Part 4

II. From the structure of human bodies, in which respect we are said to be fearfully and wonderfully made; this, if it be abstractedly considered without regard to the fixed course and laws of nature, exceeds the power and skill of all creatures, and can be no other than the workmanship of a God, and therefore is a demonstration of his being and perfections. No man ever pretended to give a specimen of his skill therein. The finest statuaries or limners, who have imitated or given a picture, or representation of human bodies, have not pretended to give life or motion to them; herein their skill is baffled. The wisest men in the world have confessed their ignorance of the way and manner of the formation of human bodies; how they are framed in their first rudiments, preserved and grow to perfection in the womb, and how they are increased, nourished, and continued in their health, strength, and vigour for many years. This has made the inquiries of the most thoughtful men issue in admiration: herein we plainly see the power and wisdom of God, to which alone it is owing.

Here it may be observed, that there are several things very wonderful in the structure of human bodies, which farther evince this truth. As,

1. The organs of sense and speech.

2. The circulation of the blood, and the natural heat which is preserved for many years together, of which there is no instance but in living creatures. Even fire will consume and waste itself by degrees, and all things, which have only acquired heat, will soon grow cold; but the natural heat of the body of man is preserved in it as long as life is continued.

3. The continual supply of animal spirits, and their subserviency to sense and motion.[13]

4. The nerves, which, though small as threads, remain unbroken, though every one of these small fibres performs its office, and tends to convey strength and motion to the body.

5. The situation of the parts in their most proper place: the internal parts, which would be ruined and destroyed if exposed to the injuries that the external ones are: these are secured in proper inclosures, and so preserved, Job x. 11. _Thou hast cloathed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinews._

6. All the parts of the body are so disposed, that they are fitted for their respective uses, as being situate in those places which render them most fit to perform their proper actions.

7. The differing features of different bodies, so that we scarce see persons in all respects alike, is wonderful, and the result of divine wisdom: for even this is necessary for society, and our performing the duties we owe to one another.

8. The union of this body with the soul, which is a spirit of a very different nature, can never be sufficiently admired or accounted for; but gives us occasion herein to own a superior, infinitely wise being. Which leads us,

III. To consider how the being of God may be evinced from the nature of the soul of man. He is said, Zech. xii. 1. _To have formed the spirit of man within him._ And hereby his power and wisdom, and consequently his being, is declared. For,

1. The nature of a spiritual substance is much less known than that of bodies; and therefore that which we cannot fully understand, we must admire.

If the wisdom and power of God is visible in the structure of our bodies, it is much more so in the formation of our souls; and since we cannot fully describe what they are, and know little of them but by their effects, certainly we could not form them; and therefore there is a God, who is the _Father of spirits_.

2. The powers and capacities of the soul are various, and very extensive.

(1.) It can frame ideas of things superior to its own nature, and can employ itself in contemplating and beholding the order, beauty, and connexion of all those things in the world, which are, as it were, a book, in which we may read the divine perfections, and improve them to the best purposes.

(2.) It takes in the vast compass of things past, which it can reflect on and remember, with satisfaction, or regret: and it can look forward to things to come, which it can expect, and accordingly conceive pleasure or uneasiness in the forethoughts thereof.

(3.) It can chuse or embrace what is good, or fly from and reject what is evil and hurtful to it.

(4.) It is capable of moral government, of conducting itself according to the principles of reason, and certain rules enjoined it for the attaining the highest end.

(5.) It is capable of religion, and so can argue that there is a God, and give him the glory that is due to his name, and be happy in the enjoyment of him.

(6.) It is immortal, and therefore cannot be destroyed by any creature; for none but God has an absolute sovereignty over the spirits of men; _No man hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he power in the day of death_, Eccles. viii. 8.

IV. From the nature and office of conscience, which is that whereby the soul takes a view of itself, and its own actions, as good or evil; and considers itself as under a law to a superior being, from whom it expects rewards or punishments; and this evidently proves a God. For,

1. Conscience is oftentimes distressed or comforted by its reflection on those actions, which no man on earth can know: and therefore when it fears punishment for those crimes, which come not under the cognizance of human laws, the uneasiness that it finds in itself, and its dread of punishment, plainly discovers that it is apprehensive of a divine being, who has been offended, whose wrath and resentment it fears. All the endeavours that men can use to bribe, blind, or stupify their consciences, will not prevent these fears; but the sad apprehension of deserved punishment, from one whom they conceive to know all things, even the most secret crimes committed, this makes persons uneasy, whether they will or no. Whithersoever they fly, or what amusement soever they betake themselves to, conscience will still follow them with its accusations and dread of divine wrath: _The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest_, Isa. lvii. 20. _A dreadful sound is in his ears; in prosperity the destroyer shall come upon him_, Job xv. 21. _Terrors take hold of him as waters, a tempest stealeth him away in the night. The east-wind carrieth him away, and he departeth; and as a storm hurleth him out of his place. For God shall cast upon him, and not spare; he would fain flee out of his hand_, Job xxvii. 20, 21, 22. _The wicked flee when no man pursueth_, Prov. xxviii. 1.

And this is universal, there are none but are, some time or other, liable to these fears, arising from self-reflection, and the dictates of conscience; the most advanced circumstances in the world will not fortify against, or deliver from them, Acts xxiv. 25. _As Paul reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled._ Even Pharaoh himself, the most hard-hearted sinner in the world, who would fain have forced a belief upon himself that there is no God, and boldly said, _Who is the Lord, that I should obey him?_ yet he could not ward off the conviction that there is a God, which his own conscience suggested. Therefore he was forced to say, Exod. ix. 27. _I have sinned this time; the Lord is righteous, and I and my people are wicked._ And indeed all the pleasures that any can take in the world, who give themselves up to the most luxurious way of living, cannot prevent their trembling, when conscience suggests some things terrible to them for their sins. Thus Belshazzar, when in the midst of his jollity and drinking wine, having made a great feast to a thousand of his lords, when he saw the finger of a man’s hand upon the wall, it is said, Dan. v. 6. _The king’s countenance was changed, and his thoughts troubled him; so that the joints of his loins were loosed, and his knees smote one against another._

Thus concerning those dictates of conscience, which make men very uneasy, whereby wicked men are forced to own that there is a God, whether they will or no; we now proceed to consider good men, as having frequently such serenity of mind and peace of conscience, as affords them farther matter of conviction concerning this truth. It is, indeed, a privilege that they enjoy, who have the light of scripture revelation, and so it might have been considered under a following head; but since it is opposed to what was but now brought, as a proof of the being of a God, we may here observe, that some have that composure of mind, in believing and walking closely with God, as tends to confirm them yet more in this truth. For,

(1.) This composure of mind abides under all the troubles and disappointments they meet with in the world: those things which tend to disturb the peace of other men, do not so much affect them; _He shall not be afraid of evil tidings; his heart is fixed, trusting in the Lord_, Psal. cxii. 7. And as this peace abides under all the troubles of life, so it does not leave them, but is sometimes more abundant, when they draw nigh to death.

(2.) It is a regular and orderly peace that they have, accompanied with grace, so that conscience is most quiet when the soul is most holy; which shews that there is a hand of God in working or speaking this peace, as designing thereby to encourage and own that grace which he has wrought in them: Rom. x. 13. _thus the God of hope_ is said _to fill us with all joy and peace in believing_.

(3.) Let them labour never so much after it, they can never attain this peace, without a divine intimation, or God’s speaking peace to their souls; therefore when he is pleased, for wise ends, to withdraw from them, they are destitute of it; so that God is hereby known by his works, or by those influences of his grace, whereby he gives peace to conscience.

V. The being of a God appears from those vast and boundless desires, which are implanted in the soul; so that it can take up its rest, and meet with full satisfaction, in nothing short of a being of infinite perfection: therefore there is such an one, which is God. This will farther appear if we consider,

1. We find, by experience, that though the soul, at present, be entertained, and meets with some satisfaction in creature-enjoyments, yet it still craves and desires more, of what kind soever they be; and the reason is, because they are not commensurate to its desires; _The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing_, Eccles. i. 8. _That which is wanting cannot be numbered_, ver. 15.

2. We cannot rationally suppose that such boundless desires should be implanted in the soul, and yet that there should be nothing sufficient to satisfy them; for then the most excellent creature in this lower world would be, in some respects, more miserable than other creatures of a lower order, which obtain their ultimate desire. Thus the Psalmist, speaking of the brute creatures, says, Psal. civ. 28. _They are filled with good_; that is, they have all that they crave. Therefore,

3. There must be one that is infinitely good, who can satisfy these desires, considered in their utmost extent; and that is God, the fountain of all blessedness.

VI. The being of a God may be farther evinced, from the consent of all nations to this truth. Now that which all mankind agrees in, must be founded in the nature of man, and that which is so, is evident from the light of nature. It is true, there are many who have thus _known God, who have not worshipped and glorified him as God; but have been vain in their imaginations, and have changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator_, as the apostle says, Rom. i. 21, 25. But it doth not follow from hence, that the heathen, who were guilty of idolatry, had no notion of a God in general, but rather the contrary; that there is something in the nature of man, which suggests, that they ought to worship some divine being, whom they could not, by the light of nature, sufficiently know, and therefore they did service to those who were by nature no gods; however, this proves that they were not wholly destitute of some ideas of a God, which therefore are common to all mankind. Now that all nations have had some discerning that there is a God, appears,

1. From the credit that is to be given to all ancient history; which sufficiently discovers that men, in all ages, have owned and worshipped something that they called a God, though they knew not the true God.

2. The heathen themselves, as may easily be understood from their own writings, reckoned atheism a detestable crime, for this reason, because contrary to the light of nature; and therefore some of them have asserted, that there is no nation in the world so barbarous, and void of reason, as to have no notion of a God.

3. We may consider also, that no changes in the world, or in the circumstances of men, have wholly erased this principle: whatever changes there have been in the external modes of worship, or in those things which have been received by tradition, still this principle has remained unalterable, that there is a God. Therefore the being of a God may be proved by the consent of all nations.

_Object._ 1. But it is objected to this, that there have been some speculative atheists in the world. History gives us an account of this; and we are informed, that there are some whole countries in Africa and America, where there is no worship, and, as to what appears to us, no notion of a God. Therefore the being of a God cannot be proved by the consent of all nations.

_Answ._ 1. As to the first branch of this objection, that there have been some speculative atheists in the world; it is true, history furnishes us with instances of persons who have been deemed so, yet their number has been very inconsiderable; so that it will not follow from hence, that the idea of a God is not some way or other, impressed upon the heart of man. Might it not as well be said, that, because some few are born idiots, therefore reason is not natural to man, or universal? And it may be farther observed, that they who are branded with the character of atheists in ancient history, or such as appear to be atheists in our day by their conversation, are rather practical atheists than speculative. We do not deny, that many in all ages have, and now do, assert, and pretend to prove, that there is no God; but it is plain that they discover, at some times, such fear and distress of conscience, as is sufficient to disprove what they pretend to defend by arguments.

2. As to the second branch of the objection, that there are some parts of the world, where the people seem to be so stupid, as not to own or worship a God; this is hard to be proved; neither have any, that have asserted it, had that familiarity with them, as to be able to determine what their sentiments are about this matter.

But suppose it were true in fact, that some nations have no notion of a God or religion, nothing could be argued from it, but that such nations are barbarous and brutish, and though they have the principle of reason, do not act like reasonable creatures; and it is sufficient to our purpose to assert, that all men, acting like reasonable creatures, or who argue from those principles of reason, that they are born with, may from thence conclude that there is a God.

_Object._ 2. It is farther objected by atheists against the being of God, and indeed against all religion, which is founded thereon, that both one and the other took its rise from human policy, that hereby the world, being amused with such-like speculations, might be restrained from those irregularities, which were inconsistent with the well-being of civil government; and that this was readily received, and propagated by tradition, and so by an implicit faith transmitted from one generation to another, among those who enquired not into the reason of what they believed; and that all this was supported by fear, which fixed their belief in this matter: so that human policy invented, tradition propagated, and fear rooted in the minds of men, what we call the natural ideas of God and religion.

_Answ._ This is a vile insinuation, but much in the mouths of atheists, without any shadow of reason, or attempt to prove it; and indeed it may be easily disproved. Therefore,

1. It appears that the notices we have of the being of a God, are not in the least founded in state policy, as a trick of men, to keep up some religion in the world, as necessary for the support of civil government. For,

If the notion of a God, and religion consequential hereon, were a contrivance of human policy, it would follow,

(1.) That it must be either the invention of one single man, or else it was the result of the contrivance of many convened together in a joint assembly of men, in confederacy, to impose on the world.

If it was the invention of one man, who was he? when and where did he live? What history gives the least account of him? or when was the world without all knowledge of a deity, and some religion, that we may know, at least, in what age this notion first sprang up, or was contrived? Or could the contrivance of one man be so universally complied with, and yet none pretend to know who he was, or when he lived? And if it was the contrivance of a number of men convened together, how was this possible, and yet the thing not be discovered? or how could the princes of the earth, who were at the head of this contrivance, have mutual intelligence, or be convened together? By whose authority did they meet? or what was the occasion thereof?

(2.) It is morally impossible, that such a piece of state policy should be made use of to deceive the world, and universally take place, and yet none in any age ever discover the imposture. The world could never be so imposed on, and yet not know by whom; the plot would certainly have been confessed by some who were in the secret.

(3.) If human policy had first invented this notion, certainly the princes and great men of the world, who had a hand in it, would have exempted themselves from any obligation to own a God, or any form of worship, whereby they acknowledge him their superior; for impostors generally design to beguile others, but to exempt themselves from what they bind them to. If any of the princes, or great men of the world, had invented this opinion, that there is a God, and that he is to be worshipped, their pride would have led them to persuade the world that they were gods themselves, and ought to be worshipped; they would never have included themselves in the obligation to own a subjection to God, if the notion of a God had, for political ends, been invented by them.

(4.) If the belief of a God was invented by human policy, how came it to be universally received by the world? It is certain, that it was not propagated by persecution; for though there has been persecution to inforce particular modes of worship, yet there never was any such method used to inforce the belief of a God, for that took place without any need thereof, it being instamped on the nature of man.

If therefore it was not propagated by force, neither was the belief of a God spread through the world by fraud, what are those arts which are pretended to have been used to propagate it? It took its rise, say they, from human policy; but the politicians not known, nor the arts they used to persuade the world that there is a God found out. How unreasonable therefore is this objection, or rather cavil, against a deity, when the atheists pretend that it was the result of human policy!

2. It appears that the belief of a God was not propagated in the world merely by tradition, and so received by implicit faith. For,

(1.) Those notions that have been received with implicit faith by tradition, from generation to generation, are not pretended to be proved by reason; but the belief of a God is founded on the highest reason; so that if no one in the world believed it besides myself, I am bound to believe it, or else must no longer lay claim to that reason which is natural to mankind, and should rather shew myself a brute than a man.

(2.) No schemes of religion, that were propagated merely by tradition, have been universally received; for tradition respects particular nations, or a particular set of men, who have propagated them. But as has been before considered the belief of a God has universally prevailed. Moreover, if the belief of a God was thus spread by tradition through the world, why was not the mode of worship settled, that so there might be but one religion in the world? The reason is, because their respective modes of worship were received, by the heathen, by tradition: whereas the belief of a God was not so, but is rooted in the nature of man.

(3.) Whatever has been received only by tradition, has not continued in the world in all the turns, changes, and overthrow of particular nations, that received it; but the belief of a God has continued in the world throughout all the ages and changes thereof: therefore it is not founded in tradition, but by the light of nature.

3. It appears, moreover, that the belief of a God could not take its first rise merely from fear of punishment, which men expected would be inflicted by him, though that be a strong argument to establish us in the belief thereof. For,

(1.) A liableness to punishment for crimes committed, supposes that there is a God, who is offended by sin, and from whom punishment is expected. Therefore as the effect cannot give being to the cause, so fear could not be the first ground and reason of the belief of a God. But,

(2.) The principal idea which mankind has of God, and that which is most natural to us, is, that of an infinitely amiable object, and so we conceive of him, as a being of infinite goodness, 1 John iv. 8. _God is love._ Thus we conceive of him, as the spring of all we enjoy and hope for; and as for fear, that is only what arises in the breasts of wicked men, and is founded in the secondary ideas we have of him; to wit, as taking vengeance, supposing he is offended. But they who do not offend him are not afraid of his vengeance; and the sentiments of the worst of men are not to be our rule in judging concerning the being of a God. If these believe that there is a God, only because they fear him, others believe him to be the fountain of all blessedness, and as such they love him: therefore the ideas that men have of the being of a God, did not arise from fear.

VII. The being of a God, may be proved from the works of providence, whereby the world is governed, as well as preserved from returning to its first nothing. It is that which supplies all creatures with those things that their respective natures or necessities require: creatures could no more provide for themselves than they could make themselves; therefore he that provides all things for them is God. All finite beings have their respective wants, whether they are sensible thereof or no; and he must be all-sufficient that can fill or supply the necessities of all things, and such an one is God.

Thus the Psalmist speaks of this God, as supplying the necessities of _beasts and creeping things_; who are said, _to wait upon him, that he may give them their meat in due season_, Psal. civ. 25, 27. Psal. cxlv. 15,16.

In considering the providence of God, whereby his being is evinced, we may observe,