"1683-1920" The Fourteen Points and What Became of Them—Foreign Propaganda in the Public Schools—Rewriting the History of the United States—The Espionage Act and How It Worked—"Illegal and Indefensible Blockade" of the Central Powers—1,000,000 Victims of Starvation—Our Debt to France and to Germany—The War Vote in Congress—Truth About the Belgian Atrocities—Our Treaty with Germany and How Observed—The Alien Property Custodianship—Secret Will of Cecil Rhodes—Racial Strains in American Life—Germantown Settlement of 1683 and a Thousand Other Topics

Part 6

Chapter 63,889 wordsPublic domain

=Dutch and German.=--In the history of early American colonization the terms Dutch and German are often confounded, as the English had little first-hand acquaintance with the people of the continent save Dutch, French and Spanish. Hence many have inferred that the Pennsylvania Germans were somehow misnamed for Pennsylvania Dutch, because the latter designation is the more frequently employed in describing the most important element of the population concerned in the settlement of Penn’s Commonwealth. Many of the first settlers of New Amsterdam were Germans and almost as many Germans as Swedes were concerned in the earliest European settlement of Delaware. Peter Minnewit, the first regular governor of New Amsterdam, was German-born, and it was he who, having entered the Swedish service, in 1637, with a ship of war and a smaller vessel, led a colony of Swedes with their chaplain, to the Delaware River region, between Cape Henlopen and Christian Creek. They bought land of the Indians and called it “New Sweden.” A second company of immigrants from Sweden came over in 1642, under Colonel John Printz, likewise a native of Germany. Among these first settlers of Delaware a considerable number were Germans. The latter however, are more often confounded with their nearest of kin, the Hollanders. “At that time,” says Anton Eickhoff (“In der Neuen Heimath”) “the distinction between Hollanders and Germans was not as pronounced as nowadays. The loose political union which had never been very close, between Holland and the German Empire, was formally severed by the Peace of Westphalia. But though politically it was no longer a German State, Holland continued to be regarded as such in public mind. The common language of the Hollanders and the Low Germans was Plattdeutsch.” Dr. William Elliot Griffis (“The Romance of American Colonization”) refers to the confounding of Germans with Dutch. “The Isthmus of this peninsula was called ‘Dutch Gap,’ after the glass makers who set up their furnace here in 1608,” he writes. “Most Englishmen then made and uneducated people now make, no distinction between the Dutch and the Germans, who are politically different people.”

=Dual Citizenship.=--It was frequently alleged before and during our entrance into the war that a native German might under the laws of Germany become a citizen of another country without thereby being released from his obligations to his native country, and the attempt was made to make it appear that naturalized Germans could still be regarded as citizens of Germany, or as possessing dual citizenship.

It is true that the German law (Reichs-und-Staatsangehorigkeits-Gesetz) of July, 1913, says: “Citizenship is not lost by one who, before acquiring foreign citizenship, has secured on application the written consent of the competent authorities of his home State to retain his citizenship. Before this consent is given the German Consul is to be heard.” But this section is under no circumstances applicable to the United States, because in Section 36 the law says: “=This law does not apply as far as treaties with foreign countries say otherwise.=” Now the treaty of the United States with the Northern German Confederacy which was concluded 1868 (the Bancroft treaty) provides that Germans naturalized in the United States =shall be treated by Germany as American citizens=. This provision applies now to the natives of all the German States, and was so interpreted by the State Department.

=Earling, Albert J.=--President of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company and one of the recognized authorities on modern railway economics. Son of German immigrants.

=Eckert, Thomas.=--General superintendent during the Civil War of military telegraphy, and assistant secretary of war (1864). Given the rank of Brigadier General Appointed general superintendent of the Western Union Telegraph Company in 1866, and in 1881 became its president and general manager, and also director of the American Telegraph and Cable Company also of the Union Pacific Railroad.

=Eliot, Prof. Charles W.=--One of the most eminent as well as bitter enemies of the German cause. Prof. Eliot has attacked German civilization and German institutions in magazines and newspaper articles and in a book. Yet in 1913, one year before the war, at a public dinner, Prof. Eliot paid German “Kultur” this high tribute: “Two great doctrines which had sprung from the German Protestant Reformation had been developed by Germans from seeds then planted in Germany. The first was the doctrine of universal education, developed from the Protestant conception of individual responsibility, and the second was the great doctrine of civil liberty, liberty in industries, in society, in government, liberty with order under law. These two principles took their rise in Protestant Germany; and America has been the greatest beneficiary of that noble teaching.” Yet with all these political and civic virtues, Prof. Eliot reversed himself like a weather-cock within a few months and became the hysterical spokesman of the most violent section of the Anglo-American coterie.

=England Plundered American Commerce in Our Civil War.=--From Benson J. Lossing’s “History of the Civil War:” “The Confederates ... with the aid of the British aristocracy, shipbuilders and merchants, and the tacit consent of the British government, were enabled to keep afloat on the ocean some active vessels for plundering American commerce. The most formidable of the Anglo-Confederate plunderers of the sea was the ‘Alabama,’ which was =built, armed, manned and victualled in England=. She sailed under the British flag and was received with favor in every British port that she entered. In the last three months of the year 1862 she destroyed by fire twenty-eight helpless American merchant vessels. While these incendiary fires, kindled by Englishmen, commanded by a Confederate leader, were illuminating the bosom of the Atlantic Ocean, a merchant ship (the “George Griswold”) laden with provisions as a gift for the starving English operatives in Lancashire, who had been deprived of work and food by the Civil War in America, and whose necessities their own government failed to relieve, was sent from the City of New York, convoyed by a national war vessel, to save her from the fury of the British sea-rover!”

Recent statistics show that while 90% of our imports and 89% of our exports were carried in American bottoms before the Civil War, they had declined to 10 and 7½% of our imports and exports in 1910.

=English Tribute to Germany’s Lofty Spirit.=--The following tribute to the lofty spirit of the German Empire is from the pen of Prof. J. A. Cramb, “Germany and England,” (Lecture II, p. 51, 1913):

And here let me say with regard to Germany, that, of all England’s enemies, she is by far the greatest; and by “greatness” I mean not merely magnitude, not her millions of soldiers, her millions of inhabitants; I mean grandeur of soul. She is the greatest and most heroic enemy--if she is our enemy--that England, in the thousand years of her history, has ever confronted. In the sixteenth century we made war upon Spain. But Germany in the twentieth century is a greater Power, greater in conception, in thought, in all that makes for human dignity, than was the Spain of Charles V and Philip II. In the seventeenth century we fought against Holland, but the Germany of Bismarck and the Kaiser is greater than the Holland of DeWitt. In the eighteenth century we fought against France, and again the Germany of to-day is a higher, more august Power than France under Louis XIV.

=Election of 1916 and the League of Nations Covenant.=--Save for artificially engendered belligerency, owing its inspiration to a subtle propaganda conducted through a portion of the press known to be under the direct influence of Lord Northcliffe, there was no demand for war with Germany among the people in general over the various issues that had arisen. The McLemore resolution in the House was defeated through the direct intervention of the administration under whip and spur. It requested the President to warn American citizens to refrain from traveling on armed ships of any and all powers then or in the future at war.

In the Senate the Gore resolution declaring “that the sinking by a German submarine without notice or warning of an armed merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a citizen of the United States, would constitute a just cause of war between the United States and the German Empire” was laid on the table by a vote of 68 to 14. It had been designed by Senator Gore to put the issue squarely up to the Senate. Senator Stone in the Senate said, referring to the original Gore resolution warning American citizens to keep off armed merchant vessels: “The President is firmly opposed to the idea embodied in the Gore resolution. He is not only opposed to Congress passing a law relating to this subject, but he is opposed to any form of official warning to American citizens to keep off so-called armed merchantmen. If I could have my way I would take some definite step to save this country from becoming embroiled in this European war through the recklessness of foolhardy men.”

A few days before, the Senator, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had returned from an interview with the President which had convinced him even then that war was impending.

In various parts of the country test votes of whole communities showed an overwhelming sentiment in favor of peace. W. J. Bryan had resigned as Secretary of State because “the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you (the President) as it would be to the cause which is nearest my heart, namely, the prevention of war.”

Perhaps the best indication whether the war was popular or not is that supplied by the number of volunteers who offered themselves for service from April 1, 1917, to April 6, 1918, in eleven eastern States, as follows:

Connecticut 4,263 Delaware 807 Maine 2,491 Maryland 4,029 Massachusetts 19,253 New Hampshire 1,364 New Jersey 10,145 New York 44,191 Pennsylvania 45,687 Rhode Island 2,496 Vermont 645 ------- 135,371

The number of enlistments in the remaining States was in proportion.

The President had been elected because “he kept us out of the war.” In his nominating speech ex-Governor Glynn of New York assured the country that, if elected, Mr. Wilson would keep us out of war. It became the campaign slogan. The Democratic National Committee published full-page advertisements in the daily press. On November 4, 1916, it printed in all the papers a full-page display with a cartoon under the caption, “Mr. Hughes Would Name a Strong Cabinet,” showing a council of ten Roosevelts in Rough Rider attire, with slouched hats and spurs, and in every possible attitude of vociferous belligerency, intended to show the kind of cabinet that Mr. Hughes would select. In heavy type these lines appeared: “You Are Working--Not Fighting!” “Alive and Happy--Not Cannon Fodder!” “Wilson and Peace With Honor or Hughes With Roosevelt and War?” “The Lesson is Plain: If You Want War Vote for Hughes; If You Want Peace With Honor Vote for Wilson and Continued Prosperity. It Is up to You and Your Conscience!”

It latterly became known that though Hughes had repeatedly declared himself clearly on the issues in the course of his campaign speeches his remarks on this subject were not reported. All reference to the European situation and his views thereon were suppressed.

The city of Milwaukee gave Wilson 6,000 majority over Hughes. He carried the assured Republican State of Ohio on the issue that he would keep us out of the war and the decisive vote was given by California under the belief that with Wilson peace would be assured.

The defeat of Hughes secondarily must be attributed to Colonel Roosevelt. The latter’s personality fell like an ominous shadow across the path of the Republican candidate. Roosevelt was satisfied with nothing short of immediate war, and, nominally fighting Wilson, was in effect making the election of Hughes impossible. Repeatedly proven to have lost his power of influencing political results in his own State of New York, in New England and other sections, he still was able to decree the defeat of the candidate of his own party by inspiring popular fear of his future sway over him.

In Washington it was known that preparations for war with Germany were long under way. Secretary McAdoo, the President’s son-in-law, was understood to have entered into a secret arrangement with Brazil, during his visit there, for the seizure of German ships when the hour to strike should have arrived. The administration in 1916, months before the election, passed through Congress appropriations for military purposes larger than those provided in the German budget for 1914, the year of the war:

United States, for 1917 $294,565,623 German Empire, for 1914 294,390,000 ------------ In excess of Germany $ 175,623

The national election occurred in November, 1916. Three months later, early in February, 1917, Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador, was handed his passports and relations with Germany were broken off. The announcement came like a bolt out of a clear sky. The President was not to be inaugurated until March 4 following. Within a month of his formal inauguration he announced that we were in a state of war with the imperial German government.

The events that followed were marked by a complete surrender of Congress and the domination of the Executive over the Legislative branch of our government. The President was invested with dictatorial powers; political traditions and the time-honored admonitions of the founders of the government were disregarded and overruled. A Cabinet order had already decreed that American citizens forswearing their allegiance in order to serve in the British army were not to lose their standing as American citizens. Now armies of conscripts were made ready to be sent a distance of 3,000 miles to fight for the safeguarding of democracy in Europe and to protect us from an invasion, possible only by ships which were subsequently pronounced by the Secretary of the Navy to be restricted by their bunker capacity to operations in European waters.

A sudden mad fury seized the people, following a visit of Lord Northcliffe, marked by numerous conferences with publishers during a trip West. The press became unanimous, with the exception of the Hearst papers, on the question that Germany must be crushed. During the floating of the $500,000,000 loan to England and France pending our neutrality, full page advertisements had been generously distributed to papers throughout the country by the Morgan banking interests. In mining regions, in steel-producing sections, in great industrial centers, in cities having large packing interests or sugar refineries, local interests prevailed to influence sentiment for war as a means of profit and prosperity. Public opinion was soon rendered so completely unfit for sober reflection by the continued propaganda directed from Wall Street and British and French publicity centers in this country that a wave of hate against people of German descent swept everything before it. The Germans were not wanted, and papers like the New York “Sun” declared that Germans were not human beings in the same sense as other members of the family.

Yet, shortly prior to the election, a member of the Cabinet and others in the confidence of the administration had come to New York to confer with those whom they regarded authorized to speak for the German element to prevail upon them to influence the so-called German vote in favor of the Democratic candidate, and in one case, at least, a post of honor was tentatively promised to one such spokesman by an agent direct from the highest source.

The crowning event of the raging spirit of repression was the passage of the Overman bill creating the Espionage act, considered elsewhere, under which every liberal paper was tampered with in one form or another, and public assembly, the right of petition, freedom of speech and the press became a memory.

A vigorous reaction against the President set in during the fall of 1918. Down to that period he had practically had a free hand in dealing with the conduct of the war and with the European situation. There had been a protest by Senators against the disregard shown that body by the President in the initial negotiations at Paris, but so completely had the Executive dominated the high legislative body, his treaty-making partner, that the protest took the discreet form of a round-robin, which in turn was not only disregarded, but characterized as a presumption to hamper the action of the President.

The November election of 1918 was coming on. The President in Paris issued an appeal to the voters to elect a Democratic Congress to strengthen his hands. Diplomatically, steps were inaugurated to insure the end of the war by the voluntary abdication of the Kaiser in time to influence the elections with the news of a crushing victory over Germany. The name of Minister Nelson Morris at Stockholm, Sweden, as also the name of Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois, was brought into connection with rumors of negotiations looking to the surrender of Germany on the basis of the Fourteen Points in time to enable the news to be flashed to America on the eve of the election as the crowning achievement of the President. But the psychological moment passed. The elections occurred on November 7, the German debacle four days later.

Although it was well understood that a victory was at hand, the Republicans swept the country. The great Democratic majorities were reversed, not only in the House, but in the Senate. The Republican leaders interpreted the result as an endorsement of their party, but it was really a popular vote of protest that could find no channel of expression other than the Republican party because of its opposition to the administration on party policies, though in accord with it on many of the radically oppressive measures of domestic policy in the prosecution of the war.

With the Republicans in control of both branches of Congress, the President’s dominating influence began to wane rapidly. When it began to be apparent that his visit to Europe, where he had been hailed by millions as the Moses of the New Freedom, was marked by one concession on his part after another to the superior statescraft of Premiers Lloyd George and Clemenceau and that his famous Fourteen Points had been reduced one by one to zero, the magic slogan, “Stand by the President,” was forgotten. Some one said that on his way to Utopia he had met two practical politicians.

A year preceding men were arrested for failing to stand by the President, as treason to the institutions of the country; now the tide had turned, the rallying cry had lost its force. The country was witnessing the spectacle of its President stepping down from his pedestal to play the game of European politics in the secrecy of a closet, not with his equals, but with mere envoys of sovereign powers, guided by radically different interests from our own.

Thence on the President was at open war with the Senate, which had been kept in ignorance of the peace negotiations and discovered that a draft of the League of Nations covenant, including the treaty with Germany, had been in the hands of the Morgan banking group while the high treaty-making body of our government had been ignored in its demand for information.

A few courageous Senators, notably Reed of Missouri, Democrat, and Borah of Idaho and Johnson of California, Republicans, began to analyze the treaty, and showed that while Great Britain was accorded six votes the United States would have but one vote in the League, and that China had been ravaged by the ceding to Japan of the Shantung Peninsula as the price of her adherence to the League of Nations. Senator Knox directed attention to the ravagement of the German people by the terms of the treaty, and, though a conservative, evidenced the vision of a statesman and patriotic American.

The outlook for the treaty began to darken from day to day. The administration was still confident, and statements from the White House declared the treaty to redeem all of the Fourteen Points of the President’s peace program. But the constant assaults upon it by Senators Reed, Borah and Johnson in speeches in various parts of the country eventually aroused the administration to its danger.

A conference with the President was brought about at the White House in the summer of 1919, at which the Chief Executive expressed himself ready to answer all questions, and a committee from the Senate waited upon him to submit a series of inquiries. It was in the course of this interview that the following colloquy occurred:

=Senator McCumber: “Would our moral conviction of the unrighteousness of the German war have brought us into this war if Germany had not committed any acts against us without the League of Nations, as we had no League of Nations at that time?”=

=The President: “I hope it would eventually, Senator, as things developed.”=

=Senator McCumber: “Do you think if Germany had committed no act of war or no act of injustice against our citizens that we would have got into the war?”=

=The President: “I do think so.”=

=Senator McCumber: “You think we would have gotten in anyway?”=

=The President: “I do.”=

The Republican leader in the House of Representatives, Representative Mann, in 1916 had declared “Wilson is determined to plunge us into war with Germany.” Three years later the admission that we would have been in the war even “if Germany had committed no act of war or no act of injustice against our citizens” came from the White House, and Senators stood appalled at the revelation.

The President’s frank admission that the administration would have drifted into war regardless of what Germany had done or might do, is strangely in accord with statements contained in the great historic work on the World War by the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hanotaux, who writes:

=Just before the Battle of the Marne, when the spirits of many of the leading politicians in France were so depressed that they were urging an immediate peace with Germany, three American ambassadors presented themselves to the government--the then functioning ambassador, his predecessor and his successor--and implored the government not to give up, promising that America would join in the war.=

“=At present there are but 50,000 influential persons in America who want it to enter the war, but in a short time there will be a hundred million.=”

The description makes it easy to identify the three diplomats who gave France this assurance; they were Robert Bacon, Roosevelt’s ambassador; Myron T. Herrick, Taft’s ambassador, and William G. Sharp, Wilson’s ambassador to Paris. This promise was given in September, 1914. There had then been no alleged outrages against American rights. The U-boat war had not been started. The Lusitania was not sunk until May, 1915. Obviously, then, the sinking of the Lusitania, the U-boat raids, and other alleged offenses, were mere pretexts of these “50,000 influential persons” in a propaganda to precipitate their hundred million fellow-citizens into the bloody European complication.