Part 63

This leads us to consider a distinction, which we are often obliged to make use of, when we speak concerning the will of God, as secret or revealed, by which we account for the sense of many scriptures, and take occasion from it to answer several objections that are brought against this doctrine. I am sensible that there is nothing advanced in defence thereof, which they, who are in the other way of thinking, are more prejudiced against, than this distinction, which they suppose to contain a reproachful idea of the divine Majesty, and is the foundation of many popular prejudices against the doctrine we are defending, as though we hereby intended that God has a secret meaning, different from what he reveals; or that we are not to judge of his intentions by those discoveries which he makes thereof, which it would be the highest reproach to charge any creature with, and contrary to that sincerity which he cannot be destitute of, but he is hereby rendered the object of detestation; therefore no one, who conceives of an holy God, in such a way as he ought to do, can entertain a thought, as though the least appearance thereof were applicable to him. However, this is the common misrepresentation that is made of this distinction. Whether it arises from its being not sufficiently explained by some; or a fixed resolution to decry the doctrine of election, and render it odious, as it must certainly be, if supported by a distinction, understood in so vile a sense, I will not determine. However, that we may remove this prejudice, and consider how it is to be understood, in a sense more agreeable to the divine perfections, we shall proceed to explain it; and here we may observe,

_First_, That the will of God is sometimes taken, in scripture, for that which he has, from all eternity, determined, which is unchangeable, and shall certainly come to pass, which is impossible for any creature to disannul, resist, or render ineffectual; and it is such a branch of divine sovereignty, that to deny it, would be, in effect, to deny him to be God. This the apostle intends, when he represents the malicious and obstinate sinner as replying against God, and defending himself in his bold crimes, by saying, _Why doth he yet find fault; for who hath resisted his will?_ Rom. ix. 19, 20, 21, 22. In answer to which, he asserts the sovereignty of God, and that he is not accountable to any for what he does, nor to be controuled by them; and this is also intended in another scripture, in Eph. i. 11. where it is said, that _God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will_; and elsewhere he says, _My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure_, Isa. xlvi. 10. This will of God is the rule of his own acting, and, as it determines the event of things, it is impossible for him to act contrary to it; and it is equally disagreeable to his perfections, to signify to his creatures, that he determines to do one thing, but will do another; therefore, in this sense, we are far from asserting that there is a revealed will of God, which contradicts his secret.

_Secondly_, We often read, in scripture, of the will of God, as taken for what he has prescribed to us, as a rule of duty; and also of our judging concerning the apparent event of things.

(1.) The will of God may be considered as a rule of duty, which is a well-known and proper sense of his revealed will: thus our Saviour teaches us to pray, _Let thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven_; by which he principally intends his revealed will, _or law_. Enable us to yield obedience to thy law, in our measure, as thou art perfectly obeyed in heaven. So our Saviour says, _Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother_, Mark iii. 35. which can be meant of no other than his revealed will, or of his law, in which it is contained; because no one can act contrary to God’s determination, which is that sense of his will, contained in the foregoing head; and, consequently, a doing his will, in that sense, would not have been laid down as a distinguishing character of those whom Christ preferred above all, who were related to him in the bonds of nature.

Again the apostle understands the will of God in this sense, when he says, _Thou knowest his will_, Rom. ii. 18. where he speaks to the Jews, who were instructed out of the law, in which it is contained; and elsewhere, Eph. vi. 6. he speaks of his will, as what is to be obeyed, and therefore gives this description of faithful servants, that they _do the will of God_, namely, what he has commanded, _from the heart_. And there are many other scriptures thus to be understood; and this we call his revealed will, as it is the rule of duty and obedience.

(2.) The revealed will of God may be considered as a rule which he has given us, whereby we are to judge of the apparent event of things. I make this a branch of God’s revealed will, inasmuch as sometimes he condescends to discover future events to his creatures, which otherwise they could never have known; but yet there is a difference, as to the manner of their judging thereof, pursuant to the intimations which he has given them. Accordingly, when God has told us expressly, that this or that particular thing shall come to pass, then we are infallibly sure concerning the event, and need no other rule to judge of it, but by considering it as revealed: As when God has said, that there shall be a general resurrection of the dead, and that Christ shall come to judgment, and receive his redeemed, and sanctified ones, to heaven, to behold his glory, we are infallibly assured of these events, because they are expressly revealed; and, when we speak of the secret and revealed will of God, as applicable to things of this nature, we intend nothing else hereby but what all will allow of, _viz._ that what would have been for ever a secret, had it not been discovered, is now revealed, and therefore ceases to be so; and in that sense, the revealed will of God, in all respects, agrees with his secret; in this case, we suppose that God expressly revealed the event.

But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof; and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which, perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form, at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein, that his only design was to try whether his soldiers would obey the word of command, or not. Or if a king should order a number of malefactors to the place of execution, without discovering the event thereof, the apparent event is their immediate death; but if, pursuant to his secret purpose, he resolved, there to give forth a pardon to them, it cannot be supposed that he changed his purpose; but the event makes it appear, that his purpose was not then known; whatever the apparent event might be, his real design was to humble them for their crimes, and afterwards to pardon them.

It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose, that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the promise before given him, that _in Isaac his seed should be called_, by supposing that God, at some time or other, would _raise him from the dead_, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a difference between the will of God, determining the event of things, which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be contrary to what will afterwards appear to have been the real design of God therein. God’s real design was to try Abraham’s faith, and to prevent him from slaying his son, when he had given a proof of his readiness to obey him; but this remained, at first, a secret to Abraham, and the apparent design was, that he should slay him. Therefore there is a foundation for this distinction, as thus explained, concerning the secret and revealed will of God; the former belongs not to us, nor are we to take our measures from it, as being unknown: and, when the latter appears contrary to it, we must distinguish between two things, that are contrary in the same, and different respects; or between the judgment which we pass concerning events, which are apparent to us, and, at most, are only probable and conjectural, as we judge of the consequence of a duty commanded; and those events, which, though they are infallibly certain, yet are not revealed, nor can be known, till they come to pass. In this sense we understand the distinction between God’s secret and revealed will, when they seem to oppose each other; which it was necessary for us thus to explain, inasmuch as we shall frequently have occasion to mention, and apply it, when we account for the difference that there seems to be, between the purpose of God, relating to the event of things, and our present views thereof, whereby we may understand and account for the difficulties contained in several scriptures, which I would have mentioned in this place, for the farther illustration hereof, had it been necessary. But this is sufficient to explain and vindicate it from the prejudices entertained against it, by those who are disposed to misrepresent what is said in defence of this doctrine.

From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we may infer,

_1st_, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes them known; for _secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever_, Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair: that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency, which many pretend that it has.

_2dly_, The first act of saving faith does not consist in our believing that we are elected; neither is it the duty of unregenerate persons, as such to apply this privilege to themselves any more than to conclude themselves rejected: But our business, is, so long as the purpose of God remains a secret to us, to attend on the means of grace, hoping and waiting for the display of divine power, in effectually calling us; and afterwards for the Spirit’s testimony, or seal, to be set to it, whereby he discovers his own work; and then it may, in some measure, be reckoned a branch of his revealed will and will afford us matter of thanksgiving and praise to him, and a foundation of peace and comfort in our own souls. But this may be farther insisted on, when we come to consider the improvement we ought to make of this doctrine. We proceed to consider the next property of election.

4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election; therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation.

This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature: if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But more particularly,

(1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15. _He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion._ And there are many other scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives, taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied, even to the common blessings of providence; _Nevertheless, he saved them for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known_, Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise of God’s patience, _For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off_, Isa. xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy, _For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great_, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is represented as doing great things for his people, he puts them in mind, at the same time, of their own vileness and unworthiness, that the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, to them, might be more conspicuous: Thus, when he tells them how he delivered Israel out of Egypt, he puts them in mind of their idolatry in that land; therefore no motive could be taken, from their behaviour towards him, which could induce him to do this for them; as it is said, _But they rebelled against me, and would not hearken unto me; they did not every man cast away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt; then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought, for my name’s sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt_, Ezek. xx. 8, 9.

(2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will farther appear, if we consider,

_1st._ That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the word _condition_, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore,

_2dly._ That the performance of the condition is the next, or immediate cause of a conditional purpose’s taking effect; and, to apply this to the case before us,

_3dly._ If, on our performing the condition of God’s purpose to save us, it be rendered effectual, which otherwise it would not have been, (agreeably to the nature of a conditional purpose) then we are more beholden to our own conduct, than the divine purpose, and so the glory thereof will be due to ourselves; which would not only cast the highest dishonour on the divine perfections, but it is contrary to the design of the gospel, which is to stain the pride of all flesh, and take away all occasions of glorying, from the creature. Thus the prophet Isaiah, fore-telling the glory of the gospel-state, considers its tendency to humble the pride of man, when he says, _The loftiness of man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low, and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day_, Isa. ii. 17. and the apostle, describing the nature of faith, considers its tendency _to exclude boasting_; Rom. iii. 27. and our Saviour, speaking concerning the discriminating grace of God, that appears in election, either in his purpose relating to it, or in the execution thereof, says, _Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you_, John xv. 16. that is, you have done nothing that has laid any obligation on me to choose you by that act of faith, whereby you are inclined to prefer me to all others; for this is the consequence and result of my discriminating grace.

We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support the conditionality of God’s purpose, as well as of his works of grace, in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle speaks of such a confession of Christ _with the mouth_, as is attended with _believing in the heart, that God raised him from the dead_, and _calling on the name of the Lord_, as connected with salvation, Rom. x. 9, 13. and our Saviour says, that _whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life_, John iii. 15. and that _he that believeth shall be saved_, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere, _Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish_, Luke xiii. 3. and many other scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the dispensations of God’s providence, the gifts of his grace, and the execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained, agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider,

1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces, are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was before laid down, _viz._ that God having chosen to the end has also chosen to the means. We are far from denying that faith and repentance are necessary to salvation, as God never gives one without the other, and consequently they are inseparably connected in his eternal purpose relating thereunto. If nothing else were intended by a conditional purpose than this, we would not offer any thing against it; but certainly this would be to use words without their known or proper ideas; and the word _condition_, as applicable to other things, is never to be understood in this sense. There is a necessary connection between God’s creating the world, and his upholding it, or between his creating an intelligent creature, and his giving laws to him; but none ever supposed one to be properly a condition of the other: so a king’s determining to pardon a malefactor, is inseparably connected with his pardoning him, and his pardon given forth, with his having a right to his forfeited life; but it is not proper to say, one is a condition of the other; so a person’s seeing is inseparably connected with his opening his eyes; and speaking, with the motion of his lips; but we do not say, when he determines to do both of them, that one is a condition of the other. A condition, properly speaking is that which is not only connected with the privilege that follows upon the performance thereof, but it must be performed by a subject acting independently on him who made the conditional overture, or promise.

If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against, when we assert the absoluteness of God’s purpose.