Part 3
What private Man will throw Stones at him because he _loved_? Or what Prince, because he _dissembled_?
If he either _trusted_, or _forgave_ his _Enemies_, or in some Cases _neglected_ his _Friends_, more than could in Strictness be allowed; let not those Errors be so arraigned as take away the Privilege that seemeth to be due to Princely Frailties. If Princes are under the Misfortune of being accused to govern ill, their Subjects have the less right to fall hard upon them, since they generally so little deserve to be governed well.
The truth is, the Calling of a King, with all its glittering, hath such an unreasonable weight upon it, that they may rather expect to be lamented, than to be envied; for being set upon a Pinacle, where they are exposed to Censure, if they do not do more to answer Mens Expectations, than corrupted Nature will allow.
It is but Justice therefore to this Prince, to give all due Softenings to the less shining Parts of his Life; to offer Flowers and Leaves to hide, instead of using Aggravations to expose them.
Let his Royal Allies than lie soft upon him, and cover him from harsh and unkind Censures; which though they should not be unjust, can never clear themselves from being indecent.
Political, Moral and Miscellaneous
Thoughts _and_ Reflections,
_By the Marquis of_ HALIFAX.
POLITICAL THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS.
_Of Fundamentals._
Every Party, when they find a Maxim for their turn, they presently call it a Fundamental, they think they nail it with a Peg of Iron, whereas in truth they only tie it with a wisp of Straw.
The word soundeth so well that the Impropriety of it hath been the less observed. But as weighty as the word appeareth, no Feather hath been more blown about in the World than this word, _Fundamental_.
It is one of those Mistakes that at sometimes may be of use, but it is a Mistake still.
Fundamental is used as Men use their Friends; commend them when they have need of them, and when they fall out, find a hundred Objections to them.
Fundamental is a Pedestal that Men set every thing upon that they would not have broken. It is a Nail every body would use to fix that which is good for them: for all Men would have that Principle to be immoveable, that serves their use at the time.
Every thing that is created is Mortal, _ergo_ all Fundamentals of human Creation will die.
A true Fundamental must be like the Foundation of a House; if it is undermined the whole House falleth.
The Fundamentals in Divinity have been changed in several Ages of the World.
They have made no difficulty in the several Councils, to destroy and excommunicate Men for asserting Things that at other Times were called Fundamentals.
Philosophy, Astronomy, _&c._ have changed their Fundamentals as the Men of Art no doubt called them at the time. Motion of the Earth, _&c._
Even in Morality one may more properly say, There _should be_ Fundamentals allowed, than that there _are_ any which in Strictness can be maintained.
However this is the least uncertain Foundation: Fundamental is less improperly applied here than any where else.
Wise and good Men will in all Ages stick to some Fundamentals, look upon them as sacred, and preserve an inviolable Respect for them; but Mankind in general make Morality a more malleable thing than it ought to be.
There is then no certain Fundamental but in _Nature_, and yet _there_ are Objections too. It is a Fundamental in Nature that the Son should not kill the Father, and yet the Senate of _Venice_ gave a Reward to a Son who brought in his Father's Head, according to a Proclamation.
_Salus Populi_ is an unwritten Law, yet that doth not hinder but that it is sometimes very visible; and as often as it is so, it supersedeth all other Laws which are subordinate Things compared.
The great Punishments upon Self-murder, are Arguments that it was rather a tempting Sin to be discouraged than an unnatural Act.
It is a Fundamental that where a Man intendeth no hurt he should receive none, yet Manslaughter, _&c._ are Cases of Mercy.
That a Boy under Ten shall not suffer Death, yet where _Malitia supplet aetatem_, otherwise.
That there were Witches--much shaken of late.
That the King is not to be deceived in his Grant--The practical Fundamental the contrary.
That what is given to God cannot be alienated. Yet in practice it is, Treaties, _&c._ and even by the Church itself, when they get a better bargain by it.
I can make no other Definition of a true Fundamental than this: _viz._ That whatever a Man hath a desire to do or to hinder, if he hath uncontested and irresistable Power to effect it, that he will certainly do it.
If he thinketh he hath that Power, though he hath it not, he will certainly go about it.
Some would define a Fundamental to be the settling the Laws of Nature and common Equity in such a sort as that they may be well administered: even in this case there can be nothing _fixed_, but it must _vary_ for the Good of the whole.
A Constitution cannot make itself; some body made it, not at once but at several times. It is alterable; and by that draweth nearer Perfection; and without suiting itself to differing Times and Circumstances, it could not live. Its Life is prolonged by changing seasonably the several Parts of it at several times.
The Reverence that is given to a Fundamental, in a general unintelligible Notion, would be much better applyed to that _Supremacy or Power_ which is set up in every Nation in differing Shapes, that altereth the Constitution as often as the Good of the People requireth it.
Neither _King_ nor _People_ would now like just the _original Constitution_, without any varyings.
If Kings are only answerable to God, that doth not secure them even in this World; since if God upon the Appeal thinketh fit not to stay, he maketh the People his Instruments.
I am persuaded that where ever any single Man had Power to do himself right upon a _deceitful Trustee_, he would do it. That Thought well digested would go a great way towards the discouraging Invasions upon Rights, _&c._
I lay down then as a Fundamental, 1st, that in every Constitution there is _some Power_ which neither will nor ought to be bounded.
2. That the King's Prerogative should be as _plain_ a thing as the People's Obedience.
3. That a Power which may by parity of Reason destroy the whole Laws, can never be reserved by the Laws.
4. That in all limited Governments it must give the Governor Power to _hurt_, but it can never be so interpreted as to give him Power to _destroy_, for then in effect it would cease to be a limited Government.
5. That Severity be rare and great; for as _Tacitus_ sayeth of _Nero_, "Frequent Punishments made the People call even his Justice Cruelty."
6. That it is necessary to make the Instruments of Power easy; for Power is hard enough to be digested by those under it at the best.
7. That the People are never so perfectly backed, but that they will kick and sting if not stroked at seasonable times.
8. That a Prince must think if he loseth his People he can never regain them.
It is both wise and safe to think so.
9. That Kings assuming Prerogative teach the People to do so too.
10. That Perogative is a Trust.
11. That they are not the _King_'s Laws, nor the _Parliament_'s Laws, but the _Laws of England_, in which after they have passed by the Legislative Power, the People have the _Property_, and the King the _Executive_ part.
12. That no Abilities should qualify a noted Knave to be employed in Business. A Knave can by none of his Dexterities make amends for the Scandal he bringeth upon the Crown.
13. That those who will not be bound by the _Laws_, rely upon _Crimes_: a third way was never found in the World to secure any Government.
14. That a Seaman be a Seaman; a Cabinet-Counsellor a Man of Business; an Officer, an Officer.
15. In corrupted Governments the Place is given for the sake of the Man; in good ones the Man is chosen for the sake of the Place.
16. That Crowds at Court are made up of such as would deceive: The _real Worshippers_ are few.
17. That _Salus Populi_ is the greatest of all Fundamentals, yet not altogether an immoveable one. It is a Fundamental for a Ship to ride at Anchor when it is in Port, but if a Storm cometh the Cable must be cut.
18. _Property_ is not a fundamental Right in one Sense, because in the beginning of the World there was none, so that Property itself was an Innovation introduced by Laws.
Property is only secured by trusting it in the best Hands, and those are generally chosen who are least likely to deceive; but if they should, they have a legal Authority to abuse as well as use the Power with which they are trusted, and there is no Fundamental can stand in their way, or be allowed as an Exception to the Authority that was vested in them.
19. _Magna Charta_ would fain be made to pass for a Fundamental; and Sir _Edward Coke_ would have it, that the Grand Charter was for the most part declaratory of the principal Grounds of the fundamental Laws of _England_.
If that referreth to the Common Law, it must be made out that every thing in _Magna Charta_ is always and at all times necessary in itself to be kept, or else the denying a subsequent Parliament the Right of repealing any Law doth by consequence deny the preceding Parliament the Right of making it. But they are fain to say it was only a declarative Law, which is very hard to be proved. Yet suppose it, you must either make the Common Law so stated a thing that all Men know it before-hand, or else universally acquiesce in it whenever it is alledged, from the Affinity it hath to the Law of Nature. Now I would fain know whether the Common Law is capable of being defined, and whether it doth not hover in the Clouds like the Prerogative, and bolteth out like Lightening to be made use of for some particular Occasion? If so, the Government of the World is left to a thing that cannot be defined; and if it cannot be defined, you know not what it is; so that the supream Appeal is, we know not what. We submit to God Almighty though he is incomprehensible, and yet He hath set down His Methods; but for this World, there can be no Government without a stated Rule, and a Supream Power not to be controled neither by the Dead nor the Living.
The Laws under the Protection of the King govern in the ordinary Administration; the extraordinary Power is in Acts of Parliament, from whence there can be no Appeal but to the same Power at another time.
To say a Power is Supream, and not Arbitrary, is not Sense. It is acknowledg'd Supream, and therefore, _&c._
If the Common Law is Supream, then those are so who judge what is the Common Law; and if none but the Parliament can judge so, there is an end of the Controversy; there is no _Fundamental_; for the Parliament may judge as they please, that is, they have the Authority, but they may judge against Right, their Power is good, though their Act is ill; no good Man will outwardly resist the one, or inwardly approve the other.
There is then no other Fundamental, but that _every Supream Power must be Arbitrary_.
Fundamental is a Word used by the Laity, as the Word Sacred is by the Clergy, to fix every thing to themselves they have a mind to keep; that nobody else may touch it.
_Of_ PRINCES.
A Prince who will not undergo the Difficulty of Understanding, must undergo the Danger of Trusting.
A wise Prince may gain such an Influence, that his Countenance would be the last Appeal. Where it is not so in some degree, his Authority is precarious.
A Prince must keep up the Power of his Countenance, which is not the least of his Prerogatives.
The Conscience, as well as the Prerogative of a King, must be restrained or loosened as is best for his People.
It may without Scandal be made of stretching Leather, but it must be drawn by a steady Hand.
A King that lets Intercession prevail, will not be long worshipped.
A Prince used to War getteth a military Logick that is not very well suited to the Civil Administration.
If he maketh War successfully, he groweth into a Demi-God; if without Success, the World throweth him as much below Humanity as they had before set him above it.
A Hero must be sometimes allowed to make bold Strokes, without being fettered by strict Reason.
He is to have some generous Irregularities in his Reasoning, or else he will not be a good Thing of his Kind.
PRINCES (_their Rewards of Servants_).
When a Prince giveth any Man a very extravagant Reward, it looketh as if it was rather for an ill thing than a good one.
Both the Giver and Receiver are out of countenance where they are ill suited, and ill applyed.
Serving Princes will make Men proud at first, and humble at last.
Resolving to serve well, and at the same time resolving to please, is generally resolving to do what is not to be done.
A Man that will serve well must often rule the Master so hard that it will hurt him.
It is thought an unsociable Quality in a Court to do ones Duty better than other Men.
Nothing is less forgiven than setting Patterns Men have no mind to follow.
Men are so unwilling to displease a Prince, that it is as dangerous to inform him right, as to serve him wrong.
Where Men get by pleasing, and lose by serving, the choice is so easy that no body can miss it.
PRINCES, _their Secrets_.
Men are so proud of Princes Secrets, that they will not see the danger of them.
When a Prince trusteth a Man with a dangerous Secret, he would not be sorry to hear the Bell toll for him.
_Love of the Subjects to a_ PRINCE.
The Heart of the Subjects yieldeth but a lean Crop where it is not cultivated by a wise Prince.
The Good-will of the Governed will be starved, if it is not fed by the good Conduct of the Governors.
_Suffering for_ PRINCES.
Those who merit because they suffered, are so very angry with those that made them suffer, that though their Services may deserve Employment, their Temper rendereth them unfit for it.
_Of_ MINISTERS.
The World dealeth with Ministers of State as they do with ill Fidlers, ready to kick them down Stairs for playing ill, though few of the Fault-finders understand their Musick enough to be good Judges.
A Minister who undertaketh to make his Master very great, if he faileth, is ruin'd for his folly; if he succeedeth, he is feared for his Skill.
A good Statesman may sometimes mistake as much by being too humble as by being too proud: He must take upon him in order to do his Duty, and not in order to the setting himself out.
A Minister is not to plead the King's Command for such things as he may in justice be supposed to have directed.
It is dangerous to serve where the Master hath the Privilege not to be blamed.
It is hard for a Prince to esteem the Parts of a Minister without either envying or fearing them; and less dangerous for a Minister to shew all the Weakness than all the Strength of his Understanding.
There are so many things necessary to make up a good Minister, that no wonder there are so few of them in the World.
There is hardly a rasher thing, than for a Man to venture to be a good Minister.
A Minister of State must have a Spirit of liberal Oeconomy, not a restrained Frugality.
He must enlarge his Family-Soul, and suit it to the bigger Compass of a Kingdom.
A Prince should be asked, why he _will_ do a thing, but not why he _hath_ done it.
If the Boys were to choose a School-master, it should be one that would not whip them; the same thing if the Courtiers were to choose a Minister.
They would have a great many Play-days, no Rods, and leave to rob Orchards.----The Parallel will hold.
_Wicked_ MINISTERS.
A Cunning Minister will engage his Master to begin with a small wrong Step, which will insensibly engage him in a great one.
A Man that hath the Patience to go by Steps, may deceive one much wiser than himself.
State-business is a cruel Trade; Good-nature is a Bungler in it.
_Instruments of_ STATE-MINISTERS.
Men in Business are in as much danger from those that work under them, as from those that work against them.
When the Instruments bend under the Weight of their Business, it is like a weak-legg'd Horse that brings his Rider down with him.
As when they are too weak they let a Man fall, so when they are too strong they throw him off.
If Men of Business did not forget how apt their Tools are to break or fail, they would shut up Shop.
They must use things called _Men_ under them, who will spoil the best Scheme that can be drawn by Human Understanding.
Tools that are blunt cannot cut at all, and those that are sharp are apt to cut in the wrong place.
Great difference between a good Tool and a good Workman.
When the Tools will be Workmen they cut their own Fingers, and every body's else.
_Of the_ PEOPLE.
There is more Strength in _Union_ than in _Number_; witness the People that in all Ages have been scurvily used, because they could so seldom agree to do themselves Right.
The more the weaker, may be as good a Proverb as, The more the merrier.
A People can no more stand without Government, than a Child can go without Leading-Strings: as old and as big as a Nation is, it can't go by itself, and must be led. The _Numbers_ that make its Strength, are at the same time the Cause of its Weakness and Incapacity of Acting.
Men have so _discovered themselves_ to _one another_, that Union is become a mere Word, in reality impracticable.
They trust, or suspect, not upon Reason but ill-grounded Fame; they would be at ease, saved, protected, _&c._ and give nothing for it.
The lower Sort of Men must be indulged the Consolation of finding fault with those above them; without that, they would be so melancholy, that it would be dangerous, considering their Numbers.
They are too many to be told of their Mistakes, and for that Reason they are never to be cured of them.
The Body of the People are generally either so dead that they cannot move, or so mad that they cannot be reclaimed: to be neither all in a Flame, nor quite cold, requireth more Reason than great Numbers can ever attain.
The People can seldom agree to move together against a Government, but they can to sit still and let it be undone.
Those that will be Martyrs for the People, must expect to be repayed only by their _Vanity_, or their _Virtue_.
A Man that will head the Mob is like a Bull let loose, tyed about with Squibs and Crackers.
He must be half mad that goeth about it, yet at sometimes shall be too hard for all the wise Men in a Kingdom: For though good Sense speaketh against Madness, yet it is out of Countenance whenever it meets it.
It would be a greater Reproach to the People that their _Favour_ is short-liv'd, if their _Malice_ was not so too.
The Thoughts of the People have no regular Motion, they come out by Starts.
There is an accumulative Cruelty in a number of Men, though none in particular are ill-natured.
The angry Buzz of a Multitude is one of the bloodiest Noises in the World.
_Of_ GOVERNMENT.
An exact Administration, and good choice of proper Instruments doth insensibly make the Government in a manner absolute without assuming it.
The best Definition of the best Government is, that it hath no Inconveniences but such as are supportable; but Inconveniences there must be.
The Interest of the Governors and the Governed is in reality the same, but by Mistakes on both Sides it is generally very differing. He who is a Courtier by Trade, and the Country Gentleman who will be popular, right or wrong, help to keep up this unreasonable Distinction.
There are as many apt to be angry at being well, as at being ill governed. For most Men to be well governed must be scurvily used.
As Mankind is made, the keeping it in order is an ill-natured Office.
It is like a great Galley where the Officers must be whipping with little Intermission, if they will do their Duty.
It is in a disorderly Government as in a River, the lightest Things swim at the top.
A Nation is best to be judged by the Government it is under at the time. Mankind is moulded to good or ill, according as the Power over it is well or ill directed. A Nation is a Mass of Dough, it is the Government that kneadeth it into Form.
Where Learning and Trade flourish in a Nation, they produce so much Knowledge, and That so much Equality among Men, that the Greatness of Dependencies is lost, but the Nation in general will be the better for it: For if the Government be wise, it is the more easily governed; if not, the bad Government is the more easily overturned, by Mens being more united against it than when they depended upon great Men; who might sooner be gained over and weakend by being divided.
There is more reason for allowing _Luxury_ in a Military Government than in another; the perpetual Exercise of War not only excuseth but recommendeth the Entertainments in the Winter. In another it groweth into a Habit of uninterrupted Expences and idle Follies, and the Consequences of them to a Nation become irrecoverable.
CLERGY.
If the Clergy did not live like temporal Men, all the Power of Princes could not bring them under the temporal Jurisdiction.
They who may be said to be of God Almighty's Houshold, should shew by their Lives that he hath a well disciplined Family.
The Clergy in this Sense, of Divine Institution; that God hath made Mankind so weak that it must be deceived.
RELIGION.
It is a strange thing that the way to save Mens Souls should be such a cunning Trade, as to require a skilful Master.
The time spent in praying to God, might be better employed in deserving well from him.
Men think praying the easier Task of the two, and therefore choose it.
The People would not believe in God at all, if they were not permitted to believe wrong in him.
The several Sorts of Religion in the World are little more than so many spiritual Monopolies.
If their Interests could be reconciled, their Opinions would be so too.
Men pretend to serve God Almighty who doth not need it, but make use of him because they need him.
Factions are like Pirates that set out false Colours, when they come near a Booty Religion is put under Deck.
Most Mens Anger about Religion is as if two Men should quarrel for a Lady, they neither of them care for.
_Of_ PREROGATIVE, POWER _and_ LIBERTY.
A Prerogative that tendeth to the Dissolution of all Laws must be void in itself, _felo de se_; for a Prerogative is a Law. The reason of any Law is, that no Man's Will should be a Law.
The King is the Life of the Law, and cannot have a Prerogative that is mortal to it.
The Law is to have a Soul in it, or it is a dead thing. The King is by his Sovereign Power to add Warmth and Vigour to the meaning of the Law. We are by no means to imagine there is such an Antipathy between them, that the Prerogative, like a Basilisk, is to kill the Law, whenever it looks upon it.
The Prince hath very rarely use of his Prerogative, but hath constantly a great Advantage by the Laws.
They attribute to the Pope indeed, that all the Laws of the Church are in his Breast; but then he hath the Holy Ghost for his learned Counsel, _&c._
The People's Obedience must be _plain_, and without _Evasions_. The Prince's Prerogative should be so too.
King _Charles the First_ made this Answer to the Petition of Right, (to the Observation whereof he held himself obliged in Conscience, as well as of his Prerogative.) "That the People's Liberties strengthen the King's Prerogative, and the King's Prerogative is to defend the People's Liberties."
That Prince's Declarations allow the Original of Government to come from the People. Prerogative never yet pretended to repealing.
The first ground of Prerogative was to enable the Prince to do _good_, not to do _every thing_.
If the ground of a King's desire of Power be his assurance of himself that he will do no hurt by it; is it not an Argument for Subjects to desire to _keep_ that which they will never _abuse_?