Part 10

Then he speaks of the ignorance of the Germans, their incapability of using the English language, the impossibility of removing their prejudices--“not being used to liberty, they know not how to make a modest use of it,” etc.

They are under no restraint from any ecclesiastical government; they behave, however, submissively enough to the civil government, which I wish they may continue to do, for I remember when they modestly declined to meddle in our elections, but now they come in droves and carry all before them except in one or two counties.

The last sentence, comments Faust, betrays the learned writer of the letter; the uncertainty of their votes is the cause for his accusations of ignorance and prejudice.

On the point of ignorance we get contradictory evidence in the same letter. “Few of their children in the country know English. They import many books from Germany and of the six printing houses in the province, two are entirely German, two are half-German, half English, and but two entirely English. (This large use and production of books disproves want of education. Their lack of familiarity with the English language was popularly looked upon as ignorance.--Faust.) They have one German newspaper and one half German. Advertisements intended to be general are now printed in Dutch (German) and English. The signs in our streets have inscriptions in both languages, and in some places, only German. They begin of late to make all their bonds and other legal instruments in their own language, which (though I think it ought not to be) are allowed good in our courts, where the German business so increases that there is continued need of interpreters; and I suppose within a few years they will also be necessary in the Assembly, to tell one half of our legislators what the other half say. In short, unless the stream of importation could be turned from this to other colonies, as you very judiciously propose, they will soon so outnumber us that the advantages we have will, in my opinion, be not able to preserve our language, and even our government will become precarious.”

Illustration: GERMAN PIONEERS Group of the Monument Erected to the Memory of the Settlers of Germantown, Pa., by Albert Jaegers.

It is obvious from many indications that Benjamin Franklin did not adhere to his point of view and learned to regard the Germans in a far more favorable light than in 1753, twenty-three years before the Declaration of Independence. The Revolution, as Bancroft relates, found no Tories among the German settlers of Pennsylvania, but a unanimous sentiment for independence, and their full quota of fighting men in the American ranks.

When queried before the English Parliament concerning the dissatisfaction of the Americans with the Stamp Act, he was asked how many Germans were in Pennsylvania. His answer was, “About one-third of the whole population, but I cannot tell with certainty.” Again the question was put whether any part of them had seen service in Europe. He answered, “Many, as well in Europe as America.”

When asked whether they were as dissatisfied with the Stamp Act as the native population, he said, “Yes, even more, as they are justified, because in many cases they must pay double for their stamp paper and parchments.”

If the German element felt the injustice of the Stamp Act more keenly than their neighbors, the conclusion is patent that they could not have been ignorant, as the illiterate and ignorant were least affected by its harshness. Even the honor of being the first printer of German books belongs to Franklin, for he furnished three volumes of mystical songs in German for Conrad Beissel, 1730-36. When the Philosophical Society of Philadelphia (1743) agitated for the foundation of the “Public Academy of the City of Philadelphia,” the institution that later developed into the University of Pennsylvania, Franklin designed its curriculum and recommended the study of German and French, besides English. In 1766 he attended a meeting of the Royal Society of Science in Göttingen while on a trip through Germany and visited Dr. Hartmann in Hanover to see his apparatus for electrical experiments. He was made a member of the Göttingen learned society.

Conclusive proof of Franklin’s change of view is furnished by his testimony before a committee of the British House of Commons in 1766. Referring to the Germans, who, he said, constituted about one-third of the population of 160,000 whites in Pennsylvania, he described them as “a people who brought with them the greatest of wealth--industry and integrity, and characters that had been superpoised and developed by years of suffering and persecution.” (Penn. Hist. Magazine, iv, 3.)

=Frederick the Great and the American Colonies.=--Because Frederick the Great was a Hohenzollern and a Prussian, it became the fashion early in the course of the war to frown upon all mention of his connection with the revolutionary struggle of our American forefathers, and his statue before the military college, which was unveiled with so much ceremony during President Roosevelt’s term, was discreetly taken from its pediment and consigned to the obscurity of a cellar as soon as we entered the war. Yet Frederick was the sincere friend of the Colonies and contributed largely if not vitally to the success of the struggle for American independence. The evidence rests upon something better than tradition. A more just opinion of his interest in the success of the Colonies than has been expressed of late by his detractors is contained in the works of English and American writers of history having access to the facts, who were not under the spell of active belligerency and the influence of a propaganda that has magically transformed George III into a “German king.”

Had Russia in 1778 formed an alliance with England, Russian troops would have swelled the forces arrayed against the American patriots to such proportions that the result of the struggle presumably would have been different. The influence of Prussia in that relation is a chapter of history practically closed to most students. But for immense bribes to Count Panin, Catherine the Great’s premier, paid by Frederick the Great, as testified by British authorities, Russia would have extended aid to England in her struggle with the Colonies which might have proved decisive.

It was England’s interest to secure, if possible, the alliance of Russia, and, as in the Seven Years War, to involve France in continental complications. In 1778 there seemed every reason to expect the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. The continuance of the war gave an increased importance to an alliance with Russia, and while the Dutch appealed to Catherine on the ground that Great Britain had broken with Holland solely on account of the armed neutrality, the English government offered to hand over Minorca as the price of a convention.

In 1778 Catherine was approached by the English government through Sir James Harris and invited to make a defensive and offensive alliance. But the opposition of the Premier, Nikolai Ivanovich, Count Panin, influenced by Frederick the Great, prevented any rapprochement between England and Russia, and Catherine declared her inability to join England against France unless the English government bound itself to support her against the Turks.

“The Prussian party, headed by Panin at St. Petersburg,” writes Arthur Hassall, M. A., in “The Balance of Power, 1715-1789,” p. 338; (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907), “had won its last triumph, and all chance for an Anglo-Russian alliance had for the moment disappeared.... Since 1764 Count Panin had been the head of the Prussian party at the Russian capital, and the Prussian alliance had been the keystone of Catherine’s policy.... =Frederick the Great, partly by immense bribes to Panin, had kept Catherine true to the existing political system, and had contributed to prevent Russian assistance from being given to England during the American struggle.=” (P. 361.)

Writing to his minister in Paris, Goltz, in August and September, 1777, Frederick said: “You can assure M. de Maurepas that I have no connection whatever with England, nor do I grudge France any advantage she may gain in the war with the Colonies.... Her first interest requires the enfeeblement of Great Britain, and the way to do this is to make it lose its colonies in America.... The present opportunity is more favorable than ever before existed, and more favorable than is likely to occur in three centuries.... The independence of the colonies will be worth to France all which the war will cost.”

Bancroft writes: “While Frederick was encouraging France to strike a decisive blow in favor of the United States, their cause found an efficient advocate in Marie Antoinette.” On April 7, 1777, Frederick wrote: “France knows perfectly well that it has absolutely nothing to apprehend from me in case of war with England.... =If it= (the English crown) =would give me all the millions possible I would not furnish it two small files of my troops to serve against the colonies.= Neither can it expect from me a guaranty of its electorate of Hanover.”

Bancroft comments: “The people of England cherished the fame of the Prussian king as in some measure their own. Not aware how basely Bute had betrayed him, they unanimously desired the renewal of his alliance; and the ministry sought to open the way for it through his envoy in France.” Frederick replied, “No man is further removed than myself from having connections with England. We will remain on the same footing on which we are with her.” Bancroft says: “Frederick expressed more freely his sympathy with the United States.”

The port of Emden could not receive their cruisers for want of a fleet or a fort to defend them from insult; =but he offered them an asylum in the Baltic at Danzig=. He attempted, though in vain, to dissuade the Prince of Anspach from furnishing troops to England, and he forbade the subsidiary troops both of Anspach and Hesse to pass through his domains. The prohibition which was made as public as possible, and just as the news arrived of the surrender of Burgoyne, resounded through Europe; and he announced to the Americans that it was given him “to testify his good will to them.”

Every facility was afforded to the American commissioners to purchase and ship arms from Prussia. Before the end of 1777 he promised not to be the last to recognize the independence of the United States, and in January, 1778, his minister, Schulenburg, wrote officially to one of the commissioners in Paris: “The king desires that your generous efforts may be crowned with complete success. He will not hesitate to recognize your independency when France, which is more directly interested in the event of the contest, shall have given the example.”

“I have no wish to dissemble,” Frederick wrote in answer to the suggestion of an English alliance; “whatever pains may be taken, I will never lend myself to an alliance with England. I am not like so many German princes, to be gained for money.” Of the Landgrave of Hesse, he said: “Do not attribute his education to me. Were he a graduate of my school he would never have sold his subjects to the English as they drive cattle to the shambles. He a preceptor of sovereigns? The sordid passion for gain is the only motive of his vile procedure.”

Foerster, in “Friederich der Grosse” (1871, viii) quotes the great King as follows: “This subject leads me to speak of princes who conduct a dishonorable traffic in the blood of their people. Their troops belong to the highest bidder. It is a sort of auction at which those paying the highest subsidies lead the soldiers of these unworthy rulers to the shambles. Such princes ought to blush at their baseness in selling the lives of people whom, as fathers of their countries, they ought to protect. These little tyrants should hear the opinion of mankind, which is one of contempt for the misuse of their power.”

=The “Fourteen Points.”=--On January 8, 1917, less than sixty days before we found ourselves in a state of war with Germany, President Wilson presented to Congress the following fourteen specific considerations as necessary to world peace:

1. Open covenants of peace without private international understandings.

2. Absolute freedom of the seas in peace or war, except as they may be closed by international action.

3. Removal of all economic barriers and establishment of equality of trade conditions among nations consenting to peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

4. Guarantees for the reduction of national armaments at the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

5. Impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon the principle that the peoples concerned shall have equal weight with the interest of the government.

6. Evacuation of all Russian territory and opportunity for Russia’s political development.

7. Evacuation of Belgium without any attempt to limit her sovereignty.

8. All French territory to be freed and restored, and France must have righted the wrong done in the taking of Alsace-Lorraine.

9. Readjustment of Italy’s frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. Freest opportunity for the autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary.

11. Evacuation of Rumania, Servia and Montenegro, with access to the sea for Servia, and international guarantees of economic and political independence and territorial integrity of the Balkan States.

12. Secure sovereignty for Turkey’s portion of the Ottoman Empire, but with other nationalities under Turkey’s rule assured security of life and opportunity for autonomous development, with the Dardanelles permanently opened to all nations.

13. Establishment of an independent Polish State, including territories inhabited by indisputably Polish population, with free access to the sea and political and economic independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by international covenant.

14. General association of nations under specific covenants for mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to large and small states alike.

This was the programme laid down for the attainment of peace and was accepted by both sides, the Allied powers as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The total disregard of the Fourteen Points in the peace treaty proved a grievous disappointment to the majority of the thinking people of America. In the final analysis of the work of the Paris peace conference it was found that we had achieved not a single point of our programme, except as to the last provision, from which evolved the so-called League of Nations, subsequently defeated in the Senate.

Instead of “open covenants openly arrived at,” the treaty was made in secret conference; we did not gain the freedom of the seas, but helped Great Britain to strengthen her command of the seas by eliminating her greatest rival; we witnessed no removal of economic barriers--not even among the Allies, as the President himself recommended an American tariff on dyes; disarmament was decreed for Germany and Austria only; self-determination of small nations became a dead letter at once as to Ireland, German Austria, the German Tyrol, Danzig, Egypt, India, the Boers, Korea, Persia, and numerous others, especially where the question involved the self-determination of Germans; Hungary’s borders were at once invaded by Rumania, Serbia and Czecho-Slovakia; Russia was not permitted to determine her own fate, as Kolchak was formally recognized and supported by the powers; Belgium remains a vassal of England and France; in addition to righting the wrong of 1871 by the recession of Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar Valley was taken away from Germany and a plebiscite was ordered in Schleswig, Silesia, and German-Poland under the guns of the Entente; Italy’s borders were not readjusted along national lines, for the Brenner Pass, the Voralsberg, parts of Dalmatia and a lease on Fiume provided; the autonomous development of Austria-Hungary was interpreted to mean that the German-speaking part of Austria was forbidden to unite with Germany; the independence of the Balkan States was made subject to the invisible government of the Big Four; autonomy for Turkish vassal states and the internationalization of the Dardanelles was construed to mean that these States should become mandatories of the Allies and the strait to be under Allied control; Polish freedom celebrated its advent with Jewish pogroms, while the League of Nations became a league of victors, in which Japan was bribed to enter by the cession to her of the Shantung peninsula.

“Germany has accepted President Wilson’s fourteen points,” said Dr. Mathias Erzberger, “but so have the Allies.”

That President Wilson fully recognized his responsibility and that of his European associates under the Fourteen Points is shown by his own statement. On December 2, 1918, he said in addressing Congress:

“=The Allied Governments have accepted the bases of peace which I outlined to the Congress on the 8th of January last, as the Central Empires also have=, and very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application, and it is highly desirable that I should give it =in order that the sincere desire of our government to contribute without selfish aims of any kind to settlements that will be of common benefit to all the nations concerned may be fully manifest=.”

In an interview printed in the Paris “Temps” of March 25, 1919, Count Bernstorff, former Ambassador to the United States, said:

“The armistice of November 11 was signed when all the Powers interested had accepted the program of peace proposed by President Wilson. Germany is determined to keep to this agreement, which history will regard, in a way, as the conclusion of a preliminary peace. She herself is ready to submit to the conditions arising from it, and she expects all the interested Powers to do the same.”

The President’s reversal was diplomatically covered under various specious pretexts by the staff of English journalists at the peace conference. Sir J. Foster Frazer put it this way: “Mr. Wilson has broadened in vision since he came to Paris. He has abandoned his purely national point of view.”

The same writer discoursed entertainingly of the methods pursued in the conference. “Except at intervals,” he wrote, “the conferences are not in public, that is when a certain number of journalists are permitted to be present. The great things are debated in private, and at these private conversations in M. Pichon’s room at the French Foreign Office, the full representation of the five powers is not in attendance.... The full conferences of the seventy delegates will have but little option but to acquiesce with the conclusion of the ten.... It is a perfectly open secret that the three men who are ‘running the show’ are M. Clemenceau, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George.”

The noble writer frankly admits that the conferences revolved around the secret treaties among the Allies instead of the Fourteen Points. He reports:

“We already know there were three secret treaties made during the war and to all of which Great Britain was a party; (1) conceding to Italy the Dalmatian coast in return for her help, (2) the concession of the former German islands in the North Pacific to Japan, (3) the promise of Damascus to the King of Hedjaz.”

Again he says: “Japan is in possession of the Marshall and Caroline groups of islands in the Pacific, and has a document signed by both France and Britain that she shall retain them.”

So much for “open covenants openly arrived at,” though they do not cover all the secret pacts which determined the conditions of peace.

Only once Mr. Wilson rose to the importance of his mission, when he declared that Fiume must go to the Jugo-Slav Republic. His announcement was soon followed by an invasion of Fiume under d’Annunzio, the Italian poet-patriot, with the apparent secret connivance of our associates in the war.

At the peace conference, when it was Germany’s turn to be heard, it was decided that the interests of all concerned were best served by precluding any discussion, and the German delegates, with revolution and starvation in their back, and with arms wrested from their hands by a promise, were left no alternative but to affix their signatures to the most violent peace treaty ever consummated. The commission, headed by Brockdorf-Rantzau and Scheidemann, resigned rather than sign, and a new delegation was named, which signed the treaty without being given an opportunity to discuss it. In the streets the German delegates were stoned.

Thus was realized the golden promise held out in the speech Mr. Wilson made on the very day that Congress met to declare war:

“=We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship.= It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days when people were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interests of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools.”

When Germany, in 1871, had France prostrate at her feet, the French people were represented at the peace conference by their statesmen, just as France was represented at the Peace of Vienna after the fall of Napoleon in 1815. Mr. Wilson had said peace must not be determined as it was in the Congress of Vienna. Sir Foster Frazer furnishes the answer. In 1871 the terms of peace were arranged by Bismarck on one side and a full delegation of French statesmen on the other. Bismarck relented so far as to release back to France the great fortress of Belfort, claiming only the recession of Alsace-Lorraine and a war indemnity of five billion francs. So far from seeking to crush France, everything possible on the German side was done to enable her to recover from the war, and no sooner had Paris surrendered, than trainloads of foodstuffs were rushed into the city by the Germans to feed the starving population.

The European allies had first starved Germany, with a loss of 1,000,000 souls by famine, then severed portions of her territory whose possession antedated the American Revolution, on the ground of Mr. Wilson’s point in behalf of the self-determination of small nations, and on top of all left the country in helpless vassalage to her enemies, under a war indemnity that staggers humanity. Erzberger cried out in despair:

“I appeal to the conscience of America by reminding her of the American famine conditions in the years 1862-65. At that time it was Germany who sprang to America’s aid, and steadied her, sending her not only money, but clothes, shoes and machinery as well, thus making it possible for the United States to recuperate economically.

“Today, after half a century, the situation is reversed. Germany needs American wheat, fats, meats, gasoline, cotton and copper.

“Germany’s credit is low. If America today stood by Germany as Germany stood by America fifty years ago, she could furnish us foodstuffs and raw materials against German credits and thus help us to work ourselves out of debt--and, besides, make money in doing so.

“The German people cannot live on the promises they are getting.”