Part 30

_Answ._ The account which Plato and his followers seem to have given of the doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have been taken from the light of nature, and therefore this makes nothing to the objection. We have sufficient ground to conclude that Plato travelled into Egypt, with a design to make improvements in knowledge; and some suppose, that there he saw some translation of a part of the Bible into Greek,[82] more ancient than that which is commonly attributed to the LXX, which was not compiled till an hundred years after his time. But whether he did this, or no, is uncertain: it is true, he used several expressions, which are contained in the books of Moses, and took the plan of his laws from thence; upon which account some have called him a second Moses, speaking Greek: but whether he received his notions more immediately from scripture, or by conversation with the Jews, of whom a great number settled in Egypt, after Gedaliah’s death, is not material; however, it is sufficiently evident, that he had not all of them, in a way of reasoning, from the light of nature: and as for his followers, such as Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, and others, they lived in those ages, when Christianity prevailed in the world, though none of them pretended to be Christians; and one of them was the most inveterate enemy to Christianity that lived; yet these might well be supposed to make their master Plato speak several things, as to this mystery, which he never intended, were it only to persuade the Christians to believe that he was not inferior to Moses, or any other recorded in scripture.

Thus having answered the objections, we shall take leave to consider how unwarily some divines, who have defended the doctrine of the Trinity, have not only asserted that Plato understood a great a deal of it, but have made use of this, as an answer to the Anti-trinitarian objection before mentioned, that the doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible; and they have taken a great deal of pleasure in accounting for this doctrine in such a way as these philosophers have done:[83] and some of them have taken notice of a few dark hints, which they have met with in some of the poetical fictions, and from thence concluded that there was something of the Trinity known, even by the Heathen in general: thus when the word three is mentioned by them, and applied to some things, which they relate concerning their gods; or when they speak of gods delighting in an unequal number, or in the number three. But this is too gross to be particularly mentioned, lest it should give us an unbecoming idea of this divine mystery, or of those who have better arguments than these to defend it.

The reflection which I would make on this is, that what they call an advantage to the doctrine has been certainly very detrimental to it; and, as a late learned divine observes, has tended only to pervert the simplicity of the Christian faith with mixtures of philosophy and vain deceit.[84] And I doubt not but the apostle had an eye to this, among other corruptions, which they who were attached to the Heathen philosophy began to bring into their scheme of divinity, and would notoriously do in after ages, which he purposely fences against, when he says, _Beware, lest any man spoil you, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ_, Col. ii. 8. And this corruption so much prevailed, that it has given occasion to some of the Anti-trinitarians, to reproach the doctrine of the Trinity, as though it were a system of Platonism. And it is their being too fond of using Plato’s words, in explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, that has given occasion to some of the fathers to be suspected, as though they were less favourable to the scripture account thereof; by which means the adversaries have laid claim to them as their own; and produced some unwary expressions out of Justin Martyr, and others, supposing them to be in the Arian scheme, who, in other parts of their writings, appear to be remote from it.[85]

And this leads us to consider the method which some divines have taken, in using similitudes to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, which, at best, tend only to illustrate, and not to prove a doctrine: and we can hardly make use of this method of illustrating this doctrine, without conveying some ideas, which are unbecoming, if not subversive thereof; and while we pretend to explain that which is in itself inexplicable, we do no service to the truth.

I shall here give a short specimen of this matter, that hereby we may see how some have unwarily weakened the cause which they have been maintaining. Some have taken a similitude from three of the divine perfections, _viz._ that there are three invisibles of God; power, wisdom, and goodness. Power creates, wisdom governs, and goodness conserves; and so they have gone on to explain this doctrine, till they had almost given it into the hands of the Sabellians: and, indeed, they might have instanced in more divine perfections than three, had it been to their purpose.

Again, others have explained this doctrine by some resemblance which they apprehend to be of it in man; and so they speak of the soul as a principle of a threefold life, rational, sensitive, and vegetative. Others speak of three causes concurring to produce the same effect; such as the efficient, constitutive and final cause. Others have taken their similitude from inanimate things; as the sun, in which there is light, heat, and motion, which are inseparably connected together, and tend to produce the same effects.

Moreover, others illustrate it by a similitude, taken from a fountain, in which there is the spring in the bowels of the earth, the water bubbling out of the earth, and the stream diffusing itself in a perpetual course, receiving all it communicates from the fountain. I am sorry there is occasion to caution any against this method of explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. But these, and many other similitudes of the like nature, we find in the writings of some, who consider not what a handle they give to the common enemy. There are, indeed, in most of them, three things, which are said, in different respects, to be one; but we may observe, that all these similitudes, and others of the like nature, brought to illustrate this doctrine, lead us to think of the whole divided into those parts, of which they consist, whereof they take notice of the number three; or they speak of three properties of the same thing; and if their wit and fancy saw it needful to speak of more than three, the same method of illustrating would serve their purpose, as much as it does the end for which they bring it. Therefore I would conclude this head, by using the words of God to Job, _Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?_ Job xxxviii. 2. Who are these, that, by pretending to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity by similitudes, do that, which, though very foreign to their design, tends to pervert it?

6. We shall now consider what general rules may be observed for our understanding those scriptures, on which our faith, with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, is founded; and since it is a doctrine of pure revelation, as has been before observed, we must keep close to scripture, even to the words thereof, where they are express and distinct, as to this matter; and to consequences deduced from it, so far as they are just, and self-evident; and, at the same time, while we are sensible that we cannot comprehend this mystery, we must take care that we pretend not to be wise above what is revealed. Now there are some rules, which may be of use to us, in our enquiries into the sense of scripture concerning this doctrine; as,

(1.) We must not suppose that the words of scripture, relating thereunto, are to be taken in a sense, which can be known by none but criticks, as though it were designed only for them to understand; or that the unlearned part of the world should be left in the dark, or led astray, as to several things contained in this important doctrine. Thus we are not to suppose that we are at a loss as to the proper sense of the word God; or could hardly know how to direct our faith and worship, founded thereon, without the help of criticism; or, for want of being acquainted with some distinctions, concerning one that may be called God by nature, or the supreme God, and others who may be called gods by office, or subordinate gods, we should be led to ascribe divine honour where it is not due; or else we must be able to distinguish also concerning worship, and, instead of honouring the Son as we honour the Father, must give him an inferior kind of divine worship, short of what is due to the Father. This we have no scripture warrant for; neither are we led by the scriptures to have any notion of a middle being between God and the creature, or one that is not properly God, so as the Father is, and yet more than a creature, as though there were a medium between finite and infinite; neither are we led, by scripture, to conceive of any being, that has an eternal duration, whose eternity is supposed to be before time, and yet not the same with the eternal duration of the Father. These things we shall have occasion to mention in their proper place, and therefore need make no farther use of them at present, but only to observe, from hence, how intelligible the scripture would be in what relates to this doctrine, if the words thereof had not a plain and determinate sense; but we must make use of these methods of reasoning, if we would arrive to the meaning thereof.

(2.) If some divine perfections are attributed in scripture to the Son and Spirit, all the perfections of the divine nature, may, by a just consequence from thence, be proved to belong to them, by reason of the simplicity and unity thereof: therefore, if we can prove, from scripture, that they have some perfections ascribed to them, which, I hope, it will not be a difficult matter to do, we are not to suppose that our argument is defective, or that the doctrine of the Trinity is not sufficiently maintained, if we cannot produce a scripture to prove every perfection of the divine nature to be ascribed to them.

(3.) When any thing is mentioned in scripture, concerning our Saviour, or the Holy Spirit, which argues an inferiority to the Father, this is to be understood consistently with other scriptures, which speak of their having the same divine nature; since scripture does not, in the least, contradict itself; and how this may be done, will be farther considered under a following head.

(4.) If we have sufficient arguments to convince us of the truth of this doctrine, our faith ought not to be shaken, though we cannot fully understand the sense of some scriptures, which are brought to support the contrary; not that we are to suppose that the scripture gives countenance to two opposite doctrines: but a person may be fully satisfied concerning the sense of those scriptures that contain the doctrine of the Trinity, and yet not be supposed perfectly to understand the meaning of every word or phrase used in scripture, or of some particular texts, which are sometimes brought to support the contrary doctrine; so that objections may be brought, which he is not able readily to reply to. Shall he therefore deny the truth, because he cannot remove all the difficulties that seem to lie in the way of it? That would be to part with it at too easy a rate, which, when he has done, he will find greater difficulties attending the contrary scheme of doctrine. Do they object, that we believe things contrary to reason, because we assert the incomprehensibleness of divine mysteries? or that we are Tritheists, because we believe that there are three Persons in the Godhead, and cannot exactly determine the difference between divine and human personality? We could, on the other hand, point at some difficulties, that they cannot easily surmount. What shall we think of the head of giving divine worship to our Saviour, when, at the same time, they deny him to have those perfections, that denominate him God in the same sense as the Father is so called? The Socinians found it very difficult, when the matter was disputed among themselves, to reconcile their practice with their sentiments, when they worshipped him, whose Deity they denied. And the Arians will find that this objection equally affects their scheme; and it will be no less difficult for them to reconcile Christ’s character, as Redeemer, Governor of the world, Judge of quick and dead, with their low ideas of him, when denying his proper Deity. These things we only mention occasionally at present, that it may not be thought that the doctrine of the Trinity is exposed to greater difficulties than the contrary doctrine, to the end that they who are not furnished with all those qualifications, which are necessary for its defence, may not reckon those arguments, by which they have been convinced of the truth thereof, less valid, because they are not able, at present, to answer all the objections that may be brought against them.

(5.) The weight of several arguments, taken from scripture, to prove this doctrine, is to be considered, as well as the arguments themselves; we do not pretend that every one of them is equally conclusive; there are some, which are oftentimes brought to support it, which we can lay no great stress upon, and therefore shall omit to mention them, among other arguments brought to that purpose, lest we should give occasion to the adversary to insult, or conclude that we take any thing for an argument that has been brought as such to prove this doctrine. Therefore we will not pretend to prove, or peremptorily to determine, that the doctrine of the Trinity is contained in those words of the Psalmist, Psal. xxxiii. 6. _By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the Hosts of them by the breath of his mouth._ Nor will we pretend to prove this doctrine from the threefold repetition of the word Jehovah, in the form of benediction to be used by the high priest, Numb. vi. 24, 25, 26. _The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; the Lord make his face to shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace._ Nor do we lay any stress on the three-fold repetition of the word _Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of Hosts_, Isa. vi. 3. though we shall shew, in its proper place, that there are several things in this chapter, which prove this doctrine. However, if at any time, together with arguments that are more conclusive, we bring some that are less so; this use may be made of it, to shew how the scripture way of speaking is consistent therewith in those places that do not so directly prove it. This we thought proper to mention, because it is a very common thing for those, who cannot answer the most weighty arguments that are brought to support a doctrine, to bend their greatest force against those which have the least strength; and then to triumph, as though they had gained the victory, when they have only done it in what respects that which is less material.

II. We shall now consider in what sense we are to understand the words _Trinity_ and _Persons_ in the Godhead; and in what respect the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are said to be one. It is true, the word _Trinity_ is not to be found in scripture, but what we understand by it is plainly contained therein; therefore we use the word, as agreeable thereunto: thus we read of the _three that bear record in heaven_, _viz._ _the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost_, and that _these three are one_, 1 John v. 7. These three here mentioned are Persons, because they are described by personal characters; and we shall take occasion elsewhere, when we prove the Deity of the Son and Spirit, to consider their being one, that is, having the same divine nature, which we shall therefore wave at present, being only considering the sense of words commonly used by us in treating of this doctrine. All contending parties, however they have explained the word _Trinity_, according to their different ways of thinking, have notwithstanding, in compliance with custom, used the word, and so far explained it, as that we might understand that they intend hereby three, who are, in some respect one, though some have not cared to use the word _Person_; or if they have, it is without the most known and proper idea contained in it. Thus the Sabellians, whenever they use the word, intend nothing by it, but three relations, which may be attributed to the same Person; as when the same Person may be called a father, a son, and a brother, in different respects; or as when he that, at one time, sustains the person of a judge, may, at another time, sustain that of an advocate: this is what some call a Trinity of names; and they might as well have declined to use the words altogether, as to explain them in this sense.

Again, the Arians use the word _Person_; but these have run into another extreme, inasmuch as that, whilst they avoid Sabellianism, they would lay themselves open to the charge of Tritheism, did they not deny the proper Deity of the Son and Spirit; for they suppose that every distinct Person is a distinct being, agreeable to the sense of personality, when applied to men; but this, as has been before considered, is to be abstracted from the idea of personality, when applied to the Persons in the Godhead. These also understand the oneness of these divine Persons, in a sense agreeable to their own scheme, and different from ours, and therefore they speak of them as one in will, consent, or design, in which respect God and the creature may be said to be one: accordingly Arius, and his adherents, in the council at Nice, refused to allow that the divine persons were Ὁμοουσιοι consubstantial, and, with a great many evasions and subterfuges, attempted to conceal their sentiments: all that they could be brought to own was, that the Son was Ὁμοιος, or Ὁμοιουσιος, which amounts to no more than this, that whatever likeness there may be, in some respects, yet he has not the same proper divine nature with the Father and Holy Ghost.

Which leads us to consider the sense in which it is generally used by those who defend what we think to be the scripture-doctrine of the Trinity. There are some, it is true, both among ancient and modern writers, that attempt to explain what they mean by the word _Person_, who are so unhappy as to leave the sense thereof more dark than they found it, when they have given a definition thereof, agreeable to what is used by metaphysicians and schoolmen, to this effect, that it is a _suppositum_, endowed with reason; or that it is one entire, individual, incommunicable, rational subsistence: and when they define Personality, some tell us, that it is a positive mode of a being terminating and compleating its substantial nature, and giving incommunicability to it, which words need to be explained more than the thing defined thereby. And here I cannot but take notice of that warm debate which there was between the Greek and Latin church about the words _Hypostasis_ and _Persona_; the Latin, concluding that the word _Hypostasis_ signified substance or essence, thought, that to assert that there were three divine _Hypostases_, was to say that there were three Gods: On the other hand, the Greek church thought that the word _Person_ did not sufficiently guard against the Sabellian notion of the same individual being sustaining three relations; whereupon each part of the church was ready to brand the other with heresy, till by a free and mutual conference, in a synod at Alexandria, A. D. 362. they made it appear, that it was but a mere contention about the grammatical sense of a word; and then it was allowed, by men of temper on both sides, that either of the two words might be indifferently used.[86] But what signifies the use of them, when perplexed with the scholastic explications thereof? This has given occasion to some, whose sentiments have been very remote as to the doctrine of the Trinity, to express themselves with some dislike; on the one hand, the Socinians, and some among the Remonstrants, who made very great advances toward their scheme, _viz._ Curcellæus, Episcopius, and others,[87] have complained of clouding this doctrine with hard words; and the complaint is not altogether groundless, though it may be their design herein was to substitute such words in the room of them, as would make the remedy worse than the disease. On the other hand, some, who have embraced the doctrine of the Trinity, would not have liked its advocates the worse, had they chose to have defended it in a more plain intelligible manner. Thus Calvin himself wishes, that some words, which are so warmly opposed and defended on each side, were altogether laid aside, and buried, provided that such might be retained as express our faith in the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Spirit, being the one God, but distinguished by their personal properties.[88] And this is that plain sense of the word, which I shall make use of, in what I shall farther attempt to lay down in the defence thereof. And accordingly,

1. We never call any thing a person that is not endowed with understanding and will; and therefore the most glorious inanimate creatures, either in heaven or earth, whatever excellencies they have, or how useful soever they are to the world, they are not persons. Thus, when the sun is described as though it were a person, and is compared to _a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race_, Psal. xix. 5. the words are never understood in any other but a metaphorical sense; so Behemoth and the Leviathan, mentioned in Job, being no other than brute creatures, are described with personal characters, in the same figurative way of speaking; therefore we suppose a person to have an understanding and will.

2. Whenever _I_, _thou_, or _he_, are applied to such a subject, they always connote a person; _I_, a person speaking; _thou_, a person spoken to; and _he_, or _him_, a person spoken of; and when such modes of speaking are sometimes applied to things that are destitute of reason, or to any moral virtues or principles of acting, which, from the nature of the thing, cannot be denominated persons, such expressions are very easily understood in a figurative sense, which may without any difficulty be distinguished from the proper one, whereby those who are so described are denominated persons.

There are some characters which always denote persons, and some works performed which are properly personal, which can be performed by none but persons. Thus the character of a father, or a son; so a Creator, a Redeemer, a benefactor, a Mediator, an advocate, a surety, a judge, a lord, a law-giver, and many others of the like nature, are all of them personal characters. So that whoever acts with design, and has such-like characters attributed to him, according to the proper acceptation of the word, him we call a person; and these characters we shall endeavour to apply to the Persons in the Godhead, to prove their distinct personality.

But since we are at present only considering the acceptation of words, we shall briefly observe the difference between a divine and a human person, when some personal properties, characters, or works, are attributed to each of them. And,