Part 64

2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the means, since these are inseparably connected in God’s purpose, as well as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general rule for our understanding all those scriptures, which are usually brought to prove that God’s purposes are sometimes conditional, we shall farther illustrate it, by applying it to three or four other scriptures, that are often brought in defence thereof, which we shall endeavour to explain, consistently with the doctrine we are maintaining.

One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lot _escape to Zoar_, telling him, that _he could not do any thing till he came thither_. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God, or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom, and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it; one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that God’s purpose, relating to Sodom’s destruction, was founded on Lot’s escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he designed that those two things should be connected together, and that one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as their respective connection, were the object of God’s absolute and peremptory determination.

There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob, _Let me go, for the day breaketh_; and Jacob replies, _I will not let thee go, except thou bless me_, which does not infer, that God’s determinations were dependent on Jacob’s endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart; but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as it is said elsewhere, _Weeping and making supplication_, Hos. xii. 4. _Let me go_, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the blessing which he received, was God’s gift, and both were connected in the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself was free, sovereign, and unconditional.

Again, there is another scripture, in which God condescends to use a mode of speaking, not much unlike to the other, in which he says to Moses, speaking concerning Israel, in Exod. xxxii. 10. _This is a stiff-necked people; now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them_; we are not to suppose that the whole event was to turn upon Moses’s prayer, as though God’s purposing to save his people were dependent on it; or that that grace, which inclined him to be importunate with God, did not take its rise from him. Moses, indeed, when first he began to plead with God, knew not whether his prayer would be prevalent or no; however, he addresses himself, with an uncommon degree of importunity, for sparing mercy; and, when God says, _Let me alone_, it signifies, that his people were unworthy that any one should plead their cause; and, if God should mark iniquity, then Moses’s intercession would be altogether in vain, and so he might as well let him alone, in that respect, as ask for his mercy. He does not, indeed, at first, tell him what he designed to do, that he might aggravate their crime, but afterwards he answers his prayer in Israel’s favour, and signifies that he would work, not for their sakes, but for his own name’s sake; so that he takes occasion, on the one hand, to set forth the people’s desert of punishment; and, on the other, the freeness of his own grace.

There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. that _he could not do many mighty works there_, at that time, in his own country, _because of their unbelief_? where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought: or else of the unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it.

5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this is the result of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection, if there were the least change in God’s understanding, so as to know more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the immutability of the divine nature[207], that whatever may be a reason obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his: No unforeseen occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.

If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it; that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance, superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.

They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another. Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free actions of the creature from being the objects thereof, which is a limiting and lessening of this perfection, and is directly contrary to the idea of omniscience; and therefore we must insist on their proving this to be consistent with the infinite perfection of God, which they will find it very difficult to do; and to suppose, on the other hand, that any thing is the object of God’s certain fore-knowledge, about which his will is no way conversant, or only so, in such a way, as that it is subject to change, according to the mutability of things, is altogether as indefensible, and equally subversive of the independency, wisdom, and sovereignty thereof.

_Object._ The most material objection against this doctrine, is take from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7. _It repented the Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord said, I will destroy man, whom I have created_; and, at other times he is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36. _The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants; when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or left_; and in Joel ii. 13. _Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil_; and in Psal. xc. 13, _Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee concerning thy servants_; and in Jer. xviii. 8. _If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I have thought to do unto them._ And we have a very remarkable instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, that _within forty days they should be destroyed_.

_Answ._ It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19. _God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?_ And elsewhere, in 1 Sam. xv. 29. it is said, _The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a man that he should repent_.

But we must have recourse to some methods to reconcile this seeming contradiction, and so consider the sense thereof, in different respects, as applicable to them both; in some scriptures, God is said to repent; in others, it is said that he cannot repent. That these may not appear inconsistent with one another, nor either of them infer any imperfection in God, let it be considered, that God is sometimes represented, in scripture, in condescension to our common mode of speaking, as though he had human passions, as in others, he is described, as though he had a body, or bodily parts: But such expressions are always to be taken in a metaphorical sense, without the least supposition, that he is subject to any such imperfections; and particularly we must not conclude, that repentance is ever ascribed to God in the same sense as it is to men, _viz._ as implying a change in his purpose, occasioned by an unforeseen occurrence, which is the sense contained in the objection. Such a repentance, as this, is a passion peculiarly belonging to the creature, and therefore in this sense we must understand those words; _God is not a man, that he should lye, nor the son of man, that he should repent_; accordingly, he is said to repent, not by changing his purpose, but by changing his work. Thus when it is said, that _he repented that he had made man_, nothing is meant by it, but that he determined to destroy him, as he did afterwards by the flood. And this was no new determination arising from any thing in the creature, which God did not foresee; he knew before-hand that all flesh would corrupt their way, and therefore his determination to punish them for it, was not a new resolve of the divine will, after the sin was committed; but God determined things in their respective order, first to permit sin, and then knowing what would be the consequence thereof, namely, that they would rebel against him, he determined to punish it, or to destroy the old world, which is, in effect, the same, as though he had repented that he made it. He cannot be said to repent as we do, by wishing that he had not done that which he is said to repent of, but by denying us the advantage, which we might have otherwise expected from it. In this sense we are to understand all those scriptures that speak of God, as repenting of the good that he had bestowed on man.

And, on the other hand, when he is said to repent of the evil which he threatened to bring on men, as in the case of Nineveh, this does not argue any change in his purpose; for he determined that Nineveh should be destroyed, provided they did not repent, and it was not uncertain to him whether they would repent or no; for, at the same time, he determined to give them repentance, as appears by the event, and so not to inflict the judgment threatened; and therefore when Jonah was sent to make a public proclamation to the people, that in forty days they should be destroyed, it is plain that they understood the threatening in this sense, that they had no ground to expect any thing else, except they repented, which accordingly they did, and so were spared, without having any reason to conclude that God changed his purpose relating thereunto.

If it be objected hereunto, that this is nothing less than to establish a conditional purpose in God, and so overthrows the argument that we are maintaining; the reply that may be made to it, is, that we distinguish between a conditional purpose, in God’s secret will, and a conditional proposition, which was to be the subject of the prophet’s ministry: The prophet, it is plain, was not told, when he received his commission to go to Nineveh, that God would give them repentance, but only, that, without repentance, they should be destroyed; whereas God, as the event makes it appear, determined that they should repent, and therefore that they should not be destroyed; and, consequently, we must not suppose, that, when God sent him, he was undetermined, in his own purpose, whether to destroy them or not, or that there was any thing conditional in the divine mind, that rendered the event uncertain to God, though there was a condition contained in the subject-matter of the prophet’s message, which the Ninevites very well understood, namely, that they had no ground to expect deliverance without repentance, and therefore they repented, in hope of obtaining mercy, which they supposed would be connected with their repentance; and it is evident, that Jonah himself suspected that this might be the event, though God had not told him that it would be so, and therefore says, in chap. iv. 2. _For I knew that thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil._

6. The purpose of God, in choosing men to eternal life, renders their salvation necessary; so that nothing shall defeat, or disannul it. What God says concerning Israel’s deliverance from the Babylonish captivity, may be applied to all his other determinations, and particularly to what relates to the eternal salvation of his people; _My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure; yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it_, Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. The purposes of God, indeed, are distinguished from his bringing them to pass; it is one thing to design to bring his people to glory, and another thing to bring them to it. It is not to be supposed that the decree of God has, in itself, a proper efficiency to produce the thing decreed:[208] for then there would be no difference between an eternal decree, and an eternal production of things; whereas the apostle plainly distinguishes between man’s being predestinated to glory, and brought to it, when he says, _Those whom he predestinated, them he glorified_, Rom. viii. 30.

The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary, which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise never come to pass.[209]

This is a great encouragement to those who are enabled to make their calling and election sure; for their perseverance in grace, notwithstanding all the opposition that they meet with, is the necessary consequence of their election to eternal life. Thus, as we before distinguished predestination into election and reprobation, we have considered the former of these, and we proceed,

_Secondly_, To speak concerning the doctrine of reprobation;[210] which is become obnoxious to those on the other side of the question, almost to a proverb; so that if any doctrine is considered as shocking, and to be answered no otherwise than by testifying their abhorrence of it, it is compared to this of reprobation; and, indeed, if it were not a consequence from the doctrine of election to eternal life, that doctrine would not be so much opposed by them. How far some unguarded expressions, or exceptionable methods of explication, may have given occasion for this prejudice, it is not to our present purpose to enquire; but we shall take occasion, from thence, to explain it in such a way, as that a fair and unprejudiced disputant will not see just reason to except against it, at least to reproach it, as though it were a doctrine subversive of the divine glory, and to be defended by none but those who seem to have a design to raise prejudices, in the minds of men, against religion in general.

And here we shall take occasion to consider the meaning of the word, as it is contained in, or deduced from scripture, where the same word that is used to signify the execution of this decree, may be applied to express the decree itself. Thus we read of God’s rejecting, or disregarding men, as a punishment of their rebellion against him: and these are compared by the prophet Jeremiah, chap. vi. 30. _To reprobate silver, because the Lord hath rejected them_; or, as it is in the margin, _The refuse of silver_; and, in the New Testament, the same word[212] is sometimes translated reprobates; at other times, disapproved or rejected, 1 Cor. iv. 27. 2 Cor. xiii. 5. Heb. vi. 8. and when this disapprobation, or rejection, respects not only their actions, as contrary to the holy nature of God, but their persons, as punished for their iniquities; and when this punishment is considered as what respects their eternal state, as the objects of vindictive justice, the purpose of God, relating hereunto, is what we call reprobation.

But, that we may more particularly consider the sense of the word, it seems, in scripture, to contain in it two ideas.

1. God’s determining to leave a part of the world in that state of sin and misery, which he from all eternity, fore-knew that they would bring themselves into, or his decreeing not to save them; and, since all will allow that a part of mankind shall not be saved, it cannot reasonably be denied that this was determined by him before-hand; and this is what divines generally call preterition.

2. There is another idea in the word _reprobation_, which is also contained in scripture, or deducible from it, and that respects the purpose of God to punish those for their iniquities, whom he will not save. Not to be saved, is the same as to be _punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power_. And God’s purpose, relating hereunto, is expressed in scripture by his _appointing them to wrath_, 1 Thess. v. 9. for those sins which he fore-saw they would commit. This is what some call _pre-damnation_, as taken from that expression of the apostle, Jude, ver. 4, 13. concerning some who had _crept into the church unawares_, whom he describes as _ungodly men_, that is, notoriously so, _who turned the grace of God into lasciviousness_, for whom _is reserved the blackness of darkness forever_; of these he says, that they were _before of old, ordained to this condemnation_, where God is represented as punishing sinners, in proportion to their crimes; and this is considered as the result of that eternal purpose, which was founded on his fore-sight of their contracting that guilt whereby they would render themselves liable to it.

If this doctrine be thus explained, it will appear agreeable, not only to scripture, but to the divine perfections, and therefore too great a truth to be treated with that abhorrence, with which it generally is, without explaining, distinguishing or fairly entering into the merits of the cause. It is a very easy matter to render any doctrine odious, by misrepresentation, as they on the other side of the question, have done this of reprobation, which we shall briefly consider, and therein take leave to explain it in a different manner, whereby it will appear not only worthy to be defended, as redounding to the glory of God, but a plain and evident truth, founded on scripture.