Part 15

III. It is farther observed, in this answer, that mankind sinned in and fell with Adam in his _first transgression_, and therefore they had no concern in those sins, which he committed afterwards. This appears from hence, that Adam, as soon as he sinned, lost the honour and prerogative, that was conferred upon him, of being the federal head of his posterity, though he was their natural head, or common father; for the covenant being broken, all the evils, that we were liable to, arising from thence, were devolved upon us, and none of the blessings, contained therein, could be conveyed to us that way, since it was impossible for him, after his fall, to perform sinless obedience, which was the condition of the life promised therein. This doth not arise so much from the nature of the covenant, as from the change that there was in man, with whom it was made. The law, or covenant, would have given life, if man could have yielded perfect obedience; but since his fall rendered that impossible, though the obligation thereof, as a law, distinct from a covenant, and the curse, arising from the sanction thereof, remains still in force against fallen man; yet, as a covenant, in which life was promised, it was, from that time, abrogated; and therefore the apostle speaks of it, as being _weak through the flesh_, Rom. viii. 3. that is, by reason of Adam’s transgression, and consequently he ceased, from that time, to be the federal head, or means of conveying life to his posterity; therefore those sins that he committed afterwards, were no more imputed to them, to inhance their condemnation, than his repentance, or good works, were imputed for their justification.

IV. Having considered the first transgression of Adam, as imputed to all those who descended from him by ordinary generation, we shall proceed to consider, how this doctrine is opposed, by those who are in the contrary way of thinking.

_Object. 1._ It is objected, that what is done by one man cannot be imputed to another; for this is contrary to the divine perfections, to the law of nature, and the express words of scripture. It is true, that which is done by us, in our own persons, may be imputed to us, whether it be good or evil. Thus it is said, that Phinehas’s _zeal in executing judgment, by which means the plague was stayed, was counted to him for righteousness_, Psal. cvi. 30, 31. so was Abraham’s _faith_, Rom. iv. 9, 23. Accordingly God approved of these their respective good actions, as what denominated them righteous persons, and placed them to their account, as bestowing on them some rewards accordingly; so, on the other hand, a man’s own sin may be imputed to him, and he may be dealt with as an offender: But to impute the sin committed by one person to another, is to suppose that he has committed that sin which was really committed by another; in which case, the Judge of all the earth would not do right.

_Answ._ When we speak of persons being punished for a crime committed by another, as being imputed to them, we understand the word _imputation_ in a forensick sense, and therefore we do not suppose that here is a wrong judgment passed on persons or things, as though the crime were reckoned to have been committed by them; accordingly we do not say, that we committed that sin, which was more immediately committed by Adam. In him it was an actual sin; it is ours, as imputed to us, or as we are punished for it, according to the demerit of the offence, and the tenor of the covenant, in which we were included.

Moreover, it is not contrary to the law of nature, or nations, for the iniquity of some public persons to be punished in many others, so that whole cities and nations have suffered on their account; and as for scripture-instances hereof, we often read of whole families and nations, suffering for the crimes of those, who had been public persons, and exemplary in sinning. Thus Achan coveted the wedge of gold, and, for this, he suffered not alone; but his _sons and daughters were stoned, and burned with fire_, together with himself, Joshua vii. 24, 25. though we do not expressly read, that they were confederates with him in the crime. And as for the Amalekites, who, without provocation, came out against Israel in the wilderness, God threatens them, that he would have _war with them for this, from generation to generation_, Exod. xvii. 16. and in pursuance of this threatening, God, imputing the crime of their forefathers to their posterity, some hundreds of years after, ordered _Saul to go and utterly destroy them, by slaying both man and woman, infant and suckling_, 1 Sam. xv. 2, 3. And the sin of Jeroboam was punished in his posterity, according to the threatening denounced, 1 Kings xiv. 10, 11. as was also the sin of Ahab, 1 Kings xxi. 21, 22. And the church acknowledges, that it was a righteous dispensation of providence for God to bring upon Judah those miseries, which immediately preceded, and followed their being carried captive, when they say, _Our fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne their iniquity_, Lam. v. 7. and our Saviour speaks to the same purpose, when he tells the Jews, _That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel, unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar_, Matth. xxiii. 35. These instances, and others of the like nature, prove that it is no unheard of thing, for one man to suffer for a crime committed by another[64].

But I am sensible the principal thing intended in the objection, when this is supposed to be contrary to scripture, is, that it contradicts the sense of what the prophet says, when he tells the people, that _they should not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge_; for _the soul that sinneth shall die_, Ezek. xviii. 2-4. the meaning of which scripture is, that if they were humble and penitent, and did not commit those crimes that their fathers had done, they should not be punished for them, which was a special act of favour, that God would grant them on this supposition; and it is as much as to say, that he would not impute their father’s sins to them, or suffer them to be carried captive, merely because their fathers had deserved this desolating judgment. But this does not, in all respects, agree with the instance before us; for we are considering Adam as the federal head of his posterity, and so their fathers were not to be considered in this, and such like scriptures. Moreover, the objectors will hardly deny, that natural death, and the many evils of this life, are a punishment, in some respects, for the sin of our first parents. Therefore the question is not, whether some degree of punishment may ensue hereupon? but, whether the greatest degree of the punishment of sin in hell, can be said to be the consequence hereof? But this we shall be led more particularly to consider, under a following answer[65].

_Object. 2._ It is farther objected, that it is not agreeable to the divine perfections, for God to appoint Adam to be the head and representative of all his posterity; so that they must stand, or fall, with respect to their spiritual and eternal concerns in him, inasmuch as this was not done by their own choice and consent, which they were not capable of giving, since they were not existent. The case say they, is the same, as though a king should appoint a representative body of men, and give them a power to enact laws, whereby his subjects should be dispossessed of their estates and properties, which no one can suppose to be just; whereas if they had chosen them themselves, they would have no reason to complain of any injustice that was done them, inasmuch as the laws, made by their representatives, are, in effect, their own laws. Therefore, to apply this to the case before us, had all mankind chose Adam to be their representative, or consented to stand or fall in him, there would have been no reason to complain of the dispensation of God’s providence, relating hereunto: but, inasmuch as it was otherwise, it does not seem agreeable to the justice of God, to constitute him the head and representative of all his posterity: so that, by his fall, they should be involved in ruin, and eternal perdition.

_Answ._ There are various methods taken to answer this objection.

1. Some say little more to it than this: That if Adam had retained his integrity, we should have accepted of, and rejoiced in that life, which he would have procured by his standing; there would then have been no complaint, or finding fault, with the divine dispensation, as though it had been unjust; therefore, since he fell, and brought death into the world, it is reasonable that we should submit, and acknowledge, that all the ways of God are equal. But, though we must all allow that submission to the will of God, in whatever he does, is the creatures duty, yet I cannot think this a sufficient answer to the objection, and therefore would not lay much stress upon it, but proceed to consider what may be farther said in answer to it.

2. Others say, that, since Adam was the common father, and consequently the most honourable of mankind, (our Saviour only excepted, whom he did not represent) therefore it was fit that he should have this honour conferred upon him; so that, had all his posterity been existent, and the choice of a representative been wholly referred to them, the law of nature would have directed to, and pointed out the man, who ought, in this respect, to have the preference to all others. This answer bids fairer, I confess to remove the difficulty than the other, especially if it be added, that God might have given Adam some advantages of nature, above the rest of mankind, besides that relative one, arising from his being their common father; and therefore, that it would have been their interest, as well as their duty, to have chosen him, as being best qualified to perform the work that was devolved upon him.

3. But, since this will not wholly remove the difficulty, it is farther alleged, that God chose him, and therefore we ought to acquiesce in his choice; and, indeed, had all mankind been then existent, supposing them to be in a state of perfect holiness (and we must not suppose the contrary) then they would have acknowledged the equity of this divine dispensation, otherwise they would have actually sinned, and fallen, in rejecting and complaining of the will of God. But this will not satisfy those who advance the contrary scheme of doctrine, and deny the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, who still complain of it, as a very severe dispensation, and conclude, that the sovereignty of God is pleaded for against his other perfections; therefore something farther must be added, in answer to the objection.

We freely allow, that it is not equitable (to use the similitude taken from human forms of government) for a king to appoint a representative, who shall have a power committed to him, to take away the properties, or estates of his subjects: but this does not, in many respects, agree with the matter under our present consideration: nevertheless, if we were to suppose, that these subjects had nothing which they could call their own, separate from the will of the prince, and their properties and estates were not only defended, but given by him, and that upon this tenure, that he reserved to himself a right to dispossess them of them at his pleasure; in this case, he might, without any injustice done them, appoint a representative, by whose conduct they might be forfeited, or retained; and this agrees with our present argument. Accordingly let it be considered, that there were some things which Adam was possessed of in his state of innocency, and others which he was given to expect, had he stood, which he had no natural right to, separate from the divine will; therefore it follows, from hence, that God might, without doing his posterity any injustice, repose this in the hands of a mutable creature, so that it should be retained or lost for them, according as he stood or fell. And this will appear less exceptionable, when we consider the nature of that guilt, which all mankind were brought under, by Adam’s sin, and the loss of original righteousness, as the consequence of his fall; which they, who maintain the other side of the question, generally represent, in such a way, as though we supposed that there were no difference between it, and the guilt contracted, together with the punishment ensuing on actual sins, how great soever they are. But this will be more particularly considered under a following answer,[66] in which we shall endeavour to take a just estimate of the difference between the guilt of Adam’s sin, imputed to us, and that of actual sins committed by us.

Footnote 56:

If Adam represented Eve (his rib) in the covenant, she did not fall till he fell.

Footnote 57:

_The compilers of the LXX. seem to have understood the words in this sense, when then render the text in_ Gen. ii. 17. η δ αν ημερα φαγητε απ αυτου θαγατω απο θανεισθε.

Footnote 58:

Τυπος, _the Type_.

Footnote 59:

Εφ᾽ ω.

Footnote 60:

_The words are_, ως δι ενος παραπτωματος, εις παντας ανθρωπους εις κατακριμα. _The word Judgment, though not in the original, is very justly supplied in our translation, from verse 16. or else, as the learned Grotius observes, the word εγενετο might have been supplied; and so the meaning is_, Res processit in condemnationem. _And J. Capellus gives a very good sense of the text, when he compares Adam as the head, who brought death into the world, with Christ by whom life is obtained. His words are these_: Quemadmodum omnes homines, qui condemnantur, reatum suum contraxerant, ab una unius hominis offensa; sic & quotquot vivificantur, absolutionem suam obtinuerunt ab una unius hominis obedientia.

Footnote 61:

_The word_ κατακριμα _is used in scripture, in a forensic sense, in those places of the New Testament, where it is found: Thus ver. 16. of this chapter, and chap. viii. 1. And accordingly it signifies a judgment unto condemnation; as also do those words, the sense whereof has an affinity to it, in Rom. viii. 34._ τις ο κατακρινων; _and also_ ακατακριτος, _as in Acts xvi. 37. and_ chap. xxii. 25. _So that, according to the construction of the word, though_ κριμα _signifies_ judicium _in general_, κατακριμα signifies judicium adversus aliquem, _or_ condemnatio.

Footnote 62:

That mankind are born and live in sin, maybe collected from various sources of argument; by matter of fact, none are found free from, who are capable of actual guilt, by the evils and death which a just God would not otherwise inflict; by the ideas of the ancients who speak of a degeneration from a golden, to an iron age, by the general practice of offering sacrifice, which is an acknowment of guilt, by the testimony of the heathens, that evil example has a preponderating influence over good, by the historical account of the fall of man in the scriptures, by their numerous testimonies that none are righteous before God or can be justified by their obedience to his laws, by the confessions of the saints, by the necessity of repentance in all, by the propriety of prayer for the pardon of sin, by Christ’s example of daily prayer which contains such a petition, by the necessity of faith that we may please God, by man’s unwillingness to be reconciled to God, and rejection of all the spiritual good things offered, and contempt of divine threatnings; and above all other proofs, by the coming and suffering of Christ.

Footnote 63:

The covenant of grace was from eternity, and implied his innocence.

Footnote 64:

_This is not only agreeable to many instances contained in scripture, but it has been acknowledged to be just by the very heathen, as agreeable to the law of nature and nations. Thus one says: Sometimes a whole city is punished for the wickedness of one man: Thus Hesiod,_ πολλακι και ξυμπασα πολις κακου ανδρος επαυρει; _and Horace says,_ Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi: _And one observes, that it was the custom of several cities of Greece, to inflict the same punishment on the children of tyrants, as their fathers had done on others:_ In Græcis civitatibus liberi tyrannorum suppressis illis, eodem supplicio afficiuntur. _Vid. Cicer. Epist. ad Brut. XV. & Q. Curt. Lib. VI. speaks of a law observed among the Macedonians; in which, traiterous conspiracies against the life of the prince were punished, not only in the traitors themselves, but in their near relations,_ Qui regi infidiati essent, illi cum cognatis & propinquis suis morte afficerentur.

Footnote 65:

_See Quest._ xxvii.

Footnote 66:

_See Quest._ xxvii.

Quest. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI.

QUEST. XXIII. _Into what estate did the fall bring mankind?_

ANSW. The fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.

QUEST. XXIV. _What is sin?_

ANSW. Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature.

QUEST. XXV. _Wherein consisteth the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell?_

ANSW. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of that righteousness wherein he was created; and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually, which is commonly called, Original sin, and from which do proceed all actual transgressions.

QUEST. XXVI. _How is original sin conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity?_

ANSW. Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed from them, in that way, are conceived and born in sin.

Having considered the fall of our first parents, and all mankind being so far concerned therein, as that their sin is imputed to them; we are now led to speak concerning that sin and misery which ensues hereupon. And,

I. This is not barely called a single act of sin, or one particular instance of misery, but a state of sin and misery. Man’s being brought into a state of sin, is sometimes called sin’s reigning, or having dominion over him; and his being brought into a state of misery, is called the reign, or dominion of death; so that as, by various steps, we proceed from one degree of sin unto another, our condemnation is gradually enhanced thereby. This is the subject matter of the first of these answers.

II. We have a brief definition of sin, in which there is something supposed, namely, that there was a law given, and promulgated, as a rule of obedience, to the reasonable creature, without which there could be no sin committed, or guilt contracted; as the apostle saith, _Where no law is, there is no transgression_, Rom. iv. 15. or, _Sin is not imputed, where there is no law_, chap. v. 13.

And inasmuch as it is observed, that the subjects, bound by this law, are reasonable creatures; this gives us to understand, that though other creatures be the effect of God’s power, and the objects of his providence, yet they are not the subjects of moral government. They cannot therefore be under a law, inasmuch as they are not capable of understanding their relation to God, as Sovereign, or their obligation to obey him, or the meaning of a law, which is the rule thereof. Moreover, we have in this answer, an account of the formal nature of sin.

1. It is considered, either in its negative, or rather privative idea, as containing in it a defect, or want of conformity to the law, a privation of that rectitude of nature, or righteousness that man had at first, or our not performing that which we are bound, by the law of God, to do; and those particular instances of sin, included herein, are called sins of omission.

2. It is described by its positive idea, and so it is called, a transgression of the law, or doing that which is forbidden by it. Thus it is called, by the apostle, _The transgression of the law_, 1 John iii. 4. This we shall not insist on at present, inasmuch as we shall have occasion to enlarge on this head, when we consider the sins forbidden, under each of the ten commandments, and the various aggravations thereof.[67]

III. We are, in the next answer, led to consider the sinfulness of all mankind, as fallen in Adam, or original sin, as derived to, and discovered in us; and this consists more especially in our being guilty of Adam’s first sin, our wanting that righteousness which he was possessed of; and also in the corruption of nature, from whence all actual transgressions proceed.

1. We shall enquire what we are to understand by the guilt of Adam’s first sin. Having before shewn that his disobedience is imputed to his posterity, that which is the result thereof, is, that all the world becomes guilty before God: guilt is an obligation, or liableness to suffer punishment for an offence committed, in proportion to the aggravations thereof. Now, since this guilt was not contracted by us, but imputed to us, we must consider it as the same, in all; or not admitting of any degrees; nevertheless, there is a very great difference between that guilt which is the result of sin imputed to, and that which arises from sin’s being committed by us. They, who do not put a just difference between these two, give occasion to many prejudices against this doctrine, and do not sufficiently vindicate the perfections of God, in his judiciary proceedings in punishing one or the other of them. That we may avoid this inconvenience, let it be considered, that original and actual sins differ more especially in two respects.

(1.) The sin of our first parents, how heinous soever it was in them, as being an actual transgression, attended with the highest aggravations, yet it cannot be said to be our actual sin, or committed by an act of our will; therefore, though the imputation thereof to us, as has been before proved, is righteous, yet it has not those circumstances attending it, as though it had been committed by us. Therefore,

(2.) The guilt thereof, or the punishment due to it, cannot be so great as the guilt we contract, or the punishment we are liable to, for actual sins, which are committed with the approbation and consent of the will, and as they are against some degree of light and convictions of conscience, and manifold engagements to the contrary: but this does not properly belong to Adam’s sin, as imputed to us; nor is the punishment due to it the same, as though it had been committed by us in our own persons.

But, that we may not be misunderstood, let it be considered, that we are not speaking of the corruption of nature inherent in us. We do not deny, but that the fountain that sends forth all actual sins, or that sin reigning in the heart, is, in various respects, more aggravated, than many others that are committed, which we call actual transgressions, as the corrupt fountain is worse than the streams, or the root than the branch, or the cause than the effect. But when we consider, as at present we do Adam’s sin only, as imputed, and as being antecedent to that corruption of nature, which is the immediate cause of sinful actions; or when we distinguish between original sin, as imputed and inherent, we only understand, by the former, that it cannot expose those who never committed any actual sins, to so great a degree of guilt and punishment, as the sins committed by them are said to expose them to.