LETTER XII

_February 20, 1918._

MY DEAR DICK,--

What would you do in the following circumstances?

A force is retiring in a north-westerly direction. The River Lea shown on the map is unfordable. Two companies are acting as the point of the rearguard. Their orders are to hold the bridges at _A_ and _B_. The bridge at _B_ is to be held until 10 a.m. and the bridge at _A_ until 10.30 a.m. If they can hold out until these hours, it is estimated that it will enable the main body to get away unmolested. The trees shown on the map are mostly oak, and are on an average forty feet high. The roads marked on the map are metalled and good. The farm buildings at _D_ are strong. You are commanding B Company of your battalion, which is at _B_ bridge, and are senior to Captain A., a reliable officer, who is occupying _A_ trench just south of _A_ wood. At 9.15 a.m. two scouts mounted on motor bicycles inform you that they have patrolled to the front and that none of the enemy are within three miles of you except a few companies near _E_, who are acting as support to an attack which is being made against _A_ bridge. At 9.20 a.m. you receive the following message from Captain A., dated 9 a.m.: “Please do whatever you can to support me. I am being heavily shelled, and infantry are trying to push across _A_ bridge. I fear that there is no chance of my being able to hold out until 10.30 a.m.”

What action would you take? State your reasons for the manner in which you would act and then definitely say what you intend to do.

_Comments on the Situation and Action adjudged Correct._

What you should always aim at is to obey the spirit of an order rather than its letter. You know Captain A. to be a reliable officer, and he says that he fears that he cannot hold out until 10.30. If the enemy seize _A_ trench before that hour, not only will your retreat be cut off, but the object of ordering A and B Companies to hold the bridges so as to enable the main body to get a good start will be defeated. The nearest hostile infantry to you, at _E_, is some two miles off, that is to say, some forty minutes’ march. In the circumstances it is your duty to go to the assistance of A Company. The next thing is to consider how you can best help him to carry out his retirement and also how you can best prevent the enemy from following up your main body. If you were to march straight to _A_ wood, it is doubtful whether you would help him very materially. The artillery firing from the south of the river would deal with the reinforcements you brought up and placed in _A_ trench, similarly to the way it dealt with B Company. By far your better plan will be to march as quickly as possible to _D_ wood and occupy the strong buildings at _D_ farm. From the farm buildings you will be able to prevent the enemy marching along the road from _A_ to _X_, and should be able to comply with the spirit of the order, and by the delay you will thus entail on the enemy’s movements you will be able to effect the same purpose as if you had actually prevented him from crossing _A_ bridge before 10.30. You should be able to hold on to _D_ farm until artillery are brought up to _A_ wood, and should then be able to slip away along the road _B X_. Without aeroplane observation, hostile artillery could not observe the effect of their fire from the S. of the river, as trees intercept their view.

_Orders._

B Company will at once march to _D_ wood and occupy _D_ farm.

_Order to Officer Commanding A Company._

I am marching immediately to _D_ farm, which I hope to reach before 10 a.m. From this place I shall be in a position to facilitate your retreat and prevent your being pursued farther than _A_ wood. You may retire as soon as you see that I have established myself in the farm buildings. Having accomplished the object for which we have been sent out, I shall continue my retirement to _X_.

* * * * *

These twelve little schemes I have set you are, as I think you will admit, all very simple, but I am willing to wager that you have not answered all of them correctly, even though they were only applications of the axioms which I gave in the letter which preceded them. The difficulty is, in the heat of the moment, to decide correctly which of the axioms deals with the special situation, and nothing but practice will get over this difficulty.

You should always take every opportunity of discussing with your comrades little tactical situations which have occurred, or those which may occur. In talking over the former, do not do so with the object of passing censure, but merely with the view of learning what to do and what not to do should you find yourself in a similar situation.

Whenever you have an opportunity, carefully explain the situation to your men. This is necessary if you expect them to co-operate intelligently in bringing about your designs.

In the solution of any little scheme which you may set to your subordinates, insist on definite orders being given and do not be content with vague disquisitions. When any little problem which you have set has been unsatisfactorily solved, let another leader fall in, take command, and do it again properly. This is the best way to ensure the proper solution being thoroughly understood and remembered for application on a future occasion. So long as you do not censure a superior in front of his men, it is a good thing to make your remarks in such a way that everybody can hear them.

You must guard against technical instructors giving wrong impressions. The bombing sergeant is inclined to impress on the men that there is no such weapon as the bomb. The instructors in the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun are also apt to talk so much of the value of the weapons in which they instruct that their pupils come away with very false ideas. The Lewis-gun sergeant, although he never fails to tell the men that the Lewis gun can fire at the rate of 600 rounds a minute, very often does forget to inform them that after firing 600 rounds it takes twenty minutes or half an hour to cool before it is capable of firing any more. It is all very well for these men to be enthusiasts, but you must see that they abide strictly by the truth and avoid giving false impressions.

I will close this letter with a few remarks on the moral forces. As Napoleon said, these are, compared with the physical, as three is to one. Men’s courage and determination and the will to conquer are more than half the battle. The situation to-day is no less serious than it was when I ended the last of my Twelve Letters to you, and it behoves you to devote the whole of your time and your energy to making yourself in every way efficient, and you must always bear in mind that it is possible that the little action in the winning or losing of which your right or wrong decision may be the principal factor may be the turning-point of a great battle.

Your affectionate father, “X. Y. Z.”

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; one unbalanced quotation mark was remedied.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.