Part 68
2. As to persons shortening their lives by intemperance, this has a natural tendency to do it; so that, though God be not the author of the sin, he certainly knows, before-hand, what methods the sinner will take to hasten his end, and leaves him to himself; so that, though the sin be not from God, the punishment, which is the consequence thereof, may truly be said to be from him, and therefore this was determined by him.
And when it is farther objected, that they, who destroy their health, or lay violent hands on themselves, cannot be said to sin in so doing, because they do that which tends to fulfil the divine will, provided God has determined the fatal event; herein they oppose this doctrine, without taking the words in the same sense in which it is maintained; for it is well known, that the will of God is sometimes taken for that prescribed rule that he has given us, which is the matter of our duty, in which sense we readily allow, that he that fulfils it, cannot be said to sin. But, besides this, it is sometimes taken for his purpose to permit sin; or, to give the sinner up to his own heart’s lusts, to act that which he hates, and is resolved to punish. In this sense, the sinner is said to do that which God would not have suffered him to do, had he willed the contrary; but it is a very groundless insinuation, to suppose that this exempts him from the guilt of sin.
3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise than by the event; so a person, who prays to be delivered from sickness, or death, is not to address the divine Majesty, as one who presumptuously, and without ground, supposes that God has decreed that he shall immediately die, but as one who hopes, or who has no ground to conclude otherwise, but that he will make it appear, by answering his prayer, that he has determined to spare his life. For the secret purpose of God, relating to the event of things, is no more to be a rule of duty, inasmuch as it is secret, than if there had been no purpose relating thereunto; but yet it does not follow from hence, that this matter is not determined by him.
4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced, whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of life. As for those _promises_, which God has made of a long life, _to those that love him, and keep his commandments_, the meaning thereof is this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in which it is said, that _godliness hath the promise of the life that now is_, as well as of _that which is to come_, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose, then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him.
As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s _dying before their time_, or _not living half their days_, these are to be understood agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand?
As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, when sick, _he had not died_, she does not suppose Christ’s being there, would have frustrated the divine purpose, for then, he would, doubtless, have reproved her for it; whereas, in reality, he did not come to visit him, because he knew that God had purposed that he should die, and be afterwards raised from the dead; so that this does not argue that he has not fixed the bounds, or term of life.
Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented, we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof, but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them.
The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells Hezekiah, that _he should die, and not live_; notwithstanding which, fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, _Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live_, he gave Hezekiah to understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense, otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he says, _I will add to thy days fifteen years_, the meaning is only this, though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life fifteen years.
_Object._ 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events.
Thus God speaks of the Jews, turning from their iniquities, and his bestowing pardoning mercy, as the result thereof, as an uncertain event, when he says, in Jer. xxxvi. 3. _It may be that the house of Judah will hear all the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, that they may return every man from his evil way, that I may forgive their iniquity and their sin._ So when God gave the Jews a sign, immediately before the captivity, taken from the prophet Ezekiel’s personating one that was removing his stuff, or household-goods, as signifying, that the nation in general should soon remove to other habitations, when carried captive into Babylon, he adds, upon this occasion, _It may be they will consider, though they be a rebellious house_, Ezek. xii. 3. And the prophet Zephaniah exhorts the people _to seek righteousness and meekness_, and, as the consequence thereof, says, _It may be ye shall be hid in the day of the Lord’s anger_, Zeph. ii. 3. And the apostle speaks of the uncertainty of the divine dispensations of grace, when he advises Timothy, _in meekness, to instruct those that oppose themselves, if God, peradventure, will give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth_, 2 Tim. ii. 25. which is directly contrary to the unalterable necessity of events, depending upon the divine purpose, according to the doctrine of election.
_Answ._ 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has determined.[234] And, had it been universally explained by them in this sense, it would not have done them much service, who oppose the doctrine of election, to have compared it therewith; for it would only have proved the agreeableness of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s purpose, relating to all events, to the light of nature, as some of the heathen were thereby instructed in it. But since this does not appear to be the sense of all the Stoicks about the doctrine of fate, but some of them understood it in the same sense as it is represented in the objection, this we cannot but militate against, and assert the doctrine of election to be very remote from it.
Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, explain what we mean, when we maintain the necessity of events, as founded on the will of God. We are far from asserting that there is a necessary connexion between second causes, and their respective effects, in which some are produced arbitrarily, by the will of intelligent creatures; and when we call any thing a necessary cause, producing effects, according to its own nature, we suppose that this is agreeable to the order, or course of nature, which was fixed by God. All that we pretend to prove, is the dependence of things on the divine will, and the necessity of God’s purposes taking effect; so that that which is arbitrary or contingent, which might be, or not be, as depending on, or relating to second causes, is eventually necessary, as it is an accomplishment of the divine purpose. Therefore we always distinguish between things being contingent, with respect to us, and their being so, with respect to God; and, consequently, though _it may be_, or _peradventure_, may be applied to the apparent event of things, these words can never be applied to the fulfilling of the divine will; and this leads us to consider the latter part of the objection; therefore,
2. As to the scripture’s speaking concerning the uncertainty of future events, in those places mentioned in the objection, these, and all others of the like nature, in which such a mode of speaking is used, may be explained, by distinguishing between what might reasonably have been expected to be the event of things, supposing men had not been given up to the blindness of their mind, and hearts, to act below the dictates of reason, without consulting their own safety and happiness, or expressing their gratitude to God; and what would be the real event of things, which God was not pleased to reveal, and therefore was unknown to them. Thus, when the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel represented the repentance and reformation of Israel as an uncertain event, as well as their forgiveness, and deliverance from the captivity, connected with it, in such dubious terms, _It may be they will consider and return, every man from his evil way_; it implies, that this was what might have been reasonably expected by men, though it was no matter of uncertainty to the heart-searching God, who knoweth the end from the beginning, and perfectly foresees what will be the event of things, which, in various respects, are under the direction of his providence. Though it could hardly be thought, by men, that such an admonition should be treated with such contempt, yet God knew how they would behave themselves; there was no _peradventure_ with respect to his judgment thereof; he knew that they would not repent, otherwise he would have inclined their wills, and effectually have persuaded them to exercise this grace, and thereby have prevented his expectation, or determination, from being disappointed, or frustrated.
If it be objected, that, according to this sense of the text, the prophet’s message to the people would have been to no purpose, and his ministry, among them, exercised in vain; or that it was contrary to the wisdom and goodness of God to make this overture to them, when he knew it would not be complied with.
To this it may be replied, that the great God is not bound to decline the asserting his right to man’s obedience, or requiring that which is a just debt to him, though he knew that they would not comply with his demand thereof; and, indeed, this objection cannot be maintained, without supposing, that, when the gospel is preached to man, the glory of the divine wisdom and goodness therein cannot be secured, unless we conclude either that God doth not know whether man will embrace it, or no, which is contrary to his omniscience; or that he determines, that all, to whom the gospel is preached, shall embrace it, which is contrary to matter of fact. But there may be a medium between both these, which vindicates the divine perfections, in ordering that the gospel should be preached, and thereby asserting his sovereignty, and unalienable right to their obedience; accordingly, there might be a small remnant among them, in whom God designed that this message should take effect. And will any one say, that because the goodness of God was not herein demonstrated to all, that therefore no glory was brought to that perfection?
And if it be farther said, that supposing there were some who turned from their evil ways, the captivity, which was threatened, was not hereby prevented, and therefore the promise, relating thereunto, did not take place; to this it may be replied; that as God did not give them ground to expect this blessing, unless this repentance should be more universal, than it really was, so he had various ways to testify his regard to those who should receive advantage by this message, for whose sake it was principally intended.
As for that other scripture, in which God advises his people to _seek righteousness and meekness_, and, as the consequence hereof, says, _it may be ye may be hid in the day of the Lord’s fierce anger_; the meaning is, that they, who were enabled to exercise these graces, should either have some instances of temporal deliverance vouchsafed to them; or if not, that they should have no reason to complain that the exercise thereof was altogether in vain.
As for that scripture, in which the apostle bids Timothy to exhort those that oppose the gospel, _if, peradventure, God would give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth_; the meaning is, that it was uncertain to Timothy whether God would give this grace or no; and therefore he must preach the gospel, whatever were the event thereof: Nevertheless, it was no matter of uncertainty, with respect to God, who must be supposed to know what grace he designs to bestow, and therefore the event of things may be dubious to us, and yet be certain with respect to him.
_Object._ 4. Another objection, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, is, that it is altogether inconsistent with the preaching of the gospel; for if God has determined the final state of man, so that his purpose cannot be altered, then it is a preposterous thing, not to say illusory, for grace to be offered to the chief of sinners, which must certainly argue, that it is impossible to be attained by them; and, since the overture is universal, we must conclude that God has put all mankind into a salvable state, and consequently not excluded any from salvation by his peremptory and unchangeable decree. To what purpose are the promises of the gospel held forth, to all that sit under the sound thereof, if it be impossible for them to attain the blessings promised therein? Or what regard could men be supposed to have to the promises, if they were not a declaration of God’s purpose? And, on the other hand, the threatnings denounced would be as little regarded, as an expedient to deter men from sinning, if their state were unalterably fixed by God, according to this doctrine of election, as it has been before considered.
_Answ._ That we may proceed with greater clearness in answering this objection, we shall first shew what we mean by preaching the gospel, which is nothing else but a declaration of God’s revealed will, and our duty pursuant thereunto, which is to be made known, particularly what is contained in the word of God, relating to the salvation of men, and the way which he has ordained in order to their attaining it. Therefore,
1. When this salvation is said to be offered in the gospel, we intend nothing else thereby, but that a declaration is made to sinners, that there are many invaluable privileges which Christ has purchased for, and will, in his own time and way, apply to all those whom God has purposed to save; and, since we cannot describe them by name, and no unregenerate person has ground to conclude that he is of that number, therefore there is a farther declaration to be made, namely, that God has inseparably connected this salvation, which he has chosen them to, with faith and repentance, and the exercise of all other graces, which, as they are God’s gift, and to be prayed for, and expected, in a diligent attendance on all his ordinances; so they are to be considered as the mark and evidences of their being chosen to salvation, without which, it is certainly a vain and presumptuous thing for any one to pretend that he has a right to it, as the object of God’s eternal election.
2. No one, who preaches the gospel, has any warrant from God to tell any individual person that whether he repents and believes, or no, he shall be saved; or, to direct his discourse to him, as one that is chosen thereunto, much less to give the impenitent sinner occasion to conclude, that, though he obstinately, and finally, remain in a state of rebellion against God, notwithstanding he may hope to be saved, because there is a number of mankind chosen to salvation; for this is not to declare God’s revealed will, but that which is directly contrary to it, and therefore not to preach the gospel. Therefore,
3. All, who sit under the sound of the gospel, ought to look upon it as a declaration of God’s design to save a part of mankind, under the preaching thereof, and among them the chief of sinners, which they have a sufficient ground to conclude themselves to be; but yet a door of hope is so far opened hereby, that they have no reason to conclude that they are rejected, any more than that they are elected; and, while they wait on God’s instituted means of grace, they have, at least, this encouragement, that, peradventure, they may be of the number of God’s elect; and, when they find in themselves that faith, which is the evidence thereof, then they may determine their interest in, and lay claim to this privilege, when they are enabled to make their calling, and thereby their election sure.
And as for the promises and threatnings, these are to be considered by unregenerate persons, without determining their right to the one, or falling under the other, as elected or rejected; for that is still supposed to be a secret; therefore they are to regard the promise, as a declaration of God’s purpose, relating to the connexion that there is between faith and salvation, as an inducement to perform the one, in expectation of the other. And as for the threatnings, though they determine the present state of impenitent sinners to be such, in which they are undone and miserable, yet they are not to be extended to those events, which are hid in the purpose of God, so as to give any one ground to conclude that he is thereby finally excluded from salvation, since such an exclusion as this is inseparably connected with final impenitency and unbelief.
_Object._ 5. It is farther objected, that this doctrine is, in many instances subversive of practical religion. And,
1. That it is inconsistent with the duty of prayer; for if God has determined to save a person, what need has he to ask a blessing, which is already granted? and, if he has determined to reject him, his prayer will be in vain.
2. It is farther supposed, that it leads to presumption, on the one hand, or despair, on the other; election, to presumption; reprobation, to despair. And,
3. They add, that it leads to licentiousness, as it is inconsistent with our using endeavours that we may be saved: for to what purpose is it for persons to strive to enter in at the strait gate, when all their endeavours will be ineffectual, if they are not elected? or to what purpose is it for persons to use any endeavours to escape the wrath of God, due to sin, if they are appointed to wrath, and so must necessarily perish?
_Answ._ This objection is, beyond measure, shocking; and it is no wonder, that a doctrine, that is supposed to have such consequences attending it, is treated with the utmost degree of detestation: but as the greatest part of the objections against it, are no other than misrepresentations thereof, so it is no difficult matter to reply to them, to the conviction of those who are disposed to judge impartially of the matter in controversy between us. We shall therefore proceed to reply to the several branches of this objection. And,
1. As to what concerns the duty of prayer; when we are engaged in it, we are not to suppose that we are to deal with God, in such a way, as when we have to do with men, whom we suppose to be undetermined, and that they are to be moved, by intreaties, to alter their present resolutions, and to give us what we ask for; for that is to conceive of him as altogether such an one as ourselves; accordingly, we are not to conclude, that he has not determined to grant the thing that we are to pray to him for; for that would be presumptuously to enter into his secret purpose, since he has no where told us we shall be denied the blessings we want; but rather that there is forgiveness with him, and mercy for the chief of sinners, as an encouragement to this duty; and, besides this, has given us farther ground to hope for a gracious answer of prayer, where he gives a heart to seek him. Therefore we are to behave ourselves, in this duty, as those who pretend not to know God’s secret purpose, but rather desire to wait for some gracious intimation or token for good, that he will hear and answer our prayer; therefore his secret purpose is no more inconsistent with this duty, than if, with those that deny the doctrine we are maintaining, we should conclude that this matter is not determined by him.