as to deceive the humble inquirer.' (Ibid. p. 51.)

"This is the only reply which even so powerful a reasoner as Dr. Newman can give to an objection based on distinct statements of scripture itself. He cannot deny the validity of the objection, he can only hope or believe in spite of it. Personal belief independent of evidence is the most common and the weakest of arguments; at best it is prejudice masked in the garb of reason. It is perfectly clear that miracles being thus acknowledged to be common both to God and to other spirits they cannot be considered a distinctive attestation of divine intervention; and as Spinoza finely argued, not even the mere existence of God, can be inferred from them; for as a miracle is a limited act and never expressed more than certain and limited power, it is certain that we cannot from such an effect, conclude even the existence of a cause whose power is infinite.