Chapter 2

The originals of the two Republics are so much alike, that the history of one seems but a transcript from that of the other: so that every Dutchman instructed in the subject, must pronounce the American revolution just and necessary, or pass a censure upon the greatest actions of his immortal ancestors: actions which have been approved and applauded by mankind, and justified by the decision of Heaven.

But the circumstance, which perhaps in this age has stronger influence than any other in the formation of friendships between nations, is the great and growing interest of commerce; of the whole system of which through the globe, your High Mightinesses are too perfect masters for me to say any thing that is not familiarly known. It may not, however, be amiss to hint, that the central situation of this country, her extensive navigation, her possessions in the East and West Indies, the intelligence of her merchants, the number of her capitalists, and the riches of her funds, render a connection with her very desirable to America: and, on the other hand, the abundance and variety of the productions of America, the materials of manufactures, navigation and commerce; the vast demand and consumption in America of the manufactures of Europe, of merchandises from the Baltic, and from the East Indies, and the situation of the Dutch possessions in the West Indies, cannot admit of a doubt, that a connection with the United States would be useful to this Republic. The English are so sensible of this, that notwithstanding all their professions of friendship, they have ever considered this nation as their rival in the American trade; a sentiment which dictated and maintained their severe act of navigation, as injurious to the commerce and naval power of this country, as it was both to the trade and the rights of the Colonists. There is now an opportunity offered to both, to shake off this shackle for ever. If any consideration whatever could have induced them to have avoided a war with your High Mightinesses, it would have been the apprehension of an alliance between the two Republics: and it is easy to foresee, that nothing will contribute more to oblige them to a peace, than such a connection once completely formed. It is needless to point out, particularly, what advantages might be derived to the possessions of the Republic in the West Indies from a trade opened, protected and encouraged, between them and the Continent of America; or what profits might be made by the Dutch East India Company, by carrying their effects directly to the American market; or how much even the trade of the Baltic might be secured and extended by a free intercourse with America; which has ever had so large a demand, and will have more for hemp, cordage, sail-cloth, and other articles of that commerce: how much the national navigation would be benefited by building and purchasing ships there: how much the number of seamen might be increased, or how much more advantageous it would prove to both countries, to have their ports mutually opened to their men of war and privateers, and to their prizes.

If, therefore, an analogy of religion, government, origin, manners, and the most extensive and lasting commercial interests, can form a ground and an invitation to political connections, the subscriber flatters himself that, in all these particulars, the union is so obviously natural, that there has seldom been a more distinct designation of Providence to any two distant nations to unite themselves together.

It is further submitted to the wisdom and humanity of your High Mightinesses, whether it is not visibly for the good of mankind, that the powers of Europe, who are convinced of the justice of the American cause, (and where is one to be found that is not?) should make haste to acknowledge the independence of the United States, and form equitable treaties with them, as the surest means of convincing Great Britain of the impracticability of her pursuits? Whether the late marine treaty concerning the rights of neutral vessels, noble and useful as it is, can be established against Great Britain, who will never adopt it, nor submit to it, but from necessity, without the independence of America? Whether the return of America, with her nurseries of seamen and magazines of materials for navigation and commerce, to the domination and monopoly of Great Britain, if that were practicable, would not put the possessions of other nations beyond seas wholly in the power of that enormous empire, which has been long governed wholly by the feeling of its own power, at least without a proportional attention to justice, humanity, or decency. When it is obvious and certain that the Americans are not inclined to submit again to the British government, on the one hand, and that the powers of Europe ought not and could not with safety consent to it, if they were so inclined, on the other; why should a source of contention be left open, for future contingencies to involve the nations of Europe in still more bloodshed, when, by one decisive step of the maritime powers, in making treaties with a nation long in possession of sovereignty by right and in fact, it might be closed?

The example of your High Mightinesses would, it is, hoped, be followed by all the maritime powers, especially those which are parties to the late marine treaty: nor can the apprehension that the independence of America would be injurious to the trade of the Baltic, be any objection. This jealousy is so groundless that the reverse would happen. The freight and insurance in voyages across the Atlantic are so high, and the price of labour in America so dear, that tar, pitch, turpentine, and ship-timber never can be transported to Europe at so cheap a rate, as it has been and will be afforded by countries round the Baltic. This commerce was supported by the English before the revolution with difficulty, and not without large parliamentary bounties. Of hemp, cordage, and sail-cloth there will not probably be a sufficiency raised in America for her own consumption in many centuries, for the plainest of all reasons, because these articles may be imported from Amsterdam, or even from Petersburg and Archangel, cheaper than they can be raised at home. America will therefore be for ages a market for these articles of the Baltic trade.

Nor is there more solidity in another supposition, propagated by the English to prevent other nations from pursuing their true interests, that the colonies of other nations will follow the example of the United States. Those powers, who have as large possessions as any beyond seas, have already declared against England, apprehending no such consequences. Indeed there is no probability of any other power of Europe following the example of England, in attempting to change the whole system of the government of colonies, and reducing them by oppression to the necessity of governing themselves: and, without such manifest injustice and cruelty on the part of the metropolis, there is no danger of colonies attempting innovations. Established governments are founded deep in the hearts, the passions, the imaginations and understandings of the people; and without some violent change from without, to alter the temper and character of the whole people, it is not in human nature to exchange safety for danger, and certain happiness for very precarious benefits.

It is submitted to the consideration of your High Mightinesses, whether the system of the United States, which was minutely considered and discussed, and unanimously agreed on in Congress in the year 1776, in planning the treaty they proposed to France, to form equitable commercial treaties with all the maritime powers of Europe, without being governed or monopolized by any: a system which was afterwards approved by the king, and made the foundation of the treaties with his majesty: a system to which the United States have hitherto constantly adhered, and from which they never will depart, unless compelled by some powers declaring against them, which is not expected, is not the only means of preventing this growing country from being an object of everlasting jealousies, rivalries, and wars among the nations. If this idea be just, it follows, that _it is the interest of every state in Europe to acknowledge American independency immediately_. If such benevolent policy should be adopted, the new world will be a proportional blessing to every part of the old.

The subscriber has the farther honour of informing your High Mightinesses, that the United States of America, in Congress assembled, impressed with an high sense of the wisdom and magnanimity of your High Mightinesses, and of your inviolable attachment to the rights and liberties of mankind, and being desirous of cultivating the friendship of a nation, eminent for its wisdom, justice, and moderation, have appointed the subscriber to be their minister plenipotentiary to reside near you, that he may give you more particular assurances of the great respect they entertain for your High Mightinesses; beseeching your High Mightinesses to give entire credit to every thing, which their said minister shall deliver on their part, especially when he shall assure you of the sincerity of their friendship and regard. The original letter of credence, under the seal of Congress, the subscriber is ready to deliver to your High Mightinesses, or to such persons as you shall direct to receive it. He has also a similar letter of credence to his most Serene Highness the Prince Stadtholder.

All which is respectfully submitted to the consideration of your High Mightinesses, together with the propriety of appointing some person, or persons, to treat on the subject of his mission, by

LEYDEN 19 April 1781.

J. ADAMS

GUELDERLAND.

In the assembly of the States of Guelderland, holden in October 1781, to consider of the requisition of the king of France, of a negotiation of five millions of florins, under the warranty of the Republic, some were for an alliance with France. The Baron Nagel, Seneschal of Zutphen, avoided putting of the question, and said among other things, "That he had rather acknowledge the independence of the Americans, than contract an alliance with France."

The Baron van der Capellen de Marsch was for an alliance with France and America too. He observed, "That nothing being more natural than to act in concert with the enemies of our enemy, it was an object of serious deliberation, to see, if the interest of the Republic did not require to accept, without farther tergiversations, the invitations and offers of the Americans: that no condescension for England could hinder us, at present, from uniting ourselves against a common enemy, with a nation so brave and so virtuous: a nation, which, after our example, owes its liberty to its valour, and even at this moment is employed in defending itself from the tyranny of the enemy of the two nations: that, consequently, nothing could restrain us from acknowledging the independence of this new Republic: that our conduct differed very much from that holden by our ancestors, who allied themselves with the Portuguese, as soon as they shook off the yoke of the Spaniards: that there was no doubt, that the said alliances with the enemies of our enemy would soon restrain his fury, and operate a general peace advantageous for us."

The QUARTER

of

OOSTERGO.

_The Quarter of Oostergo, in the Province of Friesland, in December, 1781, was the first public Body which proposed a Connection with the United States of America in these Words._

Every impartial Patriot has a long time perceived that, in the direction of affairs relative to this war with England, there have been manifested an inconceivable lukewarmness and sloth; but they discover themselves still more, at this moment, by the little inclination which, in general, the Regencies of the Belgic Provinces testify to commence a treaty of commerce and friendship with the new Republic of the Thirteen United States of North America; and to contract engagements, at least during the continuance of this common war with the Crowns of France and Spain. Nevertheless, the necessity of these measures appears clearly, since, according to our judgments, nothing was more natural, nor more conformable to sound policy, founded upon the laws of the nature the most precise, than that this Republic, immediately after the formal declaration of war by the English (not being yet able to do any thing by military exploits, not being in a state of defence sufficiently respectable to dare, at sea, to oppose one fleet or squadron, to our perfidious enemy) should have commenced by acknowledging, by a public declaration, the Independence of North America. This would have been from that time the greatest step to the humiliation of England, and our own re-establishment; and by this measure, the Republic would have proved her firm resolution to act with vigour. Every one of our inhabitants, all Europe, who have their eyes fixed upon us, the whole World expected, with just reason, this measure from the Republic. It is true, that before the formal declaration of war by England, one might perhaps have alleged some plausible reason, to justify, in some degree, the backwardness in this great and interesting affair. But, as at present Great Britain is no longer our secret, but declared enemy, which dissolves all the connections between the two nations; and as it is the duty, not only of all the Regencies, but also of all the Citizens of this Republic, to reduce, by all imaginable annoyances, this enemy so unjust to reason, and to force him, if possible, to conclude an honourable peace; why should we hesitate any longer, to strike, by this measure so reasonable, the most sensible blow to the common enemy? Will not this delay occasion a suspicion that we prefer the interest of our enemy to that of our country? North America, so sensibly offended by the refusal of her offer; France and Spain, in the midst of a war supported with activity, must they not regard us as the secret friends, and favourers of their and our common enemy? Have they not reason to conclude from it, that our inaction ought to be less attributed to our weakness, than to our affection for England? Will not this opinion destroy all confidence in our nation heretofore so renowned in this respect? And our allies, at this time natural, must they not imagine, that it is better to have in us declared enemies than pretended friends? And shall we not be involved in a ruinous war, which we might have rendered advantageous, if it had been well directed? While on the other hand it is evident, that by a new connection with the States of North America, by engagements at least during this war with France and Spain, we shall obtain, not only the confidence of these formidable powers, instead of their distrust, but by this means we shall moreover place our colonies in safety against any insult; we shall have a well grounded hope, of recovering, with the aid of the allied powers, our lost possessions, if the English should make themselves masters of them; and our commerce at present neglected, and so shamefully pillaged, would reassume a new vigour; considering that in such case, as it is manifestly proved by solid reasons, this Republic would derive from this commerce the most signal advantages. But, since our interest excites us forcibly to act in concert with the enemies of our enemy; since the United States of America invited us to it long ago; since France appears inclined to concert her military operations with ours (although this power has infinitely less interest to ally itself with us, whose weakness manifests itself in so palpable a manner, than we have to form an alliance, the most respectable in the universe) it is indubitably the duty of every Regency, to promote it with all their forces, and with all the celerity imaginable. To this end, we have thought it our duty, to lay it before your noble Mightinesses, in the firm persuasion that the zeal of your noble Mightinesses will be as earnest as ours, to concur to the accomplishment of this point, which is for us of the greatest importance; that, consequently, your noble Mightinesses will not delay to co-operate with us, that, upon this important subject, there may be made to their High Mightinesses, a proposition so vigorous, that it may have the desired success: and that this affair, of an importance beyond all expression for our common country, may be resolved and decided by unanimous suffrages, and in preference to every particular interest.

ULTERIOUR ADDRESS.

_On the 9th January, 1782, Mr. ADAMS waited on the President VAN DEN SANDHEUVEL, and addressed him as follows._

On the fourth of May, I had the honour of a conference with the President of their High Mightinesses, in which I informed him, that I had received from the United States of America a commission, with full powers and instructions to propose and conclude a treaty of amity and commerce, between the said United States of America and the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

At the same conference, I had the honour to demand an audience of their High Mightinesses, in order to present to them my letters of credence and full powers.

The President assured me, that he would make report of all that I had said to him to their High Mightinesses, in order that it might be transmitted to the several members of the sovereignty of this country, for their deliberations and decisions.--I have not yet been honoured with an answer. I now do myself the honour to wait on you, Sir, to demand, as I do, a categorical answer, that I may be able to transmit it to the United States of America.

GUELDERLAND.

In an extraordinary assembly of the county of Zutphen, held at Nimeguen the 23d of February, 1782, the following measures were taken.

After the report of the Committee of this Province to the Generality, laid this day upon the table, relative to what passed in the precedent assembly, and after the examination of an extract of the register of the resolutions of their High Mightinesses the States General of the Low Countries, of the ninth of last month, in relation to the Ulteriour Address of Mr. Adams to the President of their High Mightinesses, concerning the presentation of his letters of credence to their High Mightinesses, in behalf of the United States of America, demanding a categorical answer, whereof the Lords the Deputies of the respective Provinces have taken copies; the Baron Robert Jasper van der Capellen de Marsch, first by word of mouth, and afterwards in writing, proposed, and insisted, at the assembly of this Quarter, that, at present, and without delay, we should make a point of deliberation, and that we should make upon the table the necessary overture, conceived more at length, in the advice of this nobleman, inserted in these terms:

NOBLE AND MIGHTY LORDS!

The subscriber judges, upon good grounds, and with out fear of being contradicted, that he is able to affirm, that it is more than time that we should give a serious attention to the offer and the invitation, in every sense honourable and advantageous for this Republic, of friendship, and reciprocal connections with the Thirteen American Provinces, now become free _at the point of the sword_, in such sort, that the categorical answer demanded by their Minister Mr. Adams, may become a subject of the deliberations of your Grand Mightinesses, and that you may decide as soon as possible, concerning their respective interests. He judges, that he ought not to have any farther scruple in this regard; and that the uncertain consequences of the mediation offered by Russia cannot, when certain advantages for this Republic are in question, hinder that, out of regard for an enemy, with whom we (however salutary the views of her Imperial Majesty are represented) cannot make any Peace, at the expence of a negligence so irreparable: that a longer delay, to unite ourselves to a nation already so powerful, will have for its consequence, that our inhabitants will lose the means of extending, in a manner the most advantageous, their commerce and their prosperity: That by the vigorous prohibition to import English manufactures into America, our manufactures, by means of precautions taken in time, will rise out of their state of languor: and that, by delaying longer to satisfy the wishes of the nation, her leaders will draw upon them the reproach of having neglected and rejected the favourable offers of Providence: that, on the contrary, by adopting these measures, the essential interests of this unfortunate people will be taken to heart.

The subscriber declaring, moreover, that he will abandon this unpardonable negligence of an opportunity favourable for the Republic, to the account of those whom it may concern; protesting against all the fatal consequences that a longer refusal of these necessary measures will certainly occasion: whereupon he demanded, that for his discharge, this note should be inserted in the registers of the Quarter.

_Signed_

R. J. VAN DER CAPELLEN.

This advice having been read, Mr. Jacob Adolf de Heekeren d'Enghuisen, Counsellor and first Master of Accounts in Guelderland, President at this time of the Assembly of the Quarter, represented to the said Robert Jasper van der Capellen de Marsch, that "Although he must agree to the justice of all that he had laid down, besides several other reasons, equally strong, which occurred to his mind, the deliberation upon the point in question appeared to him premature, considering that the Lords the States of Holland and West Friesland, and of Zealand, as the principal commercial Provinces, who are directly interested, had not nevertheless as yet explained themselves in this regard; consequently that it would not be so convenient for the States of this Duchy and County, who are not interested in it, but in a consequential and indirect manner, to form the first their resolutions in this respect: for this reason he proposed to consideration, whether it would not be more proper to postpone the deliberations upon this matter to a future opportunity."

Nevertheless, the before-mentioned Robert Jasper van der Capellan de Marsch insisting, that the voices should be collected upon the proposition and advice in question, and thereupon having deliberated, their noble Mightinesses have thought fit to resolve, that although the motives alledged by this Nobleman in his advice, appear to merit a serious consideration, nevertheless, for the reasons before alleged, they judge, that they ought to suspend the decision of it, until the commercial Provinces have formed their resolutions concerning it: and that, upon the requisition of Robert Jasper van der Capellan de Marsch, there be delivered to him an extract of the present, upon one as well the other.

_Signed_

HERM. SCHOMAKER.

PETITION OF LEYDEN.

To the noble, great, and venerable Lords of the Grand Council of the city of Leyden.