Chapter 24

Since, then, it is manifest that the power granted to Congress to dispose of and make all needful regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States relates solely to the territory and property which had been ceded by individual States, and which after such cession lay without their respective limits, and for which special provision was deemed necessary, the main power of the Constitution operating internally, not being applicable or adequate thereto, it follows that this power gives no authority, and has even no bearing on the question of internal improvement. The authority to admit new States and to dispose of the property and regulate the territory is not among the enumerated powers granted to Congress, because the duties to be performed under it are not among the ordinary duties of that body, like the imposition of taxes, the regulation of commerce, and the like. They are objects in their nature special, and for which special provision was more suitable and proper.

Having now examined all the powers of Congress under which the right to adopt and execute a system of internal improvement is claimed and the reasons in support of it in each instance, I think that it may fairly be concluded that such a right has not been granted. It appears and is admitted that much may be done in aid of such a system by the right which is derived from several of the existing grants, and more especially from that to appropriate the public money. But still it is manifest that as a system for the United States it can never be carried into effect under that grant nor under all of them united, the great and essential power being deficient, consisting of a right to take up the subject on principle; to cause our Union to be examined by men of science, with a view to such improvements; to authorize commissioners to lay off the roads and canals in all proper directions; to take the land at a valuation if necessary, and to construct the works; to pass laws with suitable penalties for their protection; and to raise a revenue from them, to keep them in repair, and make further improvement by the establishment of turnpikes and tolls, with gates to be placed at the proper distances.

It need scarcely be remarked that this power will operate, like many others now existing, without affecting the sovereignty of the States except in the particular offices to be performed. The jurisdiction of the several States may still exist over the roads and canals within their respective limits, extending alike to persons and property, as if the right to make and protect such improvements had not been vested in Congress. The right, being made commensurate simply with the purposes indispensable to the system, may be strictly confined to them. The right of Congress to protect the works by laws imposing penalties would operate on the same principles as the right to protect the mail. The act being punishable only, a jurisdiction over the place would be altogether unnecessary and even absurd.

In the preceding inquiry little has been said of the advantages which would attend the exercise of such a power by the General Government. I have made the inquiry under a deep conviction that they are almost incalculable, and that there was a general concurrence of opinion among our fellow-citizens to that effect. Still, it may not be improper for me to state the grounds upon which my own impression is founded. If it sheds no additional light on this interesting part of the subject, it will at least show that I have had more than one powerful motive for making the inquiry. A general idea is all that I shall attempt.

The advantages of such a system must depend upon the interests to be affected by it and the extent to which they may be affected, and those must depend on the capacity of our country for improvement and the means at its command applicable to that object.

I think that I may venture to affirm that there is no part of our globe comprehending so many degrees of latitude on the main ocean and so many degrees of longitude into the interior that admits of such great improvement and at so little expense. The Atlantic on the one side, and the Lakes, forming almost inland seas, on the other, separated by high mountains, which rise in the valley of the St. Lawrence and determine in that of the Mississippi, traversing from north to south almost the whole interior, with innumerable rivers on every side of those mountains, some of vast extent, many of which take their sources near to each other, give the great outline. The details are to be seen on the valuable maps of our country.

It appears by the light already before the public that it is practicable and easy to connect by canals the whole coast from its southern to its northern extremity in one continued inland navigation, and to connect in like manner in many parts the Western lakes and rivers with each other. It is equally practicable and easy to facilitate the intercourse between the Atlantic and the Western country by improving the navigation of many of the rivers which have their sources near to each other in the mountains on each side, and by good roads across the mountains between the highest navigable points of those rivers. In addition to the example of the Cumberland road, already noticed, another of this kind is now in train from the head waters of the river James to those of the Kanawha; and in like manner may the Savannah be connected with the Tennessee. In some instances it is understood that the Eastern and Western waters may be connected together directly by canals. One great work of this kind is now in its progress and far advanced in the State of New York, and there is good reason to believe that two others may be formed, one at each extremity of the high mountains above mentioned, connecting in the one instance the waters of the St. Lawrence with Lake Champlain, and in the other some of the most important of the Western rivers with those emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, the advantage of which will be seen at the first glance by an enlightened observer.

Great improvements may also be made by good roads in proper directions through the interior of the country. As these roads would be laid out on principle on a full view of the country, its mountains, rivers, etc., it would be useless, if I had the knowledge, to go into detail respecting them. Much has been done by some of the States, but yet much remains to be done with a view to the Union.

Under the colonial governments improvements of this kind were not thought of. There was, it is believed, not one canal and little communication from colony to colony. It was their policy to encourage the intercourse between each colony and the parent country only. The roads which were attended to were those which led from the interior of each colony to its principal towns on the navigable waters. By those routes the produce of the country was carried to the coast, and shipped thence to the mercantile houses in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, or other towns to which the trade was carried on. It is believed that there was but one connected route from North to South at the commencement of the Revolution, and that a very imperfect one. The existence and principle of our Union point out the necessity of a very different policy.

The advantages which would be derived from such improvements are incalculable. The facility which would thereby be afforded to the transportation of the whole of the rich productions of our country to market would alone more than amply compensate for all the labor and expense attending them. Great, however, as is that advantage, it is one only of many and by no means the most important, Every power of the General Government and of the State governments connected with the strength and resources of the country would be made more efficient for the purposes intended by them. In war they would facilitate the transportation of men, ordnance, and provisions, and munitions of war of every kind to every part of our extensive coast and interior on which an attack might be made or threatened. Those who have any knowledge of the occurrences of the late war must know the good effect which would result in the event of another war from the command of an interior navigation alone along the coast for all the purposes of war as well as of commerce between the different parts of our Union. The impediments to all military operations which proceeded from the want of such a navigation and the reliance which was placed, notwithstanding those impediments, on such a commerce can not be forgotten. In every other line their good effect would be most sensibly felt. Intelligence by means of the Post-Office Department would be more easily, extensively, and rapidly diffused. Parts the most remote from each other would be brought more closely together. Distant lands would be made more valuable, and the industry of our fellow-citizens on every portion of our soil be better rewarded.

It is natural in so great a variety of climate that there should be a corresponding difference in the produce of the soil; that one part should raise what the other might want. It is equally natural that the pursuits of industry should vary in like manner; that labor should be cheaper and manufactures succeed better in one part than in another; that were the climate the most severe and the soil less productive, navigation, the fisheries, and commerce should be most relied on. Hence the motive for an exchange for mutual accommodation and active intercourse between them. Each part would thus find for the surplus of its labor, in whatever article it consisted, an extensive market at home, which would be the most profitable because free from duty.

There is another view in which these improvements are of still more vital importance. The effect which they would have on the bond of union itself affords an inducement for them more powerful than any which have been urged or than all of them united. The only danger to which our system is exposed arises from its expansion over a vast territory. Our union is not held together by standing armies or by any ties other than the positive interests and powerful attractions of its parts toward each other. Ambitious men may hereafter grow up among us who may promise to themselves advancement from a change, and by practicing upon the sectional interests, feelings, and prejudices endeavor under various pretexts to promote it. The history of the world is replete with examples of this kind--of military commanders and demagogues becoming usurpers and tyrants, and of their fellow-citizens becoming their instruments and slaves. I have little fear of this danger, knowing well how strong the bond which holds us together is and who the people are who are thus held together; but still, it is proper to look at and to provide against it, and it is not within the compass of human wisdom to make a more effectual provision than would be made by the proposed improvements. With their aid and the intercourse which would grow out of them the parts would soon become so compacted and bound together that nothing could break it.

The expansion of our Union over a vast territory can not operate unfavorably to the States individually. On the contrary, it is believed that the greater the expansion within practicable limits--and it is not easy to say what are not so--the greater the advantage which the States individually will derive from it. With governments separate, vigorous, and efficient for all local purposes, their distance from each other can have no injurious effect upon their respective interests. It has already been shown that in some important circumstances, especially with the aid of these improvements, they must derive great advantage from that cause alone--that is, from their distance from each other. In every other way the expansion of our system must operate favorably for every State in proportion as it operates favorably for the Union. It is in that sense only that it can become a question with the States, or, rather, with the people who compose them. As States they can be affected by it only by their relation to each other through the General Government and by its effect on the operations of that Government. Manifest it is that to any extent to which the General Government can sustain and execute its functions with complete effect will the States--that is, the people who compose them--be benefited. It is only when the expansion shall be carried beyond the faculties of the General Government so as to enfeeble its operations to the injury of the whole that any of the parts can be injured. The tendency in that stage will be to dismemberment and not to consolidation. This danger should, therefore, be looked at with profound attention as one of a very serious character. I will remark here that as the operations of the National Government are of a general nature, the States having complete power for internal and local purposes, the expansion may be carried to very great extent and with perfect safety. It must be obvious to all that the further the expansion is carried, provided it be not beyond the just limit, the greater will be the freedom of action to both Governments and the more perfect their security, and in all other respects the better the effect will be to the whole American people. Extent of territory, whether it be great or small, gives to a nation many of its characteristics. It marks the extent of its resources, of its population, of its physical force. It marks, in short, the difference between a great and a small power.

To what extent it may be proper to expand our system of government is a question which does not press for a decision at this time. At the end of the Revolutionary war, in 1783, we had, as we contended and believed, a right to the free navigation of the Mississippi, but it was not until after the expiration of twelve years, in 1795, that that right was acknowledged and enjoyed. Further difficulties occurred in the bustling of a contentious world when, at the expiration of eight years more, the United States, sustaining the strength and energy of their character, acquired the Province of Louisiana, with the free navigation of the river from its source to the ocean and a liberal boundary on the western side. To this Florida has since been added, so that we now possess all the territory in which the original States had any interest, or in which the existing States can be said, either in a national or local point of view, to be in any way interested. A range of States on the western side of the Mississippi, which already is provided for, puts us essentially at ease. Whether it will be wise to go further will turn on other considerations than those which have dictated the course heretofore pursued. At whatever point we may stop, whether it be at a single range of States beyond the Mississippi or by taking a greater scope, the advantage of such improvements is deemed of the highest importance. It is so on the present scale. The further we go the greater will be the necessity for them.

It can not be doubted that improvements for great national purposes would be better made by the National Government than by the governments of the several States. Our experience prior to the adoption of the Constitution demonstrated that in the exercise by the individual States of most of the powers granted to the United States a contracted rivalry of interest and misapplied jealousy of each other had an important influence on all their measures to the great injury of the whole. This was particularly exemplified by the regulations which they severally made of their commerce with foreign nations and with each other. It was this utter incapacity in the State governments, proceeding from these and other causes, to act as a nation and to perform all the duties which the nation owed to itself under any system which left the General Government dependent on the States, which produced the transfer of these powers to the United States by the establishment of the present Constitution. The reasoning which was applicable to the grant of any of the powers now vested in Congress is likewise so, at least to a certain extent, to that in question. It is natural that the States individually in making improvements should look to their particular and local interests, The members composing their respective legislatures represent the people of each State only, and might not feel themselves at liberty to look to objects in these respects beyond that limit. If the resources of the Union were to be brought into operation under the direction of the State assemblies, or in concert with them, it may be apprehended that every measure would become the object of negotiation, of bargain and barter, much to the disadvantage of the system, as well as discredit to both governments. But Congress would look to the whole and make improvements to promote the welfare of the whole. It is the peculiar felicity of the proposed amendment that while it will enable the United States to accomplish every national object, the improvements made with that view will eminently promote the welfare of the individual States, who may also add such others as their own particular interests may require.

The situation of the Cumberland road requires the particular and early attention of Congress. Being formed over very lofty mountains and in many instances over deep and wide streams, across which valuable bridges have been erected, which are sustained by stone walls, as are many other parts of the road, all these works are subject to decay, have decayed, and will decay rapidly unless timely and effectual measures are adopted to prevent it.

The declivities from the mountains and all the heights must suffer from the frequent and heavy falls of water and its descent to the valleys, as also from the deep congelations during our severe winters. Other injuries have also been experienced on this road, such as the displacing the capping of the walls and other works, committed by worthless people either from a desire to render the road impassable or to have the transportation in another direction, or from a spirit of wantonness to create employment for idlers. These considerations show that an active and strict police ought to be established over the whole road, with power to make repairs when necessary, to establish turnpikes and tolls as the means of raising money to make them, and to prosecute and punish those who commit waste and other injuries.

Should the United States be willing to abandon this road to the States through which it passes, would they take charge of it, each of that portion within its limits, and keep it in repair? It is not to be presumed that they would, since the advantages attending it are exclusively national, by connecting, as it does, the Atlantic with the Western States, and in a line with the seat of the National Government. The most expensive parts of this road lie within Pennsylvania and Virginia, very near the confines of each State and in a route not essentially connected with the commerce of either.

If it is thought proper to vest this power in the United States, the only mode in which it can be done is by an amendment of the Constitution. The States individually can not transfer the power to the United States, nor can the United States receive it. The Constitution forms an equal and the sole relation between the General Government and the several States, and it recognizes no change in it which shall not in like manner apply to all. If it is once admitted that the General Government may form compacts with individual States not common to the others, and which the others might even disapprove, into what pernicious consequences might it not lead? Such compacts are utterly repugnant to the principles of the Constitution and of the most dangerous tendency. The States through which this road passes have given their sanction only to the route and to the acquisition of the soil by the United States, a right very different from that of jurisdiction, which can not be granted without an amendment to the Constitution, and which need not be granted for the purposes of this system except in the limited manner heretofore stated. On full consideration, therefore, of the whole subject I am of opinion that such an amendment ought to be recommended to the several States for their adoption.

I have now essentially executed that part of the task which I imposed on myself of examining the right of Congress to adopt and execute a system of internal improvement, and, I presume, have shown that it does not exist. It is, I think, equally manifest that such a power vested in Congress and wisely executed would have the happiest effect on all the great interests of our Union. It is, however, my opinion that the power should be confined to great national works only, since if it were unlimited it would be liable to abuse and might be productive of evil. For all minor improvements the resources of the States individually would be fully adequate, and by the States such improvements might be made with greater advantage than by the Union, as they would understand better such as their more immediate and local interests required.

In the view above presented I have thought it proper to trace the origin of our institutions, and particularly of the State and National Governments, for although they have a common origin in the people, yet, as the point at issue turned on what were the powers granted to the one government and what were those which remained to the other, I was persuaded that an analysis which should mark distinctly the source of power in both governments, with its progress in each, would afford the best means for obtaining a sound result. In our political career there are, obviously, three great epochs. The colonial state forms the first; the Revolutionary movement from its commencement to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation the second, and the intervening space from that event to the present day the third. The first may be considered the infant state. It was the school of morality, of political science and just principles. The equality of rights enjoyed by the people of every colony under their original charters forms the basis of every existing institution, and it was owing to the creation by those charters of distinct communities that the power, when wrested from the Crown, passed directly and exclusively to the people of each colony. The Revolutionary struggle gave activity to those principles, and its success secured to them a permanent existence in the governments of our Union, State and National. The third epoch comprises the administration under the Articles of Confederation, with the adoption of the Constitution and administration under it. On the first and last of these epochs it is not necessary to enlarge for any purpose connected with the object of this inquiry. To the second, in which we were transferred by a heroic exertion from the first to the third stage, and whose events give the true character to every institution, some further attention is due. In tracing in greater detail the prominent acts of a movement to which we owe so much I shall perform an office which, if not useful, will be gratifying to my own feelings, and I hope not unacceptable to my readers.