Part 72
Let us appeal to facts. Are there not marks of high sovereignty and holy partiality through universal nature? Are they not visible in the heavens above, and in this lower world? Is there not a greater light that rules the day, and the lesser lights that rule the night? And does not one star differ from another star in glory? Are not these marks visible in the operations of providence, in the persons of men, their corporeal forms and mental endowments? Are they not constantly seen in the history of nations, the changes of empires, and the dispensations of grace to different tribes of men? How conspicuous is this in God’s conduct towards Abraham and his posterity for a series of ages, and afterwards in the calling of the Gentiles? And how becoming in us to adopt the same language with the apostle Paul on that occasion: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!” And is not the same partiality visible at this very day? Yet is he holy in all his works, and righteous in all his ways.
2. It is objected, If this doctrine be true, then is man reduced to a mere machine. No, a mere machine has no sensibility, no consciousness, no reason, and no will. But he is acted upon, they say, and therefore not an agent. Is it then essential to an agent not to be acted upon? Then there is but one agent in the universe; for every thing but the first cause is acted upon more or less. The fact is, there is no contrariety in these two things. Angels and men are acted upon, yet they are moral agents. The holy agency upon them respects chiefly their _disposition_ itself, but the agency they exert is the _exercise_ of their faculties, will, and disposition. Whether their disposition be good or bad, still they are agents. If this be made good, it must be by sovereign influence; and then the agency and choice will be good: but if this be bad, the agency is bad too.
But granting to the objector that the objects of predestination are, in the sense now mentioned, machines, or instruments in the hand of divine sovereignty; what then? I fain would know what better lot can be assigned us than to be instruments in the hand of a predestinating God? I solemnly protest that I desire no better, no other lot. And who can describe the nature of this high privilege! This people have I formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise. O the blessedness of being entirely passive in the hand of that God who predestinates nothing but good? Was Paul obliged to the Lord, or was he not, for arresting him in the midst of his wicked career? Has that man any reason to complain, who is restrained from wickedness, but compelled to embrace happiness? Then, say some, his will would be forced. O no! this by no means follows. My people, saith the Lord, shall be willing in the day of my power. Surely God can put his Holy Spirit in either man or child without forcing the will. And let there be but the active, regenerating renewing presence of this divine agent, the choice of good will be no more compelled, or the will no more forced, than in the most free acts of which the human mind is capable.
3. This doctrine, it is said, tends to licentiousness.—This is an assertion which has been often made, but, I apprehend, never fairly proved; for it is contrary to universal experience. Turn your eyes to a vast army, headed by experienced officers—what is the language of nature and experience? You uniformly find great generals anxious to impress the sentiment on the minds of their troops that they are _destined_ to victory. What gives rise to this kind of oratory? What is the philosophy of such rhetoric? It is founded in the nature of man, and confirmed by the experience of ages, that confidence in a favourable issue animates exertion.
Consult a serious christian, who, through a long pilgrimage, has believed this doctrine. Will he deliberately tell you that it has this tendency, or that he has found this effect in his own experience? No, he will tell you nothing gives him more courage and vigour against sin.—It is not when in a dry, backsliding frame of mind, or when verging to licentiousness, that he can rest in this doctrine; but when he is most resolved for God and heaven—when most diligent in the high way of holiness. Then, indeed, he can say, I know that all things work together for my good—my predestination includes conformity to Christ, my calling, my justification, and warfare against sin. If God be for me, who can be against me? Who shall lay any thing to my charge? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, is risen, and maketh intercession. Who shall separate me from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or famine, or persecution, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in all these things I am more than conqueror through him that loved me. For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate me from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus my Lord.
4. Some would insinuate, that though this doctrine be true, yet it should not be preached, because it is a secret in the mind of God. But I hope it has been proved, that as a _doctrine_ it is not a secret, but is revealed in the holy scriptures, and supported by the soundest arguments. The objects, indeed, or the persons who are predestinated, are known to God only before they bear fruit, By their _fruits_ WE can come to know them, in the _ordinary_ course of things; nor is it any part of the doctrine asserted, that it belongs to man to ascertain the individual objects any farther than by character.
But there are other ends to be answered by this doctrine.—To be in the way to eternal glory is an unspeakable privilege; and it is the proper part of a christian to enquire into the cause of it. His own humility and gratitude are involved in it. The honour of God, the wisdom of his counsel, and the lustre of his grace; the offices of Christ, the surety of a better covenant, and the good Shepherd of the sheep; his powerful intercession, and his government over all things to the church—all are involved in the proper declaration of this truth.—Once more,
5. This doctrine, it may be said, is dangerous, in proportion as it is insisted upon, in that it prevents the more needful enquiry, “Am I born again!” Yes, there would be danger, if _all_ the attention of ministers and people, or even a disproportionate share of it were confined to this. But, thou mistaken objector, because there are some who will take the bread of children and cast it away, are the children not to be fed? Because there were corrupt men disposed to turn the grace of God into lasciviousness, would you rob any child of God of this holy triumph. He will choose our inheritance for us! The Lord will not cast off his people, neither will he forsake his inheritance. For the Lord is our defence, the Holy One of Israel is our King. I will trust and not be afraid, for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and my song, he also is become my salvation.——For the same reason that we ought not to be ashamed of the gospel of Christ, we need not, we ought not to be ashamed of this doctrine.
I would now offer
IV. A few practical uses of the subject. And,
1. This doctrine is a source of great comfort, when contrasted with the fickleness of men, and the perpetual vicissitudes of the world. The lot may be cast, but the Lord is the disposer of it. He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. His counsel shall stand, and he doeth, and will do, all his pleasure. The wrath of man shall praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain. All things work together for good to them who love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. He doeth all things well.
After viewing the present perturbed state of the world, the revolutions of empire, the devastations of war, the alarms of invasion, the degradation of some, and the exaltation of other characters—how pleasing and consolatory to view a steady hand over-ruling, guiding, and influencing all! Providence is “as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel.”—As for their rings, they are so high that they are dreadful, and are full of eyes round about them. But how delightful to reflect, that within these perpetually revolving wheels there is an immoveable centre! God’s aim is steady, he is of one mind, who can turn him?
2. As the predestination for which we contend is only to _good_, it affords the most pleasing view of the divine character. God is love. In him is no such inconsistency as is but too frequently found among men. He is not a fountain sending forth at the same place both sweet water and bitter, yielding both salt water and fresh. With the utmost safety and confidence may a humble soul commit itself into the arms of such a being. No one has any thing to fear from God but the proud and rebellious, the unbelieving and impenitent. And surely bad must be the doctrine that speaks peace to the wicked.
3. As in the present case the end, and the way leading to it, are inseparable; every reason and argument, every alarming topic, every scriptural exhortation, and every obligation to duty, are in full force. They who represent these things as inconsistent with predestination, either have a wrong view of the subject, or care not what they say nor whereof they affirm. Obligation to duty is founded on widely and totally different considerations.[242]
God sustains, with respect to man, a twofold character, the one is that of an equitable governor, the other that of a sovereign disposer. Answerably to this, man sustains a twofold character also; that of an accountable agent, and that of a disposable subject. As _passive_ in the hand of a sovereign God, he is necessitated to good, in proportion as goodness attaches to him; and in the heirs of salvation this is predestination to life. As _active_, or a moral agent, man is treated according to the rules of reason and equity, yet mingled with undeserved favours. So that every man is, in these different respects, at once the subject of liberty and necessity.
Equally vague and unprofitable, therefore, is all controversy on the subject now alluded to while one side contends for _liberty_ and the other for _necessity_ to the usual exclusion of the opposite. Neither can be wholly right. For, as sure as God disposes of a man for final good, the doctrine of necessity is true; and as sure as a man is a transgressor of divine law, and thus is fitted for destruction, he is _free_ from all _decretive_ necessity. Therefore,
4. Here is no room for the impious inference, that when we do evil we are predestinated to it. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for as God cannot be tempted with evil, so neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not err, my beloved brethren; every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.—But evil, in whatever person, in whatever place, at whatever time, in whatever form or degree, is from a quarter diametrically opposite.—On the contrary,
5. When at any time we are engaged in the work of God, in any thing whatever that is morally good, then are we employed in the execution of the divine purposes; for there is no good done in time but was decreed to be done, in all its circumstances, from eternity. Even all the actions of the wicked, except the deformity or sinfulness which is in them, are also worthy of God to predestinate. This consideration, every one must allow, is a great incentive to virtue and holiness. This remark is applicable both to ministers and people. Are ministers engaged in preaching the law for conviction, the promises for encouragement, and the unsearchable riches of Christ for consolation; are they urging, according to scripture commands and example, repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; do they enforce christian duties, teaching the disciples all things whatsoever our Lord and lawgiver has commanded; do they warn sinners to flee from the wrath to come, or invite the burdened and heavy laden to seek rest in the meek and lowly, the merciful and loving Saviour? They are in all this only the instruments of a sovereign God, or the _appointed means_ whereby he executes his eternal purposes. Again, has God enjoined the necessity of repentance, faith, holiness, obedience, and perseverance; poverty of spirit, holy mourning, purity of heart, love to enemies, &c? our personal compliance, which is evermore of grace, is only the _decreed method_ of bringing us to that eternal glory which is the end. Once more,
6. This doctrine properly guarded, and rightly understood, shews with peculiar force the true ground of repentance, and the obligations of gratitude and holiness.—If the sinfulness of no action is decreed, but proceeds wholly from that in us which is opposite to God and his will, whether secret or revealed, rectoral or decretive, what can be more binding and reasonable than repentance toward God? And if all good, whether natural, supernatural, moral or spiritual, in ourselves and others, in time and to eternity proceed from God’s predestination, what a foundation is there laid for gratitude! Put on, therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering. Give all diligence to make your calling and election sure. And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body, and be ye thankful. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. _Amen._
DR. WILLIAMS.
Footnote 238:
Predestination _to Death_ or _misery_, as the end, and to _sin_ as the means, I call “an impure mixture;” a _mixture_, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, that _sin and misery_ are _decreed_ in the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be the _divine decree_ determining their future existence, or it must be in the future _existences themselves_. But the future existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be nothing but _divine decree_, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p. 110-217.
On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures:
1. It is a mere assumption, that _sin_, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possible _cause_ of its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to divine causation, will constitute _sin_. Nor yet is it true that sin is the _cause of itself_; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence.
2. It is equally plain that the _cause_ of sin is not itself morally evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is _related_ to good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.—Therefore,
3. We assert, that the _origin of moral evil_ is to be found in the _union_ of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of a _moral_ character. These two principles are _Liberty_ and _Passive Power_. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed a _natural good_ of which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is a _natural evil_ of which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of _unavoidable necessity_ found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, It is that _tendency_ to nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which of _absolute necessity_ belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be of _absolute_ or _unavoidable_ necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands in _direct contrariety_ to himself. That it is not a _moral_ evil is plain, for the _holiest_ creatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.
4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, to _good only_; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent, _unites_ with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question, _Whence cometh moral evil?_ If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them,
5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between _decreeing_ and _permitting_ sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act of _injustice_, the other is _doing nothing_. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think, demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction _antecedently_ to desert—to _annihilate_ the sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas to _permit_, or to _suffer_ to take place without prevention, is _not to act not to decree_. To ‘decree to permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.
6. But, it has been said, the _event_ is the same to the sinner, whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the _happiness_ of the creature were the only, or even the _principal_ end of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that the _event_ of a man’s execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for the _event_ of his execution was _certain_! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’s _actual_ dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the _happiness_ of the Creature is not the _chief_ end of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin.
7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish between _having_ the principle, and being under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is the _disposition_, or the _seat_ of moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,