Part 6

But in the present altered condition of the country--the national debt paid off at a season of universal peace and unexampled prosperity, with an overburthened Treasury, and when it is deemed necessary to dispose of it to resort to measures which many eminent statesmen consider unwarranted by the Constitution and which a great portion of the people of the Union consider of doubtful policy--at such a period and under such circumstances it is difficult to perceive the justice of longer withholding suitable appropriations for the defense of Maine, and to our view it can only be withheld by doing violence to the principles of equal rights and by neglecting a plain constitutional duty.

Your committee therefore submit the following resolutions.

STEPHEN C. FOSTER,

_Chairman_.

STATE OF MAINE.

RESOLVE relating to the fortification of frontier States.

_Resolved_, That the obligation of the Federal Government, under the Constitution, when it has the means to erect suitable fortifications for the defense of the frontier of the States, is a practical duty not justly to be denied, evaded, neglected, or delayed.

_Resolved_, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our Representatives requested to use their influence to obtain liberal appropriations for the defense of Maine and the Union.

_Resolved_, That the governor be requested to transmit copies of the above report and resolutions to the President and Vice-President, the Secretaries of State, Navy, and War, and to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress.

[Passed by both Houses and approved March 30, 1837.]

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

_Augusta, April 30, 1837_.

His Excellency MARTIN VAN BUREN,

_President of the United States_.

SIR: In compliance with a request of the legislature of this State, I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the accompanying report and resolutions:

In behalf of the State of Maine, I would respectfully, yet urgently, call on the President of the United States to cause the northeastern boundary of this State to be explored and surveyed and monuments erected in accordance with the request contained in the resolutions which are herewith communicated. As the subject is one in which the people of Maine have a deep interest, I feel a confidence it will commend itself to your early attention.

With high consideration, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

ROBERT P. DUNLAP.

STATE OF MAINE, IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

_FEBRUARY 2, 1837_.

The joint committee to whom was referred so much of the governor's message as relates to the northeastern boundary, and the documents and evidence, together with an order of the two houses instructing the committee "to inquire into the expediency of providing by law for the appointment of commissioners on the part of this State, by the consent of the Government of the United States, to survey the line between this State and the Province of New Brunswick according to the treaty of 1783, to establish monuments in such places as shall be fixed by said commissioners and by commissioners to be appointed on the part of the Government of Great Britain, have attended to the duties assigned them with the industry and solicitude which the importance of the subject demanded. Could the committee have spared the time and had the means to obtain documents not within the jurisdiction of the State, and consequently out of its power, a more clear, methodical, and perfect view of the subject would have been presented; but as there had been hitherto so much procrastination and the impatience of the public, already great, was becoming more and more intense, your committee without further preamble or apology ask leave to present the following report:

The legislature and people of Maine, we believe, will not contend that the treaty-making power of the United States does not extend to a final adjustment of a disputed and undefined line of boundary between a State and a foreign nation; _but we do insist_ that no power is granted by the Constitution of the United States to _limit_ or _change the boundary of a State or cede a part of its territory without its consent_. It is even by no means certain how far _such consent_ would enable the treaty authority to exert its powers. _Citizens_ might be made the subjects of a treaty transfer, and these citizens owing allegiance to the State and to the Union, and allegiance and protection being reciprocally binding, the right to transfer a citizen to a foreign government, to _sell_ him, might well be questioned as being inconsistent with the spirit of our free institutions. But be this as it may, Maine will never concede the principle that the President and two-thirds of the Senate can transfer its territory, much less its citizens, without its permission, given by its constitutional organs.

Your committee, however, deem it but fair to admit that they have discovered no inclination in the General Government, or any department of it, to assume this power. On the contrary, the President has repeatedly declined the adoption of a conventional line deviating from the treaty of 1783, upon the express ground that it could not be done without the consent of Maine.

It is due, nevertheless, to the State of Maine to say that the committee have no evidence that any conventional line has been proposed to them for their consent. It indeed appears that the consent of Maine had not been given to the adoption of any other boundary than that prescribed by the treaty of 1783 up to the 29th February, 1836, and we are well assured that no proposition for a different boundary has since that time been made to any department of the government of this State.

The President of the United States on the 15th June last communicated to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution, a copy of the correspondence relative to the northeastern boundary. This correspondence embraced a period from the 21st July, 1832, to the 5th March, 1836.

The opinion and advice of the King of the Netherlands, to whom the controversy was referred by the provisions of the treaty of Ghent, was made on the 10th January, 1831, and of the three questions submitted, viz, _the northeastern boundary, the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River_, and _the forty-fifth parallel of latitude_, he seems to have determined _but one_. He did decide that the source of the stream running into and through Connecticut Lake is the true northwest head of that river as intended by the treaty of 1783; and as to the rest, he _advises_ that it will be _convenient (il conviendra)_ to adopt the "Thalweg," the deepest channel of the St. John and St. Francis, for the north line, and that the forty-fifth degree is to be measured in order to mark out the boundary to the St. Lawrence, with a deviation so as to include Rouses Point within the United States. As to _the convenience_ of establishing the St. John and St. Francis as the northern boundary of Maine, we have only to observe that however "convenient" it may be to Great Britain to obtain so large a portion of our territory and waters, it would certainly be very _inconvenient_ to us, and inasmuch as we are probably capable of judging of our own "convenience," and have never solicited _the advice_ of anyone on this point, it is scarcely to be expected that we shall be _advised_ to adopt a line so preposterous and injurious.

It was in this view and in strict conformity with the Constitution conferring the treaty power that the President on the 7th December, 1831, submitted to the Senate this "award" and "advice" of the King of the Netherlands. Senators were divided on a principal point, some insisting that to carry the award or opinion into effect was only _in execution_ of the treaty, and it therefore belonged exclusively to the President "to take care" that this "supreme law" was faithfully executed or to reject it altogether.

But the prevailing opinion was that this "award" or "advice" was _perfecting an unfinished_ treaty, and that therefore it could not be effected by the President without "the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of the members present concurring therein." So far from the concurrence of two-thirds _for_ the measure, there were _thirty-four_ to _eight against_ it, and it was consequently rejected, and a recommendation to the President was adopted to open a new negotiation to determine the line of boundary according to the treaty of 1783.

It is insisted by the British ministers that a due north line from the monument at the source of the St. Croix will intersect no highlands described in the treaty of 1783. Now this is an assumption by Great Britain totally unwarranted by any evidence. The boundaries bearing upon the question are thus given: "From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, to wit, that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the highlands; along the said highlands which divide _the rivers_ that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north westernmost head of Connecticut River"; "east by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix from its mouth, in the Bay of Fundy, to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid highlands which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the St. Lawrence."

The first object, starting place, or _terminus a quo_, is this _northwest angle of Nova Scotia_. It is the corner of the British Province _designated by themselves_. It was presumed, and it is still believed, that they knew the identical spot; we have a right to demand of them to define it. In the treaty of 1783 they were disposed to define it, and hence they say it is _that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix to those highlands which divide the rivers that flow into the St. Lawrence from those which flow into the Atlantic Ocean_.

Nothing can be more clear than that the British negotiators of the treaty of 1783 had reference to their east and west line between Canada and Nova Scotia. This in 1755-56 was matter of controversy between France and England, the French claiming that it was far south and the British strenuously contending that these very highlands were even more north than we have endeavored to fix them.

The controversy resulted in a war, which, after the capture of Quebec, was terminated by the peace of 1763, whereby Great Britain obtained both sides of the line, and she then established the north line of Nova Scotia about where we contend it should be. So far from admitting that a due north line from the monument will not intersect the highlands intended by the treaty of 1783, the State of Maine has always insisted, and still insists, that no known obstacle exists to the ascertaining and accurately defining them, and thus establishing the _terminus a quo, to wit, the northwest angle of Nova Scotia_. It would seem strange, indeed, that this line, so fully discussed and controverted between the English and French in 1755-56, should have been left unsettled still when both Provinces became British. It is impossible to imagine such ignorance of so important a point as this northwest angle, so often referred to and spoken of as a notorious monument.

The peace of 1783 was considered by Great Britain as _a grant by metes and bounds_. The boundaries were prescribed, and this northwest angle was _the commencement_. Twenty years only before this (1763) Nova Scotia had been organized as a distinct Province, then including what are now Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and this angle was referred to as a boundary without hesitancy or doubt. Indeed, the treaty itself, as if to make assurance doubly sure, fixed it where a due north line from the source of the St. Croix will intersect those highlands which divide the rivers which flow into the _river_ St. Lawrence from those which flow into the Atlantic Ocean. This source of the St. Croix has been determined and a monument fixed there by the commissioners under the fifth article of the treaty of 1795 (Jay's). Now the assumption that the north line from this monument will intersect or meet no such highlands is entirely gratuitous.

The treaty does not speak of mountains nor even hills, but of "highlands" that divide rivers flowing different ways. It was well known that rivers did fall into the St. Lawrence and into the Atlantic, that these rivers would run _down_ and not _up_, and it was consequently inferred that the _land_ from whence these _rivers_ flowed must of necessity be _high_, and unless there are to be found in that region _geological phenomena_ which exist nowhere else on the face of the globe this inference is irresistible.

The truth is that these highlands have been known and well understood by the British themselves ever since the grant of James I to Sir William Alexander, in 1621. The portion of the boundary there given which relates to this controversy is "from the western spring head of the St. Croix, by an imaginary line conceived to run through the land northward to the next road of Ships River or Spring discharging itself into the great river of Canada, and proceeding thence _eastward_ along the shores of the sea of the said river of Canada to the road, haven, or shore commonly called _Gaspeck_" (Gaspe).

The cession of Canada by France made it necessary to define the limits of the Province of Quebec, and accordingly His Britannic Majesty, by his proclamation of 7th October, 1763, is thus explicit as to what affects this question: "Passing along the highlands which divide _the rivers_ that empty themselves into the said _river_ St. Lawrence from those which fall into _the_ sea, and also _along the north coast of the Bay de Chaleurs_ and the coast of the _Gulf_ of the St. Lawrence to _Cape Rosiers_" etc.

The act of Parliament of the fourteenth George III (1774) defines thus the south line of Canada: "South by a line from the Bay de Chaleurs along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which flow into _the sea_." The north line of the grant to Alexander is from the source of the St. Croix to the "spring head" or source of some river or stream which falls into the river St. Lawrence, and thence _eastward_ to Gaspe Bay, which communicates with the Gulf of St. Lawrence in latitude 49 deg. 30', and would make nearly an east and west line. The proclamation of 1763 defines the _south_ line of the Province of Quebec as passing along the highlands which divide the rivers that fall into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea, and also along the north coast of the Bay de Chaleurs to _the Gulf_ of St. Lawrence. This is the _south_ boundary, and consequently in an _east_ and _west direction_; but it passes _north_ of Bay de Chaleurs, wherefore the south boundary of the Province must of necessity be north of Bay de Chaleurs. The eastern boundary is northerly by the Gulf of _Cape Rosiers_, in about latitude 50 deg., longitude 64 deg. north of Gaspe Bay, and at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence, where it communicates with the gulf or sea. And the act of Parliament makes _this south side_ from this same bay along those highlands, and it must _inevitably run west_ or _it is no south_ boundary. Now no one can doubt that in the proclamation of 1763 it was the intent to adopt Sir William Alexander's _northern_ for this _southern_ boundary of the Province of Quebec.

Indeed, it appears in every commission to the governor of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick from 1763 to 1784, and after the treaty of peace of 1783, that the Province of Nova Scotia extended to the southern boundary of the Province of Quebec. It then irresistibly and inevitably follows that a west line from the Bay de Chaleurs, intersecting a due north line from the monument, is the identical northwest angle. Now a line from Mars Hill direct to Cape Rosiers, instead of being _easterly_, would be north of northeast, _crossing_ the Bay de Chaleurs. But passing along its north coast, as the proclamation provides, the line from this Mars Hill must be more northerly still. Indeed, the pretense that a pyramidal spur or peak, such as this hill, should constitute the range of highlands mentioned in the treaty is so utterly visionary that it is entitled to _no sort of respect_.

We may now by these facts and reflections give this inquiry a right direction, _to wit,_ to the ascertainment of the north boundary of Nova Scotia, which is the southern boundary of Canada. We have always been lured from this by the British negotiators to the _left_ or _west_ of this north line from the monument.

No one who is in the least conversant with the subject can suppose for a moment that this northwest angle can be found in such a direction. The question for us is, Are there any highlands north of the Bay de Chaleurs extending _in a western direction toward_ a north line drawn from the monument? If this line westerly from the bay be not distinctly marked so far as to intersect this north line, the principle is to extend it in the same direction to the place of intersection; that is, if the line between Nova Scotia and Canada is _west_ to within, say, 30 miles of the north line from the monument, and the rest of the way is indefinite or obscure, extend it on in the same direction until you form a point of intersection, and this will be the northwest angle of Nova Scotia. But the truth is, _the highlands are there_, and have been found in running due north from the monument. The elevations were taken by the British surveyor from the source of the St. Croix, at the monument, to the first waters of the Restigouche; and at Mars Hill, 40 miles, the summit of this isolated sugar loaf was 1,100 feet, and at the termination of the survey at the Restigouche waters, 100 miles farther, the elevation was I,600 feet; consequently the summit of Mars Hill, 1,100 feet above the waters of the St. Croix, is 500 feet lower than the lands at the Restigouche. And yet the pretense is that there are no highlands but this detached spur, Mars Hill! Still further, the highest position surveyed is nearly 50 miles short of the Melis, which falls into the St. Lawrence, and we do not perceive that the elevations have been taken there at all, but we do find it is here that _the waters separate_, and consequently the land must be still higher.

In failure of highlands (_assumed_ not to exist), the British negotiators claim a line which, instead of dividing the St. Lawrence and Atlantic waters, would actually extend between two rivers, _both of which fall into the Atlantic_.

To say nothing of the absurdity, not to say ignorance, of such a claim, it is enough that it is in the teeth of the treaty itself. It is painful to repeat the argument that no other highlands were intended, for all others were expressly excluded but those which divide the waters that flow in those different directions. The effect of their construction, as we all know, is to give them the whole of the St. John, with all its tributaries, and a tract of territory south of that river equal at least to 75 miles square.

Whether from the peaceful spirit of our Government, the Christian patience of Maine, or the "modest assurance" of the British negotiators--any or all--certain it is that His Britannic Majesty's pretensions _are growing every day_. It is not only an afterthought, but one very recently conceived, that we were to be driven south of the St. John.

His Britannic Majesty's agent, Mr. Chipman, who has been lately urging us south of that river, was also agent to the commission, under the treaty of 1795, to ascertain the true St. Croix, and in insisting on a more _western_ branch of this river gives as a reason that a line due north will cross the St, John _farther up_, whereas if you take an _eastern_ branch such line will cross near Frederickton, the seat of government of New Brunswick, and materially infringe upon His Majesty's Province. He not only admits, but contends, that this north line _must_ cross the river. Here are his words: "This north line must of necessity cross the river St. John." Mr. Liston, the British minister, in a private letter to Mr. Chipman of 23d October, 1798, recommends a modification of the powers of the commissioners for the reason that _it might give Great Britain a greater extent of navigation on the St. John River_. The same agent, Mr. Chipman, was also agent under the fourth article of the treaty of Ghent, and we find him contending there "that the northwest angle of Nova Scotia is the same designated in the grant to Sir William Alexander in 1621, subject only to such alterations as were occasioned by the erection of the Province of Quebec in 1763." Now we have already seen that this south line of the Province of Quebec, so far from _altering_ this northwest angle, in fact confirms it.

In perfect accordance with this disposition to encroach is a proposition of the British minister (Mr. Vaughan) that inasmuch as the highlands can not be found by a due north direction from the monument we should _vary west_ until we should intersect them, _but not_ EAST. Now that in case a monument can not be found in the course prescribed you should look for it _at the left, but not to the right_, seems to us a very _sinister_ proposition. We have shown, and, as we think, conclusively, that the range of highlands is to be looked for on British ground, and nowhere else, because it is their own boundary, and a line which must, with an ascertained north line, form the angle of one of their own Provinces. And yet we are not to examine there at all; we have never explored the country there, and are expected to yield to such arrogant, extravagant, and baseless pretensions!

We would ask why, in what justice, if we can not find the object in the route prescribed, are we to be thus trammeled? Where is the _reciprocity_ of such a proposition, so degrading to the dignity and insulting to the rights and liberties of this State? No; the people of Maine will not now, and we trust they never will, tamely submit to such a _one-sided_ measure.