Part 29

As to that part of the objection, that which is unintelligible, is not the object of faith, we must distinguish before we grant or deny it; therefore, since the object of faith is some proposition laid down, it is one thing to say that a proposition cannot be assented to, when we have no ideas of what is affirmed or denied in it; and another thing to say that it is not believed, when we have ideas of several things contained therein, of which some are affirmed, and others denied; as, for instance, when we say God is an infinite Spirit, there is a positive idea contained in that proposition, or some things affirmed therein, _viz._ that he is able to put forth actions suitable to an intelligent being; and there is something denied concerning him, to wit, his being corporeal; and in concluding him to be an infinite Spirit, we deny that they are limits of his understanding; all this we may truly be said to understand and believe: but if we proceed farther, and enquire what it is to have such an understanding, or will? this is not a proposition, and consequently not the object of faith, as well as exceeds the reach of our understanding. So as to the doctrine of the Trinity, when we affirm that there is one God, and that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have all the perfections of the Godhead; and that these perfections, and the personality of each of them, are infinitely greater than what can be found in the creature, this we yield our assent to; but if it be enquired how far does God herein exceed all the ideas which we have of finite perfections, or personality, here our understandings are at a loss; but so far as this does not contain the form of a proposition, it cannot, according to our common acceptation of the word, be said to be the object of faith.

3. As to what concerns practical religion, the ideas we have of things subservient to it are of two sorts; either such as engage our obedience, or excite our adoration and admiration: as to the former of these, we know what we are commanded to do; what it is to act, as becomes those who are subject to a divine person, though we cannot comprehend those infinite perfections, which lay us under the highest obligation to obey him: as to the latter, the incomprehensibleness of the divine personality, or perfections, has a direct tendency to excite our admiration, and the infiniteness thereof our adoration. And, since all religion may be reduced to these two heads, the subject matter of divine revelation is so far from being inconsistent with it, that it tends to promote it. Things commanded are not, as such, incomprehensible, as was but now observed, and therefore not inconsistent with that obedience, or subjection, which is contained in one branch thereof; and things incomprehensible do not contain the form of a command, but rather excite our admiration, and therefore they are not only consistent with, but adapted to promote the other branch thereof. Is it not an instance of religion to adore and magnify God, when we behold the display of his perfections in his works? And is he less to be adored, or admired, because we cannot comprehend them? Or should we not rather look upon them with a greater degree of astonishment, than if they did not exceed the reach of a finite mind? Must a person be able to measure the water of the ocean, or number all the particles of matter that are contained in the world; or can our ideas be no ways directed to shew forth the Creator’s praise? Or must we be able to account for every thing that is a mystery in nature; or can we not improve it to promote some of the ends of practical religion, that we are engaged to thereby? May we not say, with wonder, _O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches?_ Psal. civ. 24. So when we behold the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, as displayed in the work of redemption, or as contained in scripture, which is therein said to be an instance of his _manifold wisdom_, Eph. iii. 10. should we not admire it the more, inasmuch as it is, as the apostle calls it, unsearchable? Therefore practical religion, as founded on divine revelation, is not, in all the branches thereof, inconsistent with the incomprehensibleness of those things, which are, some in one respect, and others in another, the objects thereof.

And as to what is farther contained in this objection, concerning the will’s following the dictates of the understanding, and practical religion’s being seated therein, I own, that we must first know what we are to do in matters of religion, before we can act; thus we must first know what it is to worship, love, and obey, the Father, Son, and Spirit, as also that these three divine persons are the object of worship, love, and obedience, and then the will follows the dictates of the understanding; but it is one thing to know these things, and another thing to be able to comprehend the divine, essential, or personal glory, which belongs to them, and is the foundation of these acts of religious worship.

4. As to what is farther objected, concerning the design of divine revelation’s being to improve our understanding; or, as it is sometimes expressed, that it is an improvement upon the light of nature; this seems to have a double aspect, or tendency, _viz._ to advance, or depreciate, divine revelation.

1. If we take it in the former view, we freely own,

(1.) That it is a very great improvement upon the light of nature, and that, either as we are led hereby, not only into the knowledge of many things which could not be discovered by it, namely, the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, and that infinite satisfaction which was given by him to the justice of God, in order to our discharge from condemnation, as also that communion which believers have with the Father, Son, and Spirit; and therefore, since the light of nature gives us no discovery of these doctrines, divine revelation, and particularly the gospel, makes a very great addition to those ideas which we are led into by the light of nature. It is true, they both take their rise from God, yet one excels the other, as much as the light of the sun does that of a star; and is, as the Psalmist says, when comparing them together, _perfect, converting the soul_; and _sure, making wise the simple_, Psal. xix. 7.

(2.) That when the same truths are discovered by the light of nature, and by divine revelation, the latter tends very much to improve our ideas: thus when the light of nature leads us into the knowledge of the being and perfections of God, his wisdom, power, and goodness, as illustrated in the works of nature and providence, we have not so clear ideas thereof, as we receive from the additional discoveries of them in divine revelation; and in this respect one does not cloud or darken those ideas which the other gives. But neither of these are designed by those who bring this objection against the doctrine of the Trinity: therefore we must suppose,

2. That they intend hereby to depreciate divine revelation, and then the sense thereof is this; that though the light of nature leads mankind into such a degree of the knowledge of divine truths, as is sufficient, in its kind to salvation; so that they, who are destitute of divine revelation, may thereby understand the terms of acceptance with God, and the way which, if duly improved, would lead to heaven; yet God was pleased to give some farther discovery of the same things by his word, and, in this sense, the one is only an improvement upon the other, as it makes the same truths, which were known, in some degree, without it more clear, and frees them from those corruptions, or false glosses, which the perverse reasonings of men have set upon them; whereas we, by insisting on inexplicable mysteries, which we pretend to be founded on divine revelation, though, in reality, they are not contained in it, cloud and darken that light, and so make the way of salvation more difficult, than it would otherwise be; and this certainly tends to depreciate divine revelation, how plausible soever the words, at first view, may appear to be; for it supposes those doctrines but now mentioned, and many others of the like nature, not necessary to salvation; so that this objection takes its first rise from the Deists, however it may be applied, by the Anti-trinitarians, in militating against the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, since it is principally designed to overthrow this doctrine, by supposing it to be unintelligible, and consequently, according to their method of reasoning, in no sense the object of faith, the only reply which need be made to it is, that the discoveries of the glory of God, by the light of nature, are, in some respects, as incomprehensible as the doctrine of the Trinity; which we are not, for that reason, obliged to disbelieve, or reject; and therefore there is no advantage gained against our argument, by supposing that the light of nature contains a discovery of truths, plain, easy, and intelligible by all, in the full extent thereof, and that the doctrine of the Trinity is otherwise, and consequently must not be contained in divine revelation, and, as such, cannot be defended by us.

4. Another thing that may be premised, before we enter on the proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, is, that it is not contrary to reason, though it be above it; neither are our reasoning powers, when directed by scripture-revelation, altogether useless, in order to our attaining such a degree of the knowledge thereof, as is necessary, and ought to be endeavoured after. When a doctrine may be said to be above reason, has been already considered, as well as that the doctrine of the Trinity is so; and now we are obliged to obviate an objection, which is the most popular one of any that is brought against it, namely, that it is an absurd and irrational doctrine; and that they who maintain it must first lay aside their reason, before they can be induced to believe it, for it is as much as to say that three are equal to one; which is contrary to the common sense of all mankind, or else, that we maintain a plurality of gods, which is contrary to the very first principles of the light of nature. And here we are reflected on, as though we demanded that our antagonists should lay aside their reason, before we argue with them, and then it is easy to determine on which side the argument will turn; therefore, to make way for what might be said in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, we shall, under this head, consider,

(1.) When a doctrine may be said to be contrary to reason.

(2.) Shew that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so.

(3.) What is the use of reason, in establishing it, or any other doctrines, which are the subject of pure revelation.

(1.) When we may conclude, that a doctrine is contrary to reason. This it may be said to be, when it is contrary to the methods of reasoning made use of by particular persons, which are not always just, and therefore it does not follow, from hence, that it is false or absurd, because our reasoning about it is so, but rather the contrary; so that when they, on the other side of the question, tell us, with an air of boasting, that if the doctrine we are maintaining could have been accounted for, how comes it to pass that so many men of sense and learning, as are to be found among the Anti-trinitarians, have not been able to do it? But this is nothing to our present argument; therefore we suppose that a doctrine is contrary to reason, when it contradicts some of the first principles, which the mind of man cannot but yield its assent to, as soon as ever it takes in the sense of the words which contain them, without demanding any proof thereof; as that the whole is greater than the part; and that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time; or that two is more than one, &c. or when we can prove a thing to be true to a demonstration, and yet suppose that a contradictory proposition, in which the words are taken in the same sense, may be equally true.[80]

(2.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is not contrary to reason. This appears, inasmuch as we do not say that the three Persons in the Godhead are one Person, or that the one divine Being is three divine Beings.

_Object._ But it is objected, that it is contrary to reason, which establishes and proves the unity of the Godhead, to say that the divine nature may be predicated of more than one, inasmuch as that infers a plurality of Gods, and every distinct Person must be concluded to be a distinct God; therefore the Trinitarian doctrine is down-right Tritheism, and consequently contrary to reason; and here those words of the Athanasian Creed are produced, as an instance hereof, namely, that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God; so, that the Father is Eternal, the Son is Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal, yet there are not three Eternals, but one Eternal; and the Father Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty, yet are there not three Almighties, but one Almighty. This they suppose, though without ground, to be a plain contradiction.

_Answ._ But to this it may be replied, that when we say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are God, we do not say they are distinct Gods, for the distinction between them respects their personality, not their deity: and when we assert that they are all Eternal, or Almighty, we do not suppose that their duration, or power, are distinct; and the same may be said of all other divine perfections that are attributed to them, the perfections are the same in all of them, though the persons are distinct. So that the charge of Tritheism lies in a narrow compass: they say that there is one divine Being, so do we; and to this they add, that this divine Being is a divine person, since existence and personality are the same; therefore, if there are more divine Persons, there must be more Gods; this consequence they maintain, but we deny. But how do they prove it? The proof amounts to no more than this; that there is no instance in finite things, when we speak of angels or men, to whom alone personality can be applied, of any distinct persons, but at the same time their beings are distinct; therefore it must be so with respect to the divine persons. This we are bound to deny, since our ideas of personality and existence are not the same; therefore, how inseparable soever they may be in what respects creatures, we may have distinct ideas of them, when we speak of the divine being and personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Here it will, doubtless, be demanded, that we determine wherein the difference consists; or, in particular, since every distinct finite person is a distinct being, what there is in the divine personality, that should exclude the Father, Son, and Spirit, from being distinct beings, because distinct persons; so that when we conclude that there is a small or faint resemblance between divine and human personality, we must be able to comprehend, and fully to describe, that infinite disproportion that is between them, or else must be charged with using words without any manner of ideas annexed to them, and so our cause must fall to the ground. If, indeed, the divine personality were finite, like that of the creature, then it might be required that a finite mind should account for it: but since it is not so, but incomprehensible, we are bound to believe what we cannot comprehend.

But have we no ideas at all of the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit? To this we may answer; that we have finite ideas thereof, and more than these we have not of any of the divine perfections. We are taught, by scripture, to say that they are distinct persons; and we know what those personal characters, or properties, from whence our ideas take their rise, signify, when applied to men; but, at the same time, abstract, in our thoughts, every thing from them that argues imperfection; or, in short, our conceptions hereof proceed in the same way, as when we think of any of the perfections of the divine nature: these, as well as the divine personality, are equally incomprehensible; yet, while we say they are infinitely more than can be in any creature, we, notwithstanding, retain such ideas of them, as tend to answer those ends of religion, which suppose that we apprehend something of them that is conducive hereunto. We are now to consider,

(3.) The use of reason in proving or defending the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other doctrines of pure revelation. They could not, indeed, have been at first discovered by reason, nor can every thing that is revealed be comprehended by it, yet our reason is not to be laid aside as useless; therefore some call it a servant to faith. Thus revelation discovers what doctrines we are to believe, demands our assent to them, and reason offers a convincing proof that we are under an indispensable obligation to give it: it proves the doctrine to be true, and such as is worthy of God, as it is derived from him, the fountain of truth and wisdom; and this office of reason, or the subserviency thereof to our faith, is certainly necessary, since what is false cannot be the object of faith in general; and nothing unworthy of God can be the matter of divine revelation, nor consequently the object of a divine faith.

Now, in order to reason’s judging of the truth of things, it first considers the sense of words; what ideas are designed to be conveyed thereby, and whether they are contrary to the common sense of mankind; and if it appears that they are not, it proceeds to enquire into those evidences that may give conviction, and enforce our belief thereof; and leads us into the nature of the truths revealed, receives them as instamped with the authority of God, and considers them as agreeable to his perfections, and farther leads us into his design of revealing them, and what we are to infer from them; and in doing this it connects things together, observes the dependence of one thing on another, what is the importance thereof, and how they are to be improved to answer the best purposes.

Now this may be applied particularly to the doctrine of the Trinity; for it contains in it no absurdity contradictory to reason, as has been already proved; and the evidences on which our faith herein is founded will be farther considered, when we prove it to be a scripture doctrine, by the express words thereof, agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, or by just consequences deduced from it; by which it will farther appear, that it is necessary for us to use our reason in stating those doctrines, which are neither founded on, nor can be comprehended by it.

5. We are now to consider from whence the doctrine of the Trinity is to be deduced, or where we are to search for that knowledge thereof, which we are to acquiesce in. And here it must be observed, that it cannot be learnt from the light of nature, for then we should certainly be able to behold some traces or footsteps thereof in the works of creation and providence, that so this might be understood thereby, as well as the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as the cause is known by its effect; but we should never have known that God made all things by his essential word, _without whom nothing was made, that was made_, as the evangelist speaks, John i. 3. had we not received this doctrine from divine revelation: likewise, we should never have known that the Spirit, as a distinct Person from the Father, created all things, and performed several other works, by which his personal glory is demonstrated, had we not received the account which we have thereof from scripture. The light of nature could discover to us, indeed, that God, who is a Spirit, or incorporeal Being, has produced many effects worthy of himself; but we could not have known hereby, that the word Spirit signifies a distinct person, which we are beholden to divine revelation for.

And as for the work of our redemption, in which, more than in all the other divine works, the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is demonstrated, we could have known as little of that by the light of nature, as we do the persons to whom it is attributed. But I am sensible that it will be objected to this,

_Object._ 1. That our first parents knew the doctrine of the Trinity as soon as they were created, otherwise they could not have given that distinct glory to the Persons in the Godhead that is due to them; and if we are required, not only to worship the divine Being, but to worship the Father, Son, and Spirit; and, if this worship is due from us, as creatures, and not merely as fallen and redeemed; then it will follow from hence, that our first parents must know the doctrine of the Trinity: but this they did not know by divine revelation; therefore they knew it by the light of nature.

_Answ._ We will allow every thing contained in this objection, excepting that they did not know this by divine revelation; for certainly they had some ideas conveyed this way at first, otherwise they could not have known any thing that related to instituted worship, which, it is plain, they did. And shall it be reckoned any absurdity to suppose that they received this doctrine of the Trinity by divine revelation, though we have no particular account thereof, in that short history which Moses gives us of things relating to the state of innocency? It is therefore sufficient to our purpose, to suppose that it was agreeable to the wisdom and goodness of God to make known to them this important truth, and consequently that he did so, though not by the light of nature.

_Object._ 2. It is farther objected, that the heathen knew something of the doctrine of the Trinity, as appears by their writings, though they were unacquainted with scripture. To support this objection, they refer to several mystical expressions in the works of Plato, which seem to look that way, when he speaks of three principles; one whereof he calls goodness, or a being that is good; the second he calls his word, or reason; and the third a spirit, which diffuses its influence throughout the whole system of beings, and calls him sometimes the soul of the world; and in other places, he speaks of them as having a distinct sovereignty.[81] And he supposes the first of these to be the cause of things most great and excellent; the second, the cause of things of an inferior nature; the third, of things yet more inferior; and some of his followers plainly call them three hypostases; and sometimes, Father, Word, and Spirit.