Chapter 4

It was naturally difficult for the Secretary of State to justify his instructions that the Annexation of the Transvaal was only to take place in case a majority of the inhabitants favoured such a course, in face of the fact that 6,800 out of 8,000 burghers had protested against it.

But both Shepstone and Lord Carnarvon declared without a shadow of proof that the signatures of the protesting petitions were obtained under threats of violence. The case, indeed, was exactly the reverse. When the meeting was held at Pretoria to sign this petition, Shepstone caused the cannons to be pointed at the assemblage. As if this were not enough, he issued a menacing proclamation against the signing of the petition.

When these pretexts were thus disposed of, they relied on the fact that the Annexation was a _fait accompli_.

Delegates were sent to England to protest against the Annexation, but Lord Carnarvon told them that he would only be misleading them if he held out any hope of restitution. Gladstone afterwards endorsed this by saying that he could not advise the Queen to withdraw her Sovereignty from the Transvaal.

When it was represented that the Annexation was a deliberate breach of the Sand River Convention, Sir Bartle Frere replied, in 1879, that if they wished to go back to the Sand River Convention, they might just as well go back to the Creation!

It is necessary here not to lose sight of the fact that the ground, which according to the Keate award in 1870 had been declared to lie beyond the borders of the Republic, was now included by Shepstone as being a part of the Transvaal.

There were, however, other matters which under Republican administration were branded as wrong, but which under English rule were perfectly right. In the Secoecoeni War under the Republic the British High Commissioner had protested against the use of the Swazies and Volunteers by the Republic in conducting the campaign.

Under British administration the war was carried on at first by regulars only, but when these were defeated by the Kaffirs, an army of Swazies, as well as Volunteers, was collected. The number of the former can be gathered from the fact that 500 Swazies were killed. The atrocities committed by these Swazi allies of the English on the people of Secoecoeni's tribe were truly awful.

Bishop Colenso, who condemned this incident, said, with regard to the results of the Annexation of the Republic, that the Zululand difficulty, as well as that with Secoecoeni, was the direct consequence of the unfortunate Annexation of the Transvaal, which would not have happened if we had not taken possession of the country like a lot of freebooters, partly by "trickery," partly by "bullying." Elsewhere he said: "And in this way we annexed the Transvaal, and that act brought as its Nemesis the Zulu difficulty."

That the British Government had all along considered the Zulus as a means of annihilating the Transvaal when a favourable opportunity occurred, is clear from a letter which the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, wrote to General Ponsonby, in which he says:--[27] "That while the Boer Republic was a rival and semi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulus as one might a tame wolf who only devoured one's neighbours' sheep. We always remonstrated, but rather feebly, and now that both flocks belong to us, we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolfs ravages."

And again in a letter to Sir Robert Herbert:--[28] "The Boers were aggressive, the English were not; and were well inclined to help the Zulus against the Boers. I have been shocked to find how very close to the wind the predecessors of the present Government here have sailed in supporting the Zulus against Boer aggression. Mr. John Dunn, still a salaried official of this Government, thinking himself bound to explain his own share in supplying rifles to the Zulus in consequence of the revelations in a late trial of a Durban gun-runner, avows that he did so with the knowledge, if not the consent, and at the suggestion of (naming a high Colonial official) in Natal. There can be no doubt that Natal sympathy was strongly with the Zulus as against the Boers, and, what is worse, is so still."

Under such circumstances did the Annexation take place. The English did not scruple to make use of Kaffir aid against the Boers, as at Boomplaats, and it was brought home in every possible way to the British Nation that a great wrong had been committed here; but even the High Commissioner, though he heard the words issue from our bleeding hearts, wished that he had brought some artillery in order to disperse us, and misrepresented us beyond measure.

Full of hope we said to ourselves if only the Queen of England and the English people knew that in the Transvaal a people were being oppressed, they would never suffer it.

[Sidenote: The War of Freedom.]

But we had now to admit that it was of no use appealing to England, because there was no one to hear us. Trusting in the Almighty God of righteousness and justice, we armed ourselves for an apparently hopeless struggle in the firm conviction that whether we conquered or whether we died, the sun of freedom in South Africa would arise out of the morning mists. With God's all-powerful aid we gained the victory, and for a time at least it seemed as if our liberty was secure.

At Bronkorst Spruit, at Laing's Nek, at Ingogo, and at Majuba, God gave us victory, although in each case the British troopers outnumbered us, and were more powerfully armed than ourselves.

After these victories had given new force to our arguments, the British Government, under the leadership of Gladstone, a man whom we shall never forget, decided to cancel the Annexation, and to restore to us our violated rights.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 23: Molesworth.]

[Footnote 24: Theal, 305.]

[Footnote 25: 30th April, 1877, Letter to the Rev. La Touche.]

[Footnote 26: Martineau, _The Transvaal Trouble_, page 76.]

[Footnote 27: Martineau, _The Transvaal Trouble_, page 69.]

[Footnote 28: _The Transvaal Trouble_, page 76.]

CONVENTIONS OF 1881 AND 1884.

[Sidenote: Pretoria Convention.]

An ordinary person would have thought that the only upright way of carrying a policy of restitution into effect would have been for the British Government to have returned to the provisions of the Sand River Convention. If the Annexation was wrong in itself--without taking the Boer victories into consideration--then it ought to have been abolished with all its consequences, and there ought to have been a _restitutio in integrum_ of that Republic; that is to say, the Boers ought to have been placed in exactly the same position as they were in before the Annexation. But what happened? With a magnanimity which the English press and English orators are never tired of vaunting, they gave us back our country, but the violation of the Sand River Convention remained unredressed. Instead of a sovereign freedom, we obtained free internal administration, subject to the suzerain power of Her Majesty over the Republic. This occurred by virtue of the Convention of Pretoria, the preamble of which bestowed self-government on the Transvaal State with the express reservation of suzerainty. The articles of that Convention endeavoured to establish a _modus vivendi_ between such self-government and the aforesaid suzerainty. Under this bi-lateral arrangement the Republic was governed for three years by two heterogeneous principles--that of representative self-government, and that represented by the British Agent. This system was naturally unworkable; it was also clear that the arrangement of 1881 was not to be considered as final.

[Sidenote: The London Convention.]

The suzerainty was above all an absurdity which was not possible to reconcile with practical efficacy. So with the approval of the British Government a Deputation went to London in 1883, in order to get the status of the Republic altered, and to substitute a new Convention for that of Pretoria. The Deputation proposed to return to the position as laid down by the Sand River Convention, and that was in fact the only upright and statesmanlike arrangement possible. But according to the evidence of one of the witnesses on the British side, the Rev. D.P. Faure, the Ministry suffered from a very unwholesome dread of Parliament; so it would not agree to this, and submitted a counter proposal (see Appendix A.), which eventually was accepted by the Deputation, and the conditions of which are to-day of the greatest importance to us.

This Draft was constructed out of the Pretoria Convention with such alterations as were designed to make it acceptable to the Deputation. The preamble under which complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty, was granted to the Republic was deliberately erased by Lord Derby, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, so that the suzerainty naturally lapsed when the Draft was eventually accepted. In order to make it perfectly clear that the status of the Republic was put upon another basis, the title "Transvaal State" was altered to that of the "South African Republic." All articles in the Pretoria Convention which gave the British Government any authority in the internal affairs of this Republic were done away with. As far as foreign affairs were concerned, a great and far-reaching change was made. It was stipulated in Article 2 of the Pretoria Convention that "Her Majesty reserves to herself, her heirs and successors (_a_), the right from time to time to appoint a British Resident in and for the said State, with such duties and functions as are hereinafter defined; (_b_), the right to move troops through the said State in time of war or in case of the apprehension of immediate war between the Suzerain Power and any Foreign State or Native tribe in South Africa; and (_c_) the control of the external relations of the said State, including the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with Foreign Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular officers abroad."

This was superseded by Article 4 of the Convention of London, which was to the following effect:--

"The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or Nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any Native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen.

"Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if Her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of such treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or any of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa."

The right of the British Government to exercise control over all our foreign relations, and to conduct all our diplomatic negotiations through its own Agent, was thus replaced by the far more slender right of approving or disapproving of our treaties and conventions _after they were completed_, and then only when it affected the interests of Great Britain or Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa.

[Sidenote: Status of the Republic.]

It was this Article 4 which gave an appearance of truth (and an appearance only) to Lord Derby's declaration in the House of Lords that although he had omitted the term of suzerainty, the substance thereof remained. It would have been more correct to have said that owing to the lapse of suzerainty the South African Republic no longer fell under the head of a semi-suzerain State, but that it had become a free, independent, sovereign international State, the sovereignty of which was only limited by the restriction contained in Article 4 of the Convention. Sovereignty need not of necessity be absolute. Belgium is a sovereign international State, although it is bound to observe a condition of permanent neutrality. The South African Republic falls undoubtedly under this category of States, the sovereignty of which is limited in one or other defined direction. But the fact of its sovereignty is nevertheless irrefutable. It will be pointed out later how this position, which is undoubtedly the correct one, has been consistently upheld by the Government of the South African Republic, but it is necessary now to revert to the historical development.

CAPITALISTIC JINGOISM.

FIRST PERIOD.

[Sidenote: The gold fields.]

In 1886 gold was discovered in great quantities and in different parts of the South African Republic, and with that discovery our people entered upon a new phase of their history. The South African Republic was to develope within a few years from a condition of great poverty into a rich and prosperous State, a country calculated in every respect to awaken and inflame the greed of the Capitalistic speculator. Within a few years the South African Republic was ranked among the first gold-producing countries of the world. The bare veldt of hitherto was overspread with large townships inhabited by a speculative and bustling class brought together from all corners of the earth. The Boers, who had hitherto followed pastoral and hunting pursuits, were now called upon to fulfil one of the most difficult tasks in the world, namely, the management of a complicated administration, and the government of a large digging population, which had sprung up suddenly under the most extraordinary circumstances. And how have they acquitted themselves of the task? We quote the following from a brilliant pamphlet by Olive Schreiner, who possesses a deeper insight into the true condition of affairs in South Africa than has been vouchsafed to any other writer on the same subject:--

[29] "We put it to all generous and just spirits, whether of statesmen or thinkers, whether the little Republic does not deserve our sympathy, which wise minds give to all who have to deal with new and complex problems, where the past experience of humanity has not marked out a path--and whether, if we touch the subject at all, it is not necessary that it should be in that large impartial, truth-seeking spirit in which humanity demands we should approach all great social difficulties and questions?"

"It is sometimes said that when one stands looking down from the edge of this hill at the great mining camp of Johannesburg stretching beneath, with its heaps of white sand and _débris_ mountain high, its mining chimneys belching forth smoke, with its seventy thousand Kaffirs and its eighty thousand men and women, white or coloured, of all nationalities, gathered here in the space of a few years on the spot where, fifteen years ago, the Boer's son guided his sheep to the water and the Boer's wife sat alone at evening at the house door to watch the sunset, we are looking upon one of the most wonderful spectacles on earth. And it is wonderful; but as we look at it the thought always arises within us of something more wonderful yet--the marvellous manner in which a little nation of simple folk, living in peace in the land they loved, far from the rush of cities and the concourse of men, have risen to the difficulties of their condition; how they, without instruction in statecraft or traditionary rules of policy, have risen to face their great difficulties, and have sincerely endeavoured to meet them in a large spirit, and have largely succeeded. Nothing but that curious and wonderful instinct for statecraft and the organisation and arrangement of new social conditions which seem inherent as a gift of the blood to all those peoples who took their rise in the little deltas on the north-east of the Continent of Europe where the English and Dutch peoples alike took their rise could have made it possible. We do not say that the Transvaal Republic has among its guides and rulers a Solon or a Lycurgus, but it has to-day, among the men guiding its destiny, men of brave and earnest spirit, who are seeking manfully and profoundly to deal with the great problems before them in a wide spirit of humanity and justice. And we do again repeat that the strong sympathy of all earnest and thoughtful minds, not only in Africa, but in England, should be with them."

If one compares the gold fields of the Witwatersrand with those of other countries, it is certain that the former can claim to be the best governed mining area in the world. This is the almost unanimous verdict of people who have had a lengthy experience of the gold fields of California, Australia, and Klondyke.

As far as South Africa is concerned, it is only necessary to instance the diamond fields of Griqualand West when they were directly administered by the British Government. They then afforded a continual spectacle of rebellion, rioting, and indescribable uncertainty of, and danger to, life and property.

In Appendix B. are certain extracts from the evidence of eye witnesses as to the chaos which characterised the condition of the diamond fields when under British rule--a condition which differs from that of the Witwatersrand gold fields as night from day. Reference will be made later on to the administration of the gold fields of the South African Republic. For the present it is necessary to glance at certain forces which had been developed on the diamond fields of the Cape Colony, and which have introduced a new factor of overwhelming importance into the South African situation.

[Sidenote: Capitalism.]

The development of British policy in South Africa had hitherto been influenced at different times, and in a greater or less degree, by the spirit of Jingoism, and by that zeal for Annexation which is so characteristic of the trading instincts of the race. It was, however, a policy that had been conducted in other respects on continuous lines, and it might be justified by the argument that it was necessary in the interests of the Empire. But Capitalism was the new factor which was about to play such an important _rôle_ in the history of South Africa. The natural differences in men find their highest expression in the varieties of influence which one man exercises over another; this influence can either be of a religious, moral, political, or purely material nature. Material influence generally takes the form of money, or the financial nexus, as an English writer has termed it. An unusual combination of this form of influence leads to Capitalism just as an unusual combination of political influence leads to tyranny, and an unusual combination of religious influence to hierarchical despotism. Capitalism is the modern peril which threatens to become as dangerous to mankind as the political tyranny of the old Eastern world and the religious despotism of the Middle Ages were in their respective eras.

In a part of the world so rich in minerals of all descriptions as the Transvaal, it is natural that Capitalism should play a considerable _rôle_. Unfortunately, in South Africa it has from the very first attempted to go far beyond its legitimate scope; it has endeavoured to gain political power, and to make all other forms of government and influence subservient to its own ends. The measure of its success can be clearly gauged by the fact that all South Africa is standing to-day on the brink of a great precipice, and may be hurled into the abyss before the ink on these pages is dry.

[Sidenote: Mr. Cecil Rhodes]

The spirit of Capitalism found its incarnation in Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who was able to amalgamate the pressing and conflicting interests of the Diamond Fields into the one great Corporation of which he is the head.

Although he probably had no exceptional aptitude for politics, he was irresistibly drawn towards them by the stress of his interests. By means of his financial influence, together with a double allowance of elasticity of conscience, he succeeded so far as to become Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and was powerfully and solidly supported by the Africander party. The Africanders believed in him because they were really and deeply imbued with the necessity of the co-operation and fusion of the two white races in South Africa, and he, as a loyal Englishman, but fully possessing the confidence of Colonial Africanderdom, seemed to them just the very person to realise their ideal.

To a careful observer the alliance between Africanderdom and Capitalism was bound to lead to a rupture sooner or later. Deeply rooted and pure national sentiment as well as burning conviction form the basis of Africander Policy, and it was obvious that in the long run it would be discovered that this policy could never be made subservient to purely financial interests.

[Sidenote: Jingoism.]

But there was another factor. There was that debased form of patriotism called Jingoism. It is a form of party politics without solid convictions or real beliefs, which puffs itself out with big words, and with the froth of high-sounding ideas and principles. It is a policy, nevertheless, which appeals most strongly to the instincts of self-interest and to the illegal appropriation of other people's property. It revels in the lust of boasting, so deeply ingrained in human nature. In a word, it is a policy which is in direct opposition to the true spirit of religion, to the altruistic ideals of humanity, and to that sentiment of humility and moderation which is the natural basis of all morality.

[Sidenote: Alliance between Capitalism and Jingoism.]

Here, indeed, were the elements of an enduring alliance--an alliance between Capitalism, with its great material influence, but barren of any one single exalted idea or principle on the one hand, and Jingoism, sterile, empty, soulless, but with a rich stock-in-trade of bombastic ideas and principles, prompted by the most selfish aspirations, on the other hand.

The one was eminently calculated to form the complement of the other, thus creating a natural alliance which is rapidly becoming a menace, all the world over, to the best and most enduring interests of humanity.

This Capitalistic Jingoism is the tree from which it is the lot of our unfortunate South Africa to gather such bitter fruit to-day.

Mr. Rhodes, with that treacherous duplicity which is an enduring characteristic of British policy in South Africa, co-operated publicly, and in the closest relationship, with the Colonial Africanders, while he was secretly fomenting a conspiracy with Jingoism against the Cape Africanders and the South African Republics. He already had the Africanders in the Cape Colony under his sway; his aim was now to gain the same influence in the South African Republic, with its rich gold mines--not so much, perhaps, for himself personally as for Capitalism, with which his interests were so closely identified. In case of success, he would obtain his personal aim, and Capitalism would be absolutely despotic in South Africa. With an eye to this end he, with other Capitalists, began in 1892 to foment a political agitation in Johannesburg against the Republic. In a place like Johannesburg, where drink is consumed in great quantities, and where the high altitude and the stress of business all tend to keep people's spirits in a constant state of excitability, it was easy enough, with the aid of money, to bring about a state of political ferment in a very short time, especially as just that measure of grievances existed to give a colour of truth to the imaginary ones.

[Sidenote: The National Union.]