Part 73
8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in _mere equity_ with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the _certainty_ of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production.—If it be asked, why the exercise of _equity_ is assigned as the occasion of this union, rather than _sovereignty_; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By _equity_ then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by _sovereignty_, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a two-fold deviation from equity, _viz._ giving _more_ than is due, or _less_ than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called a _gracious_ deviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly called _injustice_, and is such a deviation from equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us good _beyond_ our claim is an act of _sovereignty_; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us in _pure equity_.
9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in _sovereignty_, according to the definitions, he does them _good beyond_ their claim. But to make _this_ to be the immediate _cause_ of the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evil than is their due; and therefore _this_ cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall into sin when dealt with in _pure equity_. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.
COROLLARIES.
1. All the _good_ and happiness in the universe of created beings are the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.
2. All the _moral evil_ and misery in the universe are the offspring of _liberty_, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united to _passive power_, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle, which may be called analogically _the heart_.
3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God, as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain futurition.
Footnote 239:
It is allowed that there is a difference between the _cause of sin_, as a _principle_, and being a _sinner_; but when applied to an _agent_, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense whatever can it be said that he is the _author of sin_.—“If by _the author of sin_ is meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or a _not hinderer_ of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv. Sect. xi.
But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the phrase, he no where assigns the _true ground_ why it should not be used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any alternative between the _certain futurition_ of sin and its being _decreed_. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief, is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is not _willing evil_. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is not _doing evil_.”
It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but here certainly he does fail. The phrases _willing evil_, and _doing evil_, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises, from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor can it be said that this is arguing against _fact_, without begging the question, that God has _appointed the evil_ which is blended with the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be considered:
1. If choosing and willing a system in which _sin is a decreed part_ is not _willing evil_, because the system is good and best, all things considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a part of that system is _not an evil_. But, it may be said, It is willing it for a _good end_. Does then a good _end_ or intention destroy the _nature_ of sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saint _anihilated_ because he _sincerely aimed_ at the Glory of God? Or has any _design_, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, the _least tendency_ to alter the _nature_ of sin?
2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself is _decreed_, or is any part of divine appointment. For _not to hinder_ sin, is extremely different from being the _cause_ or author of it. The one is perfectly consistent with equity, the other would be an act of _injustice_.
3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, to _do evil that good may come_, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr. Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes the principle, that every event comes to pass from _decretive_ necessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that opinion, in order to establish his theory of _hypothetical_ necessity; for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.
4. In reality, the certain futurition of _good_, and that of _evil_, arises from _different_, yea from diametrically _opposite_ causes. The one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained, which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yet _this_ is the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite prescience the event must appear with _equal certainty_ as if decreed.
Footnote 240:
“_Equally impious and needless._” _Needless_, because the existence of sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle; _impious_, because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of men is worthy of him; and equally so that he does _not hinder_ the existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says, that “the attempt to _distinguish_ between the sinful volitions or actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of the _depravity_ and sin which is in them, is, it is believed, _unintelligible_—unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined, it is probable they will not be wholly “_unintelligible_.”
1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is of _absolute necessity_—the self-existent, independent, and all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but of the same necessity.
2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views all _possibles_ with all their positive and privative _tendencies_. That all possibles have their _positive_ tendencies is as plain as that two added to three make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that there are _privative_ tendencies in all beings but that one who exists of _absolute necessity_. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to suppose that a creature _may be made_ independent, and all-sufficient. But that is, every reasonable being must allow, _absolutely impossible_, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in every created nature which I call _Passive Power_. Yet.
3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to give each his due; but to _prevent_ sin is not _due_ to the subject of it, otherwise no one _could ever sin_ but on condition of _injustice_ in God.
4. After all, it may be objected, that the _scriptures_ ascribe to God the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the import of such representations may be, no interpretation which is _unworthy of God_ can be the true meaning—that the idioms of the sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denote _making_, _doing_, _causing_, and the like, often denote a _declaration_ of the thing done, or that shall take place; or a _permission_ of it.
Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hath _cleansed_,” means, what God hath _declared_ to be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive not;” and he is ordered to “_make_ the heart of this people fat, to _make_ their ears heavy, and to _shut_ their eyes.” And what can this mean more than to _declare a fact_, either what they then were, or what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’s _declaration_ of what should be, is called his _rooting_ out _pulling_ down, &c.—Ezek. xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came to _destroy_ the city;” his meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy or _declare_ that the city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thou _evil entreated_ this people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thou _permitted_ them to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou hast greatly _deceived_ this people;” that is, _permitted_ or not hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I the Lord have _deceived_ that prophet.” Can any thing else be meant than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hast _hid_ these things” _i. e._ _not revealed_.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom he will he _hardeneth_,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “God _gave them_ a spirit of slumber,” _i. e._ permitted them to slumber. 2 Thes. ii. 11. “God shall _send_ them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie;” _i. e._ shall _permit_ them to be deluded so that they shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I will _harden_ Pharaoh’s heart,” i. e. I will _suffer_ it to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I am not come to _send_ peace, but _a sword_; For I am come to _set_ a man _at variance_ against his father,” That is, my coming shall be the _innocent occasion_ of wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of old _ordained_ to this condemnation;” _i. e._ _foretold_, or _forewritten_, as the word signifies; _announced_ in the sacred pages, and _proscribed_ by divine law.
But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the notion, that God is the _cause_ of sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the word, being disobedient, _whereunto also they were appointed_.” _i. e._ _unto which thing_, their stumbling, _they were appointed because disobedient_. The Greek participle includes the cause of their falling; as Heb. ii. 3. _Neglecting_ so great salvation, how shall we escape? _To which_ not escaping, they _were appointed, for neglecting_ so great salvation. A striking _contrast_ to this we have, John vii. 17. “If any man will _do his will_, he shall _know_ of the doctrine;” but the _disobedient_ shall, according to an awful but equitable _appointment_, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them that _believe_ not?” _i. e._ Who were _appointed_ to destruction? The answer is, the _disobedient_; for the original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter in _because_ of _unbelief_.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The rest _were blinded_, or _hardened_;” _i. e._ were _suffered_ to be blind or hard. And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “_Because of unbelief_ they were broken off.”
Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his gospel. Their end is what might be expected, as _foretold_ by the prophets, according to God’s _righteous_ government, and his eternal _appointment_, or _determination_, respecting all such offenders. Their habitual unbelieving _disobedience_ was the _cause_, but their actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the righteous, the appointed _effect_. To this they were appointed, _placed_, or _set forth_ (as Pharaoh was _raised up_) by the righteous judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personally _appointed_ to exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiastical _builders_; they were _suffered_ to reject Christ, in pure equity; and thus were deservedly _constituted_ awful warnings to others.
Footnote 241:
This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termed _Baxterianism_, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit, and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power and way as shall _infallibly_ convert and save them.” He moreover says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question, whether _any_ or _how many_ are ever converted or saved by that _mere grace_ which we call _sufficient_, or rather _necessary_, and common to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes.
Footnote 242:
The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him, form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail; and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render useless God’s _reasoning_ with sinners, his _exhortations_ to repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end, and form a part of the decree itself.
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
Transcriber’s Notes:
Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic punctuation and spellings have been retained.
End of Project Gutenberg's A Body of Divinity, Vol. 1 of 4, by Thomas Ridgley