Part 30

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th of December last, requesting the President of the United States "to communicate a plan for a peace establishment of the Navy of the United States," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of the Navy, which contains the plan required.

In presenting this plan to the consideration of Congress, I avail myself of the occasion to make some remarks on it which the importance of the subject requires and experience justifies.

If a system of universal and permanent peace could be established, or if in war the belligerent parties would respect the rights of neutral powers, we should have no occasion for a navy or an army. The expense and dangers of such establishments might be avoided. The history of all ages proves that this can not be presumed; on the contrary, that at least one-half of every century, in ancient as well as modern times, has been consumed in wars, and often of the most general and desolating character. Nor is there any cause to infer, if we examine the condition of the nations with which we have the most intercourse and strongest political relations, that we shall in future be exempt from that calamity within any period to which a rational calculation may be extended. And as to the rights of neutral powers, it is sufficient to appeal to our own experience to demonstrate how little regard will be paid to them whenever they come in conflict with the interests of the powers at war while we rely on the justice of our cause and on argument alone. The amount of the property of our fellow-citizens which was seized and confiscated or destroyed by the belligerent parties in the wars of the French Revolution, and of those which followed before we became a party to the war, is almost incalculable.

The whole movement of our Government from the establishment of our independence has been guided by a sacred regard for peace. Situated as we are in the new hemisphere, distant from Europe and unconnected with its affairs, blessed with the happiest Government on earth, and having no objects of ambition to gratify, the United States have steadily cultivated the relations of amity with every power; and if in any European wars a respect for our rights might be relied on, it was undoubtedly in those to which I have adverted. The conflict being vital, the force being nearly equally balanced, and the result uncertain, each party had the strongest motives of interest to cultivate our good will, lest we might be thrown into the opposite scale. Powerful as this consideration usually is, it was nevertheless utterly disregarded in almost every stage of and by every party to those wars. To these encroachments and injuries our regard for peace was finally forced to yield.

In the war to which at length we became a party our whole coast from St. Croix to the Mississippi was either invaded or menaced with invasion, and in many parts with a strong imposing force both land and naval. In those parts where the population was most dense the pressure was comparatively light, but there was scarcely an harbor or city on any of our great inlets which could be considered secure. New York and Philadelphia were eminently exposed, the then existing works not being sufficient for their protection. The same remark is applicable in a certain extent to the cities eastward of the former, and as to the condition of the whole country southward of the latter the events which mark the war are too recent to require detail. Our armies and Navy signalized themselves in every quarter where they had occasion to meet their gallant foe, and the militia voluntarily flew to their aid with a patriotism and fought with a bravery which exalted the reputation of their Government and country and which did them the highest honor. In whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to land their troops our fortifications, where any existed, presented but little obstacle to them. They passed those works without difficulty. Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only, but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering those inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there. The expense attending this species of defense, with the exposure of the inhabitants and the waste of property, may readily be conceived.

The occurrences which preceded the war and those which attended it were alike replete with useful instruction as to our future policy. Those which marked the first epoch demonstrate clearly that in the wars of other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral rights. Those of the second demonstrate with equal certainty that in any war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. Hence the subject of defense becomes intimately connected in all its parts in war and in peace, for the land and at sea. No government will be disposed in its wars with other powers to violate our rights if it knows we have the means, are prepared and resolved to defend them. The motive will also be diminished if it knows that our defenses by land are so well planned and executed that an invasion of our coast can not be productive of the evils to which we have heretofore been exposed.

It was under a thorough conviction of these truths, derived from the admonitions of the late war, that Congress, as early as the year 1816, during the term of my enlightened and virtuous predecessor, under whom the war had been declared, prosecuted, and terminated, digested and made provision for the defense of our country and support of its rights, in peace as well as in war, by acts which authorized and enjoined the augmentation of our Navy to a prescribed limit, and the construction of suitable fortifications throughout the whole extent of our maritime frontier and wherever else they might be deemed necessary. It is to the execution of these works, both land and naval, and under a thorough conviction that by hastening their completion I should render the best service to my country and give the most effectual support to our free republican system of government that my humble faculties would admit of, that I have devoted so much of my time and labor to this great system of national policy since I came into this office, and shall continue to do it until my retirement from it at the end of your next session.

The Navy is the arm from which our Government will always derive most aid in support of our neutral rights. Every power engaged in war will know the strength of our naval force, the number of our ships of each class, their condition, and the promptitude with which we may bring them into service, and will pay due consideration to that argument. Justice will always have great weight in the cabinets of Europe; but in long and destructive wars exigencies often occur which press so vitally on them that unless the argument of force is brought to its aid it will be disregarded. Our land forces will always perform their duty in the event of war, but they must perform it on the land. Our Navy is the arm which must be principally relied on for the annoyance of the commerce of the enemy and for the protection of our own, and also, by cooperation with the land forces, for the defense of the country. Capable of moving in any and every direction, it possesses the faculty, even when remote from our coast, of extending its aid to every interest on which the security and welfare of our Union depend. Annoying the commerce of the enemy and menacing in turn its coast, provided the force on each side is nearly equally balanced, it will draw its squadrons from our own; and in case of invasion by a powerful adversary by a land and naval force, which is always to be anticipated and ought to be provided against, our Navy may, by like cooperation with our land forces, render essential aid in protecting our interior from incursion and depredation.

The great object in the event of war is to stop the enemy at the coast. If this is done our cities and whole interior will be secure. For the accomplishment of this object our fortifications must be principally relied on. By placing strong works near the mouths of our great inlets in such positions as to command the entrances into them, as may be done in many instances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ships to pass them, especially if other precautions, and particularly that of steam batteries, are resorted to in their aid. In the wars between other powers into which we may be drawn in support of our neutral rights it can not be doubted that this defense would be adequate to the purpose intended by it, nor can it be doubted that the knowledge that such works existed would form a strong motive with any power not to invade our rights, and thereby contribute essentially to prevent war. There are, it is admitted, some entrances into our interior which are of such vast extent that it would be utterly impossible for any works, however extensive or well posted, to command them. Of this class the Chesapeake Bay, which is an arm of the sea, may be given as an example. But, in my judgment, even this bay may be defended against any power with whom we may be involved in war as a third party in the defense of our neutral rights. By erecting strong works at the mouth of James River, on both sides, near the capes, as we are now doing, and at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps, and connecting those works together by chains whenever the enemy's force appeared, placing in the rear some large ships and steam batteries, the passage up the river would be rendered impracticable. This guard would also tend to protect the whole country bordering on the bay and rivers emptying into it, as the hazard would be too great for the enemy, however strong his naval force, to ascend the bay and leave such a naval force behind; since, in the event of a storm, whereby his vessels might be separated, or of a calm, the ships and steam batteries behind the works might rush forth and destroy them. It could only be in the event of an invasion by a great power or a combination of several powers, and by land as well as by naval forces, that those works could be carried; and even then they could not fail to retard the movement of the enemy into the country and to give time for the collection of our regular troops, militia, and volunteers to that point, and thereby contribute essentially to his ultimate defeat and expulsion from our territory.

Under a strong impression that a peace establishment of our Navy is connected with the possible event of war, and that the naval force intended for either state, however small it may be, is connected with the general system of public defense, I have thought it proper in communicating this report to submit these remarks on the whole subject.

JAMES MONROE.

WASHINGTON, _February 2, 1824_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of December last, requesting the President of the United States to communicate to the House all such parts of the correspondence with the Government of Spain relating to the Florida treaty to the period of its final ratification, not heretofore communicated, which, in his opinion, it might not be inconsistent with the public interest to communicate, I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with copies of the correspondence requested.

JAMES MONROE.

WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

The House of Representatives on the 12th instant having "resolved that the President of the United States be requested to inform this House whether the rules and regulations compiled by General Scott for the government of the Army are now in force in the Army, or any part thereof, and by what authority the same has been adopted and enforced," I herewith transmit a report from the Department of War, which contains the information required.

JAMES MONROE.

WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

Agreeably to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th instant, requesting the President of the United States "to inform this House if the line intended to constitute the western boundary of the Territory of Arkansas has been run in conformity with the provisions of the third section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1823, entitled 'An act making appropriation for the military service of the United States for the year 1823, and for other purposes,' and, if said line has not been run, that he inform this House what instructions have been given or measures adopted in relation to the execution of the provision of the law, and what causes have prevented said line from being run," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of War, which contains the information required.

JAMES MONROE.

WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

The House of Representatives on the 26th ultimo having "resolved that the President of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before the House an estimate of the expense which would be incurred by transporting 200 of the troops now at the Council Bluffs to the mouth of the Columbia or Oregon River," I herewith transmit a report of the Secretary of War, which contains the information required.

JAMES MONROE.

WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1824_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I herewith transmit to Congress certain documents relating to a claim of Massachusetts for services rendered by the militia of that State in the late war, and for which payment was made by the State. From the particular circumstances attending this claim I have thought it proper to submit the subject to the consideration of Congress.

In forming a just estimate of this claim it will be necessary to recur to the cause which prevented its admission, or the admission of any part thereof, at an earlier day. It will be recollected that when a call was made on the militia of that State for service in the late war, under an arrangement which was alike applicable to the militia of all the States and in conformity with the acts of Congress, the executive of Massachusetts refused to comply with the call, on the principle that the power vested in Congress by the Constitution to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions was not a complete power for those purposes, but conditional, and dependent on the consent of the executives of the several States, and, also, that when called into service, such consent being given, they could not be commanded by a regular officer of the United States, or other officer than of the militia, except by the President in person. That this decision of the executive of Massachusetts was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and of dangerous tendency, especially when it is considered that we were then engaged in a war with a powerful nation for the defense of our common rights, was the decided opinion of this Government; and when the period at which that decision was formed was considered, it being as early as the 5th of August, 1812, immediately after the war was declared, and that it was not relinquished during the war, it was inferred by the Executive of the United States that the decision of the executive of that State was alike applicable to all the services that were rendered by the militia of the State during the war.

In the correspondence with the governor of Massachusetts at that important epoch, and on that very interesting subject, it was announced to him by the Secretary of War that if the militia of the State were called into service by the executive of the State, and not put under the command of the Major-General of the United States, as the militia of the other States were, the expense attending their service would be chargeable to the State, and not to the United States. It was also stated to him at the same time that any claim which the State might have for the reimbursement of such expenses could not be allowed by the Executive of the United States, since it would involve principles on which that branch of the Government could not decide.

Under these circumstances a decision on the claim of the State of Massachusetts has hitherto been suspended, and it need not be remarked that the suspension has proceeded from a conviction that it would be improper to give any sanction by its admission, or by the admission of any part thereof, either to the construction of the Constitution contended for by the then executive of that State or to its conduct at that period toward the General Government and the Union.

In January, 1823, the Representatives in Congress from Massachusetts and Maine suggested, by memorial, that the constitutional objection could not apply to a portion of the claim, and requested that the accounting officer of the Government might be instructed to audit and admit such part as might be free from that objection. In all cases where claims are presented for militia service it is the duty and the practice of the accounting officer to submit them to the Department for instruction as to the legality of the claim; that is, whether the service had been rendered by order of the competent authority, or otherwise, under circumstances to justify the claim against the United States, admitting that the evidence in support of it should be satisfactory. To this request there appeared to be no well-founded objection, under the reservation as to the constitutional principle, and accordingly an order was given to the accounting officers of the Treasury to proceed in auditing the claim with that reservation.

In conformity with this arrangement, the executive of Massachusetts appointed two citizens of that State commissioners to attend to the settlement of its claim, and who, in execution of the trust reposed in them, have presented to the accounting officer of the Treasury that portion comprehending the services of the fifth division of the militia of the State, which has been audited and reported for consideration, subject to the objection above stated. I have examined this report, with the documents presented by the commissioners, and am of opinion that the services rendered by that division were spontaneous, patriotic, and proper, necessary for self-defense, to repel in some instances actual invasion and in others to meet by adequate preparation invasions that were menaced. The commissioners of the State having intimated that other portions of service stood on similar ground, the accounting officer has been instructed, in auditing the whole, to do it in such manner as to enable the Department to show distinctly under what circumstances each portion of service was rendered, whether voluntary, called out by invasion or the menace of invasion, or by public authority, and in such case whether the militia rendering such service was placed under the authority of the United States or retained under that of the State.

It affords me great pleasure to state that the present executive of Massachusetts has disclaimed the principle which was maintained by the former executive, and that in this disclaimer both branches of the legislature have concurred. By this renunciation the State is placed on the same ground in this respect with the other States, and this very distressing anomaly in our system is removed. It is well known that the great body of our fellow-citizens in Massachusetts are as firmly devoted to our Union and to the free republican principles of our Government as our fellow-citizens of the other States. Of this important truth their conduct in every stage of our Revolutionary struggle and in many other emergencies bears ample testimony; and I add with profound interest and a thorough conviction that, although the difficulty adverted to in the late war with their executive excited equal surprise and regret, it was not believed to extend to them. There never was a moment when the confidence of the Government in the great body of our fellow-citizens of that State was impaired, nor is a doubt entertained that they were at all times willing and ready to support their rights and repel an invasion by the enemy.

The commissioners of Massachusetts have urged, in compliance with their instructions, the payment of so much of their claim as applies to the services rendered by the fifth division, which have been audited, and I should have no hesitation in admitting it if I did not think, under all the circumstances of the case, that the claim in all its parts was cognizable by Congress alone. The period at which the constitutional difficulty was raised by the executive of the State was in the highest degree important, as was the tendency of the principle for which it contended, and which was adhered to during the war. The public mind throughout the Union was much excited by that occurrence, and great solicitude was felt as to its consequences. The Executive of the United States was bound to maintain, and did maintain, a just construction of the Constitution, in doing which it is gratifying to recollect that the most friendly feelings were cherished toward their brethren of that State. The executive of the State was warned, in the correspondence which then took place, of the light in which its conduct was viewed and of the effect it would have, so far as related to the right of the Executive of the United States, on any claim which might afterwards be presented by the State to compensation for such services. Under these circumstances the power of the Executive of the United States to settle any portion of this claim seems to be precluded. It seems proper, also, that this claim should be decided on full investigation before the public, that the principle on which it is decided may be thoroughly understood by our fellow-citizens of every State, which can be done by Congress alone, who alone, also, possess the power to pass laws which may be necessary to carry such decision into effect.