Part 11

Chapter 114,099 wordsPublic domain

The first Article, in the Report, is founded on the Deposition of Sir _Solomon Medina_, by which you are Informed of a yearly Sum paid by him and his Predecessor, Contractors for Bread and Bread-Waggons, to myself. This Payment, ... I have called a Perquisite of the General or Commander in Chief in the _Low-Countries_; and it has been constantly apply'd to one of the most Important Parts of the Service there, I mean the procuring Intelligence, and other Secret Service.

The Commissioners are pleased to observe, That these Sums cannot be esteemed legal Perquisites, because they don't find 'em Claim'd or Receiv'd by any other _English_ General in the _Low-Countries_. But I must take leave to affirm to this House, That this Perquisite or Payment, has been allowed to that General or Commander in Chief, in the _Low-Countries_, both before and ever since the Revolution, to enable him to carry on such Secret Service. The like Allowance was made to Prince _Waldeck_, whilst he was General of the Dutch Army in _Flanders_; it was made during the last War as well as this; and for your further Satisfaction in this matter, I am content to refer my self to Sir _Solomon Medina_, who cannot but own, that when he made this Allowance, he knew it to be the constant Practice during the former Wars in the _Low-Countries_, and particularly when Prince _Waldeck_ commanded there. And if it be a Circumstance worth your notice, he must Inform you also, That the Allowance of Waggons, which the Report takes Notice of, is usual likewise; that he has allowed the like, or near the like Number to Count _Tilly_, though he was not Velt-Marshal, and that there is a proportionate Allowance of the same kind to other Officers. The Report may have observed very rightly, that the strictest Enquiry the Commissioners could make, they cannot find that any English General ever receiv'd this Perquisite. But I presume to say, the Reason is, that there never was any other English General besides my self, who was Commander in Chief in the _Low-Countries_. I crave leave then to say, That this Observation in the Report was Occasion'd through the want of due Information in the Usage of the Army. In receiving this as an established and known Perquisite, I have follow'd and kept up that Usage which I found in the Army when I first enter'd upon that Service; And upon this Ground alone, I hope that this House will not think I was Unwarranted in taking it.

But that no doubt may remain with you, I will State, as well as I can, what I have learnt, and during that time I have been in the Service, have been always understood to be the Ground, as well as the Design of this Allowance. The Contracts of Bread being of necessity at the same Rates for the whole Army, and it being for the Security of the Service that those Contracts should be in the fewest Hands; the certain Gain upon so large a sum as a Contract for the whole, or even part of the Army, even at the lowest Prices, makes this yearly allowance to have been thought not Unreasonable from the Contractor. This being an Allowance generally arising from Contracts that concern a variety of Troops, all under the same General, must naturally fall under the Direction, and come into the Hands of the Commander in Chief, as an Allowance to enable him to carry on such Designs which could not be foreseen, but yet necessary to be put in execution, and which chiefly depend upon Intelligence.

I thought it more needful to give you this Account of the Nature and Design of this Allowance, because I observe from the Report, that the Objection is to the Justice and Reasonableness of the Perquisite it self, without having regard to the Application or Use for which it is intended.

But the Commissioners apprehend this not to be a Justifiable Perquisite, because they say, the Publick or the Troops, necessarily suffer in proportion to every such Perquisite.

If these Observations were well grounded, I should think them good Reasons to put an end to the Allowance, and at the same time to blame those who first introduced it: But I take upon me to affirm, that this neither is nor can be the Cause. I have never heard a Complaint either of publick or particular Injury from this Allowance; nor does the Report assign any particular wherein it may be judged to be so.

This Allowance to the General can have no Influence upon the Contract it self, which is annually made and signed at the _Treasury_, and the Price regulated by what the States have agreed to pay for the Bread for their Forces. I appeal to all the Officers who have served with me in _Flanders_, whether the Forces in Her Majesty's Pay have not all along had as much, and as good Bread, as those of the _States_, and at the same Prices; which every Body will believe to be the Lowest, that consider the Frugal Economy of the _States_, and the small Pay of their Troops. And therefore I may safely conclude, that if the _English_ have had their Bread as Cheap as the _Dutch_, they have had it as Cheap as was possible. Nor indeed can it be imagined to be otherwise; for the very supposition of two different Prices paid by different Troops in the same Army, for the same Quantity of Bread, would occasion a Mutiny.

* * * * *

'Twill be necessary that I trouble the House with an account of the Time and Occasion whence this Payment of Two and Half _per Cent._ by the Foreign Troops commenced.

During the last War, the Allowance by Parliament for the Contingencies of the Army, of which that of Secret Service is the principal, was Fifty Thousand Pounds _per Annum_; but this Allowance fell so far short of the Expense on that Head, that upon the Prospect of this War's breaking out, the Late King assured me, That this part of the Service never cost him less than Seventy Thousand Pounds a year; However the Allowance of Parliament for the whole Contingent Service during this War, has been but Ten Thousand Pounds _per annum_; Three Thousand Pounds of which, or thereabouts, has generally gone for other Contingencies, than that of Intelligence. The Late King being unwilling to come to Parliament for more Money on that Head of the Service, proposed this Allowance from the Foreign Troops, as an Expedient to assist that part of the Service, and Commanded me to make the Proposition to them; which I did accordingly, and it was readily Consented to. By this Means a New Fund of about Fifteen Thousand Pounds _per annum_, was provided for carrying on the Secret Service, without any Expense to the Publick, or grievance to the Troops from whom the Allowance was made: For when the Publick pays, those Troops are not at all affected, or one Farthing increased in Consideration of this Deduction; nor is there in any Conventions for them any weight laid upon it, the Hire of Foreign Troops being governed by settled Rules and Treaties, and the Convention of the _States_ for them, being in the same Terms.

* * * * *

The true design of this Deduction being to supply the Secret Service, Gentlemen, I hope, you will observe that this, together with the _Article_ of the _Allowance_ by Parliament, when put together, doth fall short of the _Allowance_ given by Parliament, in the last War, upon this Head.

THE TORIES AND THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1712).

+Source.+--Swift: _The Conduct of the Allies_. Vol. v., pp. 66-72. Swift's Works, Bohn edition.

At the Revolution, a general war broke out in Europe, wherein many princes joined in an alliance against France, to check the ambitious designs of that monarch; and here the emperor, the Dutch, and England were principals. About this time the custom first began among us of borrowing millions upon funds of interest: It was pretended, that the war could not possibly last above one or two campaigns; and that the debts contracted might be easily paid in a few years, by a gentle tax, without burthening the subject. But the true reason for embracing this expedient, was the security of a new prince, not firmly settled on the throne: People were tempted to lend, by great premiums and large interest, and it concerned them nearly to preserve that government, which they trusted with their money. The person[30] said to have been author of so detestable a project, is still living, and lives to see some of its fatal consequences, whereof his grandchildren will not see an end. And this pernicious counsel closed very well with the posture of affairs at that time: For, a set of upstarts, who had little or no part in the Revolution, but valued themselves by their noise and pretended zeal when the work was over, were got into credit at court, by the merit of becoming undertakers and projectors of loans and funds: These, finding that the gentlemen of estates were not willing to come into their measures, fell upon those new schemes of raising money, in order to create a monied interest, that might in time vie with the landed, and of which they hoped to be at the head.

The ground of the first war, for ten years after the Revolution, as to the part we had in it, was, to make France acknowledge the late king, and to recover Hudson's Bay. But during that whole war, the sea was almost entirely neglected, and the greatest part of six millions annually employed to enlarge the frontier of the Dutch. For the king was a general, but not an admiral; and although King of England, was a native of Holland.

After ten years fighting to little purpose; after the loss of above an hundred thousand men, and a debt remaining of twenty millions, we at length hearkened to the terms of a peace, which was concluded with great advantages to the empire and Holland, but none at all to us;[31] and clogged soon after by the famous treaty of partition;[32] by which, Naples, Sicily, and Lorrain, were to be added to the French dominions; or if that crown should think fit to set aside the treaty, upon the Spaniards refusing to accept it, as they declared they would, to the several parties at the very time of transacting it; then the French would have pretensions to the whole monarchy. And so it proved in the event; for the late King of Spain reckoning it an indignity to have his territories cantoned out into parcels, by other princes, during his own life, and without his consent, rather chose to bequeath the monarchy entire to a younger son of France: And this prince[33] was acknowledged for King of Spain both by us and Holland.

It must be granted, that the counsels of entering into this war were violently opposed by the church-party, who first advised the late king to acknowledge the Duke of Anjou; and particularly, 'tis affirmed that a certain great person,[34] who was then in the church interest, told the king in November, 1701, That since His Majesty was determined to engage in a war so contrary to his private opinion, he could serve him no longer, and accordingly gave up his employment; though he happened afterwards to change his mind, when he was to be at the head of the Treasury, and have the sole management of affairs at home; while those abroad were to be in the hands of one, whose advantage, by all sorts of ties, he was engaged to promote.

The declarations of war against France and Spain, made by us and Holland, are dated within a few days of each other. In that published by the States, they say very truly That "they are nearest, and most exposed to the fire; that they are blocked up on all sides, and actually attacked by the Kings of France and Spain; that their declaration is the effect of an urgent and pressing necessity;" with other expressions to the same purpose. They "desire the assistance of all kings and princes," &c. The grounds of their quarrel with France, are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other prince or state; such as, "the French refusing to grant the Tariff promised by the treaty of Ryswick; the loading the Dutch inhabitants settled in France, with excessive duties, contrary to the said treaty; the violation of the Partition Treaty, by the French accepting the King of Spain's will, and threatening the States, if they would not comply; the seizing the Spanish Netherlands by the French troops, and turning out the Dutch, who by permission of the late King of Spain were in garrison there; by which means that republic was deprived of her barrier, contrary to the treaty of partition, where it was particularly stipulated, that the Spanish Netherlands should be left to the archduke." They alleged, that "the French king governed Flanders as his own, though under the name of his grandson, and sent great numbers of troops thither to fright them: That he had seized the city and citadel of Liège, had possessed himself of several places in the archbishopric of Cologne, and maintained troops in the country of Wolfenbuttel, in order to block up the Dutch on all sides; and caused his resident to give in a memorial, wherein he threatened the States to act against them, if they refused complying with the contents of that memorial."

The Queen's declaration of war is grounded upon the grand alliance, as this was upon the unjust usurpations and encroachments of the French king; whereof the instances produced are, "his keeping in possession a great part of the Spanish dominions, seizing Milan and the Spanish Low Countries, making himself master of Cadiz, &c. And instead of giving satisfaction in these points, his putting an indignity and affront on Her Majesty and kingdoms, by declaring the pretended Prince of Wales, K. of England, &c.," which last was the only personal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was positively denied by France, that king being willing to acknowledge Her Majesty.

I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no more to have been a principal in this war, than Prussia, or any other power, who came afterwards into that alliance. Holland was first in the danger, the French troops being at that time just at the gates of Nimeguen. But the complaints made in our declaration, do all, except the last, as much or more concern almost every prince in Europe.

For, among the several parties who came first or last into this confederacy, there were but few who, in proportion, had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill success of this war, than we. The Dutch took up arms to defend themselves from immediate ruin; and by a successful war, they proposed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier against France. The emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger son, chiefly at the expense of us and Holland. The King of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip designed to renew the old pretensions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all sides, except towards the sea, and could therefore only be defended by maritime powers. This, with the advantageous terms offered by K. Charles,[35] as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The Duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet greater: The main charge of the war on that side was to be supplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In case Milan should be conquered, it was stipulated that his highness should have the Duchy of Montferrat, belonging to the Duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria and Valencia, and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and the Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or in lieu of it, an equivalent out of the province of Novara, adjoining to his own state; beside whatever else could be taken from France on that side by the confederate forces. Then, he was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by France, who had so many troops in the Milanese, and might have easily swallowed up his whole duchy.

The rest of the allies came in purely for subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable sums into their own coffers, and refused to send their contingent to the emperor, alleging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.

Some time after the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the monarchy of Spain, in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was, Whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun. Those who were for the former alleged the debts and difficulties we laboured under; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowledged Philip for King of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the house of Austria, and their aversion for that of Bourbon, were not so surely to be reckoned upon, as some would pretend; that we thought it a piece of insolence, as well as injustice, in the French to offer putting a king upon us; and the Spaniards would conceive, we had as little reason to force one upon them; that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood, as one of Austrian; but, that if we should engage in a war for dethroning the D. of Anjou, we should certainly effect what, by the progress and operations of it, we endeavoured to prevent, I mean an union of interest and affections between the two nations; for the Spaniards must of necessity call in French troops to their assistance: This would introduce French counsellors into King Phillip's court; and this, by degrees, would habituate and reconcile the two nations: That to assist King Charles by English or Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new subjects, who have nothing in so great an abomination, as those whom they hold for heretics: That the French would by this means become masters of the treasures in the Spanish West Indies: That, in the last war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria were in our alliance, and by a modest computation brought sixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when Flanders, the seat of war, was on our side, and His Majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boast of our success: How then should we be able to oppose France with those powers against us, which would carry sixty thousand men from us to the enemy, and so make us, upon the balance, weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?

On the other side, those whose opinion, or some private motives, inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alleged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be King of Spain; that we could have no security for our trade, while that kingdom was subject to a prince of the Bourbon family; nor any hopes of preserving the balance of Europe, because the grandfather would, in effect, be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his design for universal monarchy. These and the like arguments prevailed; and so, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to consider the consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we hastily engaged in a war which hath cost us sixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected success in arms, hath put us and our posterity in a worse condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themselves.

The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I shall now particularly examine; where I presume it will appear, by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, the ambition of its domestic enemies; or treated with so much insolence, injustice and ingratitude by its foreign friends.

This will be manifest by proving the three following points.

_First_, That against all manner of prudence, or common reason, we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.

_Secondly_, That we spent all our vigour in pursuing that part of the war which could least answer the end we proposed by beginning of it; and made no efforts at all where we could have most weakened the common enemy, and at the same time enriched ourselves.

_Lastly_, That we suffered each of our allies to break every article in those treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burthen upon us.

[30] Dr. Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Sarum.

[31] The Peace of Ryswick, concluded in October, 1697. All that Louis did for England by that peace was to acknowledge William as King of England, and to engage not to assist his enemies. The Dutch and Leopold, however, were much better treated. The former had its commerce re-established, while to the latter were given many fortresses and towns, and advantages strengthening his empire. The Peace of Ryswick was truly not a peace, but a temporary cessation of hostilities.

[32] The Partition Treaties arose out of the troublesome question of the Spanish succession. After the Peace of Ryswick William III. and Louis XIV. attempted to settle this question by a partition of the Spanish possessions.

[33] This was Philip of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin.

[34] Sidney Godolphin, one of the greatest financiers among English statesmen. He was Lord High Treasurer under Queen Anne, and an intimate friend, as well as relative by marriage, of Marlborough. He was created an Earl in 1706, but was removed from his office at the fall of the Whig ministry in 1710.

[35] The Archduke Charles, who styled himself Charles III. of Spain.

VICAR OF BRAY.

_Old Song Composed in the time of George I._

The song illustrates the many changes of religion in the later Stuart period.

1. In good King Charles's golden days When loyalty no harm meant, A zealous High-Churchman was I, And so I got preferment. To teach my flock, I never missed, Kings were by God appointed, And damned are those that dare resist Or touch the Lord's anointed.

_Chorus._ And this is law that I'll maintain Until my dying day, sir, That whatsoever King shall reign I'll still be Vicar of Bray, sir.

2. When royal James possessed the Crown And Popery came in fashion The penal laws I hooted down And signed the Declaration. The Church of Rome I found would fit Full well my constitution, And I had been a Jesuit But for the Revolution.