A Body of Divinity, Vol. 1 (of 4) Wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are explained and defended, being the substance of several lectures on the Assembly's Larger Catechism

Part 69

Chapter 694,202 wordsPublic domain

2. As to this doctrine’s leading to presumption, or despair, there is no ground to conclude that it has a tendency to either of them. It cannot lead to presumption, inasmuch as election is not discovered to any one till he believes; therefore an unconverted person has no ground to presume and conclude, that all is well with him, because he is elected; for that is boldly to determine a thing that he knows nothing of; the objection therefore, with respect to such, supposes that to be known, which remains a secret. And, on the other hand, they have no ground to despair, on a supposition that they are finally rejected; for it is one thing to be the object of the decree of reprobation, which no one can, or ought to determine, concerning himself, so long as he is in this world, much more if we consider him as enjoying the means of grace, and a door of hope is open to him therein; and God has pleased to declare, in the gospel, that he will receive sinners that repent and believe in him, how unworthy soever they are; therefore such are not to conclude that their state is desperate, though it be exceeding dangerous, but to wait for the efficacy of the means of grace, and those blessings that accompany salvation.

And as for those that are in a converted state, this doctrine is far from having a tendency, either to lead them to presumption, or despair; but, on the other hand, to thankfulness to God, for his discriminating grace, which, when persons experience, they are not only encouraged to hope for farther blessings, but to perform those duties whereby they may express their gratitude to him. As for presumption, which is the only thing that election is pretended to lead them to, that cannot be the natural consequence or tendency thereof; for if they presume that they shall be saved, this is not to be reckoned a crime in them; for that presumption which is supposed to be so in the objection consists in a person’s expecting a blessing without reason; but this is contrary to the supposition that he is a believer; and it would be a strange method of reasoning to infer, that he, who has ground to conclude that he has a right to eternal life, from those marks and evidences of grace, which he finds in himself, is guilty of a sinful presumption, when he is induced hereby to lay claim to it; and therefore the sense of the objection, must be this, that a believer having been once enabled to conclude himself elected, may, from hence, take occasion, supposing that his work is done, and his end answered, to return to his former wicked life, and yet still presume that he shall be saved; whereas that would be a certain indication that he had no ground to conclude this, but was mistaken, when he thought that he had; so that this doctrine cannot lead a believer, as such, to presumption, and consequently the objection, in which it is supposed that it does, is founded on one of these two mistakes, _viz._ that every one, who is elected to salvation, knows his interest in this privilege, as though it were immediately revealed to him, without inferring it from any marks and evidences of grace that he finds in himself; or else, that it is impossible for any one, who thinks that he believes, and, from thence, concludes that he is elected, to appear afterwards to have been mistaken in the judgment, which he then passed upon himself; but either of these contain a misrepresentation of the consequences of the doctrine of election; neither is there any regard had to that necessary distinction that there is, between a person’s being chosen to eternal life, and his being able to determine himself to be interested in this privilege; and it is contrary to what we have before considered, that whenever God chooses to the end, he chooses to the means, which are inseparably connected with it, which is the only rule whereby we are warranted, when applying it to ourselves, to conclude that we shall be saved.

3. It cannot, in the least, be proved that this doctrine has any tendency to lead persons to licentiousness; nor is it inconsistent with our using the utmost endeavours to attain salvation. If it be said, that many vile persons take occasion, from hence, to give the reins to their corruption; that is not the natural, or necessary consequence thereof; since there is no truth but what may be abused. The apostle Paul did not think the doctrine of the grace of God, which he so strenuously maintained, was less true, Or glorious, because some drew this vile consequence from it, _Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound_, Rom. vi. 1.

And as for those means, which God has ordained to bring about the salvation of his people, we are obliged to attend upon them, though we know not, before-hand, what will certainly be the event thereof; and if through the blessing of God accompanying them, we are effectually called and sanctified, and thereby enabled to know our election, this will (agreeably to the experience of all true believers,) have a tendency to promote holiness.

_Object._ 6. It is farther objected, that more especially against the doctrine of reprobation, that it argues God to be the author of sin; and particularly in such instances as these, _viz._ with respect to the first entrance of sin into the world, and in God’s imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, and afterwards suffering it to make such a progress as it has done ever since; and, most of all, when it is supposed that this is not only the result of the divine purpose, but that it also respects the blinding men’s minds, and hardening their hearts, and so rendering their final impenitency and perdition unavoidable.

_Answ._ To this it may be answered,

1. As to what concerns the first entrance of sin into the world, it cannot reasonably be denied, that the purpose of God was concerned about it, before it was committed, in the same sense as his actual providence was afterwards, namely, in permitting, though not effecting it; notwithstanding this was not the cause of the committing it, since a bare permission has no positive efficiency in order thereunto; the not hindering, or restraining a wicked action, does not render him the author of it. It is true, God knew how man would behave, and particularly, that he would mis-improve and forfeit that original righteousness, in which he was created, and that, by this means, he would contract that guilt, which was the consequence thereof, and thereby render himself liable to his just displeasure; to deny this, would be to deny that he foreknew that, from eternity, which he knew in time. And, so far as the actual providence of God was conversant about what was natural therein, so far his purpose determined that it should be; but neither does this argue him to be the author of sin. But this will be farther considered, when we speak concerning the actual providence of God under a following answer.[235]

2. As to that part of the objection, which respects the imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, that is more frequently brought against this doctrine than any other; and it is generally represented in the most indefensible terms, without making any abatements as to the degree of punishment that was due to it; and, accordingly, they think that we can hardly have the front to affirm, that our arguments, in defence hereof, are agreeable to the divine perfections, as we pretend those others are, which have been brought in defence of this doctrine. But, I hope, we shall be able to maintain the doctrine of _original sin_, in consistency with the divine perfections, as well as scripture, in its proper place, to which we shall refer it.[236] Therefore all that I shall add, at present, is, that if the doctrine of original sin be so explained, as that it does not render God the author of sin, his purpose relating thereunto, which must be supposed, in all respects, to correspond with it, does not argue him to be the author of it.

3. As to the progress of sin in the world, and the proneness of all mankind to rebel against God; this, as before was observed, concerning sin in general, is the object of his permissive, but not his effective will; though there is this difference between God’s suffering sin to enter into the world at first, and his suffering the continuance, or increase of it therein, that, at first, he dealt with man as an innocent creature, and only left him to the mutability of his own will, having before given him a power to retain his integrity. But the fallen creature is become weak, and unable to do any thing that is good in all its circumstances, and afterwards is more and more inclined to sin, by contracting vicious habits, and persisting therein. Now, though God’s leaving man to himself at first, when there was no forfeiture made of his preventing grace, must be reckoned an act of mere sovereignty, his leaving sinners to themselves may be reckoned an act of justice, as a punishment of sin before committed, and neither of these argue him to be the author of it; neither does the purpose of God, relating thereunto, give the least occasion for such an inference.

Again, we must distinguish between the occasion and the cause of sin. God’s providential dispensations, though unexceptionably holy and righteous, are often-times the occasion thereof: thus his afflictive hand sometimes occasions the corruptions of men to break forth, in repining at, and quarrelling with his providence; and his giving outward blessings to one, which he withholds from another, gives occasion, to some, to complain of the injustice of his dealings with them; and the strictness, and holiness of his law, and gives occasion, to corrupt nature to discover itself in the blackest colours; the apostle plainly evinces this truth, when he says, _Sin taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence_, Rom. vii. 8. and, indeed, there is nothing in the whole compass of providence, or in the methods of the divine government therein, but what may be, and often is, an occasion of sin, in wicked men. But certainly it is not the cause of it; even as the clemency of a prince may occasion a rebellion among his subjects; but it is the vile ingratitude, and wickedness of their nature, that is the spring and cause thereof; so the providence, and consequently the purpose of God, which is executed thereby, may be the occasion of sin, and yet the charge brought in this objection, as though God hereby was argued to be the author of sin, is altogether groundless.

4. As to what is farther objected, relating to the purpose of God, to blind the minds, and harden the hearts of men, and that final impenitency, which is the consequence thereof, God forbid that we should assert that this is a positive act in him; and, so far as it contains nothing else but his determining to deny that grace, which would have had the contrary effect, or his providence relating thereunto, this does not give any countenance to the objection, or weaken the force of the arguments that we have before laid down, which is very consistent therewith.

_Object._ 7. There is another objection, which is generally laid down in so moving a way, that, whether the argument be just or no, the style is adapted to affect the minds of men with prejudice against this doctrine, and that is taken from the inconsistency thereof with God’s judicial proceedings against the wicked in the day of judgment, and that it will afford the sinner a plea, in which he may say to this effect: Lord, I sinned by a fatal necessity; it was impossible for me to avoid that which thou art now offended with me for; it was what thou didst decree should come to pass. I have been told, that thy decrees are unalterable, and that it is as impossible to change the course of nature, or to remove the mountains, which thou hast fixed with thy hand, as to alter thy purpose; wilt thou then condemn one, who sinned and fell pursuant to thy will? Dost thou will that men should sin and perish, and then lay the blame at their door, as though they were culpable for doing what thou hast determined should be done?

_Answ._ This objection supposes that the decree of God lays a necessary constraint on, and enforces the will of man to sin; which, if they could make it appear that it does, no reply could be made to it. But this is to represent the argument we are maintaining in such a way, in which no one, who has just ideas of this doctrine, would ever understand it, and it is directly contrary to the foregoing method of explaining it. We have already proved, in our answer to the third objection, that sin is not necessary in that sense, in which they suppose it to be, or that, though the decree of God renders events necessary, yet it does not take away the efficiency of second causes, and therefore the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is not to be pleaded, as an excuse for it, or as a ground of exemption from punishment. We read of the Jews, that, _with wicked hands, they crucified_ our Saviour; the crime was their own; but this is expressly said to have been done by, or, in pursuance of, _the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God_, Acts ii. 23. He fore-knew what they would do, and purposed not to prevent it; but yet he did not force their will to commit it. And elsewhere God says, concerning Israel, _Thou heardest not; yea, thou knewest not; from that time thine ear was not opened_; and then he adds, _I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously_, Isa. xlviii. 8. Israel might as well have pleaded, that God knew, before-hand, how they would behave themselves, and so have thrown the blame on him, for not preventing this foreseen event, but suffering them to go on in this destructive way, with as much reason, as the sinner is supposed, in the objection, to have, when taking occasion so to plead, as he is represented, as having ground to do, in the day of judgment, as a consequence from the doctrine we are maintaining.

Again, whatever has been said concerning the immutability of the divine purpose, yet this does not give the least countenance to any one’s charging his sin on God; as we have, in answer to the last objection, proved that it does not render him the author of sin; and therefore man’s destruction must lie at his own door. It is one thing to say, that it is in the sinner’s power to save himself, and another thing to say, that the sin he commits is not wilful, and therefore that guilt is not contracted thereby; and, if so, then this affords no matter of excuse to the sinner, according to the import of the objection.

IX. We are now to consider some things that may be inferred from the doctrine we have been insisting on, and how it is to be practically improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual advantage. And,

1. From the methods taken to oppose and decry it, by misrepresentations, which contain little less than blasphemy, we infer, that however unjust consequences deduced from a doctrine may be an hindrance to its obtaining in the world; yet this method of opposition will not render it less true, or defensible; nor ought it to prejudice the minds of men against the sacred writings, or religion in general. We cannot but observe, that while several scriptures are produced in defence of this doctrine and others in opposition to it, and the utmost cautions have not been used to reconcile the sense given thereof with the natural ideas which we have of the divine perfections; and many, in defending one side of the question have made use of unguarded expressions, or called that a scripture-doctrine which is remote from it; and others, in opposition hereunto, have, with too much assurance, charged the defenders thereof with those consequences, which are neither avowed by them, nor justly deduced from their method of reasoning; the unthinking and irreligious part of mankind have taken occasion, from hence, with the Deists, to set themselves against revealed religion, or to give way to scepticism, as though there were nothing certain, or defensible, in religion; and take occasion to make it the subject of satire and ridicule. But, passing this by, though it is a matter very much to be lamented we will consider this doctrine as rendered less exceptionable, or more justly represented; and, accordingly,

2. We may infer from it, that as it is agreeable to the divine perfections, so it has the greatest tendency to promote practical godliness. For,

(1.) Since God has fore-ordained whatever comes to pass; this should lead us to an humble submission to his will, in all the dispensations of his providence. When we consider that nothing, in this respect comes by chance; this should have a tendency to quiet our minds, and silence all our murmuring and uneasy thoughts, whatever afflictions we are exposed to. We are too apt to complain sometimes of second causes, as though all our miseries took their rise from thence; and, at other times, to afflict ourselves beyond measure, as apprehending that those proper means have not been used, which might have prevented them; as Martha tells our Saviour, _If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died_, John xi. 21. whereas we ought rather to consider, that all this befalls us in pursuance of God’s purpose: had he designed to have prevented the affliction, he would have directed to other means conducive to that end, or would have attended those that have been used, with their desired success. We use the means as not knowing what are the secret purposes of God, with respect to the event of things; but, when this is made known to us, it should teach us to acquiesce in, and be entirely resigned to the divine will.

(2.) When we cannot see the reason, or understand the meaning of the dispensations of divine providence, and are not able to pass a judgment concerning future events, whether relating unto ourselves, or others; and, when all things look with a very dismal aspect, as to what concerns the interest and church of God in the world, we must be content to wait till he is pleased to discover them to us; what he oftentimes does, _we know not now, but shall know hereafter_, as our Saviour said to one of his disciples, John xiii. 7. It is no wonder that we are at a loss, as to God’s purposes, since secret things belong to him; and therefore all that we are to do, in such a case, is, to rest satisfied, that all these things shall, in the end, appear to have a tendency to advance his own perfections, and bring about the salvation of his people.

(3.) Since the purpose of God respects the means, as well as the end, this should put us upon the use of those proper means, in which we may hope to obtain grace and glory; and therefore this doctrine does not lead us to sloth, and indifference in religion; for that is to suppose, that the ends and means are separated in God’s purpose: and when, through his blessing attending them, the ordinances, or means of grace, are made effectual for the working of faith, and all other graces, these being connected, in God’s purpose, with glory, it ought to encourage our hope relating to the end of faith, even the salvation of our souls.

(4.) Let us take heed that we do not peremptorily, without ground conclude ourselves elected unto eternal life, on the one hand, or rejected on the other. To determine that we are chosen to salvation, before we are effectually called, is presumptuously to enter into God’s secret counsels, which we cannot, at present, have a certain and determinate knowledge of; but to lay this as a foundation, as to what concerns the conduct of our lives, is oftentimes of a very pernicious tendency. If, as the result of this conclusion made, we take encouragement to go on in sin, this will cut the sinews of all religion, and expose us to blindness of mind, and hardness of heart, and a greater degree of impenitency and unbelief, as the consequence of this bold presumption and affront to the divine Majesty.

Neither, on the other hand, are we to conclude that we are not elected; for though we may be in suspense about the event of things, and not know whether we are elected or rejected, this is not inconsistent with our using endeavours to attain a good hope, through grace; yet to determine that we are not elected, is to conclude, against ourselves that all endeavours will be to no purpose; which we have no ground to do, since it is one thing to conclude that we are in a state of unregeneracy, and another thing to determine that we are not elected. The consequence of our concluding that we are in an unconverted state, ought to be our praying, waiting, and hoping for the efficacy of divine grace, which extends itself to the chief of sinners, as a relief against despair, though such can have no ground to say, they are elected; therefore the safest way, and that which is most conducive to the ends of religion, is to be firmly persuaded, that though the final state of man be certainly determined by God, yet this is to be no rule for an unregenerate person to take his measures from, any more than if it were a matter of uncertainty, and, in all respects, undetermined by him.

(5.) Let us, according to the apostle’s advice, _Give diligence to make our calling and election sure_, 2 Pet. i. 10. It is certainly a very great privilege for us, not barely to know, that some were chosen to eternal life, but to be able to conclude that we are of that happy number; and, in order hereunto, we must not expect to have an extraordinary revelation thereof, or to find ourselves described by name in scripture, as though this were the way to attain it; for the rule by which we are to judge of this matter, is, our enquiring whether we have those marks, or evidences thereof, which are contained therein; and therefore we are, by a diligent and impartial self-examination, to endeavour to know whether we are called, or enabled, to perform the obedience of faith, which God is said to elect his people to; or whether we are holy, and without blame, before him in love? whether we have the temper and disposition of the children of God, as an evidence of our being chosen to the adoption of children, and as such, are conformed to the image of Christ?

(6.) If we have ground to conclude that we are chosen to eternal life, this ought to be improved to the glory of God, and our own spiritual advantage; it ought to put us upon admiring and adoring the riches of discriminating grace, which is herein eminently illustrated; and such are under the highest obligation to walk humbly with God, as well as thankfully; for it is owing to his grace, not only that they are chosen to eternal life, but that they are enabled to discern their interest in this privilege.[237]

Footnote 183:

“Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense, that He _does_, all that is done. ‘Far be it from God,’ says Elihu, ‘that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity.’ Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident blasphemy.

“Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God _makes_ his creatures do, whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of blame.

“Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God _creates_, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral evil.