Part 14

They all knew well in what this supposed superiority of the French lay, for the truth was, they never hesitated to turn a town or village inside out, if it suited their purposes, or to pull down a house, or half a dozen of them, if necessary, so as to get dry wood for their fires, whereas our people had to be marched regularly under officers for beef, bread, water, and wood, and they had seldom any thing else for it, but to cut down, bring in, and use the green branches of trees as fuel to cook with. This accounts for the observable difference between the two armies, for when our soldiers occasionally, and when not a tree was to be seen, got a house or two to burn, which were always paid for, they could then cook as quickly as their practised foes.

"Sir, _Frenada, Nov. 28th, 1812._

"I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions and brigades.

"But besides these objects I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to that state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree _than_ any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

"It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

"Yet the necessity for retreating existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches; none in which they made such long and repeated halts, and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army to some cause, besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army, and I am quite certain, that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of this duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and his field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the forage of his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, and a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

"These are points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as British, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant inspection and superintendance of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments, and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority, and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the view and superintendance of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the Provost, and the punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages, of which there are too many complaints, when they know that the officers and non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant _real_ inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view, both should be inspected daily.

"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked, in comparison with those of our army.

"The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and to the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c., to be cooked; and it would soon be found, if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining named, as it ought to be, equally as for the parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

"You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desireable, that the soldiers should not lose the habit of marching; and the divisions should march ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should be dry. But I repeat, that the great object of the attention of the general and field officers must be, to get the captains and subalterns of regiments to understand and perform the duties required of them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

"I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) "Wellington.

"_To the Officer commanding -- Division._"

The Duke of Wellington in this letter again accuses the officers of being, in a great measure, the cause of irregularities, by their neglect of duty; nevertheless, I still venture to attribute the bad conduct of the soldiers more particularly to what I am convinced was the chief cause, viz. the description of men they had to deal with. As a proof of this, we find what follows in a general order, dated Vizar, 28th February, 1810. "No. 6. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the soldiers of the army to the consequences of the crimes committed by the soldiers thus ordered for execution, under the sentence of a General Court-Martial. Cornelius McGuire, of the 27th regiment, and George Chambers, of the 88th regiment, committed a crime, which the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe is too common in this army; they robbed and ill-treated an inhabitant of this country, whom they met on the road; a crime which the Commander of the Forces is determined in no instance to forgive.

"The soldiers of the army have been invariably well treated by the inhabitants of Portugal, and the frequent instances which have occurred of their being robbed and ill treated, and of murder being committed, by soldiers who straggle from their detachments on a march, are a disgrace to the character of this army, and of the British nation.

"The Commander of the Forces is therefore determined, in every instance of the kind, that may occur, to have proof adduced of the crime committed, and the sentences of the General Courts-Martial, whatever they may be, shall be carried into execution.

"The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, that the crime committed by John McDonough, private in the 58th regiment, is no less common in this army, than robbery and murder, and in respect to this crime, (repeated desertion) he is equally determined to carry into execution, the sentences of the General Courts-Martial, whatever they may be."

We again find in a general order, dated Coimbra, 30th September, 1810, that four soldiers of the 45th regiment were found guilty, and sentenced to be executed, for stopping on the highway, assaulting, and robbing some Portuguese inhabitants, at, or near the bridge of St. Euphemia; and which sentence was confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, but who was, as will be seen by what follows, pleased to pardon them. "No. 3. Although the Commander of the Forces has long determined that he will not pardon men guilty of crimes of which the prisoners have been convicted, he is induced to pardon these men in consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 45th regiment on the 27th instant. (Battle of Busaco.) He trusts that this pardon will make a due impression upon the prisoners, and that by their future regular and good conduct, they will endeavour to emulate their comrades, who have, by their bravery, saved them from a disgraceful end."

I have already stated, that our soldiers certainly possess one redeeming quality, which is undaunted courage in battle; but how lamentable it was constantly to find that this was so much marred by irregularities and crimes, which invariably and instantly followed the most brilliant displays of it. As an instance of this, I beg to say, that upon the night of the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, I was in the trenches with the 45th regiment, which was destined to lead the assault of the main breach. Whilst waiting for the hour fixed upon for this purpose, an order arrived from Sir Thomas Picton, to form a forlorn hope. The officers commanding companies were therefore called together, and desired to bring to the head of the column, six men from each for the purpose. They soon returned, but to my surprise, unaccompanied by a single soldier, all of them declaring, that every man present volunteered for the pre-eminence, and they wished to know how they were to act, for that the oldest soldiers claimed it as their right. Well might officers be proud of such men, who could evince such a spirit with the breach, I may say, yawning for their destruction. The moment for the assault had however arrived--no time could be spared--the officer commanding knew not well what to do, when the Captain of Grenadiers, (now Major Martin) who was there dreadfully wounded, put an end to all difficulties, by requesting permission to lead as he stood with his company at the head of the column. This was very reluctantly acquiesced in, but there was no time to make any other arrangements, and thus the regiment advanced rapidly, but compactly and in perfect order, towards the breach.

The outer edge of the ditch was soon reached. The 45th, stoutly supported by the 88th and 74th, the other fine corps composing the leading brigade, jumped in upon bags of hay thrown there by the sappers. At that instant a very loud and prolonged explosion took place, seemingly at the foot of the breach, which, providentially, the regiment had not then reached. This did not, even for a moment, stop their progress, and the rugged breach was ascended under a most destructive fire from all points. Many brave men had already fallen. The enemy's fire continued to be most ruinous, and to our horror we saw that the breach was completely cut off, and that there was no possibility of advancing or descending into the city. The left was first tried, but in vain; and although the loss of officers and men of the brigade, but especially of the leading regiment was very great, yet no one supposed that retracing our steps could even be thought of. I had just made my way back, but with great difficulty, from the left of the breach, when I met General McKinnon, who commanded the brigade, and who had, by some means or other, contrived to get through the dense crowd below; and though I tried, amidst the uproar, to make him understand how we were situated, and that we could not gain ground to the left, yet he seemingly did not understand me, and went on in that direction. Whilst thus situated, another and a most dreadful explosion took place, which shook the ramparts like a powerful earthquake, and destroyed General McKinnon and most of those who had followed him. A short but fearful pause insued, when Brigade-Major Wylde suddenly appeared, coming greatly animated from the right, and pointing in that direction; all followed him with loud cheers, and I will venture to say, that he was the first man, who that night entered Ciudad Rodrigo. In their hurry in falling back from the breach, the French had not had time to remove a few planks laid across the cut to our right, and more were found on the other side; and thus by unflinching and persevering gallantry on the part of the leading brigade of the 3rd division, under a most appalling fire, the city was carried.

I make no remarks upon the gallantry of those employed at the smaller breach, but undaunted courage was unquestionably displayed upon this occasion by the soldiers; but all the corps engaged immediately broke away in search of plunder and liquor, or with the intention of enjoying themselves in every kind of irregularity and excess, and that too in spite of the utmost exertions of their officers, who could not for a moment be supposed capable of countenancing their atrocities.

I found myself again with the 45th regiment, which had in so noble a manner volunteered the forlorn hope, and had led so gallantly into the breach. A great part of the regiment had been got together, by the officers' exertions, in a large building in which they posted themselves immediately after the city was gained. The officers had begun to flatter themselves, and even to say to each other, that the corps would surely in this instance gain great credit for its proper behaviour; but while some watched one door, and all thought they had the soldiers secure for once, and out of harm's way, they almost all contrived to escape by another, and the officers, however zealous, had nothing for it, but to arm themselves with patience and resignation. Nevertheless several of them were ordered out into the streets to endeavour to bring back the stragglers, but the horrors witnessed, and which could not by any means be prevented, were beyond belief or description. I well remember, looking on in dismay, at a party of these madmen, belonging to all the corps engaged, sitting round a table, in a large house, carousing, singing, cheering, and firing off their muskets. The windows were all open, so that we could see every thing that was going forward, for the house was in a blaze about them. I called aloud, and did every thing possible to induce them to come out, but all in vain; they neither listened to me, nor to several other officers who were equally exerting themselves to save them, and we even ran great risks of being shot by these idiots, who continued drinking, singing, firing and cheering, and in which delightful occupations, I saw that they were most cordially joined by some of the French garrison.

This noise, however, and the reports of their muskets suddenly ceased; the roof of the building had fallen in, and they were all swallowed up amidst the ruins!

These wretched men were, I conclude, returned by their regiments as killed in the assault of the fortress.

Lord Wellington, I have reason to believe, ordered the 45th regiment, (then under the command of the present Major-General Sir Leonard Greenwell,) such was his opinion of their firmness, at the battle of Fuentes d'Onor, to receive in line, and without forming square, the enemy's cavalry then advancing in force towards them, if they should venture to charge. The experiment was not, however, made, for the French, I conclude, observing such a steady determined front presented to them, thought it wiser to retire, especially as they were at the time suffering severely from our cannon; but I have no doubt, as to what would have been the result, had they ventured to charge; yet this, if even successful, could not have been compared to the splendid achievement of the 5th regiment, in the famous retreat of the 3rd division from Elbodon to Guinaldo, in which I saw that corps receive the charge of the French cavalry steadily and firmly; to my delight and astonishment, however, they in turn charged them, and drove them down the hill with considerable loss. The 5th and 45th were, perhaps, as steady under arms, and as well conducted regiments as any in the army; yet I have seen both led away at sieges, and upon other occasions, when opportunities presented themselves, like the rest. I feel, however, that I ought here to give Lord Wellington's orders issued immediately after the retreat alluded to.

"G.O. _Richosa, 2d October, 1811._

"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces is desirous of drawing the attention of the army to the conduct of the 2d battalion, 5th and 77th regiments, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, and Major Arentschild's Portuguese artillery, under the command of the Hon. Major-General Colville, and of the 11th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars, under Major-General Alten, in the affair with the enemy on the 26th ult. These troops were attacked by between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, with six pieces of cannon, supported by a division consisting of fourteen battalions of infantry, with cannon.

"No. 4. The Portuguese artillerymen were cut down at their guns before they quitted them; but the 2nd battalion, 5th regiment, attacked the cavalry which had taken the guns, and retook them. At the same time the 77th regiment were attacked in front by another body of cavalry, upon which they advanced and repulsed them.

"No. 5. While these actions were performed, Major-General Alten's brigade, of which there were only three squadrons on the ground, were engaged on the left, with numbers infinitely superior to themselves. These squadrons charged repeatedly, supporting each other, and took above twenty prisoners; and notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy, the post would have been maintained, if the Commander of the Forces had not ordered the troops to withdraw from it, seeing that the action would become still more unequal, as the enemy's infantry were likely to be engaged in it, before the reinforcement ordered to the support of the post could arrive.

"No. 6. The troops then retired with the same determined spirit, and in the same good order with which they had maintained their post--the 2nd battalion, 5th regiment, and 77th, in one square, and the 21st Portuguese regiment in another, supported by Major-General Alten's cavalry and the Portuguese artillery. The enemy's cavalry charged three faces of the square of the British infantry, but were beaten off; and finding from their repeated fruitless efforts, that the brave troops were not to be broken, they were contented to follow them at a distance, and with firing upon them with their artillery, till the troops joined the remainder of the 3rd division, and were afterwards supported by a brigade of the 4th division.

"Although the 21st Portuguese regiment were not actually charged by the cavalry, their steadiness and determination were conspicuous, and the Commander of the Forces observed with pleasure the order and regularity with which they made all their movements, and the confidence they showed in their officers.

"No. 7. The Commander of the Forces has been particular in stating the details of this action in the general orders, as, in his opinion, it affords a memorable example of what can be effected by steadiness, discipline and confidence. It is impossible that any troops can, at any time, be exposed to the attack of numbers relatively greater than those which attacked the troops under Major-General Colville, and Major-General Alten, on the 25th of September; and the Commander of the Forces recommends the conduct of those troops to the particular attention of the officers and soldiers of the army, as an example to be followed on all such circumstances.

"No. 8. The Commander of the Forces considers Major-General Alten and Major-General Colville, and the commanding officers of the regiments under their command, respectively, viz. Lieutenant-Colonel Cummings, Lieutenant-Colonel Arentschild, Lieutenant-Colonel Broomhead, Major Ridge, and Colonel Bacellar of the 21st Portuguese regiment, and the officers and soldiers under their command to be entitled to his particular thanks, and he assures them that he has not failed to report his sense of their conduct in the action of the 25th September to those by whom he trusts it will be duly appreciated and recollected."

His Grace the Duke of Wellington very rarely bestowed such public praise upon any part of his army; yet how strange it was that soldiers who could, in the presence of their officers, behave so bravely and merit such encomiums should, when out of their sight, act so recklessly. I do not hesitate in saying that the officers of the army deserved more credit for whatever was found deserving of commendation in their men than was usually allowed them. It was of old a common saying that, "with French officers and English soldiers the world might easily be conquered." Whatever slur this may have been intended to convey against British officers, it certainly no longer exists, and it could be easily proved that they are now second to none; and all they want is a superior description of men to act with, which the United Kingdom can easily furnish, and a better system for their guidance--a system which would allow them to treat those placed under them as beings endowed with reason, and not as mere pieces of machinery.